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ABSTRACT: Jack Lewis, 'An Economic History of the Ciskei, 
C • 1848-1 900 , I 
This thesis is a contribution towards the study of the 
transformation of African society in South Africa under the impact 
of colonialism and capitalist development. Its focus is on the 
group of Xhosa and Mfengu households which, with their chiefs, 
occupied land West of the Kei River. In the opening chapters the 
internal dynamic of Xhosa society is examined. In these chapters 
the concepts necessary for such an analysis within the problematic 
of historical materialism are examined for the purposes of this 
thesis. Two main theoretical positions are developed. Firstly, 
the place of the form of separation of the direct producers from 
the means of production and the politicai and ideological 
relations by means of which this separation was achieved in Xhosa 
society, is established. ,_;.Secondly, the 't~Tf'Si,tion of Xhosa 
society from an independent social formation to its incorporation 
as a regional eleme:it in the dominant capitalist system is 
examined. The process of transition introduces a definite break 
with the al d economic structure of Xhosa society. It introduces a 
qual i ta tive1y new sys tern of economic relationships. This 
t~ansition was achieved through an articulation of the economic 
systems cf the Xhosa households and the Colonial capitalist 
economy. The transformation of the Xhosa economy is shown to lead 
to a corresponding transformation of the political and ideological 
rel ati ans of Xhosa society to correspond with the changed economic 
circumstances. The effects of conquest on the economic 9 political 
and ideological relationships of the· Xhosa are examined with 
special reference to the critical importance of the cattle-killing 
of 1857. The incorporation of the Xhosa into the Colonial economy 
is analysed by means of extensive use of statistical material 
drawn from various national, regional and local censuses taken at 
different times. The use of computerisation in the ·analysis of 
census data allowed for more detailed knowledge concerning the 
"' 
distribution of productive resources between households to be 
established. Data drawn from these and other analyses is used to 
show that the majority of households experienced a declining level 
of consumption in· the 19th century. This finding stands in 
contrast to much of the extant literature in this field and is the 
major emp.irical contribution of this study. After showing how the 
economic organisation of the households was transformed by the 
growth of capitalist economy in the Cape Colony, an attempt is 
made to show how political and ideological relations were reshaped 
/ 
by this process. Particular attention is focused on the 
individualisation and differentiation of the households and the 
role of Government appointed headmen in politically supervising 
these new relationships between households. Finally, the way in 
which this new structure of economic, political and ideological 
relations supported the emergence of migrant labour in the 1890s 
is examined. In conclusion it is suggested that the 
relationships between rural households in the 20th Century must be 
more closely studied in coming to an understanding of mi grant 
labour and the role of the dominant classes in the Reserves in 
perpetuating this system. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank the following organisations whose generous 
support made possible the research for this thesis - between 1978 
and 1983: The Stella and Paul Lowenstein Charitable and 
Educational Trust, the Albow Brothers Scholarships, the Harry 
Oppenheimer Centre for African Studies, The Twamley Postgraduate 
Awards and the Human Sciences Research Council. 
I was fortunate to find in Professor Ian Phimister and Dr. David 
Kaplan of the Department of Economic History of the University of 
Cape Town (who were both, at different times, supervisors of this 
project) two people who were more than prepared to tel erate and to 
positively encourage the breaking of new ground. Professor 
Phimister bears responsibility for suggesting that I expand the 
scope of the research to its present scale - and I sincerely hope 
that the. results justify his faith in the project. Dr Kapl ad 
provided inva1uab1e assistance both in his critical reading of the 
work and in facilitating the presentation of seminar papers in 
which the basic ideas were formulated~ 
Debbie 8ud1ander was responsible for the computerisation of the 
Ox-Kraal and Heal dtown censuses. Professor June Juritz 
contributed in large measure to the preparation and 
canputerisation of the census of 1848. They both made possible 
one of the most interesting and rewarding aspects of the research. 
The Librarians of the South African Public Library and the 
Archivists at the Cape Archives provided excellent assistance at 
every point, which was greatly appreciated. 
A special debt of gratitude is noted to Susan Vallance who 
produced many drafts of the manuscript before the final version 
emerged, and was in all ways an excellent typist. 
The laborious task of proof reading fel 1 to my parents whose 
services went far beyond that, to a myriad stylistic and other 
suggestions. To their attentive reading the manuscript owes much 
of whatever readability it possesses~ They also encouraged and 
as.sisted me in many other ways for all of which they deserve much 
thanks. 
Finally, I must acknowledge all those friends and associates who 
through many vicissitudes were sources of political stimulation, 
discussion and involvement. Without them this thesis would 
undoubtedly have been finished much earlier, but with much less 
commitment and perception of the political context within \vhich it 
was written. 
·~ --··- ---··-· -·-·· 
CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: THE XHOSA CHIEFDOM: MODE OF PRODUCTION AND 
SOCIAL FORMAfION IN iHt PRE-COLONIAL ERA. 
PAGE 
I The Concept of the Mode of Production. 1 
II Perspectives on the Nguni Social Formations, 7 
Social Relation and Chiefly State Power. 
• III Fr001 ~hiwo to Sandi11e - The Emergence of 18 
Xhosa Chiefdoms. -
IV The Xhosa Social Formation and the Relations 30 
of Production. 
V The Establishment of Homesteads and the 46 
Creation of Chiefdoms. 
CHAPTER 2: THE EARLY MERCANTILE ERA - ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATIONS io 1848 
I The Conceptualisation of the Effects of 
Exchange on the Pre-capi ta1 lst "°Mode of 
Production. 
II The Expansion of Capitalist Development and 
Colonial War 1820-1848. 
III The Effects of Mercantile Expansion 1835-
1848. 




I The "Cheap Labour Power11 Thesis and the 104 
Development of Capitalism of South Africa. 
~II The Origins of the Problem - Against an · 112 
1 Inputs 1 Theory of Articulation. 
III The Transformation of the Dynamics of the 127 
mode of Production. 
IV Social Classes and the Articulation of 133 
Modes of Production in Recent South African 
Historiography. 
CHAPTER 4: THE FIRST BRITISH KAFFRARIAN ADMINISTRATION 
I Direct Rule and the Drift to War. 
Ci' II The War of 1850-1853 and Economic 
Di s1 oca ti on. 




CHAPTER 5: BRITISH KAFFRARIA - SECOND ADMINISTRATION 
JANUARY 1853 - JUNE 1856. 
I Conquest, Chiefs and the Colonial 
State. 
II The Arrival of Sir G. Grey and the 
Growth of Commodity Production. 
III Grey's Crucial Intervention. 
CHAPTER 6: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CATTLE-
KllllNG 
I The Mfengu. 
II The Effects of the Cattle-Killing on Markets 
for Grain. 
II I The Analysis of Market Statistics for Mfengu 
Grain Production 1857-1858. 
IV The Cattle-Killing - Economic Effects on the 
Xhosa. 
v The Cattle-Killing - The Experience of Wage 
Labour and its effects. 
VI The Extent of Depopulation of the Xhosa 
. Loc~tions - A Consideration of the Census 
Data. 
CHAPTER 7: THE FINAL STAGE OF RESISTANCE - JUNE 1856 to 1863 
I The Conjuncture within the Chiefdoms. 
Ii The Magistrates with Ndlambe, Mdushane 
and Gqunukwebe. 
III The Magistrates and the Ngqika. 
IV The Growth of Prophecy. 
CHAPTER 8: FROM PROPHECY TO DISILLUSIONMENT 
I The Struggle within the Chiefdoms. 
II Disillusionment and its Effects. 


















I Theoretical Considerations. 422 
II The Growth of Commodity Production - 433 
The Differentiation of Communities. 
(a) The Purchase and Leasing of Crown Land. 435 
(b) Surveyed Quit-Rent Tenure with Titie. 442 
(c) Unsurveyed Quit-Rent Tenure (Hut Tax) 474 
Without Title ('communal tenure'). 
(d) Squatting and Tenancy on Private and 494 
Colonial Crown Lands. 
(e) The Mission Stations. 498 
CHAPTER 10: THE BRIEF RESPITE : THE GROWTH OF THE COLONIAL 
ECONOMY: MFENGU EMIGRATION AND THE DRIFT TO 
REBELLION, i866-l874. 
I The Colonial Economy. 
II The Response of the Households. 
/\ II I The Economic Impact of Population Migration. 
IV The Distribution of Productive Factors. 
An Analysis of the Healdtown Mfengu, 
Fort Beaufort District in 1869. 
v The Poli ti cal Conjuncture and the 
Relationship Between Households. 
VI Sandille and the Drift to Rebellion. 
/ 
CHAPTER 11 : THE STRUCTURE OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS AND THE.IR 
CONCLUSIONS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PLACE iN 1HE COLONIAL ECONOMO 1880-1900 
I The Transfonnation of the Mode of 
Production. 
II The Great Downward Shift 1880-1900. 
I I I State Intervention and Economic 
Relationships between nou~eholds. 




















LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 
Exports of Ivory, Horns, Hides and Aloes from 
Xhosa Chiefdoms (1799-1802 and 1818-1828) 
Table 2 
Exports of Domestic Produce 1838-1850 
Table l 
Contract Workers from British Kaffraria 
1849 and 1850 (By District) 
Table l 
Authorised Schedule of Pay to Chiefs and 
Councillors - August 1855 
Table 1 ( i) 
Census of the Peddie District 1854 
Table 1 (ii) 
Stock, Wagons, Ploughs and Guns in Peddie 
District, July 1854 
Table 2 
Comparison of Key Resources in Relation to 
Population : Peddie District 1854 
Table 3 
Population of the Crown Reserve 1856 
Table 4 (i) 
Mfengu Districts. in the Colony (excluding 
Peddie) according to Calderwood 1 s Census 
of 1855 
Table 4 (ii) 
Mfengu locations in the Colony (excluding 
Peddie) showing Total Land Cultivated 
- July 1855 
Tab 1 e 4 ( i i i ) 
Mfengu Locations in the Colony (excluding 
Peddie) Showing Assets per Capita and per 
Household 
Table 5 (i) 
Market Returns for Ebb and Flow Drift~ Lfne 
Drift and Fort Montgomery Williams, July 1857 -
December 1857 
Table 5 (ii) 
Market Returns for Ebb and Flow Drift, line 
Ori ft and Fort Montgomery Wi11 i ams, 26th December 
l 857 - 12th March 1858 
Table 6 
The Number of Cattle which Died of Luna-sickness 
Belonging to certain Chiefs - September 1856 
Table 1 
Black Land Ownership and Land ~-eases from the 


















CHAPTER 9: Cont. 
Tab 1 e 2 ( i) 
Increase in Population of Mfenqu Locations 
Peddie District - 1857-65 ~ 
Table 2 (ii) 
Increase 1n Production and Assets of Mfengu 
Locations Peddie Districts 1857-65 
Table 2 (iii) 
Increase in Production and Assets per Capita 
and per Household; Mfengu Locations Peddie 
Districts 1857-65 
Table 3 
Census of Mfengu Residing in the Ox-Kraal 
Location - 9th April 1861 
Table 4 
Acres Under Cultivation at Ox-Kraal Location 
- April 1861 
Table 5 
Acres & Ploughs 
Table 6 
Histogram of Wives - Kamas tone Location -
April 1861 
Table 7 
Acres Cultivated and Number of Wives per 
Household 
Table 8 
Histogram of Children - Ox-Kraal Location -
April 1861 
Table 9 
Acres Cultivated and Number of Children -
Households with Ploughs 
Table 10 
Histogram of Distribution of Sheep -
Ox-kraal April 1861 
Table 11 
Histogram of Distribution of Cattle, Ox-Kraal 
Location, April 1861 
Table 12 
Growth of Population Ciskei : 1858-1864 
Table 13 







Hut and Hors~ Tax 1860-1865 
CHAPTER 10: Table 1 























. -·-- - ----·· 
Table 2 
Exports and Imports through East London 
1866-1882 
Table 3 
Revenues and Expenditures Cape Colony 
1865-1882 
Table 4 
iotal Population Increase and Decrease of 




Healdtown Location, Fort Beaufort 
Table 4.3 
Victor1 a East 
Table 4.4 
King Willi am 1 s Town 
Tab 1 e 4. 4. ( i ) 
Total, all Locations (Keiskamma Hoek, Crown 
Reserve, Tamacha, Middledrift and Ngqika 
Location,sj 
Tab 1 e 4 ..4 ( i i ) 
Ngqika Locations (Sandille and Anta and Oba) 
Table 4.4 (iii) 
Breakdown of Population - All Locations 
Excluding the Ngqika Location in (i) above 
Table 4.4 (iv) 
Total Population Tarnacha, Middledrift and 
Kei skamna Hoek 
Table 5 
Assets of Various Ciskeian Locations 
1861 to 1875 
Table 5.1 Peddie 
Table 5.2 Fort Beaufort (Healdtown Mfengu} 
Table 5.3 Victoria East 
Table 5.4 King William 1 s Town 
Table 5.4 (i} Ngqika Location (Sandille} 
Table 5.4 (ii) Total, all Locations 
(Ke1skamma Hoek, Tarnacha, Middledrift, 
Ngqika Locations) 1875 only 
Table 5.4 (iii) Tamacha Locations 
(To 1 se, s 1 w ani , I.z e 1 i , Mf en gu ) 
Table 6 
Histogram showing the Number of People per 
- Household. Heal dtown Mfengu - January i869 
Table 7 
Histogram Showing the 01 stribution of Cattle 
Healdtawn Mfengu ... january 1869 
Table 8 
Analysis of Cattle S'!':ock Ho1 dings of 96 
Households with Ploughs 
Table 9 
Cross tabulation of Size of Household a~d 


























CHAPTER 10: Cont. 
Table 10 
Histogram Showing the Distribution of Sheep 567 
Healdtown Mfengu - January 1869 
Table 11 
Cross Taoulation of Size of Household and 568 
Number of Sheep Owned 
Table 12 
Distribution of Adult Males by Age, Siwani 1 s 571 
Location, Tamacha, 1868-70. 
Table 13 
Population, Stock and Assets of Tenants Living 576 
on Colonial Farms in Areas for whch Inspectors 
of Native Locations were Appointed in 1877 
Table 14 
Stock and Assets of Tenants Living on Colonial 577 
Farms per Capita and per Households in 1877 
CHAPTER 11: Table 1 
Number of Private Lessees of Land Abolished 699 
1892-1896 
' 
LIST OF MAPS & FIGURES 
PAGE 
MAPS: 
CHAPTER 5: Map 1 State of the Frontier - April 1853 204 
Map 2 British Kaffraria - Extent of 205 
Chiefdoms 
CHAPTER 10: Map 1 Sandi1le 1s Location - 1869 
FIGURES: 














"'''l-";1 .. 1-. 




1 ==:z d 
'• 10 








. , . .-.._ __  
PROVINCE 
r ... ,,~ ~64da ...,.--·~------- ___ _ 
. ------ ...... __ ....._ 
J 






od London -r 1-JE: c ''PF' _..r\ ...__. 
-1 ~ E:J-\ s-r £ r~ f'l F'f~of'rrJ.tr~ 
~~ ~_,..-/ ':' ~ • :io •o ao 60 •~Kilo..,,.,., 
--._,>- t_y 'P 2f ~ "? '? .,; ... 
_)__ ~-
( i ) 
INTRODUCTION 
This introduction outlines the structure of the thesis and 
indicates the main points that are made with a brief synopsis of 
each chapter. The main concern of this thesis is the structure of 
Xhosa society prior to its conquest and the implications of this 
structure for the subsequent course of the economic and po1 itical 
jnteraction of the Xhosa with the Settler Colonial society. 
In Chapter l the Xhosa pre-capitalist mode of production is 
analysed in terms of the concept of the l ineagi.:: mode of 
production. 
the Xhosa 
In establishing the economic and political nature of 
social formation it is necessary to state basic 
definitions of the concepts required for such an analysis. Hence, 
in Chapter 1 concepts such as •mode of production•, and 11 abour 
process•, are defined for the purposes of this thesis.· Such 
theoretical discussion is incorporated with an interpret.cUor of 
the historical dialectic and internal dynamic of the Xhosa social 
fonnation which forms the basis for an explanation of the 
succession and proliferation of chiefdoms from circa 1700 to 1848. 
In Chapter 1, as in subsequent chapters, theoretical concepts are 
introduced as they are needed and when they are relevant to. the 
particular stage of the overall exposition. There is thus no one 
single or unified theoretical statement in the present work, and 
new concepts are introduced from time to time. More 9eneral 
concepts, such as 1 mode of production 1 , the 1 arti cul ati on 9f modes 
-
of production•, 1 transition 1 etc., are, however, defin~d in the 
earlier chapters, while in subsequent chapters specifii;: typologies 
and concepts are introduced as they become re1 evant. 
In Chapter 2 attention is turned to providing a brief overview of 
the economic development of the Cape Colony prior to 1848. It is 
argued that this development was essentially capitalist in nature, 
and special attention is focused on the extent of deveiopment of 
sh~p farming, particularly in the Ea.stern Cape. However, the 
( i i ) 
dominant power in the Colony lay with merchant capital and the 
extent of trading contact with the Xhosa and its effects on 
economic rel ati ans between homesteads and the chiefdoms as a whole 
are also examined. 
In Chapter 3 the extent of penetration by the es sen ti ally 
capitalist forces of Settler colonialism and mercantile capital 
outlined in Chapter 2 are further examined. The concept of the 
'articulation' of modes of production is developed with special 
reference to the work of Harold Walp~. This chapter is almost 
totally devoted to theoretical concerns and is placed after the 
Chapter dealing with pre-capitali.st modes of production and 
trading contacts in order to emphasise the significant changes 
which had begun prior to the forma 1 incorporation of the Ci skei an 
Xhosa into the Colonial State. The relative weight of economic, 
political and ideological levels of the social formation in the 
articulation of modes of production is discussed and it is 
su_ggested that 1 articulation 1 must be understood first as a 
process of economic change and then as one of change in pol itica1 
and ideological relations, (hence, a 1 dual transformation' of the 
mode of production). 
Chapter 4 examines the first significant attempt at imposing. 
direct Colonial domination over a previously independent social 
formation in South Africa, with the establishment of British 
Kaffraria as a Crown Colony in 1848~ The conduct of this 
administration provoked a war, which broke out late in 1850. in 
this study, the effects of the British Kaffrarian Administration, 
at the level cf the Xhosa homestead production units, are examined 
for the first time. In this chapter the way in which the 
interventions of the Colonial State interposed between the chiefs 
and the homesteads, through fines and confiscation of land and 
cattle, is examined. This is important in establishing the sudden 
and dramatic effect which direct Colonial domination had on the 
economic, po 1 i ti ca 1 and ideal ogi cal structures of the 
. ... • . .. d ~ d .... 
pre-capi...a11s.~ mo e o, pro uc1.1on. 
After the war of 1850-53 the British Kaffrarian Administration was 
( i i i ) 
re-established, and now began a critical phase of the transition 
process. Al though militarily defeated, the extremely diffuse 
power base of the Xhosa chiefdom ensured that the imposition of 
Colonial authority remained problematic. The new Governor, Sir 
George Grey, recognised that the chiefs were indispensable in the 
short term, but desired to thoroughly and rapidly undermine their 
position. 
The manner in which Grey set about this task, through economic and 
education al schemes and strong support for the extensions of the 
missions, is examined in Chapter 5. The regime of the second 
British Kaffrarian Administration under Colonel J. Mac1ean and C. 
Brownlee, is examined, as far as possible, from the point of view 
of the household which formed the basic production uni ts of the 
Xhosa economy, the disruption ·cf 'normal 1 conditions of 
production, the ·1 oss of cattle through drought and 1 ung-sickness, 
and pressure of these developments on the relationships between 
homestead and the chiefs. The tensions and conflicts, which 
emerged because the chiefs were no longer in a position to fulfil 
the basic economic and political functions of chiefs ·in the 
lineage mode of production, aiso created the opportunity for the 
Colonial State to extend its patronage: This it did in two ways -
through the extension of monthly salaries to c~i efs and their 
councillors and by providing wage work at relatively high rates of 
pay near the worker's place of residence, Grey's so-called 
1 pub1ic-works 1 • The confl"icts associated with the interruption of 
the normal conditions for the reproduction of the chiefdoms led to 
a growing belief in millenarian prophecies of supernatural 
deliverance from oppression - prophecies which were to culminate 
in the cattle-killing. 
In Chapter 6 the general · economic conditions in the Mfengu 
locations up to 1855 (prior to the cattle-killing) are examined. 
It is shown that there was very little commodity production, that 
conditions were genera11y depressed, and that the pre-capitalist 
mode of production, though weakened, was still dominant. For both 
Xhosa and Mfengu ai ike these circumstances were decisively altered 
by the effects of the cattle-killing. In this cha·pte1· the 
(iv) 
consequences of the cattle-killing for the establishment of an 
internal market for grains and the effect of extraordinary high 
prices in stimulating production to meet the demand are examined 
in detail. This important economic context of the cattle-killing 
provides a new perspective from which to look at the 
cattle-killing movement itself and to attempt to provide a more 
satisfactory understanding of this critical historical episode. 
This is undertaken in Chapters 7 and 8 in which the cattle-killing 
is re-interpreted in the light of our understanding of the deep 
historical break with the old mode of production. This break both 
preceded the cattle-killing and was irreversibly confirmed by its 
consequences. In these chapters the dynamic of the Xhosa 1 ineage 
mode of production outlined earlier in Chapter 1 as one of 
struggle between generationally defined classes, is now applied to 
the , in terpreta ti on of the cattl e-kil 1 i ng. The origins, purposes 
and politics of the cattle-killing are re-interpreted as the last 
(and dyin,g) corvulsions of the dynamic of the old mode of 
production. 
Having elucidated the rationale of the cattle-killing it is then 
possible to delineate the growth of what is, for all practical 
purposes, a new form of society within the cultural shell of the 
Xhosa social formation. Delineating this society begins with 
defining the economic position of the households, which were 
becoming increasingly independent of each other, with the 
breakdown of the pre-existing homestead structure. 
In Chapter 9 the place of corrmodity production in accounting for 
the constitution of the total production of the homestead is 
examined. ihe demi nance of grain production over pas tor a 1 ism is 
demonstrated. However, along with. the place assumed by arable 
agriculture and ,pastoralism, particular emphasis is placed on the 
very uneven capacity to increase arable production that existed 
between households. These unevenesses were such, it is argued, 
that the majority of households in fact experienced a declining 
nett leve1 of consumption. I 
( v) 
Some househo1 ds, often those which had enjoyed a pri vi1 eged 
position in the regime of the chiefs, did manag~ to prosper. It 
is contended, here, that despite some channels for upward mobility 
which did exist, the general trend in levels of economic well-
being was negative, with a few clearly demarcated exceptions. In 
Chapter 10 the growth of the contradictory movement of the 
downward shift of the many, with a measure of economic prosperity 
for a few, is traced. This movement particularly supported the 
emergence of a cl ass of larger producers from whose ranks the 
Colonial State recruited a group of 'headmen 1 • Under the 
I 
supervision of this group the ideological and political 
transformation of the Xhosa was completed. 
The process of transformation was greatly assisted by the 1 boom 1 
period which prevailed between 1865 and 1875 as a result of the 
movement of 40 000 Mfengu from the Ciskei back to the Transkei 
from whence they had come in 1835. The effects of this 
emigration, made possible by the re;nova1 of the Gcaleka from their 
ancestral lands by the Colonial State after the cattle-killing, 
was greatly to ease land shortages for arable, pastoral and 
residential purposes in the Ciskei. This was to lead to a genuine 
growth in production, based not so much on "pas i ti ve attitudes to 
the market 11 , as on the more extensive use of existing methods over 
a greater land area. 
In Chapter 11 attention is focused more closely on defining the 
powers of the headmen and the c1 ass of larger househo1 ds they 
represented. Their power stemmed from the unequa 1 economic 
conditions that prevailed between households. In concluding this 
study, an examination is made of the way in which the larger, 
wealthier households were able to utilise such inequalities both 
for economic exploitation and for sustaining their political power 
in the locations over the mass of increasingly impoverished 
households. It is suggested that such unequal political and 
economic relationships between households in fact supported the 
rise of migrant labour, and ti'lat the poor households early on 




rate - which they struggled to maintain at as high a level as 
possible. In conclusion it is suggested that the political and 
economic dynamic of the relationship between households must play 
an important part in any explanation of the origins and 
persistence of the migrant labour system and the development of 
sub-states in terms of the policies of 'separate development' and 
1 apartheid 1 • 
I 
CHAPTER 1 
THE XHOSA CHIEFDOM: MODE OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL FORMATION 
IN THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA 
I The Concept of the Mode of Production 
In this study of the economic history of the Ciskei, attention 
will be focused on demonstrating the transformation of the mode of 
production of the Xhosa social formation under the impact of 
Colonial conquest and the development of the capitalist economy. 
To begin with, therefore, it is essential to cons-ider,--;n--precise 
detail, the Xhosa pre-Colonial social formation which dominated 
the present Ciskeian regions and its mode of production and 
characteristic social relations. To do this, however, it is 
necessary to have a workab 1 e and coherent theory of the 
constitution of a mode of production, conceived as a theoretical 
entity, and, in particular, of the special problem confronting the 
study of pre-ca pi ta1 ist modes of production. 
In this chapter the theory of modes of production wil 1 be 
considered and its specific relevance to the pre-Colonial Xhosa 
social formation will be examined. A brief outline of the salient 
features of the history of the Xhosa social formations up to 1848, 
the true starting point of this study, will be given in the 
context of the analysis of the mode of prodJction. 
The work of the con temporary French school of Marx~ st scholars has 
influ.enced our concept of the mode of production, and the posi tifn 
of E. Balibar in Reading Capital on this question will be outlined 
l 
in an attempt to relate th is concept to the debate on the nature .J 
of pre-c.a pi ta 1 is t mo des of production. (1 ) 
Balibar conceives concrete labour processes to be at the heart of 
any concept of a mode of production. In giving theoretical 
expression to the concept of mode of production, Bal ibar has 
abstracted the general and persistent features necessary to any 
1 ab our process. He has defined the basic elements of the 1 abour 
process as:-
(1 ) 1 ab our er; 
(2) Means of production; 
YK!i ch consist of ( i ) object of 1 ab our; 
(ii) means of labour; 
( 3) non-1 ab our er. 
These elements may be combined together in different ways, the 
result being different modes of production. However, this 
combination 'is not, and never can be, something which is 
abs tract1y conceived or derived from soire pre-given, a priori, 
theoretical category. For Ba1ibar, the general forin--ofConnection 
between these elements must involve:-
(1) property connection; 
(2) real or material appropriation connection. 
This definition of the elements of the labour process is as given 
by Marx in Capital Vol. I. Balibar places great emphasis on the 
position of the non-labourer, and this forms the basis for the 
consi dera ti on of the two forms of connection between the elements 
of the 1 ab our process. ( 2) 
It is important to understand Balibar's meaning in specifying two 
forms of connection between the elements of the labour process. 
By 'property connection' he means 'kind of ownership', but this is 
not the same as merely legal ownership. The 'property connection 1 
refers us to the basic relations of production which is property 
in the means of production and in the product of 1 ab our. It is 
therefore a connection that defines certain rights of 
a poropria ti on of the means of production and of the product cf 
1 ab our. The 'property connection 1 specifies control over and 
access to means of production that differentiates the direct 
producer (worker) fr cm the non-oroducer, and thereto re sets 1 i mi ts 
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to, or structures, the deve1 opment of the productive forces~ 
The second connection, the 'real appropriation' connection, 
specifies, for Balibar, the productive forces 11 which are also a 
connection of a certain type within the mode of production ... in 
other words they too are a relation of production". The real 
appropriation connection refers to the way in which the economic 
1 i fe of any mode of production regulates the deve1 opment of the 
social formation in which it is incorporated .. The forces of 
production define certain forms of appropriation of nature, raw 
materials, (object of labour} and techniques of production, which 
in turn affect the form of the 1 abour process and the property 
connection. 
A rel a ti on of production is therefore a form of connection between 
elements of a labour process which designates··-a-specific mode of 
production. The productive forces ( 1 rea1 appropriation 
connection') ~esi gna te a rel a ti on of production because they 
determine the develoµnent of the social division of labour and 
define the role of the direct producers and the non-1 abourers in 
the production process. 
For Balibar, the relationship between the two forms of connection 
between the elements of the labour process is constitutive of the 
relations of production of any given mode of production. The form 
of relationship between the two connections is fortunately limited 
to two possibilities - either there is a homology between them or 
there is a non-homoloov. ( 3) A homology between the real 
appropriation and property connection designates the overlapping 
of the form and structure of the two connecti ans, such that the 
mode of appropriation of nature and the mode of appropriation of 
the product of labour are conducted within a single process. 
This can only occur 'fklere ti-ie raw iria.terials used in the production 
process, the means of production, and the final product itself are 
the prooertv of the non-producer in the production process. It is 
immediately apparent that this homology, in which all possession_ 
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and ownership is vested in the non-producers, is only found under 
capitalism, where the direct producer (worker) is completely 
separated from any property rel a ti on in the elements of the 
production process. 
Only under ca pi tali sm is there no spa ti a 1 or tempora 1 disjunction 
between the performance of necessary 1 abour (1 abour necessary for 
the reproduction of the worker and the means of production e.g. 
wages, undistributed profit retained for reinvestment etc.) and 
surplus labour (the proceeds of labour appropriated by the 
non-worker in the 1 abour process and used as distributed profits, 
interest, rent, some aspects of taxation etc.). The two 
conceptually distinct components of all concrete labour merge 
' under capitalism into a single process of production. This 
homology, or merging of the performance of necessary and surplus 
1 abour into a single moment in the produ-ction- process, reflects 
the dual determination of the economic under capitalism. The 
processes of production and appropriation are both conducted 
without any political or ideological intervention being 
necessary. This condition is unique to the capitalist mode of 
production and corresponds to the existence of 1 free' wage 1 ab our 
completely separated from any property in the means of production. 
The historically speci fie function of the concept of 'homology' 
between the two forms of the re1 ati ons of production is explicitly 
formulated by Ba1ibar who argues that: 
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••• the homology between the two connections, the 
over1 ap between their forms, which characte.ri se the 
capitalist structure, does not so characterise 
those earlier modes of production. Marx only finds 
it again in the hypothetical 'natural community' 
which inaugurates history: then the form of each of 
the two connections was, on the contrary, the 
union, the belonging together of the labourer and 
rreans of production. 11 {4) 
Non-homology correspondingly implies some type of physical, spatial 
and temporal disjunction bet.-1een the performance of surplus 1 abour 
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and necessary 1 abour. Where some disjunction occurs there must 
correspondingly be some degree of possession by the direct 
producers of the means of production. But possession is not an 
absolute value. In pre-capitalist modes of production, possession 
may be partial, intermittent, and variable between different 
agents in the 1 ab our process and for the same agent at different 
points in time. The form of this disjunction is what 
differentiates one mode of production from another by defining the 
manner in which surplus labour is 1 pumped out' of the direct 
producers by the ruling class. (5) 
Thus it can be seen that the idea of a homo1 ogous or 
non-homo1 ogous form of the two connecti ans refers, in effect, to 
the form or extent of separation or non-separation of the direct 
producers from the means of production. Only under the 
historically adequate form of the capitalist mode of production 
dces this separation of the ·worker from the :nea:'ls of production 
become complete. In a11 preceding mo des of produ<.:ti on the form of 
the two connections has been non-homologous. (6} There has 
always been some (variabl~} degree of possession by the direct 
producers of the means of production. 
In order to describe theoretically a specific mode of production, 
it is therefore necessary to an.a lyse the forms of access to and 
control over the means of production retained by the direct 
producers as wel1 as the forms of separation from the means of 
production achieved through determinate political and idealogical 
in terven ti ans by the dominant cl ass in the social formation. 
Terray seems to have adopted th is pas i ti on when he wrote that 
Marx'-s conclusion, that under feudalism the surplus labour can 
only be extorted by "other than economic pressure": 
" ••• may be extended to cover all pre-capitalist 
modes of production. In the latter, the 
extra-economic bonds, ; . e. political and 
ideological, of which Marx wrote, are not just the 
rea1isaticn of the superstructural conditions of 
the reproduction .of the relations of production, 
they are present in t.'ie very constitution of these 
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relations, since in' their absence, no surplus~ 
regardless of the way it is used, could be drawn 
off. The political and ideological bonds are thus 
the preliminary conditions for the production 
process itself. In other words, the superstructure 
is in traduced at the very centre of the economic 
base as a presu pposi ti on. " ( 7) (emphasis added 
J. L. ) 
It ought to be actded that the intention is not to reduce all 
possib1 e modes of production to the opera ti on of a simpl ~ 
structural duality - homology/non-homology. On the contrary, the 
intention is to emphasise the variability of possible forms of 
intervention of political and ideological relations between the 
direct producers and the means of production in the production 
process. It is necessary, hC1t11ever, to qua 1 i fy Terray 1 s view that 
the form in which surplus 1 abour is 'pumped out 1 of the direct 
producers in the feudal mde of production through the conjunction 
of political and economic force, is applicable to all 
pre-capitalist modes. Feudal ism is distinct because of the 
existence of private property in 1 and 1 inked to regular commodity 
production and independent towns. Thus the economic instance 
already has an autonomy ...niich it did not have in the modes that 
dominated African social forTJBtions. (8) 
Godelier has argued that, with feudalism, the dependence of the 
pea.san t producers on the 1 ord who owned the 1 and, was direct and 
indivi dua1 and that this was this first tirre that the 1 and and its 
products have taken the form of private property. This was, 
therefore, a1so the first tirre that the economic instance acquired 
a history of its .cwn and each peasant househo1 d was a determinate 
centre of production and stood in isolation from the others. (9} 
The significance of this isolation wi11 be considered below. It 
should be noted, at tI1is stage, that a prime objective of this 
study is to chronicle in detail the way in ...niich the iMSS of 
homestead units of prodl.lction which had existed as inseparable 
elements in the composition of 1 arge ch iefdcms, became is o1 ate d 
from each other during the course of the 19th century and 
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functioned as economically independent units linked, through petty 
cof'l1llodity production, to the expanding capitalist sector,_at the 
1eve1s of both production and consumption. In the light of the 
above un derstan ding of the concept of the mo de of production and 
its constitution, abstractly considered, it is nON possible to 
look at the irore complex reality of the Xhosa social formation 
prior to the 19th century and to consider its history in the light 
of this conceptual framework. 
II Perspectives on the Nguni Social Formations, Social 
. Relations and Chiefly State Power 
i 
ihe Xhosa form· part of a block of people which, by ":he beginning-·~­
of the 19th century, occupied most of t.'1e eastern coastai plain of-
South Africa. They shared many characteristics with other gl"'oups 
from the Umzimkulu .River to the Fish. One of their most marked ·· 
features was the existence of centralised chieftaincies which 
ruled over the clans which constituted t.iie nation. The degree of 
th is centralisation varied, however, between · the di fferenf~.;... · 
chiefdoms. Production was based within families organised into 
hundreds of homestead units, which collectively constituted the 
chief dews. 
The roost intractable problem in the study of the Nguni chiefdoms, 
Vrhether Xhosa, Mpondo or Zulu, has proved to be that of the 
relationship between these homestead b.ased units of production and 
the chief. (10) It is intended to elucidate some of the issues 
involved in the analysis of this reiationship, by examining the 
relations of proruction within the ::hiefdom as a whole, in terms 
of the forms of separation and non-seoaration ,of the dir-ect 
pro.i!•:ers from the means of oroduc"tion which characterised the 
mode of production. 
To begin with, it is necessary to consider the relations of 
. production of pastoral ism and of agriculture based on sedentary 
local units of production. The individual units of production 
based on kinship groups were 1 inked together through a variety of 
economic relations. But this was not a purely economic process. 
There.were, in fact, very few purely 1economic 1 categories which 
were not simul taneous1y 1 inked to the reproduction of the 1 ineage 
structure. In this system kinship appears 11 not as a consequence, 
but as a pre-con di ti on of the joint appropriation and use of the 
soil 
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• (11) One of the defining characteristics of lineage based 
production is the existence of relations of personal dependence, 
based on age (seniority) and sex (patriarchal authority). 
Lineages are usually organised in to hi er arch i es, from junior to 
senior, with the heads of senior lineages controlling the 
conditions of access to means of production .and reproduction of 
the junior males. The line~ge mode of production, and the 
community of clans defined in it, is therefore an adequate basis 
for the emergence of a class system and of exploitation. (12) 
Thus it can be said that the independence of the unit of 
production in the 1 inear mode of production as with its specific 
form of dependence, was determined firstly by relations of 
personal dependence which only secondarily developed an autonomous 
economic component. 
In his recent work, Terray has confirmed that the 1 inear mode of 
production remained the indispensable basis for kingdoms with 
developed military hegemony, domestic slavery and central control 
over long distance trade. Terray sees the latter as dominating 
the former. (13) Similarly, Guy has argued that the ability of 
the Zulu King to demand tribute from other chief dams, and to 
sustain the military system depended on: 
"day to day 1 ab our within these Homes ~·ea ds and ; n 
the land associated with them, which from the time 
of Shaka to Ceteshwayo pro·li ded the subsistence and 
the surplus upon which the continued existence of 
the kingdom depenc.;ed •.. 11 , (14) 
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Guy has seen the origins of the Zulu kingdom in terms of the 
necessity for ensuring the provisioning of means of production to 
the mass of homesteads. He sees the period of conflict between 
the NdwandNe, Ngwane and Methethwa blocks, out of which the Zulu 
were formed, as a struggle for access to diminishing resources in 
a period of increasing population density, within the given limits 
of the forces of production. ( 15) - The growth of these 1 arger 
units did not constitute·a break with the mode of production of 
the previous social formations. On the contrary, the innovations 
introduced by Shaka, the military and age set systems, and the 
large scale appropriations required to feed such standing armies, 
can best be seen as a solution to the contradiction between the 
mass of homesteads and chiefly state power, which ul ti mate 1 y 
ensured- the continued reproduction of homestead based production 
uni ts. 
The gr(]Nth of centralised kingdoms does not supersede the 1 incage 
system; it develops the basis of its reproduction by establishing 
more sophisticated forms of political and ideological intervention 
between the means of production and the mass of homesteads. Thus 
the emergence of the Zulu state and the rigid enforcement of age 
sets for both rna1 es and females gave the Zulu King control over: 
"the rate and direction of the fundamental social 
process within the kingdoms, those of production 
and reproduction • • • in Zulu society, where 
marriage was 1 inked with the creation of new 
production communities, the King 1 s authority to 
hold back marriage gave him a significant degree of 
control over the rate at which production 
corrmuni ti es were formed and therefore over the 
intensity with \'6lich the environment was exploited 
••• 
11 (16) 
In achieving a much higher degree of control and centralisation of 
marriage through the age sets, tJ1e Zulu state was bui1ding on the 
basic relations of pr.oducti.o.n of the h,omestead which require 
control over female 1 abour. 
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Unlike the feudal peasant household, homesteads in Nguni society 
were~ isolated centres of independent production. They entered 
in to relations with each other through the exchange of women for 
cattle. Women were divorced from all relations involving cattle, 
and this established an internal social division of labour within 
the homestead. Once cattle were in regular ~irculation through 
the exchange of women, it became possible to control both men and 
women. through the imperatives involved in the acquisition of 
cattle. This circulation thus defined a sphere of appropriation 
that lay outside the individual "Homestead, in the exchange of 
cattle and women which formed the basis for accumulation by the 
heads of homesteads, and the chiefs. 
In conditions of over-utilisation of limited natural resources of 
arable land, pasturage and hunting grounds, such as existed in 
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18th century Zululand, the dependence of young men on the 
accumulated weal th of their elders was intensified and hence the .. 
sphere of a:propriation by these class forces was enlarged. It is 
important to reiterate that the basic movement of centralisation 
of power served to reconstitute the conditions necessary for the 
reproduction of the homestead based system with access to means of 
production within each homestead. This access, however, was now 
mediated by new forms of political and ideological intervention 
between the direct producers and means of production. As Godel i er 
has ob served, in a s 1 i ghtl y di ff er en t con text; 
"The emergence of the State and of the exp1 oi ta ti on 
of the comrnun i ti es does not change the genera 1 form 
of property relations, it remains one of communal 
ownership; 
comrnuni ty, 
this time ownership by 
while the individual 
the higher 
remains in 
possession of the soil as a member of his 
particular community. Thus a transition to a State 
society and to an embryonic form of clas.s 
expl oi ta ti on has taken p1 ace without the 
devel opnent of private ownership of 1 and ••• 11 (17} 
What emerged, in the Zulu e:xamp1e, cou1d ~Jius be seen as one 
soeci fi c, conjunctural sol uticn to a basic ;;rob 1 em of a 11 1 ineage 
based systems with centralised chiefdoms - i.e. to ensure the 
unity of the rreans of production and subsistence within the 
homesteads, given limited resources and population growth within 
a fixed technological base. Within these constraints, some 
central regulation and control was necessary over the rate at 
which new homesteads were established and over the expansion of 
existing homesteads. The basic theoretical proposition is, 
therefore, that chiefly oower operated to affect the rate at 
which new homesteads were established and, therefore, the rate 
at which existing homesteads exoanded and increased their 
productive capacity. A ch~af 1 s ability to operate in this way is 
premised on the production relations internal to the individual 
homesteads, through the fundamental division between women and 
cattle. By i nh ib i ting the formation of new homesteads as 
separate units of production, the chief was able to increase the 
intensity of exploitation within the existing homesteads. On the 
other hand, the formation of ne~ homesteads on newly occupied 
territory decreased the extent of surplus production and of the 
appropriation of surplus labour. 
The specific conditions under which such movements of 
centralisation were effected, were partly determined by the 
existing basis of chiefly power and in part by the nature of 
productive resources and the environment. The essence of the 
problem is to specify the contradictory relationship between the 
demands of reproduction of chiefly state power on the one hand, 
and of the individual homesteads on the other. It wi11 be argued 
that, in the Xhosa social formation, the primary contradiction 
was that between the local community of homestead oroduction 
units and the hioher community r~oresented by the chief. The 
function of the 'higher community' '.Vas to ensure and regulate the 
access to means of production and means of subsistence of the 
individual units of production of ':he '1ower community', 
In the Xhosa social formation the primary aspect of this was to 
maintain the national territ::irv of the chiefdoms in such a manner 
as to include adequate access to f·::.ur distinct types of 
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territory. These were hunting grounds, pasture lands, 
agricultural lands and res i den ti al sites. (18) In achieving 
this' the chief had to intervene between the 1 ocal cormnun i ty and 
the unity of the rreans of production. These forms of 
intervention were variable and uneven (resting more at one point 
on cattle or agriculture and at another point more on pl ace of 
residence or hunting etc. ) because they were the primary 1 in es on 
which the cl ass strugg1 e was based. (1 9) 
Looking beyond the Xhosa, this contradiction between the power of 
the centralised authority and the mass of homesteads is 
expressed in different African social forma ti ans in the ubiquity 
of 1 ineage based production units on the one hand, and the 
numberless shades of difference which constitute the basis for 
individual ruling classes on the other. This has mistakenly led 
soire theorists to suppose that each must be assessed in terms of 
a unique mode of production. The differences between the Xhosa 
and certain West African Kingdoms, for example, are grE-at indeed, 
yet they have more in common at the 1 evel of production than with 
any variant of European feudal ism. The extent of these 
differences between social formations is, in this view, the 
consequence of the almost infinite variety of possible forms of 
intervention by the ruling class against the conditions· of 
effective possession of means of production and subsistence by 
the homestead production units, which are compatible with t!ie 
maintenance of the basic structure of the 1 ineage mode of 
production. 
This inherent variability is the result of the non-homology 
between production and appropriation in the absence of feudal 
forms of land ownership. Thus any aiven staoe in the develoµnent 
of a kingdom based on the 1 ineage mode of production assumes a 
conjunctura1 character wn ich has too often been mis taken for a 
fundamental difference in mode of production. Indeed Terray 
seems to have been struck by th'is possibility when he wrote that 




may undergo, and may actually have experienced~ 
periods of 'grCJNth and rapid transformation preceded 
and accompanied by· an intensification of 
expl citation. But these periods are the result of 
determinate historical conjunctures: in contrast 
with the capitalist mode of production, the 
worsening of exploitation does not constitute a 
tendential law inherent in the structures of these 
modes of production. On the other hand, one may 
also witness a general deterioration of the 
relations of production forming the mode of 
production and of the situation of the classes it 
en ta i1 s • . • 11 (1 9 ) 
It has been argued that the relative non-separation of the direct 
producers from the means of production forms tiie primary 1 in es on 
which the class struggle is based. From this it follows that, in 
the 1 ineage mode of production, when the degree of separation of 
the direct producers from the means of production and subsistence 
was large, the rate of appropriation of surplus labour was high 
and exploitation more intense. Where exploitation (thus defined) 
of young men, women and others, \vas more intense, it was harder 
for rren to acquire \vives, and once acquired, to establish 
homesteads of their own. Such men were forced to work not 
primarily for their cwn aggrandizement but for that of the head 
of the homestead to which they were attached. 
Where exploitation reached this intensity,, struggles were 
engendered against it. In the case of the Xhosa, t!iese struggles 
irost often took the shape of the establishment of a new chiefdom 
in which access to necessary resources was the return that young 
rren, women and other exploited people gained for :issisting the 
pretensions of an aspiring chief. 
It is, therefore, in the light of this contraa~ction 1H"ithin the 
in di vi dual uni ts of production that his tori cal developments at 
t.1e 1 evel of the chiefdom as a who1 e must be understood. 
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The Xhosa economy depended on the availability of land to absorb 
the conflicts gener.~ted by the struggle to control the two most 
important resources - cattle and people. Both of these were 
highly mobile. In an area of wide climatic variation and 
environmental diversity, transhumance is usually essential and 
requires assured access to extensive pas tu re. The primary 
function of the Xhosa chief was to symbolise the attachment of 
the people to their cattle and their lands. Land, however, is a 
fixed resource and ensuring the availability of adequate land 
(both qualitatively and quantitatively) was the most immediate 
problem confronting the chief in maintaining the political unity 
of chiefdom. 
It is suggested here that there existed, within t'le Xhosa social 
formation, a generational cycle which led to the political and 
territorial redistribution of people and cattle when the 
prevailing distribution on the available land, over which a 
particular chief held dominion, had reached the maximum limits of 
its capacity to provi cl: for the younger genera ti on wishing to 
establish independent homesteads. The effect of this socially 
cr·eated 11and scarcity' was not something which operated in a 
mechanistic and unmediated way. The existence of pressure on 
available resources was manifested in the increasing ab i1 ity---o-f--
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the chiefly hierachy to appropriate surplus from the· mass of _____ -.. _ 
households through the expansion of the number of workers in each 
homestead unit of production, and through greater incidence of 
cattle indebtedness. (21) 
Peires has presented the view that: 
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••• The Xhosa nation is heterogeneous in origin, 
rather than from t'ie first a defined 1 tribe 1 
clearly disti.nct from its n.eighbours, and that it 
expanded and incorporated rather than migrated .•. 11 · 
( 22} 
He has emphasised the political domination of the amaTshawe clan, 
(to which all Xhosa chiefs, !f/ith one exception, belonged) over 
the mass of homesteads as the key to this process of expansion, 
and linked it to the need to maintain ecological balance with the 
increase in population and inter.generational conflict between 
chiefs: 
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The tensions of the intergenerational conflict 
were relieved to a large extent by the dispersion 
of young chiefs and their followers to territories 
of their own •.• The dispersion of the young chiefs 
benefited the po 1 i ty as a whole • . • Apart from 
extending the territory over which the amaTshawe 
reigned, it assisted in the subordination of 
commoner clans. Against these advantages was the 
disadvantage that increasing decentralization ••• 
must inevitably have led to decreasing political 
co hes ion and the ul ti mate break up of the po 1 i ty, 
unless checked by the growth of political 
·institutions at the centre ••• 11 (23) 
Perhaps the best . known case of increasing intensity of 
appropriations is that of Ngqika (1778-1829) (24}. He pursued a 
policy of concentrating power in his hands by forbidding private 
c 
revenge for adultery - substituting, instea~, fines given by his 
court; developed the custom of death dues (isizi) in cattle which 
was widely adopted by the other chiefs; took over the people and 
cattle of homesteads whose heads had died or had been deposed by 
him - amongst other things. Whi1 e these devel oµnents were 
important they were not unique to Ngqika. ( 25). 
The Xhosa never developed the sort of centralised control over 
age ranking that characterised the Zu1 u formations, because of 
the success of countervai1 ing struggles that tended, instead, to 
expand the kingdom and to subdivida political authority. The 
basic pattern of the contlkt between centralisation and 
decentralisation of power in the Xhosa chiefdoms is represented 
in the myth of origin of t!1e amaTshawa Royal clan. The myth of 
origin of ama Tshawe is bi.; i1 t on the conflict between sons of 
chiefs. Tshawe, reputedly repr::s·er.ting a minor house of his 
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'father' 'Nkosiyamantu~, ca!TE into conflict with his two senior 
brothers, Cira and Jwara. Cira is represented as the senior heir 
of 'Nkosiyamantu'. The myth, as related, c.oncerns the refusal by 
Tshawe to pay the tribute of the hunt to Cira. Tshawe had ki11 ed 
a blue-buck and Cira demanded his portion, usua11y the breast of 
the animal. Cira asked for the assistance of Jwara, chief of the 
Right-hand Rouse, but, with the assistance of the Pondomises, 
Tshawe overcame his brothers and 'usurped' the chieftainship of 
the Xhosa. ( 26} 
Peires has interpreted this myth as one of indigeneous clans 
being conquered and incorporated by invading c1 ans. However he 
has not specifically questioned why the myth of origin of the 
Xhosa chiefta incy is represented in terms of a conf1 i ct between 
brothers. In a suggestive note he commented that: 
uThe apparently frivo1 ous argument (over the blue-
buck J.L.) which Soga does not explain, is in fact 
the crux of the Tshawe justification for the 
usurpation. Cira, as the chief, was entitled to 
demand his portion of the blue-buck, but since the 
blue-buck was too small , there would not have been 
enough for the rest of the people to eat. By 
insisting on this Royal prerogative at the expense 
of his people ~s well-being Cira contravened the 
ethic of generosity and therefore rn:rited 
deposition ••. 11 { 27) 
In fact the conflict over the buck, as a conflict between chiefs 
and brothers, could very well be he1 d to represent a conflict 
over the rights of aopropria tion of a chief, expressing the way 
in which these rights are limited by the resulting conflicts they 
engender. The 'ethic of generosity' which was the ideological 
form in which the chiefs 1 dominant control over cattle was 
represented, may in fact be seen as grounded in the need to 
disguise the extent of a chief's '"H::alth. (28) The significance 
of the myth lies in its !eqi t~misation of resistance to unfair, 
or excessive, appropriations by::: chief and the support of 
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another claimant to the chieftaincy in order to right this 
unacceptable situation. As Peires justifiably argues, the myth 
of origin also legitimates the existence of a dominant lineage 
and ruling cl ass as the basis of the Xhosa chiefdom. At the same 
tim: it expresses the dialectic of the establishment of chiefdoms 
and the supercess ion of one chief by another. 
The history of the Xhosa may, in large measure, be viewed as the 
process of the creation of chiefdoms in response to the 
intensification of the contradiction between the chief and the 
roos~ of households. More specifically it may be viewed as the 
outcome of the contradiction between the chief (and his 
supporters amongst the rich heads of households, who enjoyed a 
close ·political rel a ti onshi p with him) and the poor indebted 
members of these househo1 ds and young men who wished to marry and 
estab1 i sh households of their o\'111. 
This con tr;:;.di cti on was developed by the ecol ogi ca 1 constraints of 
the limited territory of the chiefs' domain. By virtue of the 
control which they . exercised over the rate at which new 
homesteads and households could be established, and by 
restricting these processes, the dominant cl ass in the chiefdom 
was able to exercise decisive control over the chiefdom as a 
whole. However this control invited a response. It invited 
young men to seek to support the claim of a son of a chief to 
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aspire to the rank of chief himself. They could organise around 
him politically, and eventually precipitate a split in the 
chiefdom as they moved. off to fresh territory where the new chief 
and his supporters would themselves be able to supervise the 
sett1 ement of the new territory, mark out the best bi ts for 
themselves, and in turn gather supporters and indebted 
followers. This was the essential dialectic of Xhosa histcrf.. 
This view can best be examined by 1 coking in closer detai1 ·3.t the 
chronology of the formation of the different chiefdoms which 
, emerged, and which occupied the Ciskei from the Kei river to t.tie 
Sunceys River between 1670 and 1800. The character-is tic 
"sp1ftting
11 of tl1e Xhosa polity wi 11 be seen to be nei '.:rH::r ;::he 
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mechanistic anthropological abstraction as which it is sometimes 
presented, nor a chance pol itica1 happening .• (29) It will be 
argued that the formation of chiefdoms was precisely the 
outworkings of an objective contradiction in the lineage mode of 
production of the Xhosa social formation; a contradiction founded 
on social relations internal to the mode of production and 
therefore based on its uni ts of production - the individual 
homesteads. Before going on to examine t"le structure of the 
homesteads in more detail, the chronology of the. formation of the 
chiefdoms wi11 first be out1 ined. 
III From Tshiwo to Sandille - The Emergence of Xhosa Chiefdoms 
The first known sp1 it from !he !!Jain 1 ine of Xhosa chiefs traced 
from Tshawe, was Ntinde, the brother of the chief Ngconde, (mid-
17th century possibly 1670-1700). The precise causes of this 
break are not known. It seems, however, as if the authority of 
the supreme chief had developed considerably under Ngconde's 
rule. Ngconde fought with his brother Ziko. Ziko subsequently 
harboured a grudge against Ngconde and his heir, Tshiwo, and 
helped Gwa1i, Tshiwo's son, against the infant chief Pha1o, some 
. years later. The Ntinde were the first branch of the Xhosa to 
cross the Kei in the 17th century and to settle in the area 
occupied by the Khoi. (30) 
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The reign of Tshiwo appears to have marked a period of chronic Y 
instability, which may be evidence of the conjunctural result of 
increasing popu1 ation and deteriorating eccL;gica1 conditions and 
drought. Peires has noted that Tshiwo f!,ad to ward off a 
challenge to his chieftaincy from the amaNgccsini chief Gaba, and 
he did this with the help of a powerful co1..mci"ii.or, Khwane. in 
recognition of his assistance, Khwane :r;as rr;ade 2 chief over the 
amaGqunukwebe, a group which had a cons i der~:J 1 e /~ho i a dmi x ture. 
There is evidence that there was a definite drift of support from 
Tshiwo to Gaba ·and that Gaba was leading the penetration of the 
Ci skei an areas. ( 31) 
Further evidence on conditions in Tshiwo'.s time comes from a 
tradition recorded by the Rev. John Bennie in 1838. Bennie 
records Tshiwo as having moved across the Kei in search of game 
to hunt. Such extension is highly susgestive that existing game 
land was exhausted. Any movement across the Kei was, however, 
bound to bring conflict with the Khoi who sparsely occupied the 
country up to the Kei. It seems as if Tshiwo was llDtivated in 
this by a great drought which would, naturally, have made the 
Xhosa rrore depende-ft'° on hunting and on the gathering of wil-d-
roots. 
II 
Bennie records that there was ~great drought and hunger': - -They stole the property of others: cattle and 
corn they destroyed one another .•• their cattle 
were gone on account of their plundering one 
another. He that stole was not fined, all his 
catt1 e were taken from him. Part of the peop1 e 
le ft their homes, and became wanderers, those that 
had cattle fought with one another, some served 
these. Tshiwo al one had cattle and cow. Tshiwo 
gave the following order to his people; he said 
11 seek the wanderers, take them home with you, bring 
them to my kraal that I may give them food". This 
was duly done • . . he chose great men to distribute 
food to the destitute. He threw away his cattle in 
slaughtering for his people. The niggardly rich 
man wou1 d be reported to the chief. Tshiwo wou1 d 
ca11 him, blame him, caution him ••• ,at length it 
ra~!ned. The 1.and became rich and had plenty. 
Tshiwo collected his cattle and distributed them 
amcngst his destitute. Peace came, corn was sewn. 
Tshiwo said, cut the horns of your calves, do 
justi er.:, 1 et there not be a person who takes the 
p.roper:y of another ..• the cattle i.ncreased and 
bred and out:iurr.oered the people .•• 11 (32) 
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The tradition( conjure~p a vivid picture of the manner in which 
the concentratiQ.nAf cattle in the hands of a minority of 
influential men may come to combine with a particular ecological 
conjuncture to create con di ti ans wtiere the majority of the nation 
are left without access to cattle. The impression is also 
created that strife, bordering on complete civil disorder, may be 
engendered by this when the usual rules of property are 
suspended. Significantly, the solution to such strife is chiefly 
intervention to restore the internal balance of people and cattle 
on the land, through the agency of his class allies, councillors 
or 'great men' of the various clan sections, who were brought 
more firmly under his hegemony by this means, as all service and 
work for a chief was usually rewarded. 
Al though it is important to guard against extending the 
interpretation of a. tradition beyond the limits which it will 
bear, there are certain observations about the reign of Tshiwo 
that 1 end added si gni fi cance to the circumstances described. 
Tshiwo succeeded his father, at the earliest, in 1686 - and he 
. - . 
died in 1702. (32) Soga claims he was "middle-aged 11 at the time 
of his death. At a11 events, he was not old and definitely had 
not ruled for, a 1 ong time. Thus the circumstances described 
would have taken pl ace in the early years of his rule which were 
periods of great vulnerability for a chief, when he needed to 
forge new alliances and create a cl ass of supporters indebted to 
him and his councillors. 
If the early years of the reign of a new chief happened to 
coincide with a period of ecological ~xtremity, it could most 
plausibly be productive of attempts at usurpation of the 
chieftaincy such as that of Gaba, and .'lecessit.ate the young chief -attempting to decisively break the power of the old councillors 
of his father. The possibility that Tsh~·,.,,o was faced with these 
characteristic political problems '><!-hic:i :::nfrcnted a new chief, 
is supported by Bennie who recorcs that: ishiwo held the 'great 
men 1 (probably heads nf cl an sections! responsib1e for deaths 
through witchcraft - in an attempt -;·,~ 9~t csntro1 over them and 
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the cattle confiscations this would entail. (33) That such 
attempts were necessary demonstrates a fact of the 1 ineage mode 
of production as inscribed in the Xhosa social formation: that 
the success ion of chiefs marked the shift of cl ass ru1 e from one 
generation to another. Each succeeding generation had to 
re-establish the basis of its rule in production by restoring the 
unity of homesteads and the means of production where this unity 
had become broken through the 'bottlenecking 1 of ca tt1 e and 
access to 1 ands in the hands of homestead heads, counci11 ors and 
'great men 1 of a previous chief. Where this combined with 
relative overpopulation of th.e fixed or bounded land resources of 
the nation, considerable opportunity existed for political 
intrigue and the building up of a following by individuals with a 
claim to the title of chief. 
From the time of Tshiwo, there was a marked speeding up of the 
process whereby nev ch_:!!fdoms, related to the Xhosa Paramountcy, 
were created. The establishirent of the amaGqunukwebe under the 
councillor Kwane has already been mentioned.! Tshiwo defeated 
Gaba with Kwane 1 s aid in the vicinity of the Keiskamma River. 
The amaGqunukwebe were formed from the mixture of Kwane 1 s people, 
the conquered amaNqosisni and Khoi. This rrust have in itself 
reduced the pressure on resources in Tshiwo 1 s country east of the 
Kei. 
With the restoration of a more favourable balance between people, 
cattle and the land, the power of rich homestead heads over local 
fol 1 owings was grea t1 y reduced. Al though a great many young men 
who needed to acquire a wife ''4ould still have been dependent on 
older and richer hcrr:.estead heads, and ultimately on the chief, 
for acquiring cattle, the extent to which homestead heads could 
control the labour of a man's wife and children and co1T111and his 
political support was graatiy reduced. Our supposition is that 
this was reflected in ~ decrease in the number of families 
concentrated in fr1divi dual homesteads. Peires has similarly 
emphasised the aspec:. cf ~p~Ji.~1 differentiation in considering 
the effects of th>? seamentaticn cf political power amongst the 
Xhosa. ( 34) 
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The 'reduction of the pressure of population on the land~ in the 
country defined by the chieftaincy, did not mark a mere spatial 
differentiation and political segmentation only. It had effects 
o.n the entire process of reproduction of homesteads, and therefore 
of the chiefdom as a whole. The entire tradition relating to 
Tshiwo emphasises the ability of a chief to command, expecially in 
times of crisis, the distribution of cattle over the chiefdom as a 
whole. By removing an imbalance in this distribution, Tshiwo was 
able to maintain the ·unity of the chiefdom. 
Tshiwo 1s son by his first wife was Gwali, who in the absence of an 
official heir, assumed the Regency. When Mdange, Tshiwo 1 s 
brother, brought forward a child, Phalo, who he claimed was the 
son {born after his death) of Tshiwo 1 s Great Wife, Gwa1i rejected 
the contention. This led to a conflict between Mdange and Gwal i, 
the defeat of Gwali and the establishment of the amaGwali 
chiefta incy in the area of the Khoi chief Hinsati, whose people 
and. cattle were conquered in the process. {35) In the conflict 
between Gwali and Mdange, the opera ti on of the struggle between 
generations may be cl early seen. Gwal i was Tshiwo 's son, Mdange 
his brother, and (as Holden has commented) 11 the old councillors of 
the tribe, well knowing the advantages of a long minority, rallied 
around the infant chief Pha1 o, and the ambitious Gwal i was 
defeated ••• 11 ( 36) 
Mdange ruled as Regent until Pha1o was ready to assume his 
chieftainship - whereupon Mdange relinquished rule, and with his 
follONers went to live west of the Kei, where he joined the 
amaNtinde, amaGqubukwebe and amaGwal i already in the region. The 
fact that Mdange 1 s Regency, and his subsequent removal from the 
main branch of the Xhosa · d1iefta incy, was peaceful and that he 
remained on good terms with Phalo, points to the significance of 
the conquest of the Khoi and t1e removal of any obstacle to 
furth-er expansion west of :he Kei. 
During and ·after the reign cf Tshiwo, the Xhosa had begun to move 
over the Kei in ::arnes:, a.nd there seems to be no doubt that the 
22 
rootive force behind the move was the need to expand the physica1 
resource base of the chiefdom. Each rrajor migration rray be seen 
to correspond to a political crisis, first Khwane and the 
amaGqunukwebe, then Gwali, the defeated presumptive heir, and 
finally, if peacefully, ~1dange, the representative of the new 
Paramount
1
s father's generation. However, none of these 
migrations was as traumatic or as significant as the split that 
occurred between the sons of Phal o - Gca 1 eka and Rarabe. 
The rise of the ideology of the Right-hand House, P.eires has 
convincingly argued, grew out of the pol iti cal need to explain the 
split in the chiefdom that occurred, in the reign of Phalo, 
between Gcaleka {d.1778), the .'Great son' of Phalo and his brother 
Rarabe (d.1787) - who henceforth was designated the son of the 
Ri gh t-han d House. ( 37) 
In the polygamous homestead of a Xhosa chief, from then on, one 
wife was to be named tlie Great Wife and the lobola marriage cattle 
were to be provided by the tribe. This wife's first son was to be 
the legitimate heir. The Great Wife was usually one of the last 
to be rra.rried. Another wife was to be named the wife of the 
Right-hand, and other wives were. then attached to these houses as 
their supporters, cons ti tu ting the minor houses. 
The conflict between Gca1 eka and Rarabe thus assumed great 
importance because it proved a watershed, beyond which the 
possibility for centralising power over the Xhosa homesteads in 
the hands of one great chief was to be ab an cbned, and the process 
of decentralisation markedly speeded up. The effect of the 
Right-hand House ins ti tu ti on was to determine that a part of the 
nation becaire the acknow1 edged foll owing of the son of the 
Right-hand. (39) A.s we have seen, however, the fact of 
segmentation under ha] f-brothers of the chief was present before 
the ideology of the Right-hand House, at least from the time of 
Tshiwo. The 5,ons of chiefs are' all potential chiefs and this 
alone was a sufficient basis to cause the heads of certain 




chiefs with out the ideology of the Right-hand House: The 
institution of the Right-hand ·House therefore only .expressed the 
dominant reality of struggle between homesteads and the chiefs for 
optimising the conditions of production within homesteads. 
Little is known about the conflict between Gcaleka and Rarabe, 
except that it occurred during Phalo's life time. (40) The fact 
that it did so is perhaps indicative of how urgent the need for 
further expansion was. The outcome of the struggle was that 
Rarabe settled west of the Kei along with his father Phalo. This 
consolidated the process of penetration and occupation of the 
Ciskei-, and the displacement of the Khoi under Hoho that had begun 
' with Tshiwo 1s defeat of the amaNgosini and the creation of the 
')/ / / 
~ J , / U\ r,~ ''-/ \_,~ <;~ ~--·~·-.r t.__..,.,.J'~ t~('!\.· u. ' .. . ... amaGqunukweve. 
The amaGwali recognised the chieftaincy of Rarabe, and Peires 
supposes that the Ntinde also did so, although thG imiDange did 
not, largely because of their historical opposition to the 
amaGwali. (41} The amaGqunukwebe did not recognise Rarabe. One 
of the sons of Phalo from a minor house, Langa, also established 
for himse1 f a strong foll owing and crossed the Kei, and his 
o chiefdom, the amaBa1u, did not recognise Rarabe's Paramountcy west 
of the Kei. ( 42) 
Thus before the rise of Ngqika, by the end of the 18th century, 
there were at least six chiefdoms which had penetrated and 
occupied the Ciskeian areas previously occupied by the Khoi. 
These were the Ntinde, Gqunukwebe, Gwali, Mdange, tit>alu and 
Rarabe. The area was rich in good pasture 1 and, fil 1 ed with game, 
and had many perennial streams and forests from the Amato1a 
catchm:nt area. The divided allegiance of the junior chiefdcms, 
between the Rarabe and the Gacal eka as well as the amb'ivai ent 
relationship between tlie Rarabe and the Gacaleka themselves, were 
to provide the background to economic and pol i ti cal dev~1 opme.n ts 
in the 19th cent.iry. 
Mention has a·irea:::y been made of the increased level of 
appropriations that Ngqika was able to introduce. In order to 
understand this it is necessary to look at the conditions of his 
rise to power. Rarabe's son of the Great House, Mlawu, died in a 
war against the Thembu, and his heir Ngqika was then in his 
infancy. Thus, once again and as with Phalo, a long regency was 
necessitated, with a11 the consequences which that entailed for 
the enlargement of the homestead uni ts of production and the 
concentration of cattle ownership. The regency was assumed by a 
brother of Rarabe's, Ndlambe. Under Ndlambe the forces of 
centralisation in the chiefdom combined expl osive1y with the 
impact of Colonial trade and territorial wars which placed new and 
greater pressures on ·available production resources. Under the 
intensified conditions of struggle by the homesteads for access to 
means of production through a privileged relationship with a 
chief, the institution of the Right-hand House becaire generalised, 
so that in the Ciskei, all sons of chiefs attempted to gain a 
measure of independence for. themselves. These were conditions, 
under 'nhich the catastrophic internal struggles of the 19th 
century were played out. 
During the reign of Ndl ambe, the hegemony of the ama Tshawe west of 
the Kei was established. In 
he enjoyed the beneficial 
the earl i er part of Ndl arrbe 1 s regency 
effects of Colonial trade, and 
consequently found Colonial allies in the Boers of the· 
Agter-Bruintjies-Hoogte area. He used these allies to assist him 
in subduing those chiefdoms which resisted Rarabe domination -
principally the imiDange. This group he pushed west of the Fish 
to join the amaNtinde and amaGwal i who were already there. It was 
this concentration of population that led to the initial conflicts 
with the Boers, and in 1793 Ndlambe assisted van Jaarsveld in a 
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commancb against them. {43) However the main obstacle to Ndlanne I 
was the Gqunukwebe. The si gni fi cance of the Zuurvel d 1 ands, west 
of the Fi sh~Ri ver was we11 expressed by Chungw~, the Gqunukwebe 
crrief, who was intensely conscious of the long-standing historical 
right of the Gqunukwebe to the area. 
He tel d Col on el ry; er in 1808 that: 
11 he was in this part of the country before the 
Christiais •.. and that he now remains at Cosyl a 
(between the Bushman and Sundays River J.L.} for 
the health of his cattle, that for sorretime he was 
not able to raise a calf at his former residence 
(east of the Bushman~s River J.L.} ••• 0 (44) 
In 1795 Ngqika rebelled against Nd1ambe, who refused to surrender 
his regency to the young chief. Ndlambe found an ally in the 
Gcaleka regent (for tie young chief Hintsa) but Ngqika defeated 
both Ndl ambe, \vho rroved towards the coast near the Kowie, and the 
Gcal eka - whom he drove over the Kei to the Jujura River. With 
Nd1ambe 1 s fortunes temporarily in reverse, he in tensi fi ed the • 
conflict with the Gqunukwebe, and in 1799, with the help of Boer 
Corrmancbs, pushed them over the Sundays River. His success was 
shortlived, as British intervention subsequently allowed the 
Gqunukwebe to return to their lands between the Sundays and the 
Fi sh River, (from which the Sri ti sh were ultimately to drive them 
in 1812). 
Ngqika 1established himself as the most powerful of the Ciskeian 
chiefs, and certainly increased the extent of territory under his 
control, which was an effective way of attracting followers. We 
have already mentioned the innovations which Ngqika was able to 
introduce in increasing the intensity of appropriations. By means 
of the high isizi (death dues) he inhibited the founding of new 
hom:steads. The increasing difficulty in estab'lishing independent 
homesteads made sense ·in a period of political pressure on the 
chiefdoms.; it increased its cohesiveness and its capacity to 
absorb population. It is necessary to men ti on Ngqika 
1 s oti1er 
significant innovation, which was the institution of the ixhiba, 
whereby one of his sons was put in charge of the corporate body of 
councillors cf his grandfather's generation, which allowed them 
11 to expr~ss t.~eir arrt>itions through boosting their charge at the 
expense of his bro'thers 11 (45) This institution was widely adopted 
by other ::h·iefs since it attempted to resolve the structural 
conflict bet11een a chief and his father 1 s generation. The 
26 
introduction of the ixhiba may be 
absorb the tensions resu1 ting from 
homestead units of production, 
establishment of new homesteads by 
seeking to acquire cattle and a wife. 
un ders toad as an attempt to 
the expansion in size of the 
and the demand for the 
young married men, and men 
\, ' 
'' 
Ngqika 1 s early success in defeating Ndl ambe and the Gcal eka and in 
institutionally entrenching his position, was therefore 
spectacu1 ar and it was this that encouraged him to regard himself 
as the supreme Xhosa Paramount west of the Kei. This pretension 
'::as to prove very costly, as he was aware that he could not 
exercise hegemony over men like Chungwe (amaGqunukwebe) and Nqeno 
(ama.Mbalu), or over the sections of the Rarabe under Ndlarrbe and 
his increasingly powerful sons Mdushane, Mhal a and Mqhayi. 
During Ngqika 1 s reign the homesteads under Ndl ambe grew further 
apart from the main body of the Rarabe under Ngqika. However no 
other chiefdoms were created. There was a continued movement of 
homesteads back and forth between Ngqika and Ndl ambe. Ndl ambe 
occupied the land along the coast from the Keiskamma River almost 
to the Kei .• As Ndlambe enjoyed good relations with tlie Gacaleka 
over the Kei, a 1 arge part of the Rarabe split from Ngqika and 
followed Ndlambe. This conflict came to a head in 1807 when 
Ndlarnbe, with the assistance of his brother Mnyalaza and the 
amaMbal u, al most defeated Ngqika. However Ngqika managed to 
retain Ndlambe 1 s recognition of his seniority as certain factions 
aiding Ndl ambe crossed back to Ngqika. From then on Ngqika became 
increasingly dependent on the Colonial government to sustain his 
position. 
With incr,easing Colonial pressure on the lands west of the Fish, 
which the Colonial government regarded as the boundary, many of 
Ndlambe 1 s followers began returning to Ngqika, east of the Fish. 
At the end of the first decade of the 19th century, Chungwe and 
Ndl ambe were the most powerful chiefs west of the Fi sh. Their 
presence there was ultimately to lead to the 'clearing' of the 
area of Xhosa by the Colonial government ~n 1812. This systematic 
27 
war saw the death of Chungwe and the confiscation of thousands of 
Xhosa cattle. Ngqika cou1 d not control the subordinate chiefs and 
required continual support from the Colony. The Col any expected 
Ngqika to suppress cattle theft, but this he could not do, as the 
primary culprits were the amaMbalu and the imiDange under Nqeno 
and Bhotomane, who were both seeking to expand their fol 1 owings. 
They supported Ngqika politically against Ndlambe and his son 
Mdushane, provided Ngqika left them a free hand in their dealings 
with the Colony. ( 46) 
East of the Kei, Hintsa, the Gcal eka Paramount, favoured Ndl ambe 
over ~1e aggressive Ngqika who seemed more intent on alliance with 
the colonists. This culminated in one of the bloodiest internal 
wars, between Ndlambe and· Ngqika, in October 1818 in which 
Hintsa's forces directly aided Ndlambe. Ngqika was overwhelmed by 
Ndlambe. In Colonial eyes the more westerly Ndlambe were the 
prime antagonists in the'"~battl e over pasture 1 and and cattle, and 
Governor Somerset used the Col on i al 1 alliance 1 with Ngqika as a 
pretext for attacking Ndl ambe. Colonel Brereton took away more 
than 23 000 cattle from Ndlambe and his allies in December 1818. 
The war lasted until October 1819, and Ngqika found himse1 f once 
again Paramount - but in a position of increasing subservience to 
the Col onia1 government~ 
After 1819 Ngqika was no more able t6 suppress 'cattle theft' than 
he had been before it. From then on there was a greatly increased 
rate of trading contact with the Colonial economy which both 
strengthened and undermined Ngqika 's position. 
materially and increased the patronage which 
It strengthened 
he had at his 
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disposal, through the appropriations Ngqika was able to 1 evy on 
the trade at Ft Willshire between 1824 and 1826. (48) In greatly 
increasing his dependence on the Colony for a major source of 
income, hOt'iever, Ngqika weakened his position politically 
especially to non-collaborating chiefs such as his son Maqoma. At 
his deat.'1 in 1829 Ngqika had 1 ost most of his ;Jower and Maqorna was 
the obvious Regent for the young chief Sandi 11 e. 
With the death of Nd1ambe, and his heir Mdushane shortly 
thereafter, in 1828 and 1829 respectively, a struggle for control 
over the Ndlambe began with Mhala, a minor son, obtaining the 
chieftaincy and winning most of the Ndlarroe from the senior son 
Mqayi. Mhala was to prove one of the most persistent opponents of 
Col onia1 aggression from his accession in 1830. The Mdushane 
retained their separation from the rest of Ndlambe, with 
Mdushane 1 s son, Seyolo, being regent for his heir, Siwani - thus 
engendering bitter competition between them. Apart from Maqoma, 
the. other sons of Ngqika al so attempted to take part of the 
homesteads of the Rarabe into their control. Thus Tyali, Anta. and 
Xoxo a11 held part of the nation as their following. This 
increased division was to make unity of the Xhosa against the 
Colony virtually an impossib1ity, and in each war from 1818, viz, 
1835, 1846 and 1851, part of the nation under particular chiefs 
would stay out, and sorretimes actively assist the Colonial forces. 
Thus by the tirre Sandi11e succeeded to the chieftaincy of the 
Ngqika, they were split into several factions, each with a chief. 
Sorre of these were men of ability 1 ike Maqoma and Tayl i, others 
were weak and incapable, like Xoxo-. Yet this did not stop them 
from drawing around them a set of fol 1 ewers. Maqoma, An ta and 
. Tya1 i were all to succeed in finding bits of territory spatially 
removed from San dill e and the main body of the Ngqika, where they 
and their followers could settle. Anta and Tyali settled in tI1e 
territory around the Winterberg, above present day Stutterheim; 
Maqoma occupied the Fort Beaufort district, before being evicted 
from it in 1853 •. 
Amongst the Ndlambe, Mhalla held sway over most of his followers, 
but junior chiefs increasingly sprang up cha11 enging his 
authority. The Mdushane gre-1 furher apart from the Ndl arrbe, and 
themselves split between Mdushane'.s sons Siwani and Seyolo. The 
Amaba1 u devel o'l:ed, under the impact of eviction from their lands, 
into two opposed groups under Stok1i'ie and Son to. The Nti dne and 
Mdange crumbled and ·r1ere increasingly absorbed into the Ngqika and 
Ndlarroe foid. Even the strong Gqunukwebe force, under the 
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maverick Chief Phato, split with the emergence of Kama - the 
11 Christian chief'. 
The emergence of Kama, Maqoma, Tya 1 i, An ta, Si wan i and Son to as 
chiefs, in the 19th Century, must be seen in the.context of war 
with the expanding Cape Colony and the effects of the Col onia1 
boundary inhibiting further expansion. Within the logic of the 
establish!TX::!nt of Xhosa chiefdoms any restriction of expansion 
I 
would exacerbate those con di ti ons that 1 ead part of the nation to 
support the aspirations of a young chief. 
In examining this chronology. of the formation of chieftaincies, it 
is extremely significant that new chiefs often appeared after a 
long regency. As has been emphasised, the effect of a long 
regency was to allow time for the maximum centralisation of power 
30 
in the hands of one generation and the accumulation of large --·-------
amounts of cattle in the kraals of the senior homesteads of the 
leading figures of that generation. This accumulation and 
concentration inhibited the formation of new households by young 
men seeking wives~ It all owed for the filling up of the existing 
territory of the chief 1 s domain, making it difficult for 
households wishing to estabiish their own homesteads, separate 
from that of the senior man of the 1 ineage, to do so. This 
encouraged such households to support the claims of chiefs such as 
Gwali, Langa, Mdushane, Maqoma to part of the tribe, and to a 
separate territory from the main body of the Xhosa. 
IV The Xhosa Social Formation and the Relations of Production 
It has been mentioned that Ngqika modified isizi (death dues in 
cattle) by confiscating all cattle, (instead of some only), on the 
death of the head of a homestead. John Brownlee, who lived 1t1ith 
Ngqika at that ti me, ob served: 
11The great advantages which all chiefs, great and 
sma.11, possess over the other cl asses is that the 
property of the former is hereditary, while that of 
the latter may be claimed on their decease, by the 
chief under wtlom they have 1 ived. This pretension 
hcwever is on many occasions only partly enforced, 
in others not at all, and amongst some tribes it 
has fallen entirely into disuse, as for instance 
amongst the Mandanka (imiDange) •.• " (49) . 
The point to be observed is that the extent to which isizi were 
enforced, or indeed any other exactions of appropriations were 
made, was a function of the internal balance of forces within the 
chiefdom. Th is was determined by the extent to which resources 
had become concentrated in the hands of the homestead heads and 
..-
the available political and economic possibilities for expansion 
of the chiefdom. It has been argued that the es tab l i shm:nt of new 
chiefs must be linked to the dynamic of reproduction and 
establishm:nt of new homestead units, and to the effect of the 
previous generation of councillors and homestead heads in 
11 bottl e-neck ing 11 access to . cattle and 1 and. 
position is a very old one. Dugmore wrote in 1856: 
In essenc'.2 this 
"The rule of a young chief is thus in reality the 
rule of the old councillors of the tribe. The 
relative position of the two parties gradually 
changes. One after another the old Amapaka ti fall 
victim to an accusation of witchcraft, the Kaffir 
state engine for the removal of obnoxious, and by 
the time the young chief has grown old in his turn 
he has surrounded himself with another set of 
councillors ... enriched by the spoils of their 
predecessors . . . to be in turn the victims of a 
u 
system perpetuated frcm generation to generation. 
( 50) 
It is important to see t.iiat such generational i:cnfl ict did not 
occur in a mechanistic or unmedit::ted ""ay. ihe process of 
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accumulation was slow and it was only through the course of a 
lifetime that a homestead was established, cattle accumulated and 
a privileged position achieved. The conflict generated by this 
accumulation prepared the conditions for the establishirent of a 
net1 chief dam in opposition to the hegemony exercised by the 
counci 11 ors of an old chief. This . thesis attempts to take 
Dugmore's observations further, by linking this process of change 
in the 11 relative position" of the two parties to the reproduction 
of the homesteads. 
The principles of the Xhosa circumcision lodge have been rightly 
emphasised by Pei res as having a great decentra1 ising tendency on 
the chiefdom. The rite of circumcision initiated a boy into 
.manhood, eligibility to marry and to take part in the military, 
political and juridical affairs of the nation. It was thus, 
potentially, a highly democratic principle that made a11 males 
equally en titled to be bearers of the property of a homestead. 
( 51) A son of a chief would have a 1 arge number of sons of other 
prominent men and commoners as his age mates in the circumcision 
1 odge, and the process was often de 1 ayed to a 11 ow boys of 
disparate ages .. 1:9 b·~ in.i ti a ted together. 11 Age sets" were thus 
very 1 oosely determined through the ini tia ti on procedure. Those 
who were initiated with the son of a chief would always form his 
c1 osest advisors, confidants and supporters. All initiated ma1 es 
were immediately drawn into .the process of acquiring a wife and, 
ideally, of establishing a homestead. Not al1 young men could 
draw on the same resources, however, and those with the least 
resources often found it difficult to· marry and impossible to 
establish a home of their cwn. This was the basis of the 
discontent which might subsequently 1 ead them to support a young 
chief of a related age set to their own, in any contest with a 
superior chief. 
This contrasts sharply .with Zulu age sets '.-ii1ich were directly 
supervised and subsequently controlled by the King, who ·r11as t.J1.en 
able to control the rapidity with 1Nhic!1-new families and 
homeste3ds were formed. His pcwer in tn·is regard was based on the 
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abolition of circumcision rites, which removed that fundamental 
political equality of all rren which characterist=d the Xhosa social 
formation. The continuity of Xhosa history rests on the fact that 
no chief was ever able to bring the process of the reproduction of 
homesteads permanently under his command, but several managed to 
oo so temporarily while favourable circumstances prevailed d.Jring 
particular periods of their rule. 
It is therefore necessary to examine the manner in which the 
process of the expansion of a Xhosa chiefdom was reflected in the 
social relations of production of the ~ or homestead. The 
homestead had a corporate character which al 1 owed fer the-
concentrati on of means of production for the group, beyond that 
necessary for the reproduction of individual fami1 ies. The most 
pervasive division within the homestead was that based on sex. 
( 52) This involved the division of homestead production into male 
and female spheres which broadly coincided with a distinction 
betNeen cattle and agriculture. 
Within each homestead the male and female spheres together 
constituted a unity of direct producers and means of prodJcti on. 
The ideology of male controi of cattie, however, made women 
dependent on the cattle of men. The separation of women from 
catt1 e was thus a seoarati on of the 1 eve1 of access to means of 
production. Within the individual family (indlu) there was thus a 
patriarchal organisation of the labour process. 
There is an ambiva1ance in the literature on the nature of the 
homestead. Sometimes the impression is created that homesteads 
consisted of a married man, his wives, and their unmarried sons 
only. (53) Married sons and the creation of new homesteads are 
not specifically located in 'tliis view, which rests on an 
overestimation of the extent of polygamous marriage amongst the 
Xhosa in the 19th century. ( 54} On this point Alberti observed: 
"Those with least resources must be satisfied with 
one woman, others have two and, rarely, more. only 
the chiefs are enabled, by their greater 1-1ealth, to 
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own a greater number, and one finds those who have 
seven to eight •.. " ( 55). 
Those with the '1 east resources' were certainly the majority of 
the married men. As Shaw observed: 
"A 1 arge number of the people, perhaps the majority, 
have not more than one 1 awful wife 11 ( 56) 
A 1 ternati vel y, other au th ors have recognised the importance of 
'clients' or 'unrelated men' in the homestead, but are unsure as 
to which homestead such iren belonged and whether such oopendence 
was general or restricted to a f~ wealthy heads of clan sections 
and chiefs. The question of the position of adult married sons 
was also left unclear: Thus M. Wilson has written: 
"Each homestead was occupied by a man with his 
wives, his unmarried daughters, his sons and their 
children attachment of unrelated men was 
probably frequent in the homestead of a chief, but 
infrequent amongst commoners .•• 11 ( 57) 
Wilson argued this because of her over-emphasis of the busa 
(service) relationship whereby young men could obtain cattle from 
the chief. Pe ires has correctly criticised her for this, 
emphasising the impermanence of the period of service. In fact 
the poor did !l2..! attach themselves permanen t1y to a chief, but, 
quite to the contrary, served him only for short periods. ·{58) 
While Peires's criticism of Wilson is undoubtedly correct, he also 
fails to take a clear position on the constitution of the 
homesteads. For while the adherents of the Great Place did indeed 
constitute a shifting population, the adherents. of a rich commoner 
did not. Such adherents tended to fonn part of the homestead to 
which they 'r'l'ere attached, without any cl ear prospect of 
establishing themselves in a separate homestead. It 'l'lou1d thus be 
wrong ta create t'ie impress ion that bus a, whether for a chief or a 
rich commoner, automaticaily gave young men a suffici.ent nurroer of 
cattle to proceed in establishing their own homest=~ds. !../hile 
service for a chief might give a man sufficient catt1e to marry, 
there 'i'iere altogether separate obstacles to the establishment of 
an independent homestead. 
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Estimates of the size of imizi differ. 
that a 'kraal 1 (umzi) consisted of from ·-
In 1834 Dehne estimated 
8-12 huts. ( 59) Dundas 
saw kraa 1 s of from 5 to 25 huts in 1827. ( 60) Other observers saw 
Each wife built and imizi consisting of only 2 huts. (61) 
maintained her own hut and domestic establ ishrnent. Excepting 
storage and guest huts, the number of huts indicates the. number of 
wives co-habiting in the homestead. If one accepts that most men 
were rronogamous1y married, and the majority of polygamists had two 
wives, this would mean that in a typical Ngqika umzi of 5 huts, in 
about the year 1830, one wou1 d have found a polygamist head of 
umzi with two wives and three or more married men with one wife. 
The question posed concerns the form of control over such young 
married men, and young unmarried men seeking wives, exercised by 
the senior ma 1 es, who control 1 ed ca tt1 e and 1 and, and indeed the 
supply of brides. Morgan, writing in 1835, seems to have provided 
one of the best observations of the natu1e of the umzi and its 
tendency to expand: 
11These in general are formed by the members of one 
family and by others united to that family in bonds 
of friendship or servituca, for there exists in_ 
Cafferland a state of vassalage. This kraal is 
under the control of a person who is generally the 
senior of the whole and always the fa t.~er of many 
wtio forms this; to him belong the greatest flocks 
which are pastured near it, to him they l oak for 
assistance and advice - a sort of patriarchal 
authority exists in him and according to the extent 
of his fame as a man of judgement and equity, so is 
his advice sought after and followed by similar and 
surrounding kraals, and he becomes a sort of 
na tura1 council 1 or to a portion of the nation .•• 11 
( 62) 
To understand the structure of the Xhosa homes~ad it is necessary 
to look in greater detail at the division of labour in both 
pastoral and arable agricultural and other comest.ic production. 
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(i) Cattle 
Cattle had a rrul ti pl e function in the Xhosa economy. Cattle 
acted as a means of subsistence, a means of exchange, and an 
object of accumulation~ The social organisation of cattle keeping 
in the Xhosa homestead involved a11 three of these functions and 
they were not clearly differentiated within the homestead. 
Conceptually, however, the three aspects may be differentiated by 
their function within the homestead, and without, in the 
relationship bet.veen homesteads. 
Cattle as a rreans of consumption and subsistence was the most 
( 
basic 1 evel. Such consumption was usually performed entirely 
within the homestead • By contrast, cattle as means of exchange 
and object ·of accumulation were subject to economic and 
ideological relations which were constituted in relationships 
between homesteads that extended beyond the confines of any one 
homestead and linked them together in determinate relationships. 
The internal relations governing cattle within the homestead were, 
it will be argued, derived from those outside the homestead, 
because the exchange, circulation and· accumulation of cattle was 
de pen <en t on the ci rcu 1 a ti on of women. 
Milk was drunk as amasi or thick milk, and it was of undoubted 
importance as a primary object of consumption: 
11 It (arnasi J. L.) forms the chi.ef article of food for 
al 1 cl asses, who sometimes for roonths together use 
no other. 11 ( 63) 
The cattle were herded on the land in the vicinity of the cattle 
kraal and were kraaled each night. Herding was either carried out 
by the men themselves, or by clients, but most often the herders 
were boys. Al 1 the cattle of the families of a homestead were 
herc::Ed and kraaled togetlier. Because of the uncertain condition 
of the pasturage and the changing seasonal condition of the veid, 
some transhurr:ance was necessary. 
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Soga observed that chiefs placed their cattle in feed kraals so 
dispersed within their territor'' as to obviate the possibi1 ity of 
overcrowding. ( 64) It is likely that during times of drought, or 
war, or disease amongst the cattle, the cattle of the nation were 
managed collectively and the chief's far-flung cattle posts formed 
the basis for such management. (65) 
While milk was a major food source, the rules pertaining to cattle 
inside the homestead were al 1 designed to minimise contact between 
the women and the cattle. All milking was performed by men. 
Women were meant to avoid the right hand s i ci: of the hut where the 
milk sacks were kept; to· avoid the gathering pl ace of the men in 
the inkundla (the space between the hut and the cattle kraal) and 
never to enter the cattle kraal itself. (66) 
All rules governing the utilisation of cattle emphasised the 
separation of women from cattle and t'ie dependence of the people 
of the homestead on its catt1 e. Men and women were not supposed 
to drink the milk of a homestead wi th which they were not 
connected by 1 ineal descent or marriage. (67) While a woman 
could consume milk from her husband's cattle from the time of her 
marriage, her parents did not cons um: mi 1k fr cm the 1 obo1 a cattle 
received from her husband, until she produced her first chi1 d. 
Cattle were removed from the sphere of consumption by the 
inviol·able practice of 1obo1a, whereby a certain number of beasts 
were given by a prospective husband to the parents of a 
prospective bride. With the regular payment of lobola, cattle 
entered the sphere of circulation. It was through this roovement 
of cattle in one direction and 'Homen in the other, that cattle 
entered the sphere of circuiation and therefore of accumulation. 
Lobola established long-1asting social and economic ties between 
homesteads: 
"The idea lying at :he root of this custom is that 
the father suffers 1oss by the marriage of a 
daughter ..• The :::ssentiai feature of lobola .•• is 
t+ia t there is no fina 1 i ty to it. Cattle pass from 
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i;he husband to his wife's parents or their fami1y 
throughout the 1 i fe-time of· the husband and beyond 
it, that is to the second and even the third 
generation. There is no fixed number of cattle 
among the ama-Xhosa which determine ;./hat is and what 
is not lobola, and consequently there is no time 
limit in which the custom must be completed .•• 11 (68) 
On arrival at her husband's homestead the new wife was required to 
practice ukuhlonipa, i.e. avoidance of all senior male relatives 
of her husband and especially her husband 1 s father. She was never 
to utter the personal name of her husband's father and had to 
avoid words with the same syllables as those contained in her 
husband'. s fa th er 1 s name. ( 69) These avoidance taboos genera11 y 
became less stringent with time, and fell away in the case of 
older women. The overall effect, however, was to support, at the 
ideal ogi ca 1 1 evel , the separation of women from the ca tt1 e of the 
homestead. The taboos on women associating with the work of 
looking after the herds of the homestead were affirmed during the 
initiation ceremony for girls, when the women gathered and 
coll ecti ve1 y attacked the ca.tt1 e kraal, seizing a beast of their 
choice which was slaughtered for a feast. The very novelty of 
such an event cou1 d only serve to underscore the basic separation 
of women from all deal tngs with cattle. ( 70) 
It was the princi pa 1 objective of each man to acquire cattle: 
11 for the well-being of the family, a sufficient 
number of catt1 e are required, whose attendance and 
treatlj]ent is the sole responsibility of the father 
of the family, in which fie is assisted by his sons 
• • 0 II ( 71 ) 
The definition of what constituted a 11 sufficient number" of cattle 
was not only dependent on the need for cattle as a means of 
consumption, bu': had also to allow for the lcbola payment 
necessary to the ac:,1..1;sition of a wife both by a father and his 
·sons. The .3.r.d payment of lobola cattle was tlierefore a 
primary means of acc~mu1ation, and making provision for such 
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payment meant that a homestead had to try at a 11 ti mes to secure 
the possession of cattle over and above what sufficed for 
consumption requirements a1 one. 
This system of circulation and accumulation of cattle rested on 
the separation of women from control or possession of cattle. 
This separation was maintained through complex ideological 
practices which were enforced within the homestead itself. With 
the separation of women fr.om cattle, the control over cattle 
becarre the key to control over women. Because ca tt1 e were very 
unevenly distributed between homesteads, however, many households 
found themselves without sufficient cattle to meet the 
requirements of subsistence, 1 obol a and other tributary payments 
which may have been required. The dependency of women on the 
cattle of men therefore also raises the question of the access of 
men to cattle. While ideoiogy prescribed that every man should, 
on marriage, found his own homestead, most were not able to do so 
because of the effective limitations on the distribution of cattle 
posed by age di fferen ti a ti on. The dependence of a young man on 
the ca tt1 e of an elder defined not only the_subordina ti on of women 
i·n production, but the subordination of a man and his--wife to the 
structure of the homestead of an elder. 
(ii) Agriculture 
Just as men were enjoined, on initiation, to accumulate cattle, so 
a woman, on entering her husband's homestead as a bride, was 
enjoined by the women of the homestead to cultivate the ground. 
Access to agricultural lands was vested in each homestead and, 
within _each homestead, it was vest2d ~n each household. (73) A 
woman's right to cultivate a par7.i,:u1ar piece of ground was 
secured and cou1 d not be removed or ~n any ·flay interfered with in 
the course of her productive 11 fe. Ai 1 agricultural 1 abour was 
perforll'Ed bye with t.!ie eXCc!Jtion :yf cl earing and the building 
of fences around the lands. Th·::; heavy '"'or!< was the task of the 
men. ( 74) 
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The choice of garden site was highly selective. Kay observed: 
"the valleys and low lands are genera11y selected as 
corn fi~ds, on account of the soil being not only 
better, but possessed of much more moisture than is 
usually found in other pl aces. The sloping and 
bushy sides of eminences and the bases of hills, 
where we frequ en tl y meet with a rich a 11uvia1 
·deposit, are also regarded as choice spots. 11 (75) 
Ev.ery household in the homestead usually had an additional small 
gar~n in 'ffhich early crops and vegetables were planted in 
September. The gardens of the homestead were worked collectively 
by the wives and by the male and female children. The area. under 
cultivation was determined principally by the number of women 
workers.. For each wife approximate 1 y 2. 5 to ) acres were brought 
under cul tiva ti on. These 1 arger gardens were usual 1 y dug up with 
a digging stick from the mi dd1 e of October onwards. 
Agriculture was extremely 1 abour intensive, requiring two hoeings 
and repeated weedings of the fields. As the grain ripened, the 
fields had to be kept under permanent guard by the children to 
keep stray catt1 e, other animals, and birds from ruining the . 
crop. { 76) Morgan distinguished 7 stages in the agricultural 
production process: 
1 ) clearing of weeds 
2) spreading corn seed on the surface 
3) covering the seed with SC i1 1 using sma1 l wooden spades 
4) re-weeding when the seed1 ings were above ground and 
gathering so i1 around the stems 
5) harvesting 
6) hanging of seed mealies 
7) storage of grain for c:Jris;lmotfon in pi ts. 
This extremely labour ini:2r:shr~ '..)roc2ss meant that a large 
homestead, with more po ten ti 1! 'Hc~·~:2!'"'S ,~o share the 1 abour amongst 
them, could produce more ::~·ai:1, ..;o,~h relatively and absolutely, 
than a small one. This i.ed _;;;aw:::; ·:::bs.:::r·1e: 
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0ne great object which the chiefs and weal thy men 
••• contemplate when multiplying wives, being to 
secure a sufficient number of women to supply their 
establishment with corn and other agricultural 
produce."( 77) 
Apart from the number of workers, the extent of ground under 
cultivation was also influenced by the length of the rainy 
I 
season. Without any irrigation, and therefore dependent on 
natural precipitation, the Xhosa often found that if the rains 
were 1 ate the ground was too hard to hoe and no seed cou1 d even be 
planted. (78) The yields were generally not _very high. Dohne 
observed that women had speci a 1 access to grain before the heavy . 
work of harvesting, when supplies were at their 1 owest. Some 
grain was speci fi ca11y kept back for the use of people who might 
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be sick and might require more nourishment, when the - genera1---------
supply was depleted. (79} 
The balance between agriculture and pastoral ism was determined by 
the prevailing ecological conditions within the territory of the . 
chiefdom. There is no doubt that the . people could fa 11 back on 
pastoral ism and harvesting almost to the al together total neglect 
of agriculture, and this was especially true in tirries of war and 
drought. {80) 
~c2>4\_0 ~1/ 
Agriculture, unlike pastoralism, showed far more communal effort - -in both production and consumption of the product. As has been 
irenti oned, the gardens of a homestead were mar.aged co 1 lectively, 
alt.'iough each ·.vife still retained special re.sponsibility for a 
particular garden site .. There were no rules preventing the 
exogamous use of grain. In fact it was expected :hat assistance 
WCti1d be given on a generous scale, if for sor.:-e r::c.son (such as 
variable rainfall) one part of the tribe had crop '."'ai1ure while 
the ether achieved normal yields. (81) 
There is furti1er evidence of the joint use .and ccntr:.11 ever grain 
in the manner of its storage and distrfouthn. '~n;,;;1 i\ias stcred 
off the coo, either in pits located in the ca::ti~= :<r1ai or in 
grain huts. The grain pits being located in the cattle kraal 
meant that maintenance and preparation of the pits was male work. 
Grain pits could be as large as six feet square, with a narrow 
neck about t110 foot in diameter. They could hold from ten to 
twenty-eight bushels, (approximately 560 to l 570 lbs). The pi ts 
were sea1 ed at the neck with a stone and dung. Once sealed, the 
pi ts were reasonably impervious to rain. It was thus common for 
nei.ghbouring homesteads to share the contents of their grain pi ts 
I 
;_ 1Ni'len one was empty they proceeded to open the next one, so as 
not to unnecessarily expose too ll1Jch grain to th(: elements. (82) 
The prominence of women's 1 abour in agriculture did not therefore 
carry any of the prestige, or the economic or political 
implications of men's dominance over cattle keeping. Arable 
~ --
agricul tura1 work was drudgery, and it fe 11' to the 1 ot of women to 
sustain it. Perhaps for this very reason, however,-- -good-· 
agricultural sites were jealously prized, and once gained were not 
lightly relinquished. Land free of stumps, rocks and stones, of 
good fert"ility, and not too far from the site of the homestead, 
was hi gh1y prized. The absence of an abundance of such 1 and, and 
the rranifest advantages which possession of it gave to the 
homestead was an important factor in. determining the change of thi: 
site of the homestead itself. As has been suggested, the absence 
of such sites in the bounded territory of the chief dam as a whole 
cou1 d become a !T'.ajor factor im prompting a par ti cul ar household to 
support the emergence of a new chief and the acqu isi ti on of fresh 
territory. As eariy as tlie 1820s Smith had observed: 
11 
••• as population increases they will require more 
1 and and if they do not get that one of two th in gs 
wi11 hap9en, ~ither wars or regular settlement and 
cul tivati 0n . .. the want of more territory is what 
sets therr. ofte.n to migrate. 11 (83) 
Increasing the .:ippi i cat~ on of 1 ab our at a par ti cul ar garden s i ~ 
was the '.'.ln1y ·"~'/. ·1:1 the absence of any improvement in technology, 
to incre::se ::.h,~ pr?ductivity of a homestead. A 1 arge homest2ad 
wi th coed "Jar ~a.nd wouid be in a position to \vithstand 
depri v :31 ti en in :~:r:es ':Jf arcucht and would be able to all cw far the _, 
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use of grain for ceremonial purposes and in beer making, as well 
as the possibility of supplying grain to the chief. Such 
households wou1 d therefore be able to utilise surp1 us grain for 
social and political ends. Small homesteads, especially if they 
had to make do with inferior soils, were in a far worse position. 
This militated against the breaking away of households to form 
independent homesteads. Thus by the 1850s Maclean noted: 
11Whi1 e Kaffraria was but thinly popu1 ated, changes of 
residence, from various causes were common .•. but 
a Kafir never left his home simply for the sake of 
change, except the change was for the better as 
regards cattle and cornfields. 11 (84) 
The choice of garden site was in fact a function of the choice of 
site for the homestead i tse l f. The homestead had to be on a site 
which was •.ve11 drained and free from subterranean water which 
could ruin the stored grain. The homestead occupied quite a large 
piece of 1 and, consisting not only of the huts of the various 
houses (families) but the catt1 e kraal, anci 11 ary kraals, store 
huts, guest huts, and the garden land itself. The availability of 
suitable sites for the establishment of homesteads was t1erefore 
an important constraint on the rapidity with which they cou1 d be 
established. If such sites were scarce, it would be more 
difficult for young married men to establish their own homesteads, 
and the size, power and prestige of existing homesteads, would be 
increased simultaneously, fueling the social antagonism thus 
created. 
iii) Domestic Labour and Special isatian 
Within the homestead a large variety cf domesi:1c lilanufactures were 
carried out. These cou1d·be more~ or 1,:;ss, skilled, and each 
homestead would try to concentrate the r~c:;is·;te ski1is within its 
ranks. ihe preparation of c1 othing has ai re~ dy been· ITT:nti on ed. 
This ·,i1as the most common manufacture and :ne sk 111 m do i t was 
possess.ed by every woman. In additfon to c·!:ytJiing, wcmen were 
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responsible for making clay pots, grass mats and baskets. 
Clay working and the building of kilns was a specialised process. 
Different types of non-porous pots, with or without glazing, were· 
made for different uses - such as carrying and storing water, beer 
and milk, and for cooking. Where a homestead was small, and no 
woman skilled in working with clay was found within it, pots could 
be acquired in exchange. · .Kropf noted that a clay pot with a 
· volwre of two buckets was obtained for an ox hide or, 
occasionally, a cCM. (85) As with all occupational 
specialisation, this never became an exclusive field from which 
the specialists earned their subsistence. (86) 
All wom:n, generally, made sleeping mats and grain baskets and 
these were not highly valued. Large quantities of beads were 
utilised from a very early date in the decoration of clothing of 
women, girls and uninitiated males. The work of making beaded 
decorations was ex~1usive1y female. Another roore specialised 
domestic occupation was pipe making, which was a craft practised 
by a few rren. It gained si gni fi cance in the 1 i ght of the Xhosa 
reputation for tobacco growing. Peires has shown. that there \'/~S -2 
deman d for Xhosa tobacco from as far afield as t1e Sotho in the 
Transvaal. ( 87) Tobacco smoking was very general and Alberti 
observed that everyone seefred tD smokej which presumably meant 
that the demand for pipes was quite 1 arge. The pipe maker was 
paid in beads, some rretal article of value, or a goat. (88) 
The most important special i sa ti on was 
The Xhosa . had to import ~ ron ore 
't1a t of the me ta 1 smiths. 
t1rough barter with the 
neighbouring Thembu, and pcs:s~bly fran Zululand. It seems that 
iron ore was often very scarce and insufficient for the needs of 
assegai manufacture. The loca.1 smiths were one of the only 
groups, other than doctors, :o .'laved permanent specialisation in 
their craft. Bec.ause of the ;1i;n va1;.ie placed on assegais, they 
were frequently used in ti•'2 ·sft:';e:r.ent of debts - especially in 
the payment of doctors. 
Assegais were not produced in a haphazard way, but were maG€ to 
order. A cow would purchase six to eight assegais. For a man to 
be armed for warfare wou1 d require at 1 east that many assega is as 
had to be thrONn in large numbers to be effective. ( 89) A 1 arge 
trade in assegais must have existed, keeping the smiths constantly 
b.usy, if each ma 1 e was to be equipped 'r'li th the means of war. If 
there were, say, 25 000 married men in the Ngqika, Ndlanbe, and 
allied chiefdoms (as estimated by van der ~emp during his visit of 
1804) and if at the time of his visit each possessed a clutch of 
assegais, then the scale on which assegais were produced must have 
been very 1 arge in deed. 
In addition the smiths produced a variety of metallic beads, 
bangles and rings, usually from copper, but 1ater ·also from 
brass. They also made hoes and axes and solid metal shafts up to 
six inches long. The fitting of permanent handles to these 
implements forrred a separate craft skill • ( 90) 
Fina11y the practice of doctors and diviners formed one of the 
most extensive and specialised fields in Xhosa society. Doctors 
had to be paid in cattle, or with assegais: for their diagnostic 
and healing service. Doctors were freq~ently and extensively 
consulted on a regular basis by the me!T'bers of all househo1 ds. 
They would be consulted not only in times of ill health, but also 
in times of other personal crisis or calamity to the people or 
stock of the homestead.. The nature of medical beliefs and 
practices will be more fully discussed below in the context of the 
war of M1angeni and of the cattle-killing. 
As can be seen at many points, 1..thether for the work of pot making, 
the purchase of assegais and otJ1er ~tall ic objects, consul ta ti on 
with a doctor,. or the purchase of a pipe, a surplus was required 
with.in th·e homestead to mak2 pr·Jvision for these services. The 
smaller a homestead was, t1e 1ess likely was it to have many of 
these skills concentrate!j ·w·f:..'i·in its n.nks, and also the less 
1 ik el y it was to have the :;;.: '!';t} e resources necess.ary to purchase 
these services. The ex;:ans·:,::n ·:.f ~he homestead implied a more 
effective concentration of cr'3~: s:~11i within the group. 
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Most work in the homestead was collective, 1vomen helping each 
other with different aspects of their several tasks at which ~ach 
one was particularly adept. ·This was particularly so in the 
making of huts, clothing and pots. The productivity of labour, 
and the assuredness and quality with which basic wants could be 
met, were therefore better secured in a large homestead than a 
small one. Thus for basic economic reasons the heads of 
homesteads desired to obtain adherents. 
V The Establishment of Homesteads and the Creation of Chiefdoms 
As can be seen from the above consideration of pastoralism, 
agriculture and domestic crafts in the Xhosa homesteads, it was 
not an al together easy matter for a young married man to begin a 
place of his own. He would often spend many years in his 
father's homestead. If his father was rich, he might be joined 
there by a variety of distant re1 a ti ons and other unre1 a ted poor 
families who became part of his father 1 s homestead. 
The relationship between these large, rich homesteads and the 
chief was highly significant. The chief depended on them for a 
large part of his support. W. Shaw, in his reply to Sir Andrew 
Smith 1 s ques ti onnai re, was parti cul ar1y struck by the role of the 
chief in supporting the ambitions of these key homestead heads. 
He wrote: 
II while the chief frequently takes away catt1 e to 
{ 
(sic) those W'hom he chooses - he does not however 
always 9ive merely to the poor, but also to his 
favourites and such as have obtained any par ti cul ar 
influe.nca in the tribe. They in their turn, in 
order tc .:it"tach a oortion of the ooor oeoole to 
their own immediate interests, frequently give them 
C3ttl e . __ .....,.._ ••• u {emphasis added J. L.) (91) 
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Shaw's observation closely supports ·Morgan 1 s view of .how the 
homestead was constituted and er.'.arged by the accretions of poor 
and indebted households. 
In this way a chief could influence the distribution of cattle 
across the whole nation, thus decisively influencing the number of 
families which were concentrated in in di vi dual homesteads. A 
chief had to be able to acquire cattle continually to meet the 
demands made upon him. This he did in the process of deposition 
of the old councillors of his father, through confiscations, and 
through the operation of his court. Dugnore perceptively 
suggested that the chief required a "constant fund" of cattle from 
which to satisfy his dependents and the amount of the fund 
required could be judged from the character of the demands made 
upon him. (92) 
With ITBny impoverished men seeking wives, the chief wou1 d tend to 
increase the rate of appropriation from the homesteads. But this, 
as has been seen, was not necessarily a process of equalisation -
as the anthropological view of 'redistribution•· has sometimes 
implied. On the contrary, it was primarily a process of 
increasing the size of homesteads. It was only in the early years 
of the rule of a chief, during the phase of the 1reconstitution 1 
of the dominant cl ass, that any real 're distribution' tock , pl ace 
and this, more or less rapidly, gave way to concentration of 
ownership of cattle. One can thus understand the si gni fi cance of 
support for the cl aims of a son of a chief to a portion of the 
nation. Such support was offered in the hope of achieving more 
privileged access to the cattle, through the chief, and, with t'ie 
expansion of territory, t1e hope of achieving the capacity to 
establish an independent homestead. As Smith observed: 
11They are in general much .:i. ttached to the 
subordinate chiefs .::nd '"'ill sometimes for him, risk 
all and stand up a·gainst t.1e King (and) move off 
over the border. 11 ( 93) 




The women belonging to the 1 ess wel 1-off cl ass of 
people .•. per·i'crming services by being hired by 
persons who are better off to work the 1 and .•. 11 
and also to those who have 11less cattle than is necessary for the 
maintenance of his family 11 • (94) 
Smith also observed: 
11
Many families who have soire means have sometiires 
relations or adopted persons in the capaci·ty of 
slaves or servants and they find it the easiest way 
of supporting themselves, having no property or but 
little of their OtVn." (95) 
The possibility of a family that could not meet its requirements 
for reproduction was catered for by their joining the foll owing of 
a rrore successful senior. By virtue of his following, the senior 
was ensuring himself a place in the councils of a chief and 
against the effects of demographic and ecological variables which 
could render him helpless in times of extremity. 
following was able to supply support to the 
A man with a 
chief. Sy 
participating in the judicial business of the Great Place he was 
also supporting the rm.terial appropriations of the chief and 
putting himself in a position to receive cattle from the chief. 
Peires has commented that of all the chief 1 s councillors, the 
heads of cl an sections and 1 eaders of local followings were the 
nDst important for it was on them that the power of the chief 
rested. Such counci11 ors who were heads of local 
received cattle and other gifts without asking for them. 
followings, 
( 96) 
The expansion of the homestead beyond the immediate nuclear family 
was inherent in tlie expansion of the chiefdom as a whole. 
Limitations on the availability of new homesteads combined with 
the increa.s ing conc:n tration of ownership of . ca tt1 e caused 
expansion of :.:;e number of families in existing homesteads. !t 
was thus t.'1e operation of this socially conditioned land scarcity 
that affect2d the rate of appropriation of surplus labour by the 
heads of Stich ·excan:iing 1;11i zi, and by the chief. Having mere 
women ·.vi t11in t'i:~ umz1 ail owed the extension of collective 
cul tivat~on at :l par-:icu1 ar garden site. The !T'al e work of fencing 
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garden lands, building cattle kraals, as with the female work of 
hut construction, 'l1as subject to extended co-operation, and there 
were thus definite savings in labour through the concentration of 
fami 1 i es with in a homestead. 
The number of families concentrated in an homestead could thus be 
held as the key indicator of the degree of centralisation of the 
control over cattle and land achieved within the chiefdom as a 
whole. It was indicative of the hegemony of the 'higher 
cornmunity 1 (in the persons of the chief and his principal 
supporters) over the 1 local community~ and reflects the intensity 
of _exploitation. The number of wives co-resident in a homestead 
(f.e~ the rate of polygamy) would be a further indication of 
centralisation. In the terms of the earlier discussion of the 
constitution of the lineage mode of production, it was at times 
possible for the 'higher community'. to achieve a greater degree of 
separation of the direct producers from the means of production by 
rreans of their greater control over cattle and women. However 
this control was gradua11y eroded in an active process of struggle 
against it. 
Our argument has been that the fundamental cl ass relation was that 
wtlich gave senior men, who had accummulated cattle and i1dves, 
control over younger rren who wished to marry, and that chiefly 
power was vested in the political relationship bet.veen the heads 
of homesteads and the chief on the one hand, and the mass of 
indebted juniors on the other. Under these circumstances the 
heads of homesteads were able to preclude the setting up of imizi 
for a considerable period. 
found themselves in a 
It is by no means c1 ear that all men 
position to establish an independent 
homestead. The speci fi ca ti on of the con di ti ens under which a 
homestead could be established, with access to cattle and land, 
therefore becomes a question of the greatest importance. It has 
beien argued that it was with the establishing of 3. privileged 
relationship bet'.veen a particular group of men and .;l chi·ef that 
such possibilities emerged - as part 0f the nation moved out and 
established themselves in fresh territory. The affects of 
Co1cnial conquest and mercantile pen2t1aticn en this dia1ectic 
""ill for:n the subject of subsequent consider"': ·ti or.. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EARLY MERCANTILE ERA - ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS TO 1848 
I The Conceotualisation of the Effects of Exchange on 
The Pre-Caoita1ist Mode of Production 
61 
Up to now we have concentrated on showing that 1 and and 1 and 
scarcity were indeed potent factors in pre-Colonial Xhosa 
economy. It was argued that 1 and formed the middle term in ~"le 
equation that linked commoner homesteads and their cattle to the 
chiefly hierachy. We 1T1Jst now briefly consider the effects which 
over 50 years of interaction with colonists had on the structure 
of the Xhosa soci a 1 forma t1 on from 1800. 
The Colonial State, from the start, actively intervened in the 
conflicts over the distribution of resources between Nguni 
chiefdoms. The aim in doing so was to promote chief$ who wou1 d be 
dependent on it and thus would be unable to wage: w::.-: or form 
alliances against Colonial expansionist interests. Thus although 
th,e Col'onia 1 State favoured a minimum of contact with the Ngun i 
formations on the part of the Colonists, it nevertheless entered 
into alliances with various chiefs - the result of which was 
fundamentally to change the distribution of power amongst the 
Xhosa and Thembu social formations. 
This is best illustrated by the conflict between Ngqika and 
Ndl ambe in 1818. Ngqika, who had by this time become heavily 
dependent upon Colonial support, was defeated by Ndlambe, who had C\. 
previously only recognised Hintsa (the Gcal eka paramount chief) 3.S "\ 
his superior west of the Kei. The- Colonial Staf~)used the defeat 
c___ --- - -
of it 1 s .a11y Ngqika a.s an excuse to attack Nd1ambe~ and Colcinel 
Brereton took ofr@)Joo Ndlambe cattle. The main part of tie 
Ndlambe force 1r1as decirriated in the failed attack on Gr\zh.'3mstcwn 
under Nxeie (Makanda). The visible support of the Coiony for 
Ngqika r$inforc~:d i:is position over other chiefs (1 ). 
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However the Colonial State soon moved against Ngika hiw~Alf, with 
Somerset's creation of a 'neutral belt 1 (known as the Ceded 
Territory) bet'.veen the Kat and Kei skamma rivers. 
Ngqika1s sons learned the dangers of collaboration from Ngqika, 
having seen their father placed in such a position that he had 
'voluntarily' to hand over this important piece of country. 
Ngqika's acts of betrayal did not undermine his sons' position. 
On the contrary, they encouraged the formation around them of 
strong followings which desired both to re-establish the former 
Ngqika hegemony and to free t'iemselves of the Colonial menace. 
At the same till'e the Colonial State continually pressed Ngqika on 
the perennial question of cattle thefts. Ngqika was no more able 
to act effectively on this in 1819 than he had been in 1812"- He 
was increasingly isolated from the proliferating new generation of 
chiefs, amongst them his own adult sons, Maqoma and Tyhali, and 
Ndlambe's son Mdushani. The latter was reconciled i,Jith his father 
after a period of antagonism. 
Into this situation of internal political tension t:iHo important 
new developme.nts were introduced.. The opening up of trade 'rJith 
the Xhosa and their hinterland, and the arrival of the Mfengu. 
The earliest trade dated from about 1750 and was based mainly on 
cattle. This trade was irregu1 ar and it is very di ffi cult to 
assess its size or impact. In the late 18th century trade had 
been inter~persed with 'wars• - those of 1779, 1793 and 1799 were 
more like rapacious commando raids against Xhosa cattle by mixed 
Boer, Khoi, Colonist and Xhosa forces undertaken with a view to 
the acquisition of cattle (2). 
During the last two decades of the 18th century there was a 
dramatic increase in t'1e amot.:nt of catt1 e bartered from the 
Xhosa. In July 1752 a petty chief who exchar.ged two cows told 
Ensign Beut1 er, when asked ·"'hy other people did not come to 
exchange, that: 
11we must not remain here any longer as other Captains 
1'J j n not exchange• II ( 3) 
By 1813 Capt; Alberti could write to the Governor that: 
11Many Kaffirs asked permission to bring slaughter 
cattle to the Bay to exchange ·.vi th us 11 ( 4) 
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Because of the shortages of meat at the Cape, barter with the 
Xhosa was officially permitted in 1781 - only to be closed again 
in 1786. 
The loss of territory sustained by the Xhosa in 1812 and 1819, and 
the influx of settlers after 1820 stimulated the frequency of 
trade. In 1822 certain Colonial officials thought they could 
monopolise the sale of red clay (used extensively for cosrootic 
purposes) as some clay pits had come into Colonial hands as a 
result of the expulsion of the Xhosa over ttie Keiskamma in 1819. 
When the chiefs faun d that only red clay would be ava i1ab1 e for 
exchange very 1 i tt1 e ivory was forthcoming. When beads and 
buttons were included for exchange at tie clay pi ts, 434 lbs. of 
ivory was offered (5). 
Shortly thereafter in 1824 the first official market was opened, 
with the ins ti tu ti on of t1e trade fairs at Ft. 1..Jil 1 shire. These 
fairs were closely regulated but were initially very successful 
(6). The opening of this trade had significant effects in 
bolstering Ngqika 's chiefta incy. He succeeded in gaining a high 
degree of control over the Xhosa traders and according to one 
contemporary observer: 
"he levied on them an intolerably heavy tax, in 
consideration of the fairs being l1e1d i.n the 
borders of his ccmain. No sooner v1as a bargain 
struck, than he or his agents t.mceremcniously 
sei.zed the choicest part of the proce-eds 11 ( n. 
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The Ft. Willshire trade fairs inaugurated a commerce .that was to 
dominate the next thirty years, until the subordination of 
commercial interests to those of agriculture. The size of the 
trade was enormous. In the first months an estimated 32 000 
pounds sterling worth of commodities was removed from Xhosaland 
(8). While the immediate effects of the trade fairs were to boost 
the declining authority of Ngqika in the closing years of his 
reign (he died in 1829), the 1 ong term con sequences are perhaps 
more important. 
Ivory was the ma in corrmodi ty required by the Col on is ts and beads 
were the principal means of payment. From 18th August 1824 to 
12th March 1825, 50 331 · 1bs. of ivory were exchanged. In addition 
about 16 800 lbs. of mimosa gum and 15 000 hi des were brought to 
the fairs (9). This rrassive increment to the trade of Cape 
merchants had a spin-off effect on the entire Cape economy. 
Traders purchased ivory for 1 to 1.5 rix dollars per lb. Beads by 
contrast sold for 4.5 to 20 rix dollars per lb. and buttons from 4 
to 10 rix dollars. Approximately 4 lbs. of ivory was required to 
purchase one lb. of beads. The terms of trade were obviously not 
favourab 1 e to the Xhosa; I:i Cape Town traders obtained 3 
shillings to 3 shillings and 9pence per lb. for the ivory (10), 
132 traders tock out 1 icenses to trade, al though the actual number 
trading must have been much higher because many people, including 
soldiers, who were officially debarred from the general trade, 
also participated at other si tss (11 ). 
It is important to see that the trade was not exclusively basi=d on 
ivory. Hides, horns and aloes played an important part. The best 
statistics avail a.b1e on the trade up to the time of the closure of 
t'ie fairs in 18.28 are provided by Sir Andrew Smith i,.mo compi'led 
the fo1iowfog table of exports for the period 1799 - 1828, in 
order to espha::5is.:: the importance of the trade with Xhosa1and for 
the Cci ony: 
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Table 1 Exports of Ivory, Horns, Hides and Aloes from Xhosa 
Chiefdoms (1799-1802 and 1818 - 1828) (12) 
YEAR IVORY ( 1 b s. ) HORNS (lbs.) HID ES ( 1 b s . ) ALO ES (1 b s . ) 
1799 1 481 2 or 3 000 126 684 
1800 1 500 2 or 3 000 71 834 
1801 1 500 2 or 3 000 32 181 
1802 1 500 2 or 3 000 91 219 
1818 3 815 4 560 
1819 1 910 5 955 
1820 9 510 509 3 819 
1821 4 538 3 010 2 732 
1822 24 420 19 266 16 391 
1823 19 885 15 011 15 017 
1824 20-661 48 436 12 126 
1825 106 778 62 554 29 722 
1826 26 258 66 615 40 047 
1827 38 140 78 289 75 210 
1828 21 413 95 069 
From Table 1, it is also possible to estimate what the impact of 
the trade within tie Xhosa social formation must have been. 
Between 1824 and 1828 a total of 213 250 lbs. of ivory, 350 963 
lbs. of horn and 157 105 lbs. of hi des were supplied by the 
Xhosa. Using an exchange ratio of 4:1 for ivory and beads, this 
means that the ivory a1one must have secured some 53 313 lbs. of 
beads. If to this is added beads and other commodities received 
for t'ie sa1:: of horns and hides it is clear that a vast 
monetarisation of Xhosa economy must have occurred between 1820 
and 1830, providing a nev and independent basis for the 
accumul,~tion of ·:3t':1e in tlie Xhosa econo1ny. It is impossible to 
realiy visu.aHse hew great the impact of this must have been. {13) 
Pei res h.:is ?,r,;ued that ~1e Xhosa traders were fu1fi1 i ing tt;e ral e 
of midc1emEn -f;i ·:,112 trac!e of beads. The beads •,yere acquir~d ,::t 
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the Ft. Willshire fairs principally to be re-exchanged further 
inland for more cattle - which was the ,primary form of wealth in 
which they were interested. For the beads acquired from the sale 
of a single hide, a live beast could be obtained inland. (14) 
This was confirmed by the Rev. Shaw, who had himse1 f assisted the 
grcwth of trade by opening up a shop at Wesleyville Mission 
Sta ti on among the Gqunkwebe of Pha to. Shaw observed: 
11The trade among them was originated by that which 
commenced between the Col on is ts and the border 
Caffres, who at an early period of border traffic 
used to take part of those articles which tliey 
purchase·d from the English much further into the 
country, and therewith bartered for cattle with the 
tribes beyond them. They rea 1 i sed very 
considerable profits on those transacti ans and in 
that way it is that I would account for the great 
increase of the stock of cattle possessed by the 
Jlmagonakwaybie tribe living immediately on the 
border. 11 (15) 
The Ft. Wi11shire fairs began to decline because of growing 
resentment of the exactions which Ngqil<a made on the tracE. These 
became more criti ca 1 as profits on the trade declined because of a 
continuing debasement, through inflation, of the beads that formed 
the ireans of payment. This was caused by attempts to flood the 
market 1l'iith cheap beads of a particular variety by the Col onia1 
traders. This would lead to a drop off in demand and cause 't1e 
Xhosa traders to switch to ~no:her sort of bead - which would then 
very rapidly in turn locse its ·1a1ue .• (16) The decisive factor 
was almost certain1y the :::xhausticn of local supplies of ivory; 
which became marked from i:.-326. In fact i ocal supplies were almost 
entirely exhausted and f\r::,ry had to be brought from further 
inland. This cbvious1y ;ni·;~;at2d against the trade fairs, as the 
markets were now too f,:'!r r::~oved from the source of supply. A11 
this, combined with eco:1omiz: d~pressfon at the Cape in 1826, was 
enough to cause the C.:;1 on ~a.1 St::i te to suspend the fairs. 
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By this time the trade had bec0me a vital element in the Colonial 
economy and in . order to save the trade the Col on ial State began 
allowing traders to enter Xhosa country on a permit system from 
1827: The fairs were finally abolished in 1830: and traders were 
all owed to penetrate the interior freely~ These exchange 
relations provided the basis for accumulation prior to the 
establishment of commodity production within the Xhosa social 
formation; This penetration of mercanti1 e activity coincided with 
the end of a period of cen tra1 i sa tion in the Xhosa soc i a 1 
forrration and the beginning of a period of decentralisation which 
began '"'i th the deaths of the great c;:hiefs Ngqika and Ndlarroe. 
We have al ready mentioned the sp1 it bet.veen Ngqika and his sons. 
In 1829, a year after the death of Ngq i ka, Ndl ambe di ed. The 
potential unifier of the Ndlambe~ his son Mdushane, also died in 
May 1829 while still a young man~ This tragedy set off a series 
of conflicts over succession which saw the Ndl ambe split into the 
imiOushane (under another of Ndlambe's sons Qasana) and the 
Ndlambe of Mhalla, a minor son \vho achieved chieftaincy ·through 
carefully manipulated witchcraft accusations~ (17) The Mdushane 
split further between Siwani, who was Mdushane 1s Great Son, and 
Siyolo \oiiio was regent for him at the time of the 1835 war. 
Whi1 e hegemony in the Ciskei was unclear at this time·, Hintsa had 
succeeded in re-establishing the power of the Gcaleka Xhosa 
pararnountcy in the Transkei. after its earlier defeats by Ngqika 
during Hintsa 's minority. It is not cl ear to what extent the 
exchange economy emerging in the 1vest penetrated to Gca1ekaland. 
The arrival there of thousands cf refugees from the Mfecane 
·provided an alternative basis for acc:.;·n1.i1ation and the expansion 
of the economy of Gcalekaland. 
The Mf engu (from the phrase '1w€:. are ...ian cerers seeking service 11 ) 
were formed from a variety of c1 ans 1..ilo dispers2d under the impact 
of the Mfecane. The original ;'>if2ncFi ::·1c.1s, H1ubi, Zizi, Sele and 
Ngwane under Ma tiwane were dis ~er:;,::;d 1:nc11g t1e Gca l eka and the 
Thembu. (18) These refugees 'H.er":: ::bsor 1Jed by the Xhosa 
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homesteads according to t1~ model for expansion of homesteads, "a 
relationship wherein a Mfengu worked for an individual for food, 
shelter, the opportunity to acquire wealth ... and, eventually 
economic independence. 11 (19) 
The relationship between Gcaleka and Mfengu was antagonistic. 
Many heads of homesteads, i'lho were suddenly elevated by the 
acquistion of clients ruch sooner than they might otherwise have 
been, pressed the greatest exactions they cou1 d from them. Mfengu 
accumulated cattle and hid their acquisitions from their masters 
to prevent them from being confiscated. This antagonism bet'.veen a 
busa (service) client and his master was normal. What changed the 
s i tua ti on for the Mfengu was their 1 arge numbers, and the fact 
that there was an a1 ternative source of c1 ientage and patronage in 
the Col on i al State. 
In terms of the Xhosa ruling class outlook on political 
relationships, they were time and again to make the mistake of 
seeing in the Col onia1 State only another chieftaincy, albeit a 
powerful one, with which they could deal in a manner comparable to 
other powerful chieftaincies they had encountered in the past and 
therefore broadly in conformity '"ith existing Xhosa political and 
-social concepts. (20) They did not and could not foresee the 
unending and novel demands that the Colonial State would make on 
them and that the Colonial State was the vanguard for a totally 
new system of society based not on mediation of the conflicts 
between people and the land through chiefs, but on the realisation 
Of J!!Onetary profits, the expansion of monetary 1N'ealth and the 
inauguration of capitalist production. The significance of this 
for us 1 i es not so much in the ru1 ing cl ass outlook itself 
(interesting and significant tJ1ough- i": is) but in the effects of 
the~ new system being i::!iu.gurated "Jy the Colonial State and 
settlers on the internal :riat;ix of r-::1.::tionships of the lineage 
mode of production in the Xhosa ~;t1i:·fal ~~crmation. 
The presence of at least 30 :;Go :~fen;u fr: Gcaiekaland and in other 
parts of the Transk;:i undoub~d1y the pace and variety 
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of economic activity. ( 21) Being present in such 1 arge numbers 
hin~red their absorption, and the presence of the Colony provided 
them with the economic stimulus to play the role of middlemen in 
the trade between the Colony, Gcalekaland and the interior. 
Mfengu were par ti cul arly active in cattle trade. Moyers has 
argued from the evidence he faun d, that they traded tobacco 
locally for small livestock or skins, exchanged these items with 
Colonial traders for 'trade goods 1 and bartered the trade goods to 
the Xhosa and others for more or better 1 ivestock. Each 
transaction increased their relative wea 1th. ( 22) It thus seems 
possible that much of the ivory that made its way to the Ft. 
Willshire fairs was transmitted there by Mfengu middlemen 
traders. It is certainly-in their role as middlemen traders that 
the Mf engu benefited from the di fferen ti al terms of trade within 
the Xhosa formations, and between it and the Colonial traders. 
Thus in . the 1820s and early 1830s t.~ey saw demonstrably the 
possibilities for accumulation inherent in allying themselves to 
the aggressive expansionist force of Colonial trade and arms. 
This message must have been driven home with renewed sharpness in 
the wake of the collapse of the trade fairs in the late '20s. 
Receiving the protection of the Col any must have seemed an ever 
more realistic alternative to the Mfengu as the frontier drifted 
once more towards war in 1835. It certainly must form a major 
part of the explanation of why 30 000 Mfengu followed the 
missionary Ayliff out of Gcalekaland into the Colony during that 
war, where, once settled in the Ciskei, they formed a comp1 feating 
factor in the struggle between the Col any and the Xhosa. ?rior 
to their ,reparture, the effect of the Mfengu presence in 
Gcal ek.a.1 and wa.s to increase the intensity of exp1 oi ta ti on east of 
the Kei. in a similar manner, Ngqika pressed for ever greater 
exacti.cns w~;s-;': .:if it. 
:n >;ur Llnc'.:,::rst.:i.nd·iflg of the dynamics of the lineage mode of 
:Jroc'.uctior:, ::;;,A;:h increases in appropriation led to strugg'ie and to 
the <.i.l.:te 1~1.r:t :o es:abiish a more favourable relationship 1:Jetween 
\ 
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homesteads, cattle and the land thrC'·J9h politically supporting 
the ambitions of a young chief~ It is in t11is context of struggle 
that the complex series of internal conflicts and 'frontier~ wars 
that mark the period 1830 to 1857 rrust be understood. It was also 
in this period that the basis for commodity production within the 
Xhosa social formation was established, and major aspects of the 
1 ineage mod~ were superseded. 
The penetration of mercantile capital coincided with the end of a 
period of centralisation and increased exploitation of the 
homesteads with in the Xhosa formation. This accentuated the 
capacity wi1ich exchange relationships 
transform the character of production. 
inherently possess to 
In commenting on the power 
of capitalist exchange relations to transfonn 
wrote that: --· ----·- -·· 
production 
11 The exchange of the overf1 ow is a traffic which 
posits exchange and exchange value. But it extends 
on 1y to the overf1 ow and plays an accessory role to 
prodJction itself. But if the trading peoples who 
solicit exchange appear. repeatedly and an 
ongoing commerce develops, al though the producing 
people still engages in so-called passive trade, 
since the irnpu1 se for the activity of positing 
exchange values comes from outside and not from ti,e 
inner structure of its production, then the surplus 
of production rust no longer be something 
accidental, occasionally present, but must be 
constantly repeated; and in this way dorriestic 
production itself takes on a tendency towards the 
positing of exchange values ... The organisation of 
domestic production itself is already modifie".l by 
circul.3.t.ion and exchange value; but it has not yet 
:1et:~n c:omp1ete1y invaded by them, either ovc{;r r.i1e 
surfac~ or in C:€pth • • • The degree to which ·:-Jle 
:.!sta!:i1ishment. of exchange value attacks th;:; ""n~-;1e 
o{ p:rccu1;·tion depends partly on the intensit:1· .Jf 
~.:-i~s ·::xt2rna1 influence, and partly on the 
Marx 
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of development attained by the elements of domestic 
production. 11 ( 23) 
To this remarkable statement one can add that it is not only the 
intensity of the 'external influence'. in trade that is important 
but the effects on domestic production of the entire Colonial 
State apparatus, military conquest, missionary ideology etc. It 
is necessary to see Marx 1 s analysis as operating in the context of 
particular conjunctures both with respect to the capitalist and 
non-ca pi ta 1 is t modes of pro du cti on. 
Exchange relations and use of money or a money equivalent are of 
course in no way unique to capitalism. However, the formula for 
merchant capital presented by Marx, ~M-C-M 1 , does have speci fie 
and limited applicability. Although Xhosa homestead heads 
accumulated cattle, it would be ;a gross formalist error to see 
cattle as strictly speaking a money equivalent and the increase in 
cattle gained as an accumulation of caoital as Marx understood 
it. This is the sort of formalism t1at has vitiated the work of 
functio11alists such as Sansom. (24) Although there was 
accumulation and trade with in the Xhosa soci a 1 formation prior to 
E6lonia1 times it has been shown that this 1r1as based on an 
entirely different dynamic in which the money equivalent, cattle, 
did not fulfill the function of money in Marx's scherr:e in which 
money is the universal store of value and all other products are 
exchangab1 e against it as commodities. 
With the introduction of beads and a wider range of commodities 
into which beads could be converted, the first alteration that 
trade had on levels of acc:imul ati on within Xhosa economy became 
apparent. Cattle beoan taking on the form of a universal store of 
value. It is here necessary :o fccus closely on the specific 
differences in mercantile ir:ti::r~c-:ion bet1rleen a capitalist mode of 
production and a pre-capital·is":: ;:icce o·F pr8duction when compared 
with the pre-existing situa~~':on. 
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Under ca pi ta l ism, production, dis tri bu ti on, exchange and 
consumption have become broken up as different moments in the 
process of realising surplus value and capital accumulation. This 
di fferen ti a ti on is a necessary effect of the form of the 
specifically capitalist relations of prociJction; the existence of 
the 'free' ·1 abourer and the owner of the means of production who 
fully controls the production process~ The 1 free' 1 abourer is a· 
very limited agent. His basic function is to produce, and his 
social talents are limited to the reproduction of his labour-power· 
and the maintenance of a family in the interests of replacing his 
labour-power when it is worn out. His development is tlierefore 
one-.sided. Un~r capitalist production, in contrast to 
pre-capitalist modes of prodJction, there are no political and 
ideological interventions between production and consumption 
because consumption is itself determined by the place occupied by 
a particular agent in the structure of the relations of 
pro<ilction. With consumption separated from production, exchange 
and distribution become separate moments that mediate bet'leen 
prod.Jc ti on and consumption. 
Al though the four rroments of the capitalist process of production 
of commodities are analytically separated they must still be 
conceptualised as a totality. This very important point is 
strongly emphasised by Marx who wrote that: 
11The conclusion we reach is not that production, 
dis tribu ti on and consumption are 
that ti'iey all for;n the members 
i den ti cal , but 
of a totality, 
distinctions with a unity ... A definite production 
thus determines a defini:C consumption, 
distribution and exchange as wen as c.efini te 
relations between these differen~ moments." (25) 
In cases of accumulation in pre-c:i;Jit21 1s: :r:odes of production, 
political, social and ideological r'?J;;.;;~'0.f!'5 form constitutive 
parts of the relations of production. 'rc:Hiictivn, distribution, 
exchange and consumption are not f~t s:::;;2n.:ec. The form this 
unity takes in t1e relations of produ:.::t~)n '.s :::he most compiex 
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part of analysing the nature of pre-capitalist modes of 
production. The link between production and consumption is never 
in the form of a simp1 e unity. There is always some form of 
intervention between production and consumption. These 
interventions are precisely political and ideological and tlieir 
exact form cannot be determined in the abstract, outside of the 
analysis of a concrete social formation. 
' 
The significance of this in our consideration of the 1 frontier 1 
between Colonists and Xhosa is the effects of exchange relations 
and market relations, in inaugurating transformations within a 
pre-capitalist mode of production. This question is of particular 
significance in the light of much of the· misplaced Marxist 
criticism of studies that have concentrated on the "the market 11 
rather than on 11 production 11 ~ While much work on 19th century 
Colonial economic expansion and the reaction of the pre-capitalist 
social formations has concentrated on exchange relations, the 
fault does not 1 ie in that fact, but with the fact that the 
effects and functions of exchange relations have not been posed 
within the very speci:fic theoretical framework within tlie 
11Bterialist problematic for understanding these relations. (26} 
Thus although certain revisionist treatments wished to break 1"ith 
the historiographic tradition of the 1dua1 economy thesis 1 , they 
did so only by showing that African cultivators did respond to 
market opportunities and that the decline of th is production was 
related to the rise of migrant labour. (27) They did not reveal 
the basis for this in the structure of the pre-capi ta1 ist mode of 
production itself. From the practical historical viewpoint 
hcwever, the historian is often faced 1ll'ith the fact that it is 
exchange relations that 1eave the greatest impact on the available 
historical record and not the production process which preceded 
them. (28) In order to move frcm 1xchan(!e r~lations to relations 
of production; in order to use exchange relations as keys to 
forming a view of the overall relations of ;:iroduction, it is first 
necessary adequately to conceptualise t.'12se relations. It is this 
cruci a 1 s tsp which some cthar . .,-1 s2 ~:i~pcr:.:.nt s t:.id1 es have omitted. 
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It is characteristic of capitalism that its radical abilit~es to 
transform pre-capitalist social formations are present precisely 
in the sweep of its circuit of circulation of commodities -
regardless of any boundaries constituted by the pre-capi ta1 ist 
mode of production. Capitalist industry seeks to realise surplus 
value and obtain raw materials wherever its commodities· can be 
exchanged for money or for other commodities that are of use in 
its cwn production process~ 1-t'iarx expressed this cl early in the 
fol 1 owing passage: 
"Within its circulation process, in which 
in dus trial capital functions either as money or as 
commodity, the circuit of. industrial capital, 
whether in the form of money capital or cornmo_di ty 
capital, cuts across the commodity circulation of 
the most varied modes of social product~9n-.! __ ~_n __ so 
far as this commodity circulation simultaneously 
reflects commodity production. 
Whether the corrnnodi ti es are the product of 
production based on s1 avery. the product of 
peasants (Chinese, Indian pyots), of a community 
(Dutch East Indies), of State production (such as 
existed in earlier epochs of Russian history, based 
on serfdom) or of half savage hunting tribes etc -
as cormnodi ties and money they confront the money 
and commodities in which industrial· capital 
presents itself, and enter into the latter 1 s own 
circuit and into that of the surplus-value borne by 
the commodity ca pi ta 1 TI:1e character of the 
production process from wi1 i ch they derive is 
imma teria1 Thus the ci r:ul ation process of 
in dus trial capi ta1 is c;;a.rac':eri sed by the 
many-sided character o-f ,: .:.. .... origins, and the ':.,.;:, 
existence of the mark 2 t as .-1or1 d ::iarket. ii '?O) 3. \ '-<J 
Herein can be seen the effects of 2xc~ati9:= relations that are 
speci fical1y caoi ta.1 ist. 3y •.'.~·s.v1 ;ilg 3r"1:--:ap1 ta1 ist modes of 
d ... · · to "'"h .; -r· ·"'" ,.. ;:: ... ~ "·' .- . , 1 .;...;. <:.1. '"e"'e ;-hen s·LlbJ'e.ct pro uci..1on 1n ! ... e c, •. _u1 ...... '""'t" . ...... , ·-"·-/ ". "''·· 
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to an exchange quite un1 ike any other that they had previously 
encountered. That is, a system of exchange relations based on the 
continual reappearance of the means of exchange in expanded fonn, 
this being the necessary consequence of capital accumulation. 
The penetration of merchant capital does~ inaugurate capitalist 
relations of·production. To suppose that it does \'las the mistake 
of A.G. Frank and others who reduced capitalist relations to 
exchange relations. (30) 
What such penetration by merchant capital inaugurates is a period 
of transition and cl ass struggle in which the cl ass forces of the 
pre-capitalist mode contend with the C.o1onia1 representatives of 
capitalism. They contend both individually at the level of 
production, and collectively under the leadership of the ruling 
class of the formation~ As we saw above, Marx explicitly states 
that it is the products of diverse modes of production that are 
initially converted into commodities for capital - the' modes of 
production are not thereby themselves transformed. For Marx this 
period is one which necessarily precedes the process of 
transformation itself, in which conllllodity production is installed 
directly and production is now for exchange value. Marx observed 
that the tendency of the capitalist mode of production: 
;'is to transform a11 possible production into 
commodity production; the ma in means by which it 
does this is precisely by drawing this production 
·into its circulation process. The interaction of 
in dus trial ca pi taJ ev.erywhere promotes th is 
tr an sforma tion, and with it too the tr an sforma ti on 
of all immediate producers into wage-1abourers. 11 
( 31 ) 
The· ci rcul a ti on of comma di ti '?S Wi dier ca pi ta 1 ism is ca pab 1 e of 
"calling forth" exchanse vai•Je .... here: the ptoduction of commodities 
does not yet exist. ?rfor :o 7:112 cominance of commodity 
production within the colon·ised -;.:i.cf::i! formation it is the lure of 
capitalist comrnodi ti ~s, specific internal 
conjunctures t..'1at e1ici :s c:.:iitmod~ :~:::s for -:xchange from whatel/er 
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store of appropriated use values exists. In the case of the Xhosa 
socia1 forrration an examp1 e of this process would be: 
(a) the inherent need from within the Xhosa formation for young 
men to find bases for accumulation outside the restriction of 
the dominance of homestead heads and 
(b) the unique position of the Mfengu. 
It is the endless search _for money and commodities by mercantile 
capitalists that leads to the transformation of non-co111T1odity 
prod.Jcing social formations. However the exact form of this 
transformation and the historical struggles by which it was 
achieved can only be understood by reference to the main lines of 
struggle within the pre-capitalist social formation. It is. only 
by rel a ting observations about trade and exchange to observations 
about such struggle that exchange rel a ti ans may be used as a key 
to an understanding of the dominant relations of production. ( 32) 
Marx fully saw the importance of the structure of the 
pre-capitalist mode of production in determining the course of tie 
interaction of the two rrodes. 
"Commerce, therefore, has a roore or less dissolving 
influence everywhere on the producing organisation 
which it finds at hand and whose different forms 
are ll'.ainly carried on with a vier1 to use-value. To 
what extent it brings about a dissolution of the 
old mode of prod.Jction depends on its solidity and 
internal structure. And whither this process of 
dissolution will lead, what new mode of production 
wil 1 replace the old, does not depend on commerce, 
but on the structure of t1e old mode of production 
i ts e 1 f. 11 ( 33) 
It is then to the 'structure of the old mode of production itse1 f 1 
that one must look to find tr.e secret of merchant capital's 
ab i1 ity to trans form t1e co min en t soci a i relations of production 
of the pr-e-ca pi ta 1 is t :;;ode -'.)-f pre 1.i; c:.i on~ 
II The Expansion of Capitalist Development and Colonial War 
1820-1848 
During this period of contest from 1820 to 1848 in the Cape Col any 
the dominant representatives of capital were the merchant 
connections wnich proliferated from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and 
Grahams town. The Colonial agricultural sector was subordinated to 
them. The agricultural sector, both English and Boer, provided 
the backbone for the onslaught against the Xhosa. This was 
through service in the ·.vars and more particularly through the 
1 cammando 1 and 1 patrol' systems that were widely used in settling 
(and provoking) disputes aver cattle with whatever section of the 
Xhosa they came into contact with. (34) 
Merchant capital 1s attitude towards these excursions was 
anbivalent. On the one hand they wanted to pursue the wars and 
depreda ti ans because they secured the Col on ia 1 · boundaries and 
opened up trade, on the other hand the short term consequences 
were often disastrous. On balance the large mercantile interests 
favoured the setting out of farms for occupation by Colonists and 
the fostering of· sheep farming. .However as 1 ang as the vi at: i1 i ty 
of such colonising remained subject to threat by po1itica11y and 
militarily strong Xhosa chiefdoms they also desired a stable -
frontier which itself provided a large trade. Agricultural 
Colonists themselves had a totally different attitude based on 
their dependence on depredations for the acquisition of herds and, 
more importantly, 1 and. ( 35) 
It was not therefore until the 1870s, with the railway boom and 
the opening up of the diamond mines - when agriculture was able 
to expand at a significantly faster rate, that merchant capital 
began to· tie its oWTl pa th of dev e 1 o pmen t to 
agricul tura1 capi 4:31 in South Africa. 
implications for the attitude ::idopted towards 
th a t o f rn in in g an d 
This had dis ti net 
the Xhosa and other 
indigenous sod.al formations, which held a declining position in 
terms of political impcn:ance to merchant capital. This was 
reflected in t1e pol icy .1dcpted t:Jwards tiie various sections of 
the Nguni which 1.l(er~ annexed ~ :.1'2 CJ.pe. (36) 
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The period after the closure of the Ft. Wil 1 shire tra ee fairs and 
the opening up of free trade with the in:erior saw an acceleration 
of economic activity in the Col any and the beginnings of the 
internal transformation of the Xhosa social formation. The 1830s 
were boom times: "in the five years 1831-5 the value of hides and 
skins exported from the Colony doubled in value till they 
accounted for fully one quarter of the country 1 s total exports; 
and it is evidence of the growing importance of the native trade, 
as well as of settler activities, that 19 per cent of this trade 
was now exported from the open roadstead of Port El izabeth 11 (37). 
Not only did the trade in such traditional staples as hi des and 
livestock expand but a new factor also began to make its presence 
felt - wool . 
In 1822 only 1 460 pounds sterling worth of wool was exported from 
the Col any, out of total exports of domes tic products worth 
219 156 pounds. Wool thus accounted for 0.6% of total exports. 
By 1836 wool accounted for 26 169 pounds or 6.8% of total exports 
worth 269 008 pounds. 1835 also marked the .beginning of the 
unreversed slump in demand for Cape wines foll owing the raising of 
dJties on them by Britain in 1831 ~ This growth prior to the war 
of 1847-48 was itself to be outstripped, as the following table 
sh cws: 
Table 2: Exports of Domestic Produce 1838 - 1850 (39) 
1~AR WINE % OF WOOL % OF TOTAL EXPORTS POUNDS TOTAL POUNDS TOTAL POUNDS 
STERLING STERLING STERLING 
I 1a3a 
11840 
I 1842 I 
! 1844 
I 
I 1846 I I 
I 18481 


















































From Table 2 it can be seen that wool and 1.'l'ine accounted for 52% 
of the total value of Cape exports in 1838 and th is increased to 
70% by 1850. The balance of the exports, in this period, were 
made up in large part by leather, hides, horns, some ivory and 
gum, most of which was obtained in trade with the Xhosa and other 
more easterly chiefdoms. However the growth of wool, which was in 
fact only beginning its period of expansion, had other 
implica}:ions. It was to lead to the absorption of the Colony into. 
imperial trade on a large scale and create the possibility for 
capitalist agriculture in large parts of the agrarian economy of 
the 19th century Cape prior to the opening up of the diamond 
mines. (4Q) It was the demand for large and extensive farms for 
pasturage of sheep and ca tt1 e and the existence of a high and 
steady demand for Colonial wools tliat made the land grabbing of 
the 1835 and 1848 wars inevitable. (41) 
A1 though the economic expansion of this period was small compared 
with what was to foll ow, its si gni fi cance 1 ay preci se1 y in the 
obstacles that establishment of Colonial economy encountered in 
the continued occupation by the Xhosa of their lands. Some idea 
of the nature of investment in Colonial sheep farming is given in 
the ~vidence of a Parliamentary·Select Committee, appointed in 
1860 to investigate the compensation paid to frontier farrr.-ers in 
the war 1846-48. The Cammi ttee cons is te d of members of t1e 
border region such as v!al ter Stanton and T. H. Bowker. Bowker 
himself was one of the major sheep farmers who had suffered 1 asses 
in that period. He told the committee that in 1846: 
111-fe had about 32 000 sheep .•• at the c1 ose of the 
war they were about 6 000. 11 ( 42) 
The 1 ea ding .,,,; tness was a Lt. Dani e1 of Sidbury Park who started 
farming after the war of 1835. He claimed to have had 5 000 head 
of sheep, 150 cattle and 25 horses by 1846 .. He told the committee: 
11The sheep were highly improved :11er'nos, worth fu1 ly 
1 pound each. I had aiso ;nany imported sheep, 
Saxons wortl-J 20 or 22 pounds e:i.ch .•• I was at the 
tiroo the 1 argest proprietcr of ,Jtire-bred sheep in 
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the Colony and was supplying about 500 fine wooll ed 
rams through the various districts of the Colony 
yearly • • • Between the ~vars of 1835 and 1846 I 
imported several ft.ustra1 ian and Saxon merino sheep, 
which cost me 2 680 pounds, during the ten years. 11 
( 43) 
He claimed that most of his investment was lost in the 1846-8 
war. In addition there were 22 600 head of sheep be1 onging to 
other parties on his farms. He possessed a total of 41 600 acres 
of 1 and in several farms, and this gave him an income of 2 000 
pounds per annum, when the wool price was between 1 shil 1 ing and 
tenpence halfpenny to 2 shillings per lb. 
There were other farmers of similar substance in the midlands bei t 
ben'leen Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown and the Albany district 
itself was also fast expanding. In the light of such develoµnents 
in Colonial agriculture it is at once clear why military solutions 
were favoured by the Colonists. 
Some of the early observers fully understood the implications of 
the depredations of 1 and from the Xhosa carried on by the Colony 
in the wars of 1819, 1835 and 1848. The confiscation of land has 
to be seen in conjuncti en with the internal 1 aws ·of iT'iOti on of the 
lineage mode of production as inscribed in the Xhosa social 
formation. (44) Of a11 the Colonial observers the one who seems 
to have most closely understood the rea1 nature of the dialectic 
of expansion of the Xhosa social formation was Sir Andrew Smith. 
He observed the relative importance of cattle as means of 
subsistence and drew from t.~is certain important conclusions: 
11 In a pastoral 1 ife where man.kind depends in great 
measure for their food on hunting and the milk of 
cattle a vast extent of territory is necessary for 
supporting a sma11 body of people in proportion as 
they multiply and unite. The 'H'ild animals diminish 
and fly to a greater distanc: from the haunts of 
their enemies and the incr<.?ase of cattle necessary 
for the addition of population requires an 
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ex ten ti on of pasture . .. The country which they 
inhabit is deemed the property of the tribe or: 
nation from which it has a right to exclude every 
other rival." (45) 
The 'national 1 nature of occupation of territory, the fact that 
the chief rules over a 1 imi .ted and defined territory, is the root 
cause of the cycles of relative land scarcity that lead to the 
expansion of chiefdoms through wars, the proliferation of 
chiefdoms through segnentation and the overall growth of the 
kingdom. By the late 1820s such expansion was blocked by 
Colonial land acquisition and occupation. Expansion in 
pre-Colonial times had mostly involved military and political 
contest with rivals bordering the areas of expansion. As a result 
it was inevitable that such conflict would continue despite the 
greater threat posed by the Colony. In short, the 'interchiefly 
competition 1 must be seen as ·integral to the 1 aws of motion of the 
dominant mode of production, that would not be stopped merely by 
the presence of the Col on i al interl aper. 
Rei iance on cattle necessitated transhumance or removal of cattle 
to other areas in times of drought. In the most westerly reaches 
of Xhosa occupation the need for mixed grazing veld was 
essential. Without access to sweetveld grasses, which grow in the 
high altitude belts, the cattle would die in winter \okien sourveld 
grasses lose their nutritional value and become unpalatable to 
animals. Sourvel d grasses are however the best grazing and stock 
thrive on them in spring and summer. Over-exposure to the winter-
sweetve1 d grazing may cause stock to deteriorate. (46) It was 
therefore essential to have access to both types of pasture. Tl1is 
continues to be the case today and Child has noted that 
11 Winterberg farmers own sweetvel d farms as well. These are used 
for winter grazing and the sourvel d farm for sur.rrner grazing. 11 ( 47) 
With the loss of the 'Ceded territory 1 between the Keiskamma and 
Fish Rivers in 1819, in which tJ1e Winterberg is included, a large 
amount of the best sourvel d :r1as 1 ost to the Xhos.'l. Thus apar~ 
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from the strain of providing residential and garden sites~ 
pasturage that was vital to Xhosa economy was being threatened. 
In 1824 Sir Andrew Smith was already able to observe this and the 
inevitable effect on the mode of production it entailed: 
"As 1 ong as the Ca ffres do not take to agriculture 
they wil 1 never be· ab 1 e to 1 ive concentrated, as 
population increases they will require more land 
and if they do not get that one of two things will 
happen, either wars or a regu1 ar sett1 ement and 
cultivation. Since we became familiar with the 
Ca ffres they must have more than daub 1 ed their 
population and certainly according to their mode of 
life Kaffirland is not at present sufficient for 
them. The want of more territory is what sets them 
to emi grate. 11 ( 48) 
Smith's un derstan ding supports the view developed here of the 
nature of the historical conjuncture by 1848 - that the Xhosa 
social formation was entering a period of economic and ecological 
crisis in which the Colony constituted a barrier to the necessary 
expansion of the formation. The resultant conflict both between 
chiefs and with the Col any was thus, to a 1 arge extent, a product 
of the operation of the internal dynamics of the Xhosa' social 
formation. It is therefore no longer possible to accept tJ1eories 
which hold that the 1fronti er conflict 1 was the result of any one 
particular factor on the frontier. All particular factors: trade, 
cattle raiding, and agriculture have to be related to the struggle 
to secure the conditions for expansion and reproduction of the 
basic relationships of the lineage mode of production in the Xhosa 
social formation. 
The events leading up to the war of 1835, and the fol lcwing war in 
1847-48, represent the acme of Colonial land greed. The 
deliberate shooting of several sons of :::hiefs was but the prelude 
to trye shooting ,;.nd f:ijury of Sandil1e 1 s brother Xoxo which 
signalled the start of the 1834-35 war, that ended 1Hith the 
assassination of the Xhosa (Gcaleka) paramount Hintsa 0y the arch 
expansionist Southey 1Hith the assistance of Imperial forces. (49) 
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The land in question in this war was the portion of the 1 ceded 
territory' ":!iat the Ngqika had been all owed to continue occupying 
after 1819 - between the Tyhume {tributary of the Keiskamma) and 
the Keiskamma Rivers. Ngqika had his Great Place there, at the 
present site of Alice. 
Maqoma, Ngqika 1 s son, certainly never accepted the 1 ass of the 
'ceded territory' and made repeated attempts to recover it. These 
attempts led eventually to the war of 1835 and further loss of 
territory associated with it. After the war, in 1836 Governor 
D'Urban created the ill-fated Province of Queen Adelaide in the 
territory between the Kei skamma and Kei Rivers. Maqoma, who was 
in 1835 stil 1 regent for the young San dill e, wished to establish 
himself west of the Tyumie in the ancestral Xhosa 1 ands. The need 
to cb so was aggravated by drought in 1829. On that and t.i/o 
subsequent occasions in 1833 and 1834 Maqoma was forcibly evicted 
from his lands. 
The missionary author 11 Justus 11 , for one, saw the cause of Maqoma 1 s 
reoccupation of the ceded territory in the necessity engendered by 
overcrCJNding east of the Keiskamma: 
11 the inconvenience, distress and want, amounting 
to starvation, which they endured by being forced 
with their -herds upon other cl ans already too 
closely condensed, and in dry season compelled them 
to return to the 1 ands out of which they had been 
driven .•• in the autumn of 1834 there took pl ace 
the last expulsion with a11 that conflagration of 
huts .•• so that in fact Macoma and his peop1 e were 
for a wticle 12 months in a constant state of 
al arm; the patrols were continually harrassing, 
driving, burning and expelling. 11 ( 50) 
The methods employed by the Colonial forces in i835 were an 
extension and r·e finement of those used against Chung'i'le when he was 
still on the Fish River in 1812; burning of huts, des:ruction of 
grain stores and confiscation of thousands of head of cattle. 
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D' Urban actually planned to expel all the Xhosa beyond the Kei ~ 
but this was not militarily possible: At the end of the war 
Maqoma 
1
s personal entourage still numbered l 200 mounted 
cavalry~ The Ngqika bore the brunt of the war~ but the Ndlambe 
near the coast were hardly troubled by it~ Peires has 
interestingly suggested that a:~ 
11 historical opportunity was 1 ost wnen Gl enelg 
reversed the decision to establish the Province of 
Queen Adelaide with rnagisterial rule over the Xhosa 
- an immediate uprising at that point could have 
been successful in overrunning the Col any." ( 51) 
Both the •14ars of 1835 and 1848 were characterised by only partial 
unity on the part of the Xhosa chiefs. In 1835 Mqhyai, the 
Ndlambe chief, and Oyani Tshatshu (Ntinde) and Phato, c.hief of the 
Gqunukhwebe stayed out, though many of their followers deserted 
them for one of the belligerents~ (52) The eclipsed Nd1ani:>e 
chief Mgayi joined Pha to in staying out of the war. As in the 
other conflicts this may have been partly by design as stock •.vas 
sent to non-belligerent chiefs for safekeeping. It was in the 
aftermath of the Colonial attack on the Gcaleka that trie· Xhosa 
paramount Hintsa 1 ost his 1 i fe when he was taken pr.is oner by 
subterfuge after entering the Imperial army's headquarters for 
'negotiations' and was then shot \vhile allegedly trying to 
escape. The military had demanded 50 000 cattle as an indemnity 
to be pa i d by the Gca l eka. 
The war hit the Gcaleka especially hard. In addition to the 
50 000 head of cattle demanded by the Colony, the 17 000 Mfengu 
emigrants who were escorted out of Gaca1ekaland by the missionary 
Ay1iff took 'Hith tliem at least 20 000 head of livestock. (53) 
The actua 1 reasons for the Mf engu emigration 'Hh kh marked the 
Jeginning of their collaboration wit~ the Colonists and t1e 
Colonial State are hard to specify. Moyers has ;:ioin::.:d to t1e 
ccnflictua1 nature of their partial incorporati:.::n into the Xhosa 
hcmesteads and Pei res has pointed to the increased expl citation 
tney suf7ered as clients of homestead heads wt10 wouLi not normally 
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have acquired clients. Moyers has more specifically suggested 
that: 
"The turning point in relationships bebileen Mfengu 
and Gacaleka came after the defeat of. Ngwane in 
1828 i'klen Hintsa accepted Mfengu displaced by 
Ngwane . • • this· second wave had 1 ess chance of 
being absorbed, but arrived with rrore weal th than 
their predecessors 11 ( 54) 
It is quite probable that most of the Mfengu immigrants to the 
Colony were drawn from this second wave of immigration to 
Gca 1 eka1 and. 
The Colonial State saw the Mfengu from the beginning as providing 
a 1 abour force for the increasing demand$ of Col onia1 agriculture, 
and as a buffer between the Colony and the Xhosa. o• Urban stated 
in his dispatch on the Mfengu that they were to be settled in the: 
11a t present uninhabited and worse than useless 
district, between the Fish and lower Keiskama, they 
will soon convert it in to a country ab oun ding with 
cattle and corn, will furnish the best of all 
barriers aga.inst the entrance of the Kafirs ~nto 
the Fish River bush.~. and will besides afford to 
the Co 1 on is ts a supp 1 y of e xc e 11 en t h ired 
servants 11 ( 55) 
Perhaps one of the more interesting comments on the cause of the 
undoubted demand for wage workers in the Cape Colony th~t was to 
be a constant factor from the 1830s through to the economic s 1 ump 
of ti1e 1860s is suggested by De Kiewiet: 
11 It is one of the neglected yet important effects of 
the Great Trek that it imposed a serious strain on 
the labour supply of the country by cre~ting a 
demand for an unusual amount of cheap 1 aboLlr to 
work upon the vastly increased hc1dings 0f thE 
European population. Ever s ir.ce 7-..i-ie Grea.: Trek 
there has been a demand for labcur in ev.::ry section 
of t.~e country a ( 56) 
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Peires confirms that there was a shortage of workers in the Albany 
district in the 1830s. After the war of 1835 there were 6 000 
11 native foreigners 11 in the district, 30% of the total population, 
most of whom, as well as being tenants on Colonists' land, formed 
the principal 1 abourers on the farms as wel 1 as the towns and 
villages. (57) The wars of 1835 and 1848 are ascribable in large 
part to the Colonists desire to expand their sheep farming 
interests, in which many merchants from Grahamstown and Port 
Elizabeth were then investing. 
The major ~rchant houses were actively involved during the 1840s 
in establishing the system through which wool was to be purchased 
for the rest of the century. Thus, for example, Mosentha1 and Co. 
extended its operations to Port Elizabeth in 1842, established 
agents in 11 every town in the Eastern Province . . . \-Jhom they 
supported in buying produce... __ fr.om __ farmers. 11 ( 58) This system 
known as the Store Keeper System had distinct implications for all 
flock masters, especially African, in later years .. A ruling price • 
was accepted for al 1 wool in the di strict- for a particular season, 
and th is price was then fixed. These agents were therefore ab 1 e 
to effect a ;nonopo1y position for their rrerchant principals and 
prevent competition in wool prices. ( 59) 
This expansive drive, based, as has been 
merchant capital and the promo ti on of sheep 
with the social and economic forces that were 
argued, mainly on 
farming, confTi ctsd 
motivating a strong 
need to expand from within_ the Xhosa foririat'ion, a need which was 
intensified with every deprivation of pasturage and agricultural 
1 and they suffered. 
III The Effects of Mercantile Expansfor:._ 1335_:-_18~8 
The increased economic activity and the ~ {-fec:s of the expansion 
of Colonial trade and agricu1 ture '"'i tiTin 'l-:e :o-1csa formation 
became apparent almost immediately dfter t:-;e -..ia1•. .:!.s ::arly as May 
1836 a s~orekeeper from St. Thomas Mission (between old Lovedale 
and Alice) reported that "our new subjects daily evince, a greater 
inclination in their deal in gs for us.eful articles of British 
manufacture, hats, spades, saddles and all kinds of articles of 
clothing instead of beads and wire : : : 11 ( 60) 
Maqoma apparently told A. G~ Bain that Smith had rendered him 
assistance in making a watercourse on the Kei.. Bain commented in 
his Journal: "This is one of the most important steps that could 
be taken. for giving him an interest in the soil, and the only one 
likely to change the habits of a savage race, leading them 
imperceptibly from a pastoral to an agricultural life". (61), 
Indeed, after the reversal of the Province of Queen Adelaide and 
the Xhosa reoccupation of their lands the next loudest voice, 
apart from the Colonists 1 press shrill cry to be avenged, 
concerned the promo ti on of "an interest in the soil 11 amongst the 
Xhosa. It came from all sides, but especially from the 
missionaries. "One great object of our Mi.ssionary labours 11 , wrote 
Stephen Kay in 1833, "is to turn his attention more fully to 
agricultural pursuits, and to attach him to the so i1 11 ( 62) 
There ~s some direct evidence that 0 1 Urban's proposed annexation 
of the "Province of Queen Adelaideu was itself a spur to 
agriculture. The chief Tyal i (a sen cf Ngqika) had expressed the 
· des ire to Ba in to have a watercourse from t.1e Tyumi e similar to 
the one bui1 t for Maqoma. However before anything was done the 
annexation scheme was officially abandoned. Some of Tyali 1s oxen 
had meam;hile been trained fort.lie pioug.h. Bain reports that 
Tyali then abandoned the idea of using a plough en irrigated lands 
saying: 
11 Tya1i has altered his mind since he got his land 
back again. Tyal i is a Ka ffir, son of Gachabi e and 
he is not going to spoil his oxen '•ri t1 ploughing 
wh i1 e he has plenty of :t1ives to :ii 1 the ground for 
him. You must now pay ;ne a c,:w for having had my 
1 . 1 '"t-··-, oxen so ong 1n your p ougn. ,DJJ 




I saw two or three Kaffirs 11tith six oxen yoked to 
a plough ..• the ground ha-d been very badly irrigated ••• I told 
the Ka ffir who held the plough, whose name was Soga that before he 
could expect to plough his ground to advantage it must first be 
properly irrigated. 11 { 64) 
After the war of 1835 a period of internal adjustment within the 
Xhosa formation began. With the death of Hintsa, who since 1818 
had rebui1 t the power of the Gcal eka paramountcy, Sarhil i 
succeeded to the chieftaincy. The conditions of insecurity within 
the Xhosa formation favoured strong attempts by the alder 
counci11 ors of Hintsa to control the net1 paramount. Pe ires has 
argued that as late as 1877 Sarhil i was still trying to undercut 
the inf1 uence of the Great Councill ors of Hintsa '. s genera ti on. 
{65) If this was a difficulty in 1877, then its effect must have 
been of a greater magnitude in the early 1840s. It was, in this 
view, the obstacles and difficulties involved in establishing his 
own class basis that were behind much of Sarhili 1 s expansionist 
tactics ci.tring his long reign. 
Sarhil i needed to bring new territory under his command. This 
could only be Jon..: .by driving out the Colonists and thus giving 
the Ciskei Xhosa room to expand, or at the expense of some other 
grouping, either Thembu, Bacha or Pando (66). This fundamental 
impulse of Sarhil i is crucial to understanding his motivation and 
action towards the Ci skei Xhosa throughout the period under 
consideration. Sarhili's initial disputes with the Thembu in the 
early 1840s ended in disaster \lk!en he failed to dislodge Mtirara 
from the area around the White Kei river. However in 1843 he 
managed to gain a victory over some c7 the· junior Thembu chiefs 
and Mtirara acceded to his conquest. 
During these events on the Kei, S.:ndii i'=, .,.,ho had been 14 at the 
time of the 1835 war, succeeced t:) t .. 1;: chieftaincy of the Ngqika 
in 1841 , taking over from t.1:: R29er;c.:1 of Mz:.qor.;a and his mother 
Sutu. (67) This, in like fash~on to S<.:rri'i 11 .s succession, marked 
a period of intense strugg1 e '!'ti tt°i~n th.e "igqika~ Colonial 
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administrators, especially Brownlee, were to complain, right up to 
the ti me of San di 11 e ' s de a th in the r eb e 11 ion of 1 8 7 9 , of h ; s 
fickleness and that his actions were dictated by conflicting 
councils and his desire and need to secure the support of his own 
age set. ( 68) 
Bro.vnlee's attitude reflected the interests of Colonial 
over1 ordshi p. In fact Brownlee himself had to a 1 arge extent been 
sucked into the paradigmatic conflict that was inherent in ~'ie 
struggle bet\veen the father 1 s generation and that of a young 
chief. Colonial interests coincided more with the old seers such 
as Soga and Tyala and other old councillors of Ngqika, who indeed 
inherited from Ngqika a roore co-operative stance towards the 
Colonists. A stance which first Maqoma and then Sandille were 
explicit in repudiating. 
This conflict was given immediate expression in the rift that 
occurred bet'.veen San dill e and Maqoma. Maqoma never accepted 
Sandille's authority and relations between them were always 
competitive and distrusting. This fact was deeply rooted in the 
forces 'flflich pushed both chiefs to strive to provide for tlie 
expans_ion of homesteads under conditions of fixed and ultimately 
diminishing resources. Almost immediately after the i835 war 
Maqoma adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards tlie Colonial 
State. If 1835 was Maqoma 1 s war, 1847 was Sandi11e's. Indeed 
Maqoma went as far as he could to keep out of the war without 
actua 1 ly appearing trai tcrous. 
Thus t:11e C:-ecade of the 1840s saw the most important chiefdoms •.vest 
and east of the Kei, the Ngqika and Gcal eka, grapp"l ing with forces 
and corifl icts generated by the cyclical cr·ises inherent iri tJ1e 
dynamic of the mode of production~ but intensified, :nodi fi~d a:;d 
in nEny fundamental ways affected by the growing commer.:::: i·dth t1e 
Cclon,Y 'ind the loss of vital lands to it. 
Sf ;ni 1 a.r1y the Gqunukwebe under Phato were soon :~ be sp11: 'Jy the 
dispin:::: bet.veen ?hate and his younger brother Kama. ?hat:.; had 
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been loyal to the Colony in the 1835 war and he had been among the 
rmst eager to encourage missionary activity; although he never 
professed Christianity he attended Church services fairly 
regularly. The presence of missionaries in his chiefdom led to 
Kama becoming the first chief to convert to Christianity. As such 
Kama became a great favourite of the missionaries, who were 
continually to intercede on his behalf for favours from the 
Colonial State. Kama split from Phato in 1843, the land vacated 
be in g t ak en by the Sta te and given to 1 1 o ya l ' M fen gu. It is 
probable that this split led to Phato's participation in the war 
of 1848. 
Further up the coast affairs were no better with the Ndl arme. 
~a11a, who had established his claim to the chieftaincy by 
manipulating witchcraft accusations in about 1826, was faced with 
the revival of the Mdushane under Qasana, Mdushane 's son. Two 
other of Mdushane's sons, Siyol o and Siwani, •.i1ere further to split 
Ndlambe ranks, 'H'ith Siyolo acbpting the side of the belligerents 
in the war of 1848 and 1850, and Siwani distinguishing himself as 
one of the most reliable collaborating chiefs after 1848. In the 
1840s the Ndla?nbes were increasingly coming to consist of 
accretions of Ngqika wtlo had left Sandille in ·the hope of 
establishing themselves en better terms under Mhalla. There was 
thus a strong motive within Ndlambe for not recognising tJ1e 
authorit'; of San dill e. (69) 
The 1848 war~ the so-called 11War of the Axe 11 , was one of the most 
costly in terms of men, land and cattle~ (70) It marked tfie 
decision by the Colonial State to attempt to gain direct control 
of the Xhosa an<l the suppl anting of the chiefs by magistrates and 
appointed he:3.dnen. The war followed the determined efforts of 
Governor Maitland arbitrarily to revise the existing treaties 
e!ltered ~:1-:-.0 after t1e war of 1835, citing 'stock theft' as the 
reason. (71) Stretch, who had been diplomatic age!1t ·t.Ji th tne 
Nqkika s~:ic:= 1835, was in no doubt as to Ma itland's cul p2b'ii i't:y in 
regard ~ tne treaties: 
u Ti'H.~ Ar:::s of Sir P. Mai t1 and decidedly were tile 
·:::.?.use of the war in 1846 - for after the first 
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interview at Beaufort, all the chiefs declared "he 
srrel t of war", and al 1 his subsequent acts 
confirmed the worst fears of the Caffres. 11 ( 72) 
The early 1840s had been a period of intense drought, and many 
cattle died and others had to be· driven to distant pasturage, 
which was scarce. Such droughts must always have necess·itated 
expansion and movement. It was precisely this expansion and 
mdvement of Xhosa herds that the Colonial State was determined to 
stop. 
Peires has pointed out that the Xhosa always found it necessary to 
halt fighting in the spring to a11 CM for sowing of the summer 
harvest. (73) In both the 1835 and 1848 wars t~ey halted 
bel 1 i gerent activities in September - the last month in which 
sowing could be undertaken .. To some extent t~is is in co_n~J~~ 
with early observers who felt that they could, if necessary, 
survive solely off their herds, especially in times of war. (74) 
However three factors must be taken into account. Firstly, the 
greatly reduced size of the herds - many having died in the 
drought of 1842-43 or .having been sent away - probably to Sarhil i 
over the Kei for safekeeping. Secondly, the great nuriber of . . 
cattle which had been captured and confiscated by the Colonial and 
Imperial armies, including the Mfengu regiment which was dep1 oyed 
in this war. Many estimates of the number of cattle taken exist. 
According to Appleyard 1 s account he observed 40 250 head of cattle 
captured from the Xhosa. ( 75) 
Probably 60 000 head were taken ~n al 1. In contrast to t1is, the 
Central Board of Relief appointed by ~aitland to investigate 
claims for compensation arising from tJ1e war accounted for 66 806 
cattle lost to Colonists and 586 096 s.1eep and 907 horses. (76) 
Thirdly, this war was the mcst cost'!y in terms of people killed, 
partly because it featured one of "'.:he C!"liy .;.::t b.:ittles to occur on 
the frontier, the 'Battle of Swanga' (,;, s;;ia11 tributary of the 
Kei skamma) in which 500 of 'f • "'·'f I Gmna ! id 5 !nd Siyolo's men were 
k il 1 ed. Pei res estimates the G'ler'-'3.i i nr.e dmongst t1e Xhosa 
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as high as 5% of the population~ the numbers being swelle.d ·by the 
numbers of women and children who succumbed to starvation because 
of systematic Colonial assaults on granaries and gardens. 
Prcbably 3 500 people died and many others were left destitute 
(77). In late October 1847 after a year of despoilation Appleyard 
wrote: 
11
0ur Troops .•• commenced operation against the 
Gaikas, burning out their country and sweeping 
through the ftma tol as 11 ( 78) 
Sandille was taken captive and jailed in Graharnstown by Col. 
Bisset, by 1T1Jch the same underhand methods as Hintsa had been 
detained in 1835. That this was the case was confirmed when Sir 
H. Smith arrived on the fr on ti er to rep1 ace Henry Pottinger as 
Governor, (who had previously replaced Maitland) and immediately 
ordered the release cf Sandille (79): The war--en-de-(( very 
ind:cisively. If the Xhosa were not defeated in 1835, then they 
were a 1so not subordinated politically to the Col any in 1848. The 
main inroads had been rrade at the 1eve·1 of the economic 
substructure wtii ch was 1 ea ding to an intensification of 
con tradi cti ans within the Xhosa fo rrra ti on • San di 11 e never 
adnitted <*=feat in 1848, wtiile Maqoma had ceased hostilities in 
1846 and Phato had fought on late into 1847. This gives sor.x: idea 
of the lack of real co-operation between the chiefs. Ii1 fact most 
fought relatively ind:pend=ntly of each other. in the end, war 
was brought to a close not by military victory for the Col cny but 
by the economic exhausti'on of the Xhosa. (80) 
At the conclusion of the war the Ngqil<a were removed from the area 
betwe~:n the Keiskarrnna and Tyumie Rivers and the division of 
'lictcria proclaimed as part of the Colony~ (81) The 1 and :;.stwee!'l 
tfia Keiskamma and the Kei was proclaimed a Crc~n Cci(':ny, -:a be 
~!10"11 a:; Sri ti sh Ka ffrari a \'dii ch was to be ruled i)y :tiir :i ~ 1 : ::w. 
, <. was t'1rough this structure (Sri ti sh Ka ffre.ria ! 
':r::nsfor::;a::~cn Jf the Xhosa social formation unf.:!::r :O'i~~ 
c::nques: :.nd subordination to the Colonial State wa.s ·~: >= ~:;ught 
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the Xhosa in the first half of the 19th century; is in no doubt 
that the Xhosa social formation, as it existed at the time of the 
proclamation of British Kaffraria, bore a remarkably changed 
appearance to the same formation as it existed fifty years 
earlier. His conclusion is worth quoting at length: 
11
8y 1847 .•• the Xhosa kingdom had shrunk, and in 
shrinking had 1 ost vast tracts of its most fertile 
territory. The Xhosa were driven across the Fi sh 
in 1812, out of the Kat river va11 ey in 1829, and 
right past the Keiskamma in 1847~ None of the land 
which they still held wes~ of the Kei was really 
secure. No 1 anger did the sons of a chief found 
new Kingdoms in virgin territory. No 1 onger. did 
the sumner pastures guarantee t1e heal th and well-
being of the people and cattle~ The most powerful 
of the chiefs' sons set up permanently in the 
summer grazing, ( Anta); the 1 ess powerful stayed 
at home as a terror to the community . . • !:Mell in gs 
clustered closer together and not everyone 1 ived 
near a river. The game was all shot out; the 
grazing patterns were all disrupted; a drought 
b r ou gh t i rr ever s ib 1 e ca 1 ami ty r n 1 cs in g the 
Ceded Terri tory, t1 e Xhosa 1 os t rllJ ch more th an 
their land. Depriv-ed of their rreans of subsistence 
many of them 'Ner.e forced in to 1 abouring for the 
very men who had supplanted them. 11 (81) 
Perhaps 3 000 men, women and children tock employment with 
Colonists in the Eastern and Western districts of the Colony in 
the aftermath of the \flar of 1848. (82) 
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land greed and the unilateral Maitland treaties:" op:ciL 
p: 327: See also Maonillan op:cit: p: 290: 
( 72) Correspondence between C~ L - Stretch (late diplomatic· Agent 
to the Gaika Tribe of Kaffirs) and the Secretary of State 
for t'ie Colonies and the Colonial Government of Cape of Good 
Hope. Port Elizabeth (1851) p: 14: 
(73) Peiresop:cit: (1981): 
( 74) Srni th~ Sir A: op:ci t: 
(75) Appleyard, op:cit:, p: 42~ p. 86~ p: 92, p: 95, p. 102, 
p: 104 ~ p: 105 ~ p: 106 ~ p: 107 J p: 108' p. 109' p: 111 : 
(76) These claims were naturally exaggerated in many cases. Sir 
H: Smith himself estimated tJ"iat all claims could be reduced 
by a third on aggregate: This would make the real i oss 
about 46 745 cattle: 
(77) Peires, J:B. op~cit~ (1981) p.346; 
(78) Appleyard~ J~W~ op~cit: p: 111~ 
(79) 8rGWn1ee, C~ Op.cit~ p; 294; 
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( 80) Macmi11 an, W.M. op.cit. p: 305: 
(81) The district of Victoria occupied some of the area of the 
present Victoria East. 
(82) C.O. 6155, Census of the Gaika District, 1848, in which 
1 651 people from the Ngqika district alone, are stated as 




A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF ARTICULA.TION OF MODES OF PRODUCTION 
I The "Cheap Labour Power11 Thesis and the Development of 
Capitalism in South Africa 
In looking at the period preceding the formation of British 
Ka ffraria in 1848 we have concentrated on the expansion of the 
agricul tura1 and commercial economy of the Cape. It has al so been 
suggested that these changes, initiated mainly by merchant 
ca pi ta 1 , had a 1 tr an sformi n g effect 1 on t1e mo de of production of 
the Xhosa social formation~ 
It is now necessary to try, theoretically, to conceptualise these 
effects and the subsequent 1 trans forming effects 1 in greater 
detail. In seeing the history c·f the 19th century expansion of 
t"le Cape Colony as having wrought a : trans formation 1 of the Xhosa 
social formation in the face of this Colonial conquest, there is 
an implied cri ti ci sm of a range of scholarship on South Africa. 
The first attempt to conceptualise the interaction of the 
capitalist economy of South Africa and the lineage based economy 
of the indigenous African social formation, was in the seminal 
work of Wolpe and Legassick. (1) Wolpe tried to estabiish that a 
break occurred in the 20th century in the relationship between the 
expanding capitalist economy and the increasingly impoverished 
reserves. For Wo1 pe, there occurred in t1e 1930s a sharp decline 
in the productive capacity of the ;es.:rves. ( 2) This decline he 
saw as rr:arking a change in:· 
"the nature of exploitation, 2.nd trcnsfors t4ie major 
contradiction from the r~!aticnsh~p bet.ve€n 
different modes of production to the re1 ations of 
~I A.• • +-' • •. _,., -• ,;.t ! 1' prol.!Uc1.1on w1 .. nm capn:211sm. 1 ..;; 
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This change in the locus of the contradiction, from one between 
two roodes of production - capitalist and pre-capitalist - to one 
within a unified capitalist mode, Wolpe saw as the historical 
reason behind the shift from the 1 segregation 1 policies of the 
Pact Government, to the 'apartheid 1 policies of the Nationalist 
regime. 
For Wolpe, the continued existence of the African 'Reserves 1 was 
the condition for a major factor facilitating South Africa's 
ind.Jstrial expansion. They served to maintain the rate of surplus 
value (profit), and capital accumulation, by suppressing wage 
levels. In the first phase of industrial expansion (associated 
1 with the policy of segregation), the Reserves performed this 
function through the contribution of their productive capacity in 
providing part of the subsistence requirements of workers. In the 
· --·------ - -· second phase, in wi1 ich (for 11101 pe) production had fa 11 en away as a 
major factor, the Apartheid State applied sufficient coercion to 
use the Reserves as rural sites for the reproduction of a 
politically divided and fragmented working class. 
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In the second phase the Reserves functioned to . inhibit the 
struggle to raise wage levels to those comparable with other 
developed capitalist countries elsewhere. (4) Woipe's economic 
arguments were supported by Legassi ck, who provided a more general 
analysis of 20th century cl ass struggles in terms of the break 
down of 11 vestiges of rural bargaining power" and the grONth of 
11 extra economic coercion." (5) 
In this theoretical perspective, the two stages of South African 
economic development, segregation and apartheid - are both 
derived from the basic need of capital accumulation: to maintain 
the rate of surplus value, this being the prirre condition for the 
sustained gro..;th of the capitalist mode of production. All that ·· 
is held to differ between the two 'stages 1 , is the means which 
the capitalist class (her:? root'e or less identified •,yith the State) 
used to achieve t.tiis end. The .ooli,Sl_ of the State is therefore 
derived in an instrumental rrianner from -::he needs of capi ta1 ist 
expansion. The specifics of racist ideology are thereby explained 
as functional to capitalist growth, as 1-1en as t~e actual 
realities wtiich are legitimised by these ideologies - specifically 
the migrant 1 ab our sys tern. 
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'f-r-.he migrant labour system assumes a particularly important place ;( 
in Wolpe 1 s explanation of the growth 'of the South African 
economy. For Wolpe, capitalist devel opnent initially required the 
suppression of wage levels because of the extremely labour 
intensive nature of deep 1 evel mining which developed early in the 
history of the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. The migratory 
labour system fulfil 1 ed this need, because tlie worker derived part 
of his subsistence from the domestic production in the Reserves -
his family was housed and their other social overhead costs were 
met from with in the Reserve economy. These cos ts did not form 
part of the determination of the value of a migrant worker's 
labour power. The Reserves lowered the cost of the reproduction 
of the worker and thus served to 1 ewer· wages. 
KFor Wal pe, the goal of state policy in the 20th century was to X 
ensure that production in the Reserves remained 1 ow enough to \ 
force rural workers to· migrate to the urban centres for 
emp1 oymen t, but not to 1 et it fa i 1 so 1 ow that it ceased to 
provide the essential supplement to wages earned in the capitalist 
sector. However the effect of capitalist deve1 oµnent in the urban 
centres of South Africa 1 ed to the continuing decline in the 
productivity of the· Reserves. (5) It was therefore the economic 
decline in the Reserves which, for Wolpe, was above all, 
responsible for the inadequacy of the segregation pol icy of the 
Pact Government from 1924 onwards: 
11 In South Africa, the devel opnent of capital ism has 
b-een bound up 11dth, first, the deterioration of the 
productive capacity and then, with increasing 
rapidity, the destruction of the pre-capi ta1 ist 
societies. In the earlier period 
(approxiiT'ia te1y 18i0 to the 1930s), 
of capitalisra 
the ra t.2 of 
surplus value and hence the rate of capital 
accumulation depended above all upon the 
rmintenance of the pre-capitalist relations of 
production in the Reserve economy 11 ( 7) 
There is, therefore, · in the thesis of 11 Cheap Labour Power 11 a 
distinct periodisation of the history of the interaction of 
capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production into two phases, 
i.e. 
(i) 1870 - 1930s 
(ii) Post 1930s 
For Wolpe, the develoµnent of the South African economy in the 
first period is clearly very closely influenced by the evolution 
of the interaction between capital ism and the indigenous 
pre-capitalist economies. In order to sustain the importance 
placed on the subsidisation of capitalist developnent by 
production in the Reserves, it was necessary for Wal pe to present · 
a theoretical. formulation of the nature of the Reserve economy. 
However in his original article, and subsequently, Wolpe has 
failed to develop a theoretically convincing analysis of the 
11 pre-capitalist mode of production 11 which is presumed to have 
prevailed in th·e Reserves up to 1930s. 
Indeed, the main criticism that may be made of the 
conceptualisation of the interaction of the capitalist and 
pre-capitalist modes of production in. 11 Cheap Labour Power 11 , is 
that it fails to take account of the nature of the pre-capitalist 
mode of production at all. In so doing, certain serious 
distortions are brought into the overall picture which emerges of 
the model of capitalist development in South Africa. The role of 
social c1 asses in the "Reserve Economy 11 in influencing the course 
of its articulation with the capitalis: mode of production, is 
left entirely out of the picture. This, in turn., occurs because 
the determination of policy (e.g. the Pact Governme!1t) is assumed 
to be the inev i tab 1 e outcome of objective economic processes and 
the role of c1ass struggle is not c::;nsidered at the political and 
econcmic level. 
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While Wolpe did not primarily intend to explain the structure of 
th~ economy in the rural _Reserves it is 11Ethodologica1ly 
unacceptable to make an entity, e.g. "the Reserve economy" a major 
part of a theoretical exposition when the nature of the object in 
question is left unexplicated. For Wolpe to have attempted to 
conceptualise the class structure of the Reserve economy, it would 
hav,e been necessary for him to examine the nature of the mode of 
production of the indigenous social formations as they were prior 
to the impact of conquest, colonial ism and capital ism. It would 
then have become immediately app.arent that there exists an 
important rupture and discontinuity between the economy of those 
fragnented bits of territory which become the "Reserve Areas" 
under the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, and the indigenous pre• 
ca pi ta 1 is t modes of production. 
The object of the present study is to investigate in detail the 
course of this rupture and the transformation of the 
pre-capitalist mode of production that occurred. 
There is no recognition, however, of any such transformation in 
the th es is of 11 Cheap Labour Power11 • The "Reserve Economy" 
functions as a theoretical 11 black box 11 which produces certain 
effects, but its structure and contents are unkncwn, except for 
the most superficial external wrapping. Because of the central 
function of the 11Reserve Economy 11 in his exposition, Wal pe was 
forced to make certa'in theoretical as sump ti ans about the 
re-capitalist mode of production which are extremely misleading. 
\ 
Firstly, it is incorrectly assumed that there was a strong 
continuity between the pre-capitalist mode of production of the 
pre-Col on i al era and the uReserve economy 11 wni ch prevailed up to 
the 1930s. For Wal pe: 
11 What must be stressed, however, is that in the 
period of capitalist development (from say 1870), 
African redistributive economies constituted the 
predominant mode, of rural existence for a 
substantiai (fer mch of the period a majority), 





In discussing the concept of the "articulation of modes of 
production" and in the subsequent analysis presented in this 
study, it wi 11 be sho\'tfl that there was an effective discontinuity 
between the structure of the pre-capitalist mode of production and 
that of the "Reserve economy 11 which subsequently emerged. 
Secondly, even assuming the integrity of the so-called 
"redistributive economy", 'Wo1pe did not put forward any coherent 
theory of the pre-capita1 ist mode of production. He presented, 
instead, a few a-priori assertions: 
(1) that there existed land which was held communally by the 
community and •.vas worked by social units based on kinship, 
and 
(2) that the products of labour were distributed not by 
exchange, but directly by means of allocation through the 
kinship units in accordance with certain rules of 
distribution. (91 
In Chapter l above it was shown that the lineage mode of 
production in the Xhosa social formation 'i'Jas a comp1 ex structure 
with speci fi c 1 aws of devel oµnen t unique to its own con di ti on s of 
existence. Legassie!<, with his background in 19th century -
history, was one of the first to question the adequacy of the 
concept of the pre-capitalist mode of production and the 
transformation undergone by these modes: 
"what Wolpe' s initial argument ..• does not take in to 
account is the prior articulation of redistributive 
modes in South Africa both with mercantile 
capitalism and with post-slave agricultural 
capitalism in the Cape. Certainly these forms of 
articulation were acting to dominate and dissolve 
the redistributive ffiQde already. II (10) 
The considerable impact that mercantile capitalism had on the 
Xhosa up to 1848 has al ready been shown in Chapter 2 above. The 
experiences after 1848 were to be ;nany tif1'.es mor-e int=nse in ttieir 
impact on the Xhosa - resul ~ing in military and political defeat 
and the c€at1 of the old Xhosa social formation and mode of 
production. 
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The inadequacy of Wolpe's conceptualisation of the pre-capitalist 
mode of production, and the real course of its interactivr1 with 
the developing capitalist mode, was not purely fortuitous. It has 
already been suggested that lack of a proper awareness of the 
pl ace of social cl asses and cl ass struggle was one root of the 
problem. The other may be found in the logical relationship which 
the thesis of "Cheap Labour Power" assumes to exist bei:'.'feen the 
political form of white "racial" domination in the South African 
state and the requirements of capitalist development. 
There is within the arguments of the "Cheap Labour Power 11 thesis a 
certain tendency to explain the particular racial form assumed by 
capitalist devel opnent in South· African as having arisen from 
economic necessity in the development process. Specifically, that 
capitalist developnent required 11cheap 11 (migrant) labour - a 
necessity induced in the fist instance by the 1 abour intensive 
nature of deep 1 evel mining. While the importance of the 1 atter 
development cannot be denied, it is impossible to explain the 
persistence of migrant labour, and the continued existence of the 
"Reserve economy" in the 20th century and the policies of the 
State tJ enhance that system, purely on the basis of the needs of 
mining capi.tal. 
Legassie!<, without actually forrulating the objection in precise 
theoretical terms, clarified Wolpe's basic thesis and pointed to 
some of the difficulties associated with it. Commenting on the 
work of F. Johnstone and Wolpe he wrote that their paradigm: 
"takes as its starting point exploitations rather 
than domination, so that domination comes to be the 
form in which a particular set of exploitative 
relation of production is reproduced." (11) 
In adopting this view of the primacy of exploitation in exolaining 
the system of racial domination in Souti1 Africa, however, it is 
not so iruch t..'1e system of domination t.J1at is explained, as the 
necessitv for the system to exist if ':he rate cf surplus value and 
capitalist devel op-nent is :a persist. In short, the argument is 
inevitably te1 eol ogir:a1. To quote Le,1assi c!< once iTiore, the 
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policies of segregation and apartheid are seen u as the means for 
maximising the rate of ~urplus value for capital in South Africa 11 • 
( 12) 
This weakness has been succinctly commented on by ~rris, who, in 
his work on the development of capitalism in agriculture, has 
emphasised the transformation of class relations as a process of 
class struggle. 
1 
He specifically criticized the implicit teleology 
in the work of Wolpe, Legassie!< and Johnstone: 
11
Arguing backward historically, a reverse historicism, 
one could say that the articulation of modes of· 
prod.Jction and the partial proletarianisation of the 
mi grant worker was from the start a necessary 
consequence of accumulation in the mining· industry. 
Ul ti mate l y, however, the prob 1 em with such 
tel eogical answers is that the actual course of the 
cl ass struggle, in deed of history itself, is 
fundamentally eliminated. For what was, was and 
furthermore cou1 d on 1y be". (l 3) 
It will be argued below that the source of the di ffi cul ty in 
Wolpe's position stems from his faulty concept of the articulation 
of modes of orodJction, (the interaction of pre-capitalist and 
capitalist modes of production and the transformation of the 
former under the development of the latter), in which the 
pre-ca pi ta 1 is t mo de of production is held to be an es sen ti a 11 y 
passive vehicle providing certain in outs for the development of 
the capitalist mode - which inputs are determined by the 1atter 1 s 
requirements. It is a fault which, it will be argued, has 
important-implications for the analysis of capi ta1 ist devel Ojlnent 
and State intervention in the areas of non-ca pi ta1 ist production 
in the 19th and 20th centuries. rt is therefore necessary to 1 ook 
more closely at the question of articulation itself. 
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II The Ori ins of the Problem - A ainst an 1"In uts' Theory of · 
Arti cul ati on "-...,.;7 
In introducing this study, and considering the lineage mode of 
production in Nguni forfl'.ations, the concept of the mode of 
production was set out. It was shown that the basic forces and 
relations of production are defined by a set of elements, the 
arrangement of which depended crucially on the form of the 
separation of the direct producers from the means of pro due ti on in 
the production unit. It was ob served that the form of separation 
produces necessary political and i deo1 ogi cal corre1 ates regu1 a ting 
appropriation, the intensity of exploitation and the establishrrent 
of neH productive uni ts. These political and idealogical 
conditions have to be continually secured if the rode of 
production is to be reproduced. Thus the economic conditions of 
the roode of production are inseparable from their conditions of 
reproduction. 
The process of reproduction, of securing the political, 
idealogical and economic con di ti ons of the functioning of the mode 
of production is also the site of the major class struggles which 
determine the history of the social formation. it is always in 
the process of opposing the pretensions of chiefs. lords, and 
other embodiments of State power seeking to perpetuate sys terns of 
exploitation, that the history of particular social formations are 
written.· These strugg1 es are ultimately determined by the form of 
separation/ non-separation of the direct producers from the rrean s 
of production. 
There are thus two basic elements of the roode of production: the 
proc!Jctive unit and the conc!i :ions for the reproduction of the 
productive unit, er its ~mies. The. dynamics are crucial to 
perpetuation over time cf t.iie separa ticn of the direct producers 
from the rreans of prcducticn fn tiie production unit, which 
characterises the mode of production in short for the 
reproduction of scc·L:l1 c1 asses 1.vhfcn for:n an integral par-t of the 







of the 'articulation of mo des of production 1 has to be ab 1 e to 
give a theoretical specification of the place of the class 
relations involved in the art2culation. Without this the concept 
of articulation rrust become teleological, as well as economistic 
and reductionist. 
Wolpe's argument is specifically designed to show t1at the 
existence of migrant labour corresponded to the needs of capital 
accumulation under the hegemony of imperialist mining capital. In 
this, he is in fact following a tendency within the literature on 
; modes of production to see the structure of the arti cul ati on in 
terms of the inputs \tlhich the pre-capitalist mode of production 
provides for the capitalist mode. The logic of this analysis can 
be seen to be basically teleological; that we can identify the 
form of dominance of the capitalist mode of production in tlie 
social formation by reference to what capitalism has 11 taken 11 from 
the pre-capitalist mode, so that here labour, there commodities 
and other raw materials, e 1 sewhere 1 and etc, fonn the object of 
capitalism's need - and the conditions of fulfilment of this need 
somehow beco!IE the metronome of l1istory. 
This emphasis is consonant with a variety of different treatments 
of the articulation theme~ Thus Frank, )~olpe ,and later Sanaji 
have seen the operation of an undifferentiated capital ism which 
subordinates non-capitalist elements to the laws of motion of 
capitalism. (14) This is made possible precisely by 
concentrating on the inputs which the capitalist world market 
obtains from the pre-capitalist mode of production, while at the 
same time reducing the non-capitalist elements to the 1 evel of 
units of production only. 
Wolpe and Banaji, for example, disagree fundamentally on the 
question of the cons ti tu ti on of a mode of production. For Banc.Ji, 
the :node of r;roduction refers to determinate laws of mction "'hfch 
define heterog.::necus relations of prod.lction. Nevert.'1el ess, :=<ey 
both :nalys1.?. the relationship betveen ca pi +-..31 i s:n cm d 
pre-capi ta.1 i s;:i, so1 ~1 y i:i terms of the en terori se, the productive 
unit, and in t-~;;ns of that 11Whic!i is squeezed out 0f the 
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pre-capitalist productive units for use within the capitalist mode 
of production. The real difference between t1iem is that where 
Banaji is primarily concerned with petty commodity production and 
the subordination of this production to capitalism, wolpe is 
concerned with the 'production' of wage labour for capitalist 
enterprise within the non-capitalist enterprise. (15) Banaji 's 
specific error is his failure to conceptualise the conditions for 
the reproduction of the pre-ca pi ta 1 is t mode of production or how 
these conditions were dis pl aced by colonial ism. Thus, for Banaji, 
the Colonial period is characterised by a sort of inter-
relationship of enterprises (articulation~): 
"an enterprise of formally independent small 
producers functioning according to its own 
1 abour-orocess, inherited from the conditions of 
a patriarch al economy, and according to its own 
economic conceptions, also patriarchal in their 
determinations, but no 1 anger as a totally 
independent unit of production. The social 
process of production in corpora ting the immediate 
1 abour-process of the sma11 peasant enterprise is 
governed by the aims of capitalist production; . 
• 1ame1y by the compulsion to produce 
surplus-value. Within this social prqcess of 




the economic conceptions of the small 
and their formal possession of a 
the means of subsistence enter as 
regu1 ating elements only as a function of the law 
of surplus-value production." (16) 
Nowhere eoes Banaji conceptua 1 i se the process of tr an si ;:ion by 
means of which this subordination and incorporation of 
pre-capitalist production units into the relations cf production 
of the dominant capital ism was achiev~d. r~ is for this reason 
tr.at he cannot conceptualise tlie reality o:= ·::.he a:--t~culation of 
modes of production i.e. t"iat the Coloni.::i.1 soc~r.1 formation 
consists generally of a multiplicity of c1ass forces~ not all of 
'+itlici': are regula.ted directly by the laws cf Tiotfor. of ca.pitJ1ism. 
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For Banaji~ in the end~ the domination of capitalism is purely 
formal and in this sense \./olpe is quite right to argue that he 
reintroduces the dual-economy thesis, which is inadequate 
precisely because of its failure to conceptualise the articulation 
of modes of production. 
This roothod of posing the question, based on units of production 
and on the form of inputs from the pre-capitalist mode of 
production cannot answer the question of how the dominant soci a 1 
relations which preva i1 in the areas of non-ca pi ta 1 is t enterprise 
were determined historically. Their survival can, on this 
a"Ssumption, only be attributed to the needs of capital - an 
attribution which effectively blocks all futher historical 
analysis. For Wolpe, as for Banaji, the question of why, and 
indeed of l1a.-1, capitalism failed to eliminate the non-capitalist 
elements and -to conserve them instead, remain a mystery. The fonn 
of current world economy, the forces holding advanced and backward 
. areas together, as well as the_ direction of change, cannot be 
conceptualised within this limited framework, except by resorting 
to labelling capitalism as a system which always develops in a 
'restricted and uneven' manner. The roochanisms of this 
restriction, as well as the totality of forces working to 
undermine it, cannot be analysed, because t'ie precondi ticn for 1 
such analysis is to understand the cl ass struggle of the masses 
involved. 
While it is impossible here to. present a comprehensive survey of 
all the different critiques of the concept of articulation of 
modes of production, the point which should be emphasised for 
present purposes, ~s that widely differing conceptual~sations of 
the mode of production have been con si sten t with the adoption of a 
reductionist and tel eol ogi cal l.l\1 derstanding of the rel a ti on ship 
between the capitalist and the pre-capitalist modes of 
prod.Jction. This has usually r:::s:Jl ted in th·e obscuration of the 
importance of social classes in t1e pre-capitalist mode of 
production, and their part in deter:nining the manner in which 
pre-capitalist elements are incor;::orat~d into the structure of the 
dominant capi ta1 ism. 
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In further developing the concept of articulation of modes of 
production, hcwever, it is necessary to take into account the work 
of P. P. Rey, whose perspective wi11 be seen to 1 ead directly to 
our criticism of Wolpe. (17) For Rey, articulation was 
essentially linked to the "problematic hitherto known as the 
transition to capitalism\ and Rey, more than any other theorist, 
emphasised the role of the indigenous social classes in 
determining the nature of the articulation. As Rey put it: 
11 the idea of two modes of production, one of which 
es tab 1 is hes its dorni nation over the other . . . not 
as a static given, but as a process, that is to say 
a combat between the two modes of production, with 
the con fr on ta ti ans and a 11 i ances which such a 
combat implies: confrontation and al 1 iances 
essentially between the classes which these modes 
of produ.ction define. 11 (18) 
Rey provided a . theoretical periodisation of the stages of the 
process of the articulation of modes of production: 
(1) An initial link in the sphere of exchange, in which the 
interaction with capitalism reinforces the pre-capitalist 
moae. 
(2) Capitalism 'takes root', subordinating the pre-capitalist 
mode but still making use of it. 
(3) The total disappearance of the pre-capitalist mode, even in 
agriculture. · 
The third stage has not yet been reached outside the capi ta1 ist 
centres. (19) In the first period, for Rey, the influence of the 
capitalist mode of production "is exercised through the 
instrumentality of the ·dominant instance of the lineage social 
fornation itself; and this remains no 1 ess dominated by the 
1 ineage mode of producticn." ( 20) In the second period capital ism 
"takes root'' - :o quote Rey ag~i in - "it is a matter of using the 
economic basis ·:haracteristic of 1 ineage society to establish the 
d . " - · · · " ... '· m " ( ?1 \, Th1's 1·s the per~.oa· con 1 t1ons ::;r ::-:::ns 1 t1on ro ca pi ca 11su. ,_ 
of colcniaiis:n; in wt:i,.:h the imperialist centres expend vast sums 
of money to cor.qt<er ::.n~i subordinate· "die peripheral social 
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formations. This period is, for Rey, a transitional stage, and it 
should therefore be compared with the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in the metropolitan centres of capitalist development. 
Foster-Carter, in his analysis of Rey, shows that the crucial 
difficulty 1llith his concept of articulation is that it sought to 
show, in a purely orthodox Marxist way, the 11 homoficence 11 of 
capitslism. (22) That is, that the development of capitalism has 
the same effect in the peripheries of the world economy as it had 
in the centres where it originally developed. If this is so, then 
the 
11
transition phase\ which certainly starts witli colonialism, 
must still be underway. Nowhere in the Third World, to date, has 
the devel o~ent of capital ism proceeded to eliminate the vestiges 
of the al d mode of production in a way com par ab 1 e with the 
elimination of feudal relations in Western Europe. 
This consideration leads Foster-Carter to conclude that there is 
something wrong with Rey 1 s conceptualisation of arti cul ati on. 
Where capitalism is installed by force from the outside, a 
fundamentally different transition ensues from that which 
characterised the development of capitalism out of the interaction 
of the el e~nts of the feudal mode of production. (23) For 
Foster-Carter, the role of vioien~e in the initial establishment 
of capitalism in the Third World, in forcibly appropriating land, 
labour and raw materials, distinguishes the articulation of modes 
of production in the periphery from the articulation which 
characterised the spontaneous development of capitalism. 
Rey stands in danger of becoming the victim of an endless 
transition in which all social formati•::n.s ar..: held to consist of 
an 11arti cul ati on of modes cf produc~i on". For Rey, ;'arti cul ati on 11 
applies only to the transition ;.;n1:.se ~-=fore capitalism becomes 
exc1 usive. Yet the transition fn :he ::er·:::>heraj economies of the 
Third World seemingly :-:eve: ,:;rds. 
non-capitalist elements 
incorporated at a higher 
are . . ; eve 1 • 
C:i the contrary, the 
re-organised and 
::;, ~ s be ex p 1 a i n e d , i f 
capital ism acts everywhere in :i1e ;;c.rrr.:; '.:-ii:iY ·3.fid if 1:here are not, 
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forces of capital ism expanding throughout the social formations it 
dominates? This Rey does not answer except by reference to an 
eternal tran$i ti on. 
However on the nature of the transition phase itself (stage 2) Rey 
has provided very important guidelines. Specifically he has 
argued: 
11
that the transition phase can only be understood on 
the basis of the internal characteristics of the 
mode of production dominant before the intrusion of 
capital. The social formation has to bring forth 
its own form of the transition towards capitalism. 
Thus is the transitional social formation subject 
to a double history, where the contradiction bursts 
forth between two orders of necessity: on 
hand the history of capital itself, which 




forrrations; on the other hand the history of the 
transition, specific to the modes of production 
which are there articulated." ( 24) 
This vieN appears to be entirely correct; it a11ows for the 
grcwth of capitalism without artificially eliminating the dynamics 
of the pre-capitalist mode of production in de:2rmining the nature 
of the articulation. The step which Rey fa'ils to take, is 'to 
recognise that the transition phase does in fact come to an end, 
while, as he correctly maintairrs, sustaining the articulation. 
( 25) However the arti cul a ti on shou1 d no 1 anger be seen as a 
question of sustaining the pre-capitalist mode of production, but 
precisely the creature of the transition; a set of re1ations and 
forces of production and their dynamics ;~~ch comolement the 
dynamics (laws of motion) of the caei:_;=list 11o(ie of production. 
It is precisely this mutation which acco•rnts ~or the deformed, 
r~stricted, uneven and extroverted nat:irc:? of :he capit-alist mode 
of production in the Third World. (25) The par.h to full 
tor~ of capitalist capitalist development is blocked by 
re1 ations of production themselves which :v:iv~ come to include 
aspects of non-capitalist relations in th,=:;ir r-earod.1ction. The 
immediate problem is to specify how t.iis sy:;t2m ·~i.CS c:re:;;,ted. 
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Bradby, in her research on the destruction of pre-capitalist mo.des 
of production, has seen the teleological problem in arguing from 
the needs of capitalism. She shows that the global expansion of 
capitalism in its Colonial phase cannot be explained by reference 
to such supposed 11 needs 11 ; whether they be the need for an external 
market (Luxemborg), the need to export capital (Lenin), or the 
need to acquire cheap labour (Mei11asoux, Wolpe). (27) For 
Bradby, the question of 'needs.' can only be determined 
conj unctura 11 y: 
"Capitalism has different needs of pre-capitalist 
economies at different stages of development, which 
arise from specific historical circumstances e.g. 
raw ma teri a 1 s, land, 1 ab our power and at ti mes of 
crisis, markets" {28) 
Bradby has, however, criticised the idea that violence is a 
necessary concommitant of capitalist development arising 11 from the 
outside" in the colonised formations~ For her, the use of force 
is purely a con tin gent phenomenon with no important, theoretical 1 y 
justifiable, reasons for being pl aced at the centre of the theory 
of articulation of modes of production~ She has 3.rgued: 
11Force is used when either 1 and, raw ma teria 1 s or 
labour power is needed quickly in certain places by 
capital .•• The role of force is not in introducing 
commodity exchange, but in forcing people to give 
up natural resources by any other means than a fair 
exchange .•• the use of force arises out of the 
concrete needs in different branches of capitalism 
at different times, and not out of any necessity.'1 
(29) 
While it may be conceded that force and violence used against t1e 
independerit ·.;oci-.ll formations of Africa, Asia, and Latin .:;rnerica 
cepended upcn :he conjuncture of capitalist deve1 opment at a 
par:·kul ar point. in tilT.e, this does not 1 ead to the conc1 us ion 
that 'tioi er.~:2 fa ;JUrely contingent. 
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Indeed, Bradby Is argument against the necessity of force in the 
installation of capitalism in -fact supports the latter 
contention. What she shows is that when other means are available 
such as the importation of slave labour from China, then these 
alternatives will be used if the costs of using direct military 
force are too great.· But this only shows that capitalism, in its 
Colonial phases, makes labour power an internationally mobile 
corrnnodi ty. In the end the theoretical Justification for the 
necessity of force resides in the fact that the internal dynamics 
to provide for the creation of a proletariat, or the provision of 
raw materials for capitalist exploitatfon, do not exist within the 
rrode of production of the pre-capi.talist social formation - as was 
the case with European feudalism. Capitalist relations of 
production could only begin to develop within these social 
formations, once a large part of the population has been deprived 
of access to the !l'Eans of production and the old ru1 ing cl asses 
had been brought under the control of a Colonial .bureaucracy. If 
force was only the result of capitalism needing specific things 
"quickly'\ as Bradby would have it, then it must be true that 
capital ism was everywhere in a hurry.' 
The view that the origins of capitalism within the social 
forrrations of Western Europe have to be distinguished from those 
cases in \llhi ch ca pi ta1 ism arrived from the outside. is borne out 
by the analysis of the forrn::r transition itself. Robert Brenner, 
in an important article, has argued that: 
"the historical problem of the origins of capitalist 
development. in Europe comes down tJ that of the 
process of 'self- transformation' of class relations 
from serfdom to freE .,yage 1 abour - that is of 
course, th,e cl ass 5 truggl es by which th is 
transformation took place. '1 ( 30) 
By contrast, in the social for'.7'ie1t~ons of the Third \·lorld there was 
no "self-transformation" or c:.iss re1ations to produce a 
proletariat and init::ate a ~rccr:::ss cf capital formation and 
accumulation. It was f.·t~c1sr~1j' th1= incorporation of the 
forTTBtions into the ·l'icr-1c c~a~ t.:il ;st system, and the forcible 
destruction of the pre-cap;tai;s;: modes of prod.Jction that 
initiated the process of tr.::ris'. :::~on" 
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III The Transformation of the Dynamics of the Mode of Production 
The importance of focusing on the role of violence is that it 
redirects attention to the ongoing consequences of violence in the 
transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production with the 
growth of capital ism. It· has been argued above that the 
transformation inaugurated by conquest marks a different course of 
development - one which produces only a partial development- of tlie 
capitalist forces of production and retains non-capi ta1 ist 
elements as a permanent feature of its development. How is this 
to be con ce ptu a 1 is e d? Foster-Carter, when considering this 
problem in relation to the work of Rey, directed attention to an 
observation by Bal ibar l<A1 i ch he believed to be of great 
importance. Dealing speci fi ca 11 y with conquest Ba 1 i bar observed 
that the 1event 1 : 
11 con sti tuted by the rreeti ng of these societies and 
'Western' societies in transition to capital ism, 
(in conquest, colonization or the various forms of 
·commercial connection) is obviously part of the 
· diachrony of those societies, since it determines -
more or 1 ess brutally - a transformation of their 
mode of production: but it is no part of these 
societies·' dynamics. This event in their history is 
produced in the ti me of their di achrony .,..,; thout 
being produced in the time of their dynamics. 11 (31) 
What Bal ibar is here suggesting is precisely that conquest, 
foreign domination in tlie Colonial phase, inaugurates, relatively 
quid<ly, a change in the mode of production considered purely at 
the level of relations of forces of production. There occurs a 
change in the str!.lcture of the elements of the labour process, .rnd 
hence in the s tr1Jcti.ir'2 of the productive unit, and in the v=ry 
nature of ~:1e produc:ion carried on. This is quite clear1y a 
change at the i eve! ')f the mode of production. Because of :he 
nature .Jf t.1c-s2 :hanses as transforming rather than ~ir.,::_,ting, 
the pre-cap·it.11 i:;-;: mace of production,· elements of the d•marni:.:s of 
the pre-capi ta1 i5t r;;oce of production persist and are perpet.;.~ ted 
- the 1Jj'namic::: '.)2ing t7:ose po1itical~ideologica1 and economic 
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re1ations which govern the reproduction of the productive uni ts 
and rel ate the agents in them together in a determinate cl ass 
structure. ( 32) 
We can now go further and suggest, on the basis of Balibar's 
observation, that not only is the mode of production transformed, 
but the dynamics themselves are transformed, albeit more slowly, 
in conformity with the restructured non-capitalist elements in the 
articulation of modes of production~ Ba1ibar has thus provided a 
valuable perfodisation of the manner in which colonialism 
initiates a transitional conjuncture which goes through two 
distinct phases. First, the transformation of the structure of 
production, the productive unit in a direction ultimately dictated 
by the interests of capitalism whatever these may be. Secondly, <l 
transforrration, of the ideological, political and economic 
relationships which structured the reproduction of the production 
units of the old pre-capitalist mode of production. The formation 
of social cl asses cannot be determined sol e1y at the 1 evel of the 
production unit, and it seems, therefore, entirely correct to 
d.istinguish between the transforrration of production and the 
transformation of the basis of the soci a 1 cl asses defined by these 
production units. Furthermore, it is this second transformation, 
which conserves many pre-capitalist aDpearances, that is primarily 
responsible for the persistence of areas of non-capitalist 
enterprises as a permanent feature of the structure of peripheral 
social formations. 
It is through the continuation of the dominance of elements of the 
old ruling classes of the pre-<:apita1ist mode of pro<ilction that 
many individual aspects of the c1'1 ,\lode of production persist and 
thus 1 conserve 1 the appearance of t~e old mode in the new 
structures which emerge under t"ie :::i;;act :Jf colonial ism. 
reference to this second ::r::.11:;; ~or::r1ti 1Jn, which can 
WitJ1out 
only be 
analysed on t'ie basis of d ':h:::•:ir.:; of "':rie pre-capitalist mode of 
production, the whole l...J i c.r :i cul d ti on is rendered 
uni n te 11 i gi b 1 e. This proc2ss. 'lhi.::1 
the modified non-capita1is7: 2r.::.:t;:r"·>: ever: .i.s 
actively conserves 
the pre-capitalist 
... 0 lat1·ons an·d forcQs o·: ,..,- ... ri:•r·-·;··~ .·.--:: .~,··,:anna~.-;.,g i<: crucially I ..... . - I r' ! v ..... ,_ ·- .... ~ ~ t. 1, - - ... ,, ":' ':""' ._;.,.,,' t I ' ~ 
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linked to the political level of the colonial-imperialist state 
and cannot therefore be deduced purely from the 'objective needs 1 
of capital accumulation. As was suggested above, it is only by 
developing a theory of articulation that is ab 1 e to specify the 
structure of class relations within the non-capitalist arena, and 
their forms of dependence on the capitalist mode of production, 
that the process of class struggle thrown up by the articulation 
of modes of production, can be analysed~ Any attempt to avoid 
analysis of such struggle must inevitably result in an economistic 
theory subordinated to the needs of a pre-given capi ta1 ism. 
The word 
11
transformation 11 does not really denote a concept which 
can be applied in the theory of modes of production. It denotes a 
difficulty that has beset historical materialism in coming to 
terms with the prob 1 em of transition from one mode of production 
to another. The reason for the word continuing to be meaningful 
is that it carries, in untheorised form, the implication of 
internal process - of something relating to the basic 1 aws of 
rootion of the rrode of production~ By referring to the 
'transformations', the assertion of new functions, which override 
their received historical form, seems to be imp1 ied. It is at 
these effects which one must look in t1eorising the nature of a 
tr an si ti on al conjuncture. 
Taylor, in his survey of the theory of modes of production, has 
most clearly specified the nature of the articulation of modes of 
production as a transitional. state: 
"In general terms, then, the reality that has 
previously been approached via the notion of 
1 underdevelopment• or 'mode!"'nising society' ·,.;i11 be 
analysed here from within historical materiaii·;;r; as 
a social formation that is 1 transitiona'i ', The 
specificity of this transition lies in :t 
brou·ght about 1 argely by capi ta1 ist 
and more particularly by one of 
pen e tr.1 : i ·'.Jf! f 
imperialist penetration, which as ·"'e sna:1 :;!;;:;, ':es 
as specific effect a separa~ion c~ direct 
• .C • . • It f .- "~ \ produc.ers from their means O• pr>Jaucr.~on ,J,~. 
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This emphasis correctly focuses attention on the way in which the 
impact of Colonial conquest, finding in the pre-capitalist mode of 
production a par ti cul ar form of separation of direct producers 
from the rr:eans of production, proceeds to interpose its own form 
of separation, by superior force. This may be achieved through 
land confiscations, through the confiscation of other assets such 
as cattle, or through the use of forced labour and taxation. At 
the same time the dominant cl ass forces within the conquered 
social formation are able to utilise whatever opportunities may 
present themselves to continue the process of internal 
appropriation and accumulation from the productive units, even 
though the basis on which those units generate surpluses for 
appropriation has begun to change. 
Taylor has provided a very clear statement of the economic basis 
of articulation. He correctly argues {following Rey) that the 
early years of commodity exchange (in which capitalist commodities 
are exchanged for the surplus product of the pre-capitalist mode 
of production) reinforced the pre-existing ·relations of 
production. ( 34) He then describes the process vklereby the 
consumption of ca pi ta 1 is t co111T1odi ti es becomes necessary for the 
non-capitalist enterprises. (35) Once such comroodities becorr~ 
necessary, then acquiring the m:ans for procuring them also 
becomes necessary. Hence the production of commo di ti es for the 
capitalist market becomes necessary. A clear case of articulation 
conceived solely at the 1 evel of forces of production. Productive 
activity and the structure of the production unit is transformed 
in the direction of petty comroodity production for the capitalist 
markets._ The basic idea presented in this way makes out a strong 
theoretical reason for expecting the pre-ca pi ta1 ist enterprise to 
respond to the existence of a market for its comnodi ties, and to 
produce for it. 
However, in restricting the conc2;:.t of c'.1c<: articulation of modes 
of production to the 1 evel of the trar.s format~ on of the productive 
unit, it is really only echoing, ·1n :nor~ c~:mp1ex ways, the basic 
idea put forward by Giovanni Arr1~;td ~·1 his seminal article on 
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proletarianisation in the then Rhodesia {36). Arrighi argued that. 
cash requirements changed from being 11 discretionary 11 to being 
"necessary
11
• When the need for capitalist commodities, or the 
cash wtlerewi th to aquire them, becorries necessary there. are only 
two means of obtaining them either through the sale of 
corrrnodi ties produced within the pre-capitalist mode of production 
or through the sale of labour power. Arrighi then argued that as 
the 
11
effort price 11 of par ti ci pa ti on in the produce mark.et rose, so 
wage 1 abour beca~ the only alternative. (37) 
Arrighi 1 s conceptualisation of the origins of proletarianisation 
are consistent with the first level transformation of the mode of 
production in a transitional conjuncture. It is necessary, 
however, to go beyond Arrighi, and to show hew the class relations 
of the rrode of production were transforrred under' the impact of the 
dynamic that Taylor and others have outlined.. Th is is a change 
that has to be analysed in terms of the redefinition of the basic 
labour processes, the reconstitution of the productive unit, and 
the transforna tion of the form of separation of the direct 
prod.leers from the means of production. For Arrighi, as for t'ie 
reductionist view of articulation, there is only the capitalist 
market, the tribal-peasant producer, and state polky· aimed at 
raising the effort price of participation in the produce market 
(through taxation, dispossession of 1 and etc) in order to secure 
workers. The process of formation of a mi grant pro1 etaria t cannot 
be analysed, how.ever, wit'iout reference to the class forces within 
the pre-capitalist mode of production. 
Tay1or 1 s formu1 a ti on of the theory of articulation of modes of 
production represents an advance on the :-educt.ionist and 
teleological positions because he does make allowance for the 
class forces 1,•lithin the dominated social formatic:·1 and c!'leir 
effects on tie nature of the arti cul a ti on. ( 38) T:;yl or follows 
Rey, hcwever, in seeing the articulation of modes :;r ::ror::Jt:ion as 
inaugura"'.';~n·:; a transition which is a permanent state of a~:'«:!~:·s .::is 
icng as ;:ti;-} articJlation continues. 
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It is necessary to explain the histori-cal origins of the 
co-existence of capitalist and non-capitalist elements because 
there is no sign that the development of the capitalist mode of 
production in the peripheral economies is leading to the 
elimination of the non-capitalist elements, but that, on the 
contrary, such elements - small parce1lated and isolated rural 
property etc - wi11 continue to co-exist with more or less 
isolated encl aves of capitalist devel oµnent~ . To view the 
articulation of modes of production as a permanent transition 
state extends the concept of transition and makes it vacuous. 
Instead, it wi11 be argued that, in fact, the period of transition 
to capitalism in the Third World comes to an end with the creation 
of a new and relatively stable articulation of relations and 
forces of production unique to the form of capi ta1 ist-imperial ist · 
domination in the social formation. 
In this view, the blocking of the productive forces of capitalism 
by the conservation of non-capitalist enterprises rests on 
relations and forces of production unique to the transition that 
produced them. In Taylor's view of transition the possibility 
still remains open for the full devel oµnent of capital ism in 
social formations dominated by imperialism~ (39) This is 
be1 ieved to be an unwar:--ant.Ed and unnecessary theoretical 
diversion. The only prospect for the resolution of the 
contradiction between the existence of non-capitalist modes within 
social formations dominated by the laws of motion of the 
capitalist mode of production, lies in the total overthrow of the 
capitalist system which sustains this contradiction. However this 
I. 
is a transition of a totally different order to that which 
engenders the articulation of modes of production under 
capitalism. (40) 
In both the earlier views of 11 underdevei oprnent 11 3.s exemplified by 
Arrighi, and in the subsequent development 0f the theory of 
arti cul a ti on of modes of production , ,.. I.) a failure to 
conceptualise class struggle 1/'/ithin the s:.ibordinate non-capitalist 
enterprise, or, indeed, to allow for t1e exisc:.ence of classes at 
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all, except in the most pre-emptory way. It is necessary to 
overturn this idea and to show that, altliough they were by no 
means the determinate force, the struggles of the rural producers, 
and strategies adopted to cope with the growth of capital ism l'l'ere 
based on the persistence of effective cl ass forces. The 
articulation of modes of production represents not only the 
changed function which the received historical form of the 
pre-capitalist production unit incorporated, (the so-called 
11
she1l 11 of the pre-capitalist mode of production): In determining 
a change in the structure of the production unit (determinate 
11
transformation 11 ), this transition does not do away with the 
dynamics of the pre-capitalist mode of production, leaving only a 
11 shell 11 - an agglomeration of production units: It transforms not 
only the structure of the productive units and their labour 
processes, but also the dynamics of the ensemble of pre-capitalist 
relations of production.. As with a11 periods of transition, this 
is a period of intense class struggle in which a variety of 
pre-existing and new social relationships concerning commodities 
and their production, appropriation, distribution and consumption 
are brought into contention. 
Thus it is inadequate to 1 oak en l y at macro structura 1 trends for 
the 'peasant' or non-capitalist sector as a whole as correlated 
with the macro tendencies of the capitalist mode of production. 
It is also necessary to be able to specify how the pre-capitalist 
units of production were themselves transformed, what cl asses were 
then to be found dominant within them, and how they facilitated, 
or struggled against, the reproduction of the entire ensemble of 
relations and forces of production of the dominant capitalist mode 
of production. The tw'o levels of analysis thus complement each 
other - on :he one hand the transformation of uni ts of or::iducti on 
in a 1Jerfod of transition, on the other the transformed cl ass 
. -- . -
~osit<oi<?n. __ gj_ __ tne agents in ensuring the reproduction or 
ncn-recrocuc-;:icr. of the productive units and ~'le <::ominan: ------· ---·-
r~la.tions c·~ Jroiiuc:ion. _____ _,,,_~~ .. --... ··-·---
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It will be useful to clarify this formulation of the concept of 
the arti cul ati on of modes of production by contrasting it with 
Wo1pe's latest contribution to the conceptualisation of the 
articulation of modes of production. (41) Wolpe has identified 
two prevailing concepts of mode of production. First, there is 
the definition wherein the relations and forces of production in 
combination define the mode of production. This Wal pe has called 
the restricted concept of the mode of production. Secondly, 
there is the definition in which the relations and forces of 
production 11 provides only the essential foundation upon which the 
mechanisms of reproduction, and the laws of motion, _are formulated 
and the roode of production is held to be consti tute<i by the 
comb i nation of the relations and forces of pro du cti on, together 
with the rrechanisrns of reproduction derived from those relations 
and forces of production 11 • ( 42) This Wal pe cal ls the extended 
.-· 
concept of the mode of production. 
In trying to give a more definite rreaning to the concept of 
articulation, Wolpe suggests three cases: 
(1) a social· formation comprising a combination of modes of 
production restrictively defined, 
(2) a social forrriation comprising a combination of extended 
modes of production, 
(3) a social formation constituted by a dominant extended mode 
and a subordinate restricted mode. 
What is rreant by 1 dominant 1 , in the third case, is not clearly 
spelled out. However, it is the form of conceptualisation of 
articulation in W'hich Woipe is interested. 'Domination' is, for 
Wolpe, an inference, the fact once having been established that 
the subordinate mde involved is no longer capable of generating 
its own laws of motion - it is dependent for its reproduction on 
the reproduction of the c0minar.t moce, to which it is tJ1erefore 
subordinate. 
The third case is c1 €·:1riy the cne •.vhich applies to the 
relationship beb'leen the ca~ftalist mode of production and the 
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forms of the lineage mode i.n Southern Africa. In Wolpe's work~ as 
in rruch of the literature based on it, the analysis of this 
articulation and its effects on the growth of the capitalist mode 
of production is carried on in terms of the assurn::d subordination 
of the {unspecified) 'pre-capitalist mode of production', which is 
'transform:d' by the fact of its articulation. However, to quote 
Wolpe, "the nature of the transformation and its significance is 
rarely analysed with any precision."{43) 
Wolpe's O\tln analysis of the manner in which domination and 
subordination are achieved, remains at the level of relations and 
forces of production. He is concerned to show that pre-capitalist 
enterprise may persis.t, where the laws of motion of the mode of 
production of the pre-capitalist mode of production (its dynamics) 
have been displaced by capitalism. {44) It is difficult, however, 
to accept Wolpe's definition of the "restricted mode" as 
designating a real theoretical object of analysis. In fact, it 
appears to be an arbitrary construct explicitly designed to be 
consistent with l'klat we have identified as an "inputs" theory of 
the articulation of modes. of production. This can be more clearly 
seen when one considers the concept of the restricted mode which: 
11 does no more than identify the possible relation 
between agents and the means of production within 
individual isolated enterprises. The mechanisms by 
which enterprises are linked (i.e. brought into 
relationship with one another) and the process by 
which the relations and forces of production are 
reproduced, are not at all encompassed in the 
restricted concept. 11 (45) 
In Wolpe's case 3 articu:1ation, the reproduction of such 
I 
non-capitalist enterprises becomes a moment of the reproduction of 
the capitalist mode of production. It 
conceptualise the non-capitalist mode 
i s therefore po s s i b 1 e to 
c.s a. 'restricted 1 mo de 
without its own laws of motion. Thus it is, for Woipe, this loss 
of capacity for sel f-reproductfon th,it is the defining 
characteristic of the articulation of the (restricted) 
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pre-capitalist mode of production 1.¥ith the dominant capitalist 
mode of production. It has already been shown, however, t:,c.t this 
view leaves out of account the transformation of the erstwhile 
pre-capitalist mode of production and the manner in which its 
dependent reproduction is achieved. It has been argued that the 
determination of the form of dependence of the transformed 
pre-capitalist production unit on the capitalist mode of 
production requires the speci fi cation of the cl ass forces present 
in these units. Wolpe's concept of a restricted mode makes it 
impossible, however, to grasp the existence and the effects of 
such cl asses. 
Wal pe 1s distinction between a 1 restricted 1 and 'extended' mode of 
production now begins to look a lot less like a solution to the 
problem of articulation than it appeared to be at first. In fact, 
the idea of a 'restricted' mode, in his terms, is an 
impossibility, which only becomes possible if one accepts tlie 
teleological and functionalist argument that the subordination of 
the pre-capitalist mode of production must be seen in terms of the 
direct subordination of the productive units to the reproduction 
of th1- capitalist mode of production; a subordination which can 
only be determined by the 'needs'. of the capitalist mode of 
production. By restricting analysis to the inputs which tlie 
non-capitalist enterprises make to the dominant capitalist mode of 
production, the 1 i nes of arti cul ati on are reduced to functi anal 
ones. The source of the problem is in seeing the reproduction of 
the non-ca pi ta 1 is t productive uni ts in terms of the reproduction 
of forces and relations of production only, without any associated 
ideological, political and economic dynamics inherent in them. In 
this analysis we have sought to es~ablish the legitimacy of 
retaining, in the concept ·Jf !•articulation", the dynamics of the 
subordinate economic struc-.:ure. It has been argued that the 
theoretical and historica.1 pr::;b1em 1s to determine how the 
dynamics of the ersthwile ;;r~-\:::<.oi tal ist mode of production were 
transformed to make them :::::mp.::tfo~e '1'1i'th the development of a 
dependent and stunted cap·itJi~s:: ec0nomy i:i the social formations 




s theory, the non-capitalist mode is reduced to an 
agglomeration of productive units with no internal re1ationship 
other than .. that of their common (or rather, joint) subordination 
to capital. The crucial question of the economic 1transformation 1 
of the pre-capitalist mode of production by conquest has to be 
posed directly. Most authors have assumed that changes were 
effected in the pre-capitalist mode of production by deve1 opments 
outside of them. They have not allowed for a specific 1 internal 1 
dynamic based on real cl ass forces, and struggle with in the 
dominated mode, playing a rrediating, and at times determining, 
role in shaping the transformation and, therefore, the historical 
nature of capitalist domination. These two transformations -
transformation of the forces and relations of production, and the 
transforrration of the dynamics of the pre-capitalist mode of 
production, are therefore the most basic theoretical starting 
point in analysing the articulation of modes of production. The 
possiblity of a dependent class structure which is reproduced 
through its articulation with capital ism has therefore to be posed. 
It may now be seen that in order to understand the articulation of 
modes of production., it is necessary to have an adequate analysis 
of the cl ass forces of the transition pe!"'iod which engendered this 
articulation. Perhaps the most concise formulation of the 
requirements for conceptualising the transitional conjuncture and 
the arti cul a ti on of mo des of production is that given by B. 
Hindess. He has written: 
11 The structure of the social formation in transition 
must therefore be conceived as a determinate 
structure of social relations in which a specific 
dominant set of relations of production are subject 
to transforrra ti on and to the non-reproduction of 
its political, economic and ideological conditions 
of existence ... A transitional conjuncture is one 
in which the transforrr-atfon of the dominant 
relations of prcduc~i Gn ~ s a possible outcome of 
the c 1 ass s tru g g 1 e At no po int in the 
transition period ·:s t"H: f~nal outc.ofi'ie a pre-given 
certainty . . . The c ·: -,;s ur2 J f t.1e ;ieri c d of 
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transition occurs only wnen the structure of social 
relations in the conjuncture is such that the 
dominant relations cf production are no 1 anger 
subject to transformation, to the non-reproduction 
of their political, economic and ideological 
conditions of existence ... The concrete analysis 
of the transition period in a determinate soci a 1 
form ti on therefore consists of the analysis of its 
transitional conjunctures, and of the specific 
class struggles which effect movement from one 
conjuncture to another. 11 ( 46) 
The important part of Hindess 1 s formulation of the nature of a 
transitional phase, quoted above~ is the emphasis on class 
struggle.. In order to understand the cl asses in contention in a 
period of transition to capi t31 ism, one must first have a theory 
of the pre-capitalist ~ode of production; secondly an analysis of 
the determinate transformation· of the dominant relations of that 
mode in the transitional period, and, thira1y, an analysis of the 
specific structure of social classes that are the outcome of this 
process of transforrration and transition and their relationship to 
the dominance of the capitalist mode of prodJction. 
In or<Er to <Ev el op a theory of articulation of modes of 
prodlction, it is therefore necessary to al 1 CM for the existence 
of social classes w1thin the dominated non-capitalist mode of 
prod..Jction.. The question of the existence and place of such 
cl asses has to be posed directly,. a 1 tho1Igh, as has been argued 
above, it cannot be posed within the framework of Wolpe
1
s 
problematic of articulation. (47) Working within this framework, 
it is only possible to come to the conclusion that the nature of 
the articulation was such as to dissolve all economically dominant 
classes within the pre-capitalist mode of production. (48) This 
fails to account for the survival of the non-ca pi ta1 ist elements, 
however, except by way of a teleological argument, which avoids 
the history of the rural masses, preferring to ma in ta in an i c-ea of 
a 1 tribal 1 pre-capitalist essence wnich somehow survives, and 
whose struggle is essentially written outside of it. 
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It is crucial to look at the nature of possible exploiting classes 
and to posit the existence of relations of production and their 
dynamics outside of the capitalist mode of production which do not 
necessarily challenge the dominance of the capitalist mode of 
production. This can be done only by a concrete analysis of how 
in the transition period the growth of the capitalist mode of 
production actually modifies the elements of the erstwhile 
pre-capitalist mode. Our most basic assumption therefore is that 
i 
while the relations and forces· of production of the pre-capitalist 
mode of production are extensively transforrraed by the 1 ass of its 
capacity for self-reproduction, and the pre-capitalist ruling 
class is itself transformed, it is not abolished, and continues to 
exercise crucial functi ans that have everything . to do with the 
reproduction of the 'transformed form' of the productive unit. 
Our second premise is that what. emerges from this transition is 
somethin_g sui-generis that has only an historical and empirical 
relationship with, {in South Africa, for example), the ~tribal' or 
lineage mode of production. The new ensemble of relations and 
forces of production and their dynamics is an articulation of 
modes with elements of the lineage mode still present within a 
system that emerged under the unique conditions of; the 
transitional conjuncture which it faced. 
IV Social Classes and the Articulation of Modes of Production in 
Recent South African Historiography 
To conclude this chapter, a brief examination of recent trends in 
South African historiography wi11 be made in order to situate tlie 
vi ew.s presented here relative 
studies. Of concern wi11 be the 
Beinart, and Peter Delius. The 
to certain otber complementary 
work of Michael Morris, 11'iilliam 
work of Col in Bundy, wni ch is 
direct1y connected •t1ith the topic of research of this thesis, ·.;ill 
be evaluated separately in the presentation of the conc1usions of 
ttiis research. 
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Morris~ more t~an most others, has refocused a tten ti on away from 
abstractly conceived 11~0 des of production 11 and towards cl ass 
struggle~ in the determination of the form of dominance of 
capitalism in South Africa~ In his work~ however~ there remains a 
strong tendency to underestimate the extent of capitalist 
develoµnent in the 19th century~ with the concorrmitant tendency to 
ascribe to mining capital and the state in the 20th century the 
policy of ;•maintaining and reproducing such an overlapping of 
mdes of pr"oduction and the specific migrant labour system 
consequent on it ... 11 ( 49) 
Morris is particularly concerned with the transition to capital ism 
in agriculture. He is concerned to show two features of this 
process: that capitalisation 'from above' (the Prussian Path) by 
white 1 andowning· farmers was only secured as-· a result of intense 
class struggle; and that the share-cropping system ( 1 squatting 1 ) 
of Africans on white owned 1 and became trans formed in to a 1 ab our 
rent system, (a disguised form of wage labour), thus finally 
destroying any basis for African accumulation outside the 
Reserves. ( 50) The Reserves themselves do not form part of the 
object of analysis.. Neverthe1 ess Morris takes cognisance of the 
Resarves in so far as their maintenance or destruction affects the 
possibility for transition to capitalism in agriculture 'from 
be1ow 1 • As this thesis wi11 concern African producers both within 
the Reserves and 1 squatters~ on white land, it is important to 
look critica11y at Morris's conceptualisation of this. 
Morris has shown that the form of bourgeois rule in South Africa 
cannot be deduced 11 purely by reference to an idealised essence of 
capital 11 • (51) His own analysis of the transition from share-
cropping to 1 ab our rent, in which the 1 a tter undergoes an 
1 internal transforrration' is cl early constructed. 
"the transformation occurred both by a di sti net 
political break - the direct intervention of t.'ie 
State against the squatter peas an try W'h i ch 
tr an sf armed them in to 1 ab cur tenants and by a 
number of quite imperceptible transitions as labcur 
tenancy was i tsc:1:; in t 12rnal 1 y. trans formed ... why 
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labour tenancy was no longer a pre-capitalist 
relatian, from the point of view of the relation of 
possession, is very apparent from the distinction 
made earlier by Lenin. It has already been pointed 
out that the 1 abour tenant in the period under 
discussion did not perform his 11abour service 1 
with his own means of labour (implements, oxen 
etc}. The union of the direct producer with t"le 
means of 1 abour has been severed.. The 1 abour 
process was cl early capitalist in nature, 
irrespective of the 1 ow degree of development of 
the productive forces. We can only repeat wi t1 
Lenin that labour service under these conditions is 
clearly capitalist in nature. 11 (52) 
The problem that occurs is that the question of the origins of the 
'squatter peasantry 1 is not dealt with, nor therefore is their 
relation to the African producer in the Reserves. Finally, 
therefore, the question of the real transformation cf relations of 
prodJction in the Reserves is not posed, for it is as a result of 
this- transforrration that the 1squatter peasantry 1 emerged. 
These gaps are cl early interrelated and they 1 ead to the question 
of the conservation of the Reserves and the destruction of the 
rich 1 squatters 1 , which are complementary, being seen in a purely 
20th century context. {53) It is hoped to show that this is 
incorrect, at least for the Cape (and probably Natal and Lesotho 
as well). The difficulty is not only one of periodisation. It 
affects our understanding of the nature and specific mechanisms of 
capitalist domination and bourgeois rule in South Africa. In so 
far as the question of the origins of the 'squatter peasantry 1 is 
posed, it is only from the point of view of the penetration of 
monopoly (mining) capital in the Transvaal its elf. ( 54) The 
process in the Cape Colony is left entire1y unexplicated, 
al though, in several pl aces, note is taken t.liat the Cape did 
present a roore advanced capitalisation of agriculture at that 
stage. ( 55) In the Cape Col any the origin of rent-paying 
'squatters 1 on Colonist farms is related simply to the 1err.bryonic 
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and infan ti1 e' tendency towards capital ism in agriculture. ( 56) 
This vi~~" is based on a failure to conceptualise the real links 
between the Colonial economy and the transformation of the 
structure of production in the Reserves. Th is can perhaps be more 
clearly seen in Morris's analysis of the Glen Grey Act of 1894. 
In briefly considering some critical points in the evaluation of 
this Act, it can perhaps be indicated how an adequate analysis of 
so
1
cial relations and class forces in the 11 Reserve Economy" will 
'affect the evaluation of State policy in respect of these areas. 
To al 1 outward purposes, the Glen Grey Act marked an attempt to 
eradicate non-capitalist relations of production in order to 
create a labour force. This is the aspect on ·which Morris focuses 
in order to emphasise the contras ting policy of conservation of 
the non-capitalist modes which prevailed in the 20th century. 
Thus, in reference to the dissolution effects of the Glen- Grey 
Act,. he argued: 
"the bill was a direct attempt to transform tribal 
pre-capitalist social relations of production into 
individual peasant relations 11 and the "Glen Grey 
Act sought the economic, political and ideal ogica1 
destruction, (i.e. primarily dissolution effects) 
of the tribal pre- capitalist mode of production in 
the Reserves. 11 ( 57) 
Nowhere is cognisance taken of the fact that the Glen Grey Act ¥1as 
being applied to an area whfch had already been extensively 





Col on i al 
Fa i1 ure 
settler agriculture, 




cruci a 1 
trans forma ti ans 1 eads to a wrong un de rs tan ding of the nature of 
resistance to the Act and subsequent measures. It is necessary to 
consider the different interests which combined to oppose the 
Act. In order to make the point, but without anticipating the 
subsequent analysis, one can consider the following possibilities: 
{1) Chiefs and head'nen (paid) •11ho alre.ady had individual tenure 
on surveyed 1 ands i:i terms of earlier moves iri that 
direction, always strongly resisted the imposition of such 
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tenure for the masses. Opposition from them to the labour 
tax in the Act was premised on the fear of disruption of the 
gains they had made at the expense of the poor and landless. 
(2) Households, with and without the ownership of ploughs, 
harnesses and trek oxen, would find it more di ffi cult to 
enter into the hiring and renting agreements which were 
crucial to the form of comrnodi ty production which preva i1 ed. 
(3) Households with small holdings of land and little or no 
stock, were in danger of 1 os ing these to 1 arger households 
and thus of being forced into category 4. 
(4) People, landless at that point in the life-cycle, would have 
their abi1 ity to accumulate through borrowing and 
share-cropping., while awaiting entry into the productive 
cycle, cut off. They would be faced with little choice but 
to leave the district and face a new 1ife as proletarians. 
Clearly these various interests cannot be reduced to some 'tribal 1 
essence, 11 re-distributive 11 mode, etc. The objective of our 
subsequent analysis will be to show how the characteristic pattern 
of class division of the pre-capitalist mode was transformed (but 
not abolished) with conquest and colonisation, and to show the 
transformed economic, political and ideological dynamics of the 
relations of production of the non-capitalist productive units. 
The basic theoretical perspective, outlined here, derives support 
from areas of widely differing historical experience in South 
Africa. Beinart in his study of Pondol and has concluded: 
11 the analysis of the origins of mi grancy from 
Pondoland indicates that migrancy, as one 
specific form of wage labour en which much of the 
early industrialisation in South African 'l'ias based, 
was not simply determined by needs of capital. The 
mines and farms of South Africa transformed the 
rura 1 societies from wh i c.h i ab our was drawn, 
at the same ti ire the nature of accumulation in 
South Africa was deeply affected by the dynamic of 
1 • l,... • A~ . . . . " I '"8) re.1at1ons111ps in ·rr1can scc1et1es ... ~::; 
137 
Not only the timing, but the natur~ of the imposition of Colonial 
rule in Poncbland differed vastly from that of the Xhosa in the 
West. ( 59) 
Migrant labour, when it arose in Pondoland, was closely linked to 
the continued reproduction of the homesteads. Beinart is 
unfortunately not able to show how the changing dynamic of 
reproduction was affected by the existing stratification and 
differential levels of accumulation between homesteads. It is 
clear, from his study, that there was a wide spectrum of levels of 
accumulation between homesteads, and that 11migrant labour" meant 
different th in gs (in economic terms) to each worker, de pen ding on 
the vantage point from which he entered the system. (60) The 
experience of wa.ge work in turn "tended to reinforca the divisions 
within rural society 11 • (61) This present research supports the 
vi eN that: 
11 the system of migrancy can only be understood in the 
context of the rural household and its control over 
the 1 abour and earnings of its members. 11 ( 62) 
While the absence of military force used against the Pon do was in 
marked contrast with the experience elsewhere, the nature of 
economic and political relationships was u1 timately subject to 
transformation and a break with the past - which was 11 forced 11 in 
so far· as the Poncio chiefs were left with no option but to 
renounce roost of their former powers. The dominant cl ass in 
Pondoland had, as elsewhere, to seek ways of establishing its 
political and economic power within the confines and 
characteristic opportunities which were presented by the new 
economic relationships introduced by colonialism, taxes, migrant 
labour, money and the exchange of commodities, land allocations, 
and so on. 
Peter Del 'fus has noted a very different pat~ern of migrant 1 abour 
from that of the Pondo, in his analysis of the Pedi social 
forTr.ation. In the 1860s and 1870s, sustained vio1e!1ce, first by 
the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek, and then '0y the 3ritish (both 
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with Swazi assistance) was a. very prominent feature. (63) The 
Pedi, who had, 1 ike the Sotho, Tswana and Zulu,, a more centralised 
ch iefta incy than the Xhosa, ma de use of mi grant 1 ab our from an 
early date as a means of acquiring fire-arms and catt1 e. Groups 
of from one hundred to five hundred proceeded to the Cape Col any 
for work on the farms, railways and diamond mines. 
Delius has indicated that post Difigane {i.e. Tshaka) cattle 
raiding by the Swazi, Ndebele, Boers and .others, the persistence 
of tsetse fly and the emergence of lung-sickness, all led to a 
shortage of cattle for the proper functioning of Pedi political 
and economic relationships. The people migrated, therefore, for 
the twin purposes of acquiring cattle and guns wherewith to defend 
the lands. The numbers of Pedi society were swelling, especially 
with refugees, and the ca tt1 e resources were static. To cope with 
this, mf_grant 1 ab our emerged as a way of fulfil 1 ing the needs for 
the reproduction of the Pedi households and villages. Migrant 
labour was thus guided by chiefs like Sekhukhune and Moshoeshoe, 
and it supported the expansion of their chiefdoms up to the time 
of their military defeat by the combined forces of Colonist and 
Imperialist arms. 
After conquest, the centripetal forces at work became dominant. 
The large homesteads became increasingly individualised into their 
constituent family units. No longer did the old ruling class 
directly control the proceeds of mi grant 1 abour. The 
appropria ti ans formerly exacted by them were now appropriated by 
the Colonial State in the form of taxation. Lands which the Boers 
had claimed (and even issued title to) but had never effectively 
possessed~ were occupied and taken over. With most of their 
cattle lost, and land now a scarce resource, migrant labour became 
a matter of survival. 
The essence o-7 this process of transformation is t'ie existenc2 of 
a discontinuity between the pre-capitalist mode of production, and 
th,e mode of production under Colonial domination. In a fairly 
short period of ti:re the organisation of the basic structure of 
production changes, and, in the longer term, new political 
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relationships within the. dominated mode of production emerge and 
adapt themselves to these changes. Where active violence in the 
form vf Colonial arms was used,- the break with the previous mode 
was sharper, and the discontinuity mere readily discernible. 
While it was true that physical violence was not used, in every 
area (Poncbland - to name one example) most of the larger 
formations {Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa, Pedi, etc) were subject to such 
violent intervention. Jeff Guy has clearly drawn the conclusion 
that· such a break was evident in the Zulu social formation: 
"It se·ems to~ invalid to conceptualise the Zulu 
social formation in the 1890s as a pre-capitalist 
100de of production coming into articulation with 
the capitalist mode. To do this is to confuse form 
and content. One \vould have to accept the official 
rhetoric of the time, for the continuities witli the 
pre-capitalist past were superficial ones" (64) 
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THE FIRST BRITISH KAFFRARIAN .ADMINISTRATION 1848 -1850 
I Direct Rule and the Ori ft to War 
Sir H. Smith issued a proclamation on 23rd December 1847 
establishing British Kaffraria as a separate Crown Colony and 
stipulating the conditions under 'riflich the chiefs and their 
homesteads held their 'locations' in British Kaffraria. They 'l't'ere 
to occupy their land: 
11 From and under·.Her Majesty, under such service, and 
under such rules and regulations as __ Hgr:_J:1~jesty's . 
High Conuni ss ion er, or other representative who 
shall be the great chief of the territory, shall 
deem best calculated to promote the civilisation of 
the benighted humans subject to her rule. 11 (1) 
The new dispensation was officially conveyed to the chiefs on the 
7th January 1848 by Smit~ himself at a meeting that is now 
notorious in the annals of Colonist excesses. (2) Apart from the 
paranoid behaviour of Smith at the meeting, he made the chiefs 
swear to uphold an absurd list of conditions, including the 
abolition of 1obola (bridewealth) payments, the outlawing of 
'witchcraft 1 and to promise to obey the commands of the High 
Commissioner and to compel thei:-- people to do 1 ikewise. ( 3) 
The conditions imposed by Sn:iti'1 rr::solved most chiefs to make 
immediate pre para ti ons for '....-ar. In 1848 Kama of the Gqunukwebe, 
Mqhayi (who had only a very s711a1l fo1 l;;wing at that stage) of the 
Nd1ambe and Maqoma had ~een t~e c·nly chiefs not participating in 
the war. The· experience •Jf ~3.!.3 r.ac: ·5hown -:.+ie necessity for unity 
and the possession of guns ~Gr success in war '"'i ti the Colonists. 
The conditions that prev::i'l::d in Sritish Kaffraria between 1848 
;"'a.r was the on 1 y op ti on 
in dealing with the Colonf::l Sta:.:::. 
British Kaffraria was essentially a military outpost~ In 1848 
additional forts were established, incll·ding Ft. Hare on the 
Tyhumie, at Keiskamma Hoek and, most significantly, at Ft. Hill 
where the newly established King William's Town was laid out as 
the military and administrative centre. {4) Rule was to be by 
martial law, with a Chief Commissioner at King William's Town. 
Colonel G. MacKinnon was appointed as first Chief Commissioner. 
He was directly responsible to the High Commissioner of British 
Ka ffrari a who was the Governor of the Cape Colony. Two 11 Na tive 
Commissioners 11 were appointed to assist the Chief Commissioner. 
These were Captain J. Maclean at Ft. Murray for the Gqunukwebe and 
Ndlambe and Charles Brownlee at Ft. Cox with the Ngqikas. \~. Fynn 
was appointed Government Agent with the Gcal eka chief Sarhil i, 
over the Kei. ( 5) 
Exactly how British authority was_ to be enforced was not spelled 
out. Initially it was assumed that the chiefs would continue to 
rule and the commisioners would act as magistrates to whom appeal 
could be ma de. Smith instructed Mackinnon that rule was to be 
11 through the medium and instrumentality of the chiefs". (6) The 
commissioners were to hear all cases brought on appeal from the 
chief's courts and were to have the right to impose fines ~vhich 
they appropriated directly. 
As we shall see, the sys tern imposed by ~i th was to have a far 
greater impact on the chiefdoms than a mere system of judicial 
appeal would suggest. In important ways, which shall be examined, 
the system developed tnto an impediment on the ability of the 
chiefs to accumulate cattle. As such accumulation was essential 
to the process of estabi.'ishment of new homesteads, anything which. 
interfered ·,yith it 'i'la.s d direct attack on the basis of the 
chiefta incy and the mcce ;';f produ-:ti on which supported it. In the 
existing 1 iterature th~ pol itL:al ·and economic effects of the 
British Kaffrarian admfr1·:::itr1t·ion ~.n tt1e Xhosa chiefdoms have not 
been examined in .:ny (:~";:,;·P. The con':ribution of this regime -::o 
the formation of :;-;.e 2c::.nomic ().nd poiitical responses of the Xhosa 
to conquest and domin.c!c:;;;ri '-li'f<:: t:..1er~f;:)re b.een underappreciated. 
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The ability to accumulate cattle was particularly crucial in the 
early years of a ch1ef's rule. At this time there were in fact a 
number of young chiefs who had assumed their chiefta incy in the 
inter•war period between 1835 and 1848. Taking the 1 ist of ages 
of chiefs provided by Maclean in 1855, the median age of all the 
principal chiefs was 47. (7) This included some very old chiefs 
whose position was on the wane, 1 ike Botomane of the Imi dange, 
then 80 years old. More importantly it included a group of 
younger chiefs, Sandille, Anta, Toyise (Ngqika), Siwani and Siyolo 
(Mdushane), who were al 1 under 45 years old. r-.bst of these chiefs 
were still struggllng to establish their positions within their 
sections of the Xhosa, and to maintain the adherence of the mass 
of their homesteads. They could therefore least afford 
interference from rragistrates imposed on them by the Colonial 
State. 
-~ The struggle of these chiefs was not only against the Col any but 
also against the alder rival chiefs and their supporters. The 
conflict between Maqoma and Sandille has already been mentioned. 
There was a similar antagonism beti.veen Sh-Jani and Umhalla, the 
latter favouring Siwani's elder half-brother Siyolo. Both Maqoma 
and Umhal 1 a had shifting degrees of alliance w·i th the younger 
chiefs immediately connected to them. 
The a tti tu de of the chiefs towards ttie Colony or any innovations 
imposed by the Colonial State was fundamentally determined by the 
way it affected their ability to fulfil the basic function and 
obligations of a chief towards the mass of homesteads and young 
men. If the existence of a group of ol: entrenched councillors 
was a barrier to accumulation the ycung chiefs could well 
understand, the intrusion of the Cci <10-i :ii S~ te was not 
especially when the Colonial State at~:T.;.rt'::<i to interfere in the 
very mechanisms whereby the cl ass s-:r·;2::;·: .::; w·r :n;n the Xhosa 
chiefdoms was carried on. The on1:1 :;c'iut~.:;r '".o :his imposition 
.,,..as to try to overthrow it. For this n~::s::m t:~<:~ fJ:.:t:g chiefs were 
the main protagonists of the 1850-53 :H2.t. ::~ .Lid~:~on there were 
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(Ntinde) who had actively collaborated with the Colonial State and 
hoped to gain further security for their position by that means. 
To say that the Colonial State intervened in tJ1is way is to assume 
that the first adninistration in the new Colony of British 
Kaffraria from 1848-1850 was highly effective. A close 
examination of avail ab 1 e resources revea 1 s that in certain 
important respects the administration was indeed highly effective, 
even though it never succeeded in its objective of taking over all 
the powers of the chiefs over their people. Mackinnon claimed in 
a 1 etter written shortly before the outbreak of 'f'lar in 1850 that: 
11
Wherever we employed the chiefs to act for us either 
in exacting reparations for thefts committed by 
their people on the Colonists or in disputes which 
their people referred to us in 
1
preference to 
referring them to the chief for decision, there was 
some dishonesty or violence committed by them. The 
resu1 t of this was an appeal from the decision of 
the chief and an overturning of his award, he being 
generally obliged to disgorge cattle which he had 
seized and appropriated to himself. This is a1i 
connected with the hereditary privilege of 1 ea ting 
up
1
, which has from time immemorial been enjoyed by 
the chiefs. We have deprived them of this 
privilege; we. have taken the sett1 ernent of all 
disputes which are referred to us into cur own 
hands, and we act directly, ivi th out reference to 
the Chief, when a theft is committed by his oeoole 
in t.1e Col onx .... II { 8) (emphasis added} 
The last point is of particular significance because it a:=7::•.:ted 
one of the rr,ost important weapons in the hands of the chief, 
namely the direction of raiding par ti es in to the C\J1 cn.;1 to 
appr'.'.lpriate Cc1'.Jnia1 cattle. The capacity to direct raiding 
acti·tities against C:Jlonial cattle and to provide ;Jrotecti·:m :O 
the parties undertaking such raids was very important fJr the 
chiefs. In this way they '"'ere able to counteract the effect •Jf 
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the Colonial capitalist economy in providing alternative bases 
from which young men and homesteads could accurnul ate cattle 
through trade or wage labour. As much as trade and wage labour 
was regulated by Colonial farmers and merchants, so raiding 
depended on the active support of a wi11 ing chief without whose 
protection it was al together too risky a business. Raiding 
required that a chief be prepared to organise and defend the 
homesteads adhering to him which participated in these raids. 
Thus commisioners acting as magistrates directly taking up all 
cases of cattle theft, impaired the ability of the chief to direct 
these operations. 
Brcwnlee, the other commissioner along •,yith i'-"iaclean, has also 
represented their intervention as highly effective. 
11 The power of the chiefs was greatly circumscribed. 
All their decisions were 1iab1e to review, and if 
found inconsistent with justice, to be reversed by 
Colonel Maclean and myself Numerous appeals 
came against the decisions of Sandil le. 11 (9) 
As will be shown, the most serious :onsequence of the proclamation 
of British Kaffraria for the Xhosa wa's' the effectiveness of the 
magistrates in inhibiting organised cattle theft, even if in o~her 
respects they did not exercise much authority. As Mack inn on h ter 
cl aimed: 
11 I may also say it is generally acknowledged that at 
no former period have the frontier Colonists 
enjoyed such. security from marauding as during the 
present year 11 (10) 
r4ackinn·on realised that the pres.ence of the magistrates in :J1e 
territory of the chiefs and their direct action in cas.::s :':ivolving 
cattle tbeft from the Colony i1/as causing a serious loss of r'=venue 
to the chiefs and this resulted in the increasing 1.mpopu1ari::y of 
3ritish rule. He suggested "making compensation for :he privf:2ge 
of wtli ch \'le ha 11e deprived· t'iem. 11 ( 11 ) Soirie form of ·•com pens.:~ t·f on 1 
was in fact already being paid in the form of an annua1 
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distribution of 'presents'~ The purpose of the present:: is not 
clear, for (as both Smith and Mackinnon recognised) they were not 





consisted of a list of Colonial merchandise from 
clothing to· nails. (12) It seems likely that they were intended to 
stimulate the displacement of domestic production v1ith 
commodities. If the chiefs were seen to be using such commodities 
it would encourage others to do so, and thus gr ea t1 y expand the 
market. However, the chiefs found little use for the commodities 
and only distributed them. By October 1850, Mackinnon admitted 
that 
11 
It appears that t'iey rarely retain any of these presents for 
themselves and do not attach rruch importance to being made the 
medium of delivering them to the people. 11 ( 13} The presents were 
of no use in creating a fund through which chiefs could assist and 
control the process of accumulation of cattle and homestead 
expansion.. They were therefore no compensation at a 11 for the 
loss of incom: that the chiefs experienced. Two distributions of 
presents actually took place, one in February 1849, and the other 
in March 1850; the value of each distribution being about 600 
pounds. 
At the end of 1849, Mackinnon wrote a se1 f-congratul atcry report 
to Smith: 
11 Have we succeeded in giving the inhabitants of the 
frontier district of the Colony protection against 
the marauding of the Kaffirs? 11 
he asked rhetorically. His answer: 
11
The Colonists have enjoyed during the last two y0ars 
the most unparalleled impunity from maraudfog and 
in every case where stolen property has been traced 
to the Kaffirland, ample compensation has been 
obta'ine<l. 11 (14) 
Oespi te M.3.ck ir.non 's repeated cl aims for the effectiveness of his 
admfoistr.::tfon in stopping cattle theft, he had,.1 mere six months 
earlier, ::omp1ained of a high rate of theft of Colonial cattle by 
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the Ngqika, and stated that Brownlee was enforcing compensation 
payments from kraals. (15) From these contradictory statements, 
it can be concluded that it was not so much the rate of thefts 
that dropped but the value of compensation gained that increased, 
which lead Mackinnon to be well satisfied with the system. The 
commissioners were encouraged in their con fi sea ti on of Xhosa 
cattle by the knowledge that much of the money realised from the 
sale of the confiscated cattle went towards the Kaffrarian revenue. 
That British Kaffraria be self-supporting financially was of 
cardinal importance to the Colonial State and thus all m=ans of 
gaining revenue were followed up enthusiastically. Mackinnon, 
explaining the operation of the system of cattle confiscation in 
June 1848, wrote: 
u I may therefore say that the amount arising from 
t'tis source during the expired portion of the year 
is at about 500 pounds, arid that this sum will be 
considerably increased from tiire to time, ti-tough it 
would be difficult to make any estimate of what it 
will come to yearly. It will, however, always be 
considerable as we exact a fine for the Government 
in cases of theft of double the amount of stolen 
cattle, after compensating the owner for his loss. 
The chiefs are on some occasions obliged to pay for 
the spoor of stolen cattle traced into their 
·locations, and all horses and cattle found straying 
by the police are sold for the public benefit if 
not claimed within a reasonable time'1 • (16) 
(emphasis added) 
In this first six months of 1848, 419 pouncs 3 shil i ings was 
nised in the sale of confiscated. cattle. A further 100 pounds 
worth of cattle were then in the Government kraais awa:itbg sa1e, 
giving the approximate figure of 500 p.ounds referr::::i to hy 
\~' 
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Mackinnnon~ It is obviously of very great significance that he 
adnits that a fine of double the amount stolen \'las levierJ after 
compensation had been paid: (17) It is important to obtain some 
idea of the actual numbers of cattle involved in order to assess 
the extent of the impact of these con fi sea tions on the Xhosa: 
By tktober 25th 1848~ 630 pounds worth of cattle had been sold~ 
exceeding Mackinnon's wildest ·expectations: Taking an average 
price per head of cattle obtained on auction at 1 pound 
7 shillings~ this represented 468 head of cattle~ (18) However~ 
to this must be added cattle taken as direct compensation for tlie 
Colonists~ perhaps another 250 head or a total of 718 head: These 
' 
fines rrus t have been a s i gni fi cant burden on the Xhosa who had few 
cattle left after the war~ and must also.have been an intolerable 
injustice for any people who were~ as has been seen~ by no means 
yet militarily conquered: Injustice apart~ the dynamic bet\veen 
chief and the mass of homesteads still prevailed as the dominant 
relationship: The crisis produced in this· relationship by the 
deprivations imposed on them by the British Kaffrarian 
administration was enough to produce a crisis in relations with 
the Cai any: 
Later on~ in 1855~ Br<JWnlee estimated that $andi1le's annual 
income of cattle from fines •.vas 300 head a year 11 and as many more 
..• passed into the hands of his counci1lors 11 • (19) However, it 
is unlikely that;_in the period from 1848 to 1850, !1is ability to 
appropriate cattle was anything as great because of the severe 
conditions then preva i1 ing. In c1 amping down on stock theft ·..,; t1 
fines and compensation confiscations., the effects of British rule 
were to produce a crisis in t.'le Xhosa formation when chiefs could 
not provide their· homesteads •fli th cat tie, or protection from the 
Colonial State, thus undermining the entire basis of the 
chi e fta in cy . 
Between October 1848 and January i349 a further 119 pounds was 
raised through the sale of cattl::, or approximately 88 head of 
cattle. ( 20) Between January and September 1849 Maclean records 
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forwarding 179 head of cattle for sale on the King William's Town 
market, which fetched 265 pounds, or 1 pound 9 shillings per 
head. Between January and October 1850 he records forwarding 152 
head of cattle which fetched just over 1 pound each. (21) 
There is some evidence that an increased incentive for cattle 
theft resulted from the need experienced by young men to acquire 
cattle for lobola (bridewealth) payments, which in the prevailing 
circumstances they could not obtain in any other way. Writing in 
the 1850s Napier, who had been a British Commander on the 
frontier, claimed that the value of cattle had depreciated as a 
result of the presence of Colonial cattle. This depreciation was 
reflected in an increase in lobo1a cattle demanded by the family 
of a prospective bride. "Burrow states that the amount paid in 
his time for a wife was 'an ox, or a couple of cows. 1 Of late 
years, the price of --a bride has increased to ten oxen for 
co11111on ers. 11 ( 22) 
,r· 
The effects of the war had severely 1 imi ted the ability of the 
Xhosa to feed themselves from domestic production. Mackinnon 
himself noted: 
"The state of distress in v-1hich a great number of the 
kaffirs are, from want of food. The country and 
particularly the Gaika di strict was overrun by the 
troops at: the sowing season, and the usual supply 
of food therefore does not exist. 11 (23) 
In fact many thousands of Ngqika who had been dispersed during the 
war had not yet returned. In March 1848 Mackinnon began making 
prepara ti ans for a comprehensive census of the Ngqika and Nd1 ambe 
tribes. He noted in early 1848 that 11 a great many Kafirs nave 
located themselves during the war at a distance from the tribes to 
which they properly belong, and having sown the fr seed th er~, 
cannot be induced to forsake the places where they new are till 
their c:--ops are gathered. 11 (24) By late Decemoer i848 the c:ens1..:s 
had been taken and the results rev ea 1 ed 35 1 i9 Mdl amb es and 27 179 
Ngqikas, a total of 62 358. The number of cattle was only 0.9 per 
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capita. In response to these results Mackinnon wrote: 
11
Mr Brownlee calculates that from 20 000 to 25 000 of 
the Gaikas are absent, this being principally 
occasioned by the scarcity of food in that 
country. Large tracts of it were depopulated when 
it was over-run by the Troops during the sowfog 
season of 1847 and the Natives have not yet 
returned. The greater part of these are in 
Kreli 's country, some in· Tambookie Land, some in 
the Tslambie District and a good many wandering 
about the Col any without passes." ( 25) 
The immediate cause of this dispersion was the shortage of maize 
and sorghum grains. The more important cause was the shortage of 
cattle. The number of cattle in the Ngqika and NdTambe districts 
- - ·------represented the minimum required for the support of the population 
resident there. While it is certain that wealthy homestead heads 
had cattle elsewhere with clients and relatives, this do.es not in 
any way alter the fact that there was a great scarcity of cattle 
and consequently an urgent need to build up the cattle herds. 
The fact of dispersal of homesteads \·Jas comp1 ementary to 
intensified cattle raiding as a way of balancing the available 
resources of cattle over the number of homesteads. However, 
dispersion of people to Sarhili over Kei was one thing, dispersion 
into the Colony quite another. 
From January to June 1848 many families moved onto Colonial farms 
in the Ft. Beaufort and Victoria East districts. Despite attempts 
to enforce pass laws which required any Xhosa proceeding into the 
Colony to have a signed document stating the purpose of his visit, 
farmers in search of tenants ailowed Xhosa to reside on their 
farms. (26) These first squatter movements were complex in 
character. One type of squatting was an independent arrangement 
between a homestead head and a farmer; however at this stage these 
were certa 'inly in the :1d 1cri ty. The more important phenomenon 'fias 
squatting controlled and dir~cted by chiefs. 
\_ 
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This type of squatting was motivated purely by the need to find 
adequate residential and garden sites for the homesteads. It 
involved nothing- less than the unauthorised occupation of land and 
there was no question of production being undertaken for the 
Colonial landowners. In sorre cases, as in the Blinkwater valley 
(Ft. Beaufort district) the landowners received some rent for the 
land, but more often not even this was received as the border 
farms were unsurveyed and unoccupied. Nevertheless this type of 
land occupation was the forerunner of the more general squatting 
movement that characterised the decades after the 1850s. 
---As· early as June 1848 Brownlee wrote in a state of alarm: 
11 many Kafi rs are settling down about Ft. Beaufort, 
without right or authority and I believe many more 
are on the same footing in the Bl inkwater and 
various parts of the Kat River Settlement." {27) 
He al so appealed for the introduction of an effective pass law, 
because the free movement of Xhosa combined with squatting led to 
increased theft. 
The specific links between squatting and cattle theft were the 
Mfengu. There was, averred Brownlee, a· bilateral trade in stolen 
cattle between Mfengu resident (legally) in the Colony and the 
Xhosa squatters. (28) The Xhosa most involved in this were those 
of Maqoma. Maqoma had all but stayed out of the war in 1848. 
This was motivated by his be1 ief that by remaining out of the war 
he would be allowed to continue occupying his country between the 
Tyhumie and the Kat. In June 1848 1 six months after the 
proc1 amation of British Kaffraria, Maqoma was still occupying this 
1 and west of·, the Tyhumie. He at first atte11pted diplomacy in his 
efforts to have his presence there recognised. He tried to 
pursuade Brown1 ee that he wished to move to the Sl inkwa ter 
accompanied only by "5 wives 17 head of cattle and 2 of his men, 





petition was rejected, but this does not seem to have influence·d 
Maqoma, as large scale squatting in the Blinkwater and Waterkloof 
areas of Ft. Beaufort continued until 1850. The Ngqika under 
Maqoma were in effect refusing to recognise the right of the 
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Col any to possess the 1 and between the Tyhumie and Kat rivers by 
retaining occupation of it for themselves. It was ultimately the 
expulsion of these 'squatters' in 1850 that led to the 
preparations for war. (30) 
Apart from squatting in the Colony and dispersal of homesteads to 
other chiefs, one other very important phenomenon occurred in the 
inter-war period, namely _labour mi grancy. ( 31) The demand for 
labour in the Colony at this time was very strong. ( 32) The first 
group of 170 destitute Xhosa were forwarded to the Colony in 
1847. ( 33) The 1848 census showed l 651 persons absent from the 
Ngqika alone, who had left for the Colony and there was probably a 
similar number from the Ndlambe. (34) It is important to 
understand that these were not movements of families - they were 
speci fie in di vi duals who had left 'Ka ffraria' as contracted 
workers to specific employers in the Midlands district, and more 
frequently to the Western Cape. Ordinance 3 of 1848 required 
Xhosa youths to be indentured to particular empl ayers before they 
entered the Co 1 any. 
Smith
1
s system of indentured labour, supposedly approved by the 
Xhosa was aimed at getting young children to come and work in the 
Western Cape. When no children were forthcoming, the Ordinance 
was altered, so that whole families could be indentured. As 
Mackinnon wrote: 
"There is a disinclination on the part of the parents 
to part with their offspring for this purpose, 
particularly for the purpose of proceeding to the 
districts remote fr.om the border". { 35) 
In order to 1 encourage' people to go to the Western Cape, 
Mack inn on advised against a11 owing Xhosa from 'Ka ffrari a' to work 
in the border districts. Pefres has commented "that so many went, 
is a testament to the starvation of the Xhosa, newly resettled in 
their remaining possessicns". {.36) The following table reveals 
the composition of indentured wod-:.ers in 1849 and 1850. 
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Table 1 - Contract Workers from British Kaffraria 1849 and 1850 
( By Di s tr ic t ) ( 3 7 ) 
1849 I 1850 l GRANO DISTRICT 
MEN WOMEN CHILDREN TOTAL MEN WOMEN CHILDREN TOTAL I TOTAL 
ND LAMBE 155 51 88 294 116 46 55 218 512 
NGQIKA . 124 81 120 325 132 83 109 324 649 
279 132 208 619 248 130 164 542 l 161 
From the tab 1 e it can be seen that men were in fact the dominant 
participants in this early contract labour and not children as the 
Colonists had hoped. However these official statistics grossly 
underestimated the actual numbers employed because they refl.::ctec; 
only indentured labour aimed mainly at meeting the labour needs in 
the Western Cape. Many more people worked on the burgeoning sheep 
farms of the Border and Midlands districts. This group had the 
opportunity to enter into varying types of arrangements with 
farT1Ers that fell short of wage labour. It was from this point on 
that the different forms of tenancy began to make their 
a pp ea ran ce • ( 38) 
It is necessary to distinguish between 'squatters' who occupied 
Colonial land illegally, whether they paid rent to the farmers or 
not, and labour tenants who actually worked for the Colonial 
farmers. While squatting was widespread in this period, tenancy 
with labour rent or cr~p rent (share-cropping) was still in its 
beginnings. We will reserve the term squatting for the type of 
occupation in which the occupiers carried on their productive 
activity without reference to the owners of the farms; adopted 
whatev~r production processess they wished, and had only to pay an 
annual rent. {39) In subsequent years squatt1ng had a political 
importance in excess of its actual extent. Far fi'.ore comnon, and 
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economically far more significant~ was labour rent or crop rent 
which required that the tenant actua 11 y work for the farmer, 
whether using his own implements or not; whether using his own 
labour or family labour; and required that the farmer be in actual 
possession of the farm and be working it himself: 
Many of these workers on the Colonial farms did in fact enter into 
some fonn of tenancy system with their Colonial employers. This 
group is of exceptional importance, for it was they who returned 
to the districts still occupied by the Xhosa in the 1850s and '60s 
and who began the large scale transformation of domestic 
production in the Xhosa homesteads. This was accomplished both by 
the effect of exposure to new techniques and, more importantly, by 
the accumulation of money and cattle by workers on the Colonial 
farms, which began to 1 ink the process of homestead production and 
reproduction to accumulation outside of its own structures, in the 
broader Col on ia 1 economy. 
Such· bases of accumulation were, hOn'ever, not located exclusively 
outside the districts occupied by the Xhosa. Ther,e was al so some 
direct stim{Jlus to conmodity production in this period from within 
the confines of British Kaffraria. As has been mentioned, over 
2 000 military personnel were retained in Kaffraria and the sma1l 
community of traders and artisans at King Will iam 1 s Town and East 
Loncbn was grOn'ing quickly. As ·early as the meeting of 7th 
January 1848 Smith had informed the chiefs that the Anny 
Conmi ssaria t would purchase their surplus grains (towards 
maintaining the occupation force) 11 at the average price of the 
Colonial Market". (39) 
Mackinnon believed that the adoption of the plough and the 
encouragement of agri cul ture was the duty of the missionaries and 
the chiefs. The first perrnanent mission station had been 
established in 1820 on the Gwali tributary cf the Tyhumie River by 
the Rev. John Brownlee. The people surrounding this station ':¥ere 
mainly Ntinde and it was 8rownl~:e 1 s influence on the chief 
Tshatshu that was partly responsible for his general col1abora-
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tionist attitude towards the Colony. However the weak position of 
the Ntinde, living directly in the most disputed territory and 
sandwiched between Maqoma and the Col any, was no doubt a more 
important factor in determining Tshatshu 1 s political strategy. It 
was a strategic spot for the location of the first mission 
station. In 1825 the second station was established on the 
Inchera stream. This became known as Old Lovedale. The first 
pre-occupation of the early missionaries was translating the Bible 
into Xhosa and establishing themselves with the people. The 
latter objective was accomp1 ished by gaining adherents through the 
technological innovations which they in traduced. 
In 1821 the first irrigation furrows were constructed at the 
Tyhumie station and ploughs were made available to people who 
worked there. ( 40) In this way they brought 300 acres under 
cultivation at Tyhumie~ Old Lovedale was destroyed in the war of 
1835, but in the 1840s several new stations were esublished so 
that by 1848 there were six mission stations in British Kaffraria .. 
( 41 ) Loveda 1 e was reconstructed on a new site on the Co 1onia1 
side of the border, but had extensive agricultural land inside 
British Kaffraria. 
The building of military forts and the spread of mission stations 
para 11 el ed each other. The presence of missionaries both preceded 
and followed the path of the gun. There is no doubt that most 
chiefs such as Ngqika, Maqoma, Tyali and Phato saw missionaries in 
a strategic 1 ight. Prior to the war of 1835, Maqoma had professed 
interest in Christianity in his attempt to secure his occupation 
of lands in the 1ceded 1 territory. \~hen Maqoma was driven out of 
his 1 ands a contempor.ary observer recorded him as saying.: 
11 I am glad I have heard there is a God. The teacher 
has told me that God wil 1 judge al 1 men according 
to their deeds. You have overcome me by weapons 
that are in your hands. But you must answer for 
this. You and I must stand before God. He will 
judge us. I am a man who does not know God yet I 
rejoice He will be judge." (42) 
\ __ 
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Tyali 's motivation was almost certainly the same when he made a 
grant of about 40 acres to the o 1 d Loveda 1 e station. In 1848, 
Fort Hare was erected adjoining Loveda1e, and 500 men were 
stationed there. On the Colonial side of the Lovedale mission was 
the new district of Victoria, where· farms were given out to 
Colonists and part of the dense Mfengu population of Peddie 11as 
resettled there. The Pirie mission was strategically situated 
near Fort Stokes and Burns Hill station was on the Keiskamna River 
near Fort Cox •. They were al1 in areas of high population 
concentration and therefore ideal for propagating new ideology and 
technology. 
After the 1-1ar of 1848 Smith realised the potential of the 
missionaries and in a Government circu1 ar he asked an the 
missionaries to submit memoranda on the best methods "to inspire 
in the Bantu a desire to cultivate the fr 1 and by ploughing and to 
induce them to foll ow habits of industry - the first step to 
civilisation and equally so to their embracing the Christian 
faith". {43) In response to this, the Reverend Warner suggested 
a tax of 4 shillings to 5 shillings on each adult male, others 
suggested the establishment of moc~1 farms and irrigation 
furrows. Most of this Mackinnon rejected as he regarded the 
mission stations themselves as the best means of encouraging more 
intensive agriculture: 
11 ! conceive that the best means we can supply to 
encourage agriculture amongst the Kaffirs is by 
fUrnishing the missionaries with ploughs, seed 
corn and agricultural implements, such as spades, 
hoes and axes· to • • • be used for the benefit of 
the Kaffirs in the neighbourhood of t.lieir 
stations. In some cases too when the chiefs show 
desire to cultivate the soil independent of the 
missionaries, ploughs and seed shou1d be given t.J 
them. u { 44) 
The chiefs Sandille, Phato, Toise, Siwani, Siyc1o and 1·l.::mba and 
the council 1 ors Soga and Son ta each received 5 yokes, a pl u!Jgh 
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trek chains and one muid of seed wheat, oats and barley. Sandille 
received 4 oxen in addition and certain other people were al so 
given seed corn. The mission stations all received seed grains, 
ploughs and yokes. In addition, some special distributions of 
grain and spa des or hoes were ma de to des ti tu ts peep le in 
Sandi1le 1s country. (45) 
At the time of the distribution of presents in 1849, 30 hand saws, 
11 ploughs and a 1 arge number of other implements were given to 
the miss ion stations. ( 46) In April , 1849 Mack inn on again 
requested Smith to supply seed wheat from Cape Town asking for 10 
rrn.dds each for the Ngqika and Ndlambe districts~ (47) 
Although Mackinnon claimed that his assistance to the missions in 
getting them productively invo1 ved in agriculture was in order to 
promote them as model farms to 1benefi t 1 the surrounding Xhosa, 
the establishement of a cheap supplier of food for the army r1as as 
important a function. Writing about the distribution of pioughs 
to the mission stations, he noted: 
"This has given a great impulse to industry and 
agriculture, and. already has a great deal of corn 
and other produce been raised at.·t\.10 of the mission 
stations, Burns Hil 1 and Kaysers. I understand that 
about 12 000 lbs. of oat hay are ready_ for sale to 
the conmisariat. 11 (48) 
In this way, military occupation encouraged the first large scale 
production of agricultural commodities and assisted in turning the 
mission stations into magnets which attr~cted the destitute and 
displaced Xhosa who worked there and encouraged the spread of 
corrmodi ty production. 
The imposition of the British Kaffrarian administration also had a 
stimulating effect on trade. Each trader had to pay 50 pounds per 
annum for his trading license. Despite this Mackinnon was able to 
report ti1a t: 
11
A very considerable Kaffir Trade has sprung up and 
is duly on the increase. The ef feet of this wi11 
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be to benefit materially the Colonial revenue ~~: 
We have forty-three 9enera1 traders in Ka ffraria 
each of whom has paid 50 pounds for his license 
These traders must sell 1 arge l y, or they could not 
pay so high a rate of 1icense~ 11 ( 49) 
Increasing the extent of trade was one of the main concerns of the 
Colonial merchant houses in Port Elizabeth and Grahams town. The 
Colonial State also benefited from it~ As Mackinnon pointed out, 
"the Colonial Revenue benefits 1 argely by the Kaffi r Trade", as 
all arti c1 es imported were. subject to duty: British manufacture 
goods were charged at 5%, but the large quantities of beads which 
were still sold were of Italian manufacture, and as with all other 
non-British manufactured goods were charged at 12%. The ma in 
trade item, however, remained blankets~ The scarcity of cattle 
for any but the most basic food requirements during this period 
directly encouraged the adoption of blankets for clothing on a 
massive scale. 11 81ankets they buy in great quantities, and the 
sale of these is one of the great sources of profit to the 
Traders
11
• ( 50) However most of the trade at this stage was 
still carried on by 11means of an interchange of co111TJodi ties and 
there was 1 i ttl e use of money. 11 ( 51 ) 
It has al ready been inenti oned that Mf engu because of their 
position in the Colony were ideally placed to participate in 
cattle raiding operations. ihey were also ideally placed to 
participate in the other great object of trade which dominated the 
inter-war period, namely firearms. Almost immediately after the 
close of the 1848 war trade in firearms became a feature of the 
frontier. The reasons are not hard to find. It appears that 
Col onia1 merchants were importing muskets for 7 shil 1 ings or 8 
shil 1 ings each from Brita in -lnd se11 ing them for 1 pound to 1 
pound 10 shillings on the frontier. ( 52) By the tir:-;e the war 
actually began in December i850 (wi J:h an armed ambush Gf a 
Colonial patrol) the main force of the Xbosa were fairly ·...,ell 
' . th r ~.., 1 T'n arrne a w1 guns. , .:),:) 1 e ;negal nat:n·::: of the trade naturall:1 
created a ro1e for ~fengu as rniddle-meri between merchants and 
Xhosa. 
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The extent of Mfengu participation in trade went beyond the 
illegal arms trade. There appears to iiave been a considerable 
trade in other commodities as well. This trade was not in the 
interests of the 1 icensed traders, and they were quick to try and 
force Mfengu traders out. In September 1848, Mackinnon received a 
petition complaining about "the inconvenience that is occasioned 
by Fingoe from the Colony trading in British Kaffraria and beyond 
the Kei. 11 (54) Fynn, the Government agent with Sarhili, had 
app,arently detected some Mfengu sel 1 ing arms and seized 15 
I 
cannisters of gunpowder and a large number of bullets. Mackinnon 
on the strength of this, requested permission to "seize all wares 
in the possession of Fingoes proceeding towards Kafferland, and to 
make them prisoners if they had no passes, sending them back under 
escort to their location. 11 (55) it is clear· that he was using 
the trade in firearms as a pretext to force the Mfengu out 
al together. Al though this permission was never granted attempts 
were made to enforce more strictly 1 icensing provisions- wh-ich--
effectively excluded small Mfengu traders, but did not affect the 
trade in firearms which was illegal in the first place. 
The main force at the disposal of the new commissioners was two 
di vi si ans of 1po1ice 1 which had been recruited . from the Xhosa 
themselves. There were 400 in all, 200 in each division. It was 
these police, under the command of two British Army officers who 
were responsible for following the spoor of stolen cattle and 
attaching cattle confiscated in fines and compensation. The 
continual presence of these forces was backed up by over 2 000 
troops stationed at King Willi am 1 s Town and at other military 
forts. (56) The main purpose of the forts was to keep track of 
all movement into the Colony. However the presence of the forts 
al so ensured complete access to the interior for traders, and 
trade benefited most from the short lu11 be~Heen wars. 
This, in brief, '""as the system established by Sir H. Smith, and it 
is of some importance as it was the first formal attempt anywhere 




successful ', the Co1 onia1 State had to achieve a major 
dislocation of the mode of production and for that it had to break 
the fundamental relationship between the four pillars of Xhosa 
society - the chief, the homestead, the cattle and the land. 
I 
This it had done by radically reducing the available land through 
conquest, and by reducing the cattle-holding of the Xhosa through 
the confiscation of vast herds as booty in the wars. The Colonial 
economy, by providing opportunities for trade and wage 1 ab our ma de 
it possible for homesteads, and more particularly the young and 
the poor, to be drawn into the accumulation of cattle and money in 
the Col onia1 economy where the chiefs had no control over-_ the 
accumulation process. 
At the same time the contradictions within the chiefdoms were 
intensified. By restricting access to cattle, by reducing the 
overall number of cattle at the disposal of the chiefs and by 
restricting the 1 and avail able for resi den ti al, arable and 
pastural purposes, a crisis was engendered 'in the basis of chiefly 
authority. There occurred an intensification of the 
1 bottle-necking' effect, whereby the concentration of resources in 
the hands of established homesteads increased. This made it a11 
the more difficult for the normal process of the establishment of 
new homesteads by the younger men to continue. If the chief could 
not provide cattle and facilitate the establishment of ne111 
homesteads, there was no 1 anger a basis for his pas i ti on and 
authority. However, the chieftaincy was a great institution and 
chiefly ideology was extremely powerful. Belief in the eff·icacy 
of the chiefs was not lightly to be dispensed with. It was thus 
inevitable, operating under such restrictions, that the popular 
sentiment would be for war. 
The chfefs never accepted the new dispensation of Colonial ruie. 
1,;/hfle it has already been mentioned that they almost immediately 
began military preparations mainly aimed at acquiring guns, they 
almost certainly still hoped t"lat, as in 1835 witJ1 the 
renunciation of the Province of Queen Adelaide, the British 
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Government would remove the burden of British Kaffraria: Thus in 
February 1849, at a meeting for the distribution of '.presents' it 
became apparent that a rumour ·had been spread that 11 the present 
system of government was to be abandoned and that they would be 
al 1 owed to reoccupy the country taken from them at the close of 
the war". (57) Sandille, Mhalla and Seyolo were present. They 
addressed the meeting and complained specifically about the small 
size· of the country they now occupied. There can be no doubt 
that for the opera ti on of the Xhosa economy according to ; ts own 
1 aws the country was too sma 11 . 
After only a year of operation of the first administration set up 
to govern formerly independent Xhosa chiefdoms, another war 
seemed i nevi table. 
II The War of 1850 - 1853 and Economic Dislocation 
The war in 1850 is unique in that it foll owed directly from the 
imposition of British Sovereignty in Western Xhosaland. If the 
treaty system of 1835 had failed to bring a 'secure frontier' in 
the eyes of the Colonial apologists for the war of 1848, neither 
did the imposition of British military rule, and it brought 
another war in its wake. As chiefs watched the increasing 
dispersal of homesteads and the insidious growth of wage 1 abour 
and trade, it became increasingly clear that they would soon no 
longer be able to control the process of accumulation of cattle 
and expansion of homesteads within their sections of the nation. 
Alternative and radically m?w bases for accumulation had begun to 
emerge. 
At the same time the new cpportuni ti es were not open to 
everyone. For many the ccnditions of life with Sarhili or Mhalla 
as immigrants must have been scarce i y any better than with 
Sandille. ·Work 1n the d~stant western districts for all but the 
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most desperate was an unwelcome prospect. That there were many 
such desperate people is attested to by the relatively large 
numbers who went to work as contract workers, and the fact that 
Mackinnon made a special distribution of seeds and spades to the 
'destitute' in Sandille 1 s country. Working locally or squatting 
on Colonial farms on the border brought with it insecurity and 
conflict. There were therefore ample grounds to ensure 
continuous pressure on the chiefs from the mass of homesteads to 
fulfil their du ti es as chiefs; that is to provide the homesteads 
and the young men in particular with cattle and land in return 
for their loyalty and support. The more the chiefs delayed, the 
more the people were bound to become dispersed and the nation 
weakened. This would make it more difficult to defend existing 
cattle and land and to fight to regain lost resources. 
In 1849, Sandille (who it will be remembered had been absent from 
Smith 1 s meeting of chiefs in January 1848) publicly rejected the 
system, declaring bluntly that "the country was too sma11 11 • 
(58) 1849 was a year of drought which intensified the demands 
being made upon the chiefs~ The drought continued from the 
sowing season of 1849 through to 1850, and was of such severity 
that pasturage was affected, 1 ea ding to a serious drop in the 
milk yield. (59) Merriman, who toured the frontier and British 
Kaffraria in 1850, observed that because of: 11 the excessive 
drought which has been of such 1 ong con ti nuance, there was much 
distress in Kaffirland, and the people were almost perishing from· 
h un ge r • 11 ( 60 ) 
In August 1850, Comni ss ion er Maclean first reported the presence 
of a prophet ca 11 ed Ml anj en i , of Mqhayi 's tribe. Ordered to 
appear before Maclean, Mlanjeni declined and in retaliation the 
police seized two head of cattle from his father 1 s kraa1 (where 
he lived). (61) They also took down the special poies erected at 
Mlanjeni's kraal indicating the p1c.ce of d. prophet. Mackinnon's 
reaction to the increasing dissatisf.acti:Jn of the people was to 
recommend the abolition of 1 present:;' and the substitution of 
cash payments direct to the chiefs. H~ proposed payment to all 
the senior and junior chiefs at 20 poiJrid.s and 10 pounds per annum 
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respectively. ( 62) Wh i1 e he declined to arrest Ml anj en i he 
contemplated the remova1 of Sandi11e as chief, (who he thought 
was the source of disaffection) although he recognised that this 
step would be purely nominal and would intensify opposition to 
British rule. ( 63} 
The exact nature of Mlanjeni 1 s prophecies is uncertain. To place 
them in proper context it is important to understand the general 
nature of prophecy and the ro1 e of the war doctor in the Xhosa 
social formation. The war doctor was one of a hierarchy of 
pries ts or diviners who co11 ecti vel y held power over, and could 
explain the workings, of· all important phenomena including 
sickness and rain. (64) Without going into the question of the 
re1a ti onshi p between Xhosa religious i deo1 ogy and chiefly power, 
it has al rea·dy been ll'Entioned that the witchcraft accusation was 
the most powerful sanction in the hands of the chiefs. ( 65) Such 
accusations lead to the calling in of a specialist doctor to find 
the witch. The essence of the belief in witchcraft is that no 
serious illness, death or other material calamity can take place 
except through the evil influence (u-posela) of some living 
individual usually termad igqwira (witch or wizard). (66) 
Soga has explained that the role of the war doctor (Tola), such 
as M1anjeni, was based on an extension of this cosmology. 11They · 
doctor the army and use their power to 11 tie up 11 the enemy of a 
particular person or thing in such a way as to render it 
innocuous • • . this power to control is call u-mabope the 
tier-up. This tying power is not confined to the war priest, 
even the·· i-xweie or herbalist is said to have it.
11 
(67) 
Sacrifice of cattle was carried on within each ~ in cases of 
illness or bad fortune and every homestead was completely used to 
the process of divination and being called on to sacrifice 
cattle. Usually some attempt was made to keep a particular line 
of beast in the family herd which was purer in strain than the 
r~st. This was kept for sacrificial purposes. For a war doctor 
to call upon tlie nation to sacrifice cattle, was mer::1y -::;c~ending 
the normal practice of doctoring. ( 6.8) Warner has de.scribed the 
position of the war doctor in somewhat ~xaggerated but iHs kall y 
ac :::ur':l t.e terms. 
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"The peop1 e pay great deference to a 11 the pries ts, 
but they yield unbounded obedience to the national 
priest: and to disregard his injunction, and to 
neglect, or to refuse to conform to all the rites 
and ceremonies he may think it proper to institute 
••. would be considered a capital offence. 11 (69} 
While disobedience to the war doctor may have been serious, it is 
also certain that great chiefs promoted doctors, so that should 
anything go wrong in the war, the blame would fall on the inept 
doctor rather than on the chieL For these basic reasons, it is 
easy to understand that the word of a prophet cal 1 ing on the 
people for sacrifice was not lightly dismissed. 
Mlanjeni 1s early activities were those of a convent·ional doctor: 
He lived in his father's kraal in the small location of the chief 
Mqhayi. According to the census of 1848 Mqhayi 1 5 chiefdom 
contained only 47 homesteads, containing 191 households. (70) 
This made it the smallest of all the Ciskeian chiefdoms, 
accounting for only 1.4% of all househo1 ds. This is of some 
significance because Mqhayi was the senior son of Ndlarnbe who had 
been defeated in the power struggles after Jldl alT'b~ 's death, in 
wh'ich Mha1la gained the Ndlambe chieftaincy. That the prophet of 
the 1850 war shou1 d emanate from the areas in closest contact 
with the Col any and from the weakest chiefdom in Xhosal and 
certainly favoured the emergence of the widest interest from 
other chiefs. It made it easier to allay suspicions that 
M1anjeni was in any way the tool of any particular great c.hief. 
Ml anjeni was young, about 20 years al d, at that time, and shortly 
before he started prophesying he had been in the Coi ony as a 
worker. He had thus direct experience of the Colonists and 
Coionia1 servitude. (71) He declared that his father's kraa 1 was 
bewitched. Shephard claims that the crucial step taken by 
M1anjeni was to declare that the land itself was 
bewitching substances and in order to rid it of them the people 
had to come to him to be cleansed. It was this r~velation which 
caused huge crowds to gather at M1anjeni 's kra21. M1·1n.jeni 1 s 
fu1i of 
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innovation was that the normal process of divination, which any 
household would resort to through the intermediary of a doctor in 
times of adversity, was made into a national crusade. Initially 
these meetings did not involve any direct talk of war and were 
sufficiently akin to the normal practice of a doctor for the 
Colonial authorities n.ot to feel warranted in taking drastic 
action against Ml anjeni. This they realised would only increase 
mass interest in him. 
It is of particular importance to observe the part played by 
cattle sacrifice_ ordered by Ml anjeni. As part of the cleansing 
process Mlanjeni ordered people to kill the dun (red, ochre or 
yellowish brown) coloured cattle. After August 1850 he began 
prophesying that war with the Colony was inevitable and enjoined 
people to sacrifice cattle to ensure victory - promising :tfiem 
that the cattle of the Colony would be theirs. The Rev. Garvin 
of Ann Shaw mission station writing to Colonel Maclean in 1855 
stated:. 
"When I was in the interior during the last war in 
several conversations with intelligent natives on 
the subject of the ... coloured cattle having been 
ordered to be destroyed by Umlanjeni I ascertained 
that circumstances somewhat similar had occurred in 
previous years." (72) 
In fact it appears that the equally famous war doctor Nxele 
(otherwise known as Makanna) who led the attack on Grahamstown in 
April 1819, had also ordered the killing of cattle. He has been 
reported as ordering the slaughtering of all red cattle and goats 
but that any that had the 1 east patch of white were not to be 
slaughtered. (73) 
In view of the subsequent ':attla-kill ing episode that followed 
defeat in the 1850-1353 war, it is important to see that cattle-
killing was a form of :;;:c;·ifice 1'1hich every homestead was used to 
and which had been ~sed pr~vicusly in 
behind the chiefs in ~r2oar~tion for war. 
mobilising the nation 
The practice thus must 
have had a high 1eve1 of iC::::::T':.ao -1 ii :y for tl1e mass of Xhosa. 
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It is not clear from what point the chiefs started taking a 
direct interest in Mlanjeni; however~ even Colonist ideologues 
such as Brownlee conce<:E that Mlanjeni was an authentic prophet 
of the nation and was not a mere pretext established by the 
chiefs themselves. The turning point appears to have been the 
attempts made to remove those of Maqoma 's homesteads 'squatting' 
in the 81 inkwater area. It has already been discussed that since 
1848 Maqoma had been leading an attempt to occupy the Blinkwater 
I 
and Waterkloof areas around Ft~ Beaufort. In June 1850 a large 
raid was made by Lt. Davis using the Fron ti er Pol ice force. At 
the end of th_e raid Davis reported that "a11 unlawful squatters 
were sent to their respective chiefs." (74) The expulsion was 
undoubtedly serious; al together 350 women, 145 men and 11 a great 
number of chi1 dren" were removed. Most of the peop1 e. affected 
were adherents of Maqoma. A 1 though Maqoma ~ s chief dam was sma 11 , 
accounting for only 429 households or nearly 10% of the Ngqika 
chiefdom as a whole, his influence and reputation throughout the 
chiefdom was great. The area he was occupying was a valuable 
source of sourveld grazing and it is 1 ikely that many of the 
2 347 catt1 e be1 onging to the squatters had been sent there to 
survive the drought 'Nhich had greJt1y reduced available pasturage. 
A crucial feature of the raid was that it adversely affected a 
number of Khoi who had previously 1 ived in the Kat River 
sett1 ement. Many of them were removed and forced back to the 
overcrowded Kat River settlement. This seemed to be one of the 
immediate causes that stimulated most of the settlement to join 
the war on the side of the Xhosa. This was ·~ significant 
developnent and it was not lost on the Colonists that those 
groups on which they thought they could r~ly, such as the Khoi 
and the Mfengu, could in fact never be fu 11 y trust~d to protect 
Colonial interests. The Khoi rebellion along i,i1ith 'the mass 
mobii ization achieved by Mlangeni marked the war of 1850, more 
than any other, as a war of nati()ncl ,..e::;istance to defe:id t.'ie 
right of the mass of homesteads to ::h;;: land in the ~a.ce of 
Col on is t usurpation. 
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It is perhaps significant that it was only a month after this 
raid that the first report by Cormli ss ion er Mac1 ean, concerning 
Mlanjeni 1s activities, was registered~ Godlonton claims that 
after the removal of the people from the 81 inkwater, Maqoma made 
a personal visit to Phato, Mhalla and Mtirara (Thembu chief). He 
also claims that he tried to organise a combined attack, but this 
claim is not supported. However his other claim, that Maqoma 
prevailed on them to send delegations to hear Mlanjeni 1 s prophecy 
is almost certainly true. (75) The existence of the prophet and 
the large numbers of people who believed in his prophecy seems to 
indicate that the war was motiv<:ted by popular sentiment. This, 
combined with_ the realisation by the chiefs that after nearly 
three years of British domination British Kaffraria was not going 
to be deproclaimed as had occurred in 1835, resulted in the 
pre para ti on of definite pl ans for war. 
In late October 1850 the Governor Sir H. Smith was on the border 
and called a meeting of chiefs at King William 1 s Town - which 
Sandille did not attend. Chagrined by this, Smith issued a 
notice deposing Sandille, as Mackinnon had earlier contemplated 
doing, and appointed Brownlee as the new chief. (76) Nothing 
further was done immediately; Smith spent November 1850 rnak ing 
his views on the economic and political problems of the frontier 
known to the Colonists. He speci fi ca11y wished to encourage a 
dense Colonist population on the frontier. Speaking to a 
delegation of Colonists which included Godlontont the proprietor 
of the Grahamstown Journal, he declared: 
11 0ne thing I must say, al 1 of you commit a grave 
error in keeping so many black and so few white 
. servants. A black costs you 23 pounds 9 sh il 1 ings 
a year, not reckoning his thieving. A 'f<l'hi:.e will 
cost you 38 pounds 15 shi11ings, but wi11 steal 
nothing. Now the least sensib1e ::.rn<ong you must see 
that the difference . of 15 pouncs ·between a 
faithful white servant a.!d 1} b!.:1ck 
" ~ . ~- . :n1er, 1s more 
than twice ea ten up every year by the robberies 
cormli tted upon you, under the !:>r~::se1 t sys tern of 
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employing native labour, and further~ the one would 
betray you, whilst the other would defend you." (77) 
However the question of employing black workers was not based on 
considerations of cost or sentiment, it was based on the fact 
that only their 1 abour had the necessary skill to work in the 
rugged conditions of frontier sheep and cattle farms; as 
Godlonton put1 it in reply to Smith: 
"black labour cannot be entirely dispensed with, as 
no immigrant is willing to act as sheep and cattle 
herd, neither do they understand the management of 
wagons and oxen as well as the natives do. In the 
case of lost or stolen cattle, a coloured man will 
follow up the spoor through bush and_ brake, and 
frequently recover them under circumstances in 
which a white man would be baffled, and his labour 
would prove utterly in vain." (78) 
The employment of blacks on the Colonial sheep farms was 
therefore related not only to the cheapness of their 1 ab our but 
also to its quality. As sheep farming expanded so did the need 
for skilled herders. As most such workers were still in close 
contact with their homesteads. and chiefs, it is al so true that 
they were in an excellent position to direct cattle theft 
opera ti ans. By 1 ate 1850 most workers in the border districts 
were returning home in response to the injunction of Mlanjeni, 
and the news of the prophecy reached the Western districts 
bringing indentured workers back from there. 
As a result of Smith's attempts to pacify Colonial feei ing most 
farmers who had fled tnei r f:zrms in October had returned. 
However in early December Srr."f t!-1 ·was again on the fr en ti er and at 
a further meeting of ::hiefs, 3mith and the Ndlambe Commissioner 
Maclean attempted to enco1ffJ.9e the Ndi ambe under Mhall a to stay 
out of the war, sho.ulC: it :~::c1-2. Sy December 1850 the alliance of 
chiefs had taken sha;:;e. 
Maclean saying: 
the Gqunukwebe chief sent to 
"all the Hlambie chi~~~ 3na their ~eople are 
This 
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sacrifice of cattle commenced 
spread over the whole land. 
that by sacrifice of cattle, 
with Sandille and has 
The reason given is, 
much plunder will be 
got fr001 the Col any,. and never recovered and that 
those who slaughter goats wi11 only be able to take 
goats fran the Colony. 11 (79) 
By this stage most of the Ngqika force under Sandille had 
withdrawn to the Amato1a Mountains which were to be the focus of 
the war. The Amatolas are a range in w_hich the headwaters of the 
Keiskamma rise and they overlooked the main Ngqika territory. 
The forests of the Amato1 as were a sure source of grazing for the 
Ngqika in even the most severe droughts in the lowlands and 
possession of them was symbolic of Ngqika power and definitive of 
their country. It was fr an the Arna tol a that access could be had 
to the Tyhumie and from there to Ft. Beaufort and the rest of the 
Colony. In a highly significant comment Mha11a mockingly asked 
Smith at the last meeting of chiefs called by him in December 
1850, "If he had any ships that could sail up the Amatolas 11 (80) 
On the 24th December Smith decided to make a show of force and he 
despatched about 500 men up the Keiskamma. This force was 
successfully ambushed by Sandiile, and 36 men, including 12 
officers and a number of Colonials, were killed. (81) With the 
outbreak of war most of the police and the Kat River Khoi under 
Uithaalder joined the Xhosa forces.(82) Colonial troop strength 
was further weakened by the removal of ':he Boers, and those that 
remained declined to take part in th1= formation of commandos. 
These factors assisted the Xhosa forces in the early part of the 
war and saw many Xhosa successes in ambushing convoys, attacking 
farms and capturing cattle. 
One of the most noteworthy of these successes was to have far-
reachi ng con squences for a 11 the chiefdoms in the 1850s. At the 
commencement of the war Smith was a.t ;=t. C:JX, fr:Jm which point 
Mackinnon's column had set out 'n Dec::mber. Between December 
25th 1850 and January 1st 1351 Siiiith '"'as besieged at Ft. Cox and 
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was very nearly defeated there. He made an ignominious escape to 
Grahamstown disguised as a trooper. His detention at Ft. Cox 
evidently made a great impression on him. It also revealed the 
shall ow hall owness of his racist character. No sooner had he met 
Maclean at Ft. Murray after having made his escape than he stated: 
"That matters were in such a critical state ..• that 
he saw clearly that some concession must be made to 
the chiefs, and that he intended to acquaint the~ 
that henceforth the Government would not interfere 
with their native laws and customs. 11 (83) 
As a resu1 t of one narrow escape Smith was prepared to make an 
about turn on the policy of complete dispossession of the chiefs, 
which he had previously upheld so loudly. Nothing better reveals 
his lust for easy domination, which crumbled in the face of 
determined resistance, than his response to Maclean 1 s objection 
that his proposed new pol icy would be 11 striking our colours 11 • 
Smith replied 11 something must be done, for the Kaffirs of 1851 
are not the Kaffirs of 1835, and that he felt quite satisfied 
that our form of Government had been too stringent. u ( 84) 
This major change of pol icy, taken in such unceremonious haste 
while the Colonists and their Imperial protectors were on the run 
and disorganised, was in fact an event of major importance in the 
historical determination of the form of subordination of the 
Xhosa social formation. That same day Smith personally informed 
Toyi se that he would no 1 anger be subject to review in .respect of 
decisions affecting interna1 affairs in his chiefdom. Maclean 
was despatched to deliver the same message to Phato and Mhalla. 
It was almost certain1y the irnmediate effect of this about turn, 
coming as ;t did within the first week of hostilities, that kept 
Mhalla and ioyise out of the war. It is probable that Phato, 
Siwani, Mq.hayi and Kc.ma 'ND!Jl d have stayed out anyway, but this 
decision by Smith must certain'1y have strengthened their resolve, 
given the early suci::ess.es ::if Sand11le and Maqoma in the war. 
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The war disrupted a11 the major chiefdoms and saw enormous 
movement of homesteads that had been sett1 ed for generations. In 
the vicinity of each major group of belligerents there were 
strategically placed collaborationist chiefs. These formed a 
nucleus around which homesteads not participating in the war, or 
homesteads which had suffered 1 ass of members through war and had 
therefore to retire, could gather~ In this way the collaborating 
chiefs found that not parti ci pa ting in the war gained them new 
adherents, over whom they wou1 d enjoy complete control free from 
Colonial interference, in terms of the January decision. Their 
tactic of collaboration with the Colonial State must have seemed, 
to them, much more profitable than war. By consistently 
extending support to the collaborating chiefs the 1 ong process of 
the growth ·of hitherto insignificant chiefdoms now subordinate to 
the Colonial State was begun. 
Many people in the following of the collaborating chiefs 
participated in the war. In some cases this was by the design of 
the chief, as with Mha1la, whose son M:ota, (alias Mackinnon} and 
/ nephew Siyolo took an active part in the war. ( 85) In all cases 
the participation of some homesteads or households of the 
co11 abora ting chiefs and the accretion of new adherents retiring 
from the war intensified the struggle by the chiefs for the 
1 oya1 ty and support of homestead heads ~ Certain chiefs such as 
Phato adhered to the Colonial State out of conviction; most were 
motivated by strategic considerations. hoping that the war would 
weaken their rivals and benefit them. The co1laborating chiefs 
were required to perfonn certain duties. For example Phato was 
required to ensure the safety of convoys on the King Wil 1iam
1 
s 
Town - East London Road. In return for this •t1ork Phato and the 
coll ab orating Ndl ambe chiefs Si wan i and Mqhayi received payment 
in captured stock. On one occasion in t·~arch 1851 Phato received 
159 head while Siwani received 135 and Mqhayi 141. (86) The 
collaborating chiefs received r'2gul~r, bu~ ad no:::, payments from 
Cathcart, which was he felt "indisoer:sabi.c: t:o k~.:ep them steady
11
• 
{87) These cattle payments were ::=k,.:n fr::;:n ~'.:ie "Kaffrarian FundJI 
which was established from -:he saie :if c1:Jtu:2-d cattle. 
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There was some active internal opposition within these chiefdoms 
to the mercenary role their chiefs were playing. Xosa, a 
prominent councillor of Phato repeatedly tried to raise a war 
party within Phato 1 s ranks. Although the Ndlambe Conmissio·ner 
Maclean wanted Phato to destroy Xosa 11 as an example 11 , Phato, who 
understood the weakness of his situation more surely than 
Maclean, dec1 ined, agreeing only to "watch him closely. 11 ( 87) 
For much of 1851 the Xhosa enjoyed the best of the war, having 
infiltrated and occupied a massive area of the Colony. It was 
only in late 1851 that the Colonial counter-attack began. As in 
previous wars the first target of the Col on i sts was the Gca 1 eka 
chief, Sarhili. Towards the end of 1851 Smith led an attack on 
Sarh i1 i which resulted in the 1 oss of about 60 000 head of 
cattle. (89) Early in 1852 Smith was recalled as Governor 
because of dissatisfaction at Whitehall over the huge cost of the 
war. (90} His replacement was General G. Cathcart who arrived in 
the war zone in April 1852. 
He immediately consulted with Maclean and Mackinnon and stated 
his opposition to the system established by Smith in 1848. In 
his view chiefs could not be dispensed with 11 unless by a thorough 
and unmistakable conquest of the whole of the Amaxosa nation .•. 
which he considered impracticable with the means at his corrrnand. 11 
( 91) Cathcart then instructed Maclean to repeat to the Ndl ambe 
·chiefs· his confirmation of the reversal of pol icy previously 
decided on by Smith; that they would be free to determine their 
own internal affairs and to appropriate fines and sett! e cas~ 
according to Xhosa practices. This step was of the utmost 
significance for it influenced the future course of relationships 
between t1e Colonial State and the chiefs. Many chiefs and their 
suppo;"'tsr5 looked on these statements as a sort of charter which 
cr1Jcia1 ly affected their future assessment of 
situation. Thus Cathcart remained insistent in his view: 
11 agains": any premature interference witli or 
po': i ~i ca 1 
di :;paragement of the authority and i :ifl uence of 
cn·fefs in respect tc government of their clans, 
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because I am convinced that to remove one means of 
governing before you can possibly supply another 
can only be productive of anarchy; whereas if the 
chief be supported in the government of his clans, 
it is easy to govern the chief and his people 
through him. 11 ( 92) 
Cathcart had been very 'keen to raise a Co1onist force to assist 
British troops. The war had been characterised by the 
non-participation of Boer Corrrnandos and the traders and English 
Colonists were mostly content to profit by contracts for war 
supplies, without corrmitting themselves to active combat. 
Cathcart missed no opportunity to praise the Commando system and 
urge its reviv~. The second raid against Sarhili provided the 
opportunity he was looking for~ British troops under Lt. 
Colonels Michel and Napier teamed up (in the euphemistic language 
of the time) with a 11 publ ic-spiri ted body of volunteers, armed, 
mounted and equipped by voluntary subscriptions raised by the 
more weal thy part of the community, to whom it was not convenient 
to render personal service. 11 (93) Setting out in pursuit of a 
fine of 1 500 head of cattle (originally imposed by Smith on top 
of the 60 000 already taken) this "public-spirited11 force took 
off 15 000 head of cattle! The cattle booty plundered from the 
Gca 1 eka was di vi de d at Ba 1 otta 11 among the Col on is ts who had 
assisted in its capture.n (94) It was clear that Colonial war was 
a profitable undertaking for the Colonists~ In addition 7 000 
Mfen9u accompanied the Col onia1 and Imperialist forces from 
Gcalekaland. That so many came at this stage is testimony to 
the fact that far from a11 Mfengu chose to leave Gca1ekaland at 
the time of the original exodus in 1835. (95) 
The war itself cons·istsd of intermittent attacks both by the 
Xhosa and Colonist forces, punctuated by alarms as further 
contingents of Khoi r~·:r:..:its defected to the Xhosa side. 
Cathcart's main mi1it . ary <::f·fort consisted of the building of 
roads in the Amato1 as and the sen~ing of regular patrols through 
both the ;Amat.alas and '..he ;,.,•at:rkloof - thus preventing Sandille 
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from moving from the mountains: 
burnt huts and destroyed gardens 
June 1852 the war had deteriorated 
As in previous wars; patrols 
wherever they found them. By 
into a series of skirmishes. 
The Xhosa, noted Cathcart, 11 are starving, they evade any 
hostilities unless forced in self-defence to resistance, but it 
is only by occupation and temporary destruction of their 
pasturage, and consequent starvation, that they can be compe11 ed 
to retire. 11 ( 96) As late as February 1853 Cathcart reported that .. 
11
their gardens and crops of Indian corn have been partially 
destroyed, but so early in the season that a second crop, it 
appears, had sprung up, which natural consequence was artfully 
taken advantage of by the prophet Uml anjeni, who cl aimed the fact 
a mirac1 e worked by his powers. 11 ( 97) 
III The Settl~ment of the 1850-1853 War 
Those Nqqika under Sandi11 e who had fought to the end were forced 
out of the Mlato1as and the B1inkwater-Waterk1oof-Kroome 
mountains. Most of the Ngqika under Sandi11e and Maqoma were 
forced beyond the Kei into Gcal ekal and by about November 1852. 
Cathcart became obsessed with the idea of 11 c1 earing the 
Amatol as 11 • By January 1853 Cathcart could report that the Ngqika 
district was entirely evacuated and Sandille himself was beyond 
the Kei • ( 98) San di 11 e was unable to move further in to the 
Transkei, because Sarhil i apparently would not have him, and he 
was unable to return to his old country which Cathcart was 
occupying. Cathcart decided that as the remaining Ngqika could 
not be exterminated, (a possib1 ity that Smith had earlier 
entertained) (99) he would: 
11 co11ect them, place them in a new country where they 
can be more eas i 1 y dea 1 t with • . . and uni t.2 ther:i 
under the re$ponsibi1 ity of a recognised chief who 
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shou1 d have power to control them, and be held 
responsible for their conduct. 11 (100) 
In March 1853 Sandille surrendered. The settlement reached by 
Cathcart at the end of the war is of par ti cul ar significance 
because it established the first real "locations 11 in which Xhosa, 
Mfengu and Thembu held land and 1 ived under sufferance of 
Colonialist overlords, 
autonomy. What gave 
11 locations 11 was that 
while retaining a measure of internal 
these new settlements 
Cathcart used the mass 
the character of 
displacement of 
population caused by the war to move peop1 e around and change the 
geographical positions ·Of many sections of the Xhosa. This 
allowed him to reward those who had collaborated at the expense 
of those who had fought. 
Sandille was to be allowed to occupy the area between the 
Arna tel as and the Kei. The boundary on~ the west, which ~ci.s the 
most cruci a 1 consideration, was the road leading from King 
William's Town to the Windvogelberg through the Dehne mission 
station {near present day Stutterheim), thus skirting the 
Amatol as. The 1 and between this 1 ine and the Kei was very 
inferior, the parts near the Thomas River in the east being 
almost useless and impenetrable. 
The conditions of Sandille's return to the Ciskei were that he 
and his peop1e 11 shal1 in a11 things remain true and faithful to 
their allegiance to the Queen and to her Majesty's cormlands 
conveyed through the Governor and the Chief Comm·issioner, Colonel 
Maclean. 11 (101) Apart from this he was to enjoy the same internal 
autonomy that had been granted to the co1laborating chiefs. In 
addition a 1 arge number of guns had to b~ surrendered. San di 11 e 
was however to be in charge of making allotments of land to each 
minor chief and was to be responsib1e for their future conduct. 
These apparently simple conditions conceal the heart of the 
regime Cathcart installed as the 2nd Sri ti sh Kaffrarian 
a dm in is tr a ti on • 
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The Amato1as, which had been the centre of the old Ngqika 
country, were created by a Government Notice of March 8~ 1853 i.nto 
a "Royal Reserve 11 • This comprised the area between Ft. Hare on 
the Tyhame River and King Will iam 1 s Town. The area was to be 
occupied by 11 Fingoes and other loyal natives 11 • Strict 
conditions for occupation of land were laid down. All huts were 
to be in villages of not less than 20 huts, free pasturage was 
all owed, but no group of 20 huts could have more than 20 stock 
per hut. Each village was to have a headman answerable· for all 
people and cattle of his village. Most importantly, 10 shillings 
quit-rent· per year was payable for each separate dwelling and a 
Superintenoont was to be appointed to administer the Reserve. 
(102) The Crown Reserve, as it was known, was a prototype rura 1 
1 location 1 and the rules governing it are of great importance. 
The Crown Reserve was important in another respect, in- that it 
was the first large gain by the Mfengu at the expense of the 
Xhosa. Needless _to say the Colonists were not ,,al tagether happy 
as they wanted the Arnatolas laid out as farms for themselves. 
They were mollified with ample 'compensation' in another 
direction - namely at Thembu expense. 
The Thembu had parti ci pated in the war, and the chief Qesha had 
been a close ally of Maqoma, helping him to hold the Blinkwater 
area. The Colonists had attacked the Thembu paramount Mapassa 
and he and many of his people were killed. The section of the 
Thembu under Mapassa was completely dispersed. In numerous 
dispatches Cathcart never missed an opportunity to point out to 
Whitehall that Thembuland was 11 underpopulated 11 • (103) All this 
provided excellent grounds for the Colonists confiscating Thembu 
land and proclaiming the new district_ of Queenstown. With the 
death of Mapassa the chie fta i ncy passed to Mti rara who was a 
minor, and the chieftainess Nonesi, who had remained loyal to the 
" Col on is ts during the war, was apoo i r. ted regent. The Thembu were-
now confined to what becar.e the district of Glen Grey. If they 
were not short of land before, the 1·imited area available in Glen 
Grey ensured that they soon were. 
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The Mf engu, apart from gaining access to the Crown Reserve a 1 so 
gained new locations at Alice, Ft. Beaufort, Tarkastad and 
Whitt1esea. (104) All these lands were occupied on similar 
terms to the 1 and a 11 oca ted in the Crown Reserve. Apart from 
these major developments there were numerou,s 1 esser changes that, 
considered together, had a crucial influence on the deve1 Of)'llent 
of political and economic, relations in the '50s and '. 60s. The 
land previously occupied by the Mdushane chief Seyolo, who was 
imprisoned in Cape Town for his part in the war, was given to his 
brother Siwani. The Gqunukwebe chief Kama was brought back from 
his remote position at Whittlesea. near the Winterberg and was 
given a large location along the Keiskarrrna River. From Middle 
Drift he occupied an area of about 250 square mil es. (105) This 
territory adjoined that of Siwani and displaced the Mba1u chief 
Stokwe. The chief Mqhayi was also installed between Siwani and 
the sea thus 11 fillng up the border with faithful and friendly 
Kafil"s in its whole extent from the. s~a to the base of the 
.Amato 1 as . 11 ( 1 06) 
A 1 though the Ndl ambe had 1 os t no territory as a result of the 
war, the density of population in Mha11a's country was 
·cons i derab 1y increased by the presence of many Ngqika refugees. 
While the main burden of the 1 asses had fall en on the Ngqika, 
many junior chiefs benefited from the new dispensation. In 
August 1853 Ca th cart authorised payment tor the co11 abora ting 
chiefs: Phato and Toise were to receive 15 pounds, and Siwani 
Mqhayi and Kama 10 pounds per quarter. (107) 
While the land losses were a crushing blow, the Colonists were 
well aware that the reversal of Smith 1 s policy and the granting 
of internal autonomy to the chiefs was a concession cf 
considerable importance. As Brownlee commented: 
11 Sandi1le had lost the best part of his country, but 
the concession TJ1ade to him was what he had fought 
for. II (108) 
There is evidence that chiefs were unsure how litera1iy to treat 
the concession me.de to them in regard to internal autonomy. In 
one case at least Mhalla reported to Maclean, asking him how he 
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ought to punish one of his men guilty of bewitching his cattle: 
Maclean replied, in the spirit of the new policy, that he never 
interfered with native customs as long as they did not involve 
acts of cruelty. (109) 
The reason behind Cathcart's move in allowing internal autonomy 
to the chiefs was made explicity clear shortly before his 
de pa rtu re. He wrote to Mac 1 ean: 
11 I must remind you that military control and not 
Co1 onization, is the principle of pol icy which has 
induced me to advise the retention of Kaffraria as 
a separate Govermrent, in dpenden t of the Colony. 11 
( 1 lO) 
For Cathcart mi 1 i tary occupation with the retention by the Xhosa 
of sufficient land for subsistence and internal self-management 
was essenti a 1 , 
11Until it may be safe to trust to a sufficient moral 
" 
influence over them to ob ta in which can only be the 
work of time ••• and the acquirement of property by 
the Kaffirs by means of agriculture and a taste for 
the wants and luxuries of civilized society. 11 (111) 
The war of 1848, the imposition of direct British rule and the war 
of 1850-1853, may be seen as accomplishing the effective conquest 
of the Xhosa formation by Imperialist colonialism. In Cathcart's 
view, however, the outcome of the war was only a partial conquest, 
if one is to understand by conquest the complete absorption of the 
conquered by the conquerors. Imperialist conceptions apart, this 
was indeed the concept of conquest that prevailed in many African 
formations, conquest being seen as a process of the absorption of 
the conauered. Xhosa resistance to absorption by the Co 1 ony was 
comp1 emented by the fact that the Colony could not afford the 
military force that would have been required to achieve such 
controi. It may be suggested that Xhosa military decisions were 
to some extent determined by the pay off betwen further resistance 
to, and accorrrnoda:ion of, the Colonists. 
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It is cl ear than even in 1853 the Xhosa were not compl ete1y 
defeated militarily. Defeat once again came through the 
inability of the Xhosa to sustain a fighting force over an 
extended period. Economic exhaustion was leading to more and 
more households retiring from the war. It was therefore optimal 
to end the war. The relatively good terms on which it ended 
stemmed from the fact that the Colonists could not afford to 
impose harsher terms. 
The outco~ of the war was definitive in a more general 
understanding of the effects of war. The economic exhaustion of 
the Xhosa resulted in three definite responses between 1848 and 
1853 - the dispersal of households to other chiefdoms, the 
dispersal of households into the Colony as squatters and tenants, 
-· 
and the growth of wage work on the Col on i al farms. 
It is necessary to understand how these devel opnents affected the 
homestead economy of the Xhosa. In the fol 1 owing chapters the 
develoµnent of these tendencies will be related to the internal 
transformation of the Xhosa economy. 
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(1) Proc. December 23, 1847. Laws and Reoulations of British 
Kaffraria Previous to its Annexation to the Colony of the 
Cape of Good Hope. (Cape Town), i869. 
The Letters Patent establishing British Kaffraria as a 
Colony and i naugura ting its Government were never 
promulgated owing to the outbreak of war again in 1850. 
Smith's successor, Sir. G. Cathcart, only discovered this in 
late 1852. Owing to the lapse of time he was reluctant to 
promulgate them. Sir G. Grey, not wishing to be bothered 
with the encumbrance of a "regular government" failed to 
promulgate the second Letters Pa tent issued for the 
establishment of British Kaffraria,. prefering to rule by 
proclamation. After much de1 ay Letters Pa tent es tab 1 i shing 
British Kaffraria were finally issued in 1860, 12 years 
after its actual i naugura ti on. The _ terr_i_t~r~-- _was 
effectively ruled by martial law from first to last, in all 
a clear case of juridical forms legitimisir.g post-hoc that 
which had been achieved by quite other means. 
( 2) The' meeting involved Smith ordering Maqoma to the floor and 
putting his foot on his neck, tearing up the 1835 treaties, 
blowing up a wagon to 1 impress 1 the chiefs, and generally 
revealing his megolomaniac personality. 
{3) du Tait, A.E. The Cape Frontier: A Study of Native Policy 
With Special Reference to The Years 1847 - 1866. Archives 
Year Book For South Africa, (1954). p. 29. du Tait gives a 
full account of the demands. He is wrong in saying that the 
Ngqika Chief Sandi11e was present. See also Godlonton, R. 
and Irving, E. Narrative of the Kaffir War, 1850-51-51, 
Facsimile Reprint Edi ti on Cape Town 1962. pp. 20-21, -46. 
(4) Burton, A.W. The Hi ch lands of Kaffraria., Str-uik C. T. 
(1969). pp. 31-40. 
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(5) A separate peace was made with Sarhili, recognising his 
i.ndependence subject to certain conditions. 
(6) du Toit. op.cit. p. 31. 
(7) Maclean, J. A Compendium of Kaffir law and Cu.stoms State 
Library, Pretoria, Reprint, (1968). pp. 131-139. 
(8) 8.K. 371, Mackinnon to Smith, October 21st 1850. There is 
often much too much emphasis placed on the practice of 
cattle confiscation following witchcraft accusations. In 
the first place, even when an .accusation was succesfu11y 
proved, most often the accused was allowed to 'escape' -
sometimes taking his cattle with him.· In the second place 
the number of accusations is almost cer_tainly exaggerated in 
----~ -- -
the Colonial mind. It is very important to realise that the 
punishment for witchcraft, namely death by torture, was very 
rarely carried out - Soga1 found that throughout the ·sixty 
years of the Xhosa Paramount Chief Sarhil i's reign only five 
cases of the death sentence being carried out in connection 
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BRITISH KAFFRAR iA - SECOND ADMINISTRATION 
JANUARY 1853 - JUNE 1856 
I Conquests, Chiefs and the Colonial State 
In Cathcart's view the outcome of the war of 1850-53 was only a 
partial conquest. Conquest, however, does not necessarily require 
the complete.dismantling of the class structure and civil order of 
the conquered in order to achieve domination over them. It is 
sufficient that the institutions of class power of the conquered 
people be incorporated in to the sys tern of cl ass ru1 e of the neN. 
dominant power. For this to be achieved, military conquest has to 
extend far enough to ensure that the necessary con di ti ens for the 
self-reproduction of the rrode of production of the conquered 
social formation be thoroughly disrupted. This is what had been 
achieved by the series of Colonial wars culminating in the war of 
1851-53. 
The crucial theoretical point to observe in analysing this sort of 
conquest is that, while the 1 ass of capacity for self-reproduction 
(which was an accomplished fact at the economic and political 
levels) macl: the pre-capitalist economy. 'dependent' on the 
Col on ia 1 economy, the form of th is 'de pen de nee' s til 1 had to be 
determined. This could only occur through the cl ass struggles 
necessarily engendered by the interactions of the capitalist and 
pre-capitalist forces of production. The 1efini ti on of conquest 
(in the Colonial context) as the loss of .capacity for 
self-reproduction by the pre-capitalist mode of production, merely 
indicates that this process had begun anc was irreversible. 
On the Eastern Frontier of the Cape -:o·icrrif~ :onquest was a lengthy 
process. The first Xhosa 1 and losses. c-'~:c;.ir:-<o;:i'.i in 1812 and further 
losses occurred at intervals through t~ ~es7_ !~has been seen, 
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above, that a process of change in the class structure, and the 
nature of class struggle in the Xhosa social formation, was 
occurring in the thirty years prior t:J the. catt1e-k il 1 ing of 
1856-57, which rra.rked the end of the period of conquest. These 
changes can be observed at 1east since the Fort Willshire trade 
fairs of the 1820s. The first attempts to create a Colonial state 
apparatus intended directly to supers-ede the autonomy of the Xhosa 
chiefs in 1848, immediately brought on another war. After an 
ini ti a 1 retreat, with the concession of full in tern al autonomy to 
all Xhosa chiefs., the Colonial State once again prepared to 
advance on the political and economic position of the chiefs. ln 
order to be able to follow this __ process and understand the 
position of the various contending forces, the nature of the 
Col on ia 1 State !Tl.IS t be further examined. 
The Colonial State was born out of the conditions of conguest, and 
these were, in the first instance, military. However the Colonial 
State was not merely an instrument of martial 1 aw. It was a 
special form of the capitalist state, a specialist outgrowth of 
the metropolitan state adapted to the work of colonialism and 
imperialism. (1) After securing military domination, the 
Colonial State had to ensure a basis for the regirre, and this was 
not a task that ·could be left to the influence of missi.onary work 
al one. The persistence of the power of the chiefs in terms of the 
internal autonomy concession granted to them was syrnptomati c of 
the new relations of subordination which were being forged. The 
chiefs were ceasing to be chiefs in the traditional sense. They 
were becoming ."brokers 11 - links in the exercise of the patronage 
of the Colonial State. The chiefs were now only one sourc2 of 
patronage among others. 
The Co 1 on i a 1 Sta te 
intervenes 
is unique in this respect, 
in the structure of pro due ti on 
in that it 
throu oh the 
" 
effects of land confiscation and relies on this intervention to 
create its oolftical and social domination over the masses. In 
this we are only taking the representatives of the Imperialists at 
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their word, for they never tired of re pea ting that to gain a 
political hold over the people they would first have .to make them 
consumers of their commodities. (2) 
The partial separation of the economic and political levels in the 
Colonial Stat.e, stemming from conquest and the power over the 
disposal of the land this gave it also presented i·t with a 
dilemma. In so far as the Colonial State allowed the conquered 
peoples to retain possession of land on which they organised their 
own production, more or less free of servitude to Colonists or the 
Colonial State, the State could not fully control the direction of 
economic development in these areas. It could thus also not 
' control or prohibit the resumption of political power by eleJIEnts 
of the ruling cl ass of the conquered social formation. The 
political conquest, won at such pain and expense, could thus 
easily be undermined. ( 3) 
In rrany parts of Africa where the Cai on~al State was too weak to 
d:prive the (militarily) 1 conquered 1 people of access to all or 
part of their land, this dilemma was inevitably confronted. The 
solution, as often as not, was to delay the imposition of direct 
political domination until such time as the economic weakness of 
the conquered people forced them to comply with Colonial control. 
In th is way Col on ia 1 oomi nation in Africa was extraordinarily 
uneven in the extent of the penetration of its real political 
control over the peoples it had conquered. Where the Colonial 
State recognised its lack of real control over the social 
formtions it dominated, it was necessary to search for a class of 
collaborators amongst e1smer.ts of the indigenous ruling class. 
What was the situation fo British Kaffraria at the end of the war 
of 1851-53? The Chi.ef Commissioner Maclean, for one, was in no 
cbubt that a basis for chiefly power still existed: 
"While call~d British subjects they are not subjects 
... so far even as the Fingoes are, and in like 
manner WE have ,; t:::.i t::d to them that we a11 w them to 
rule themse'ives in :i.11 in~rnal matters ... and so 
it is in reality, for our control is not simp1y 
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direct .•• but it is in a great measure nominal, and 
resembles 100re the influence which a powerful and 
civilised nation exerts over a neighbouring tribe of 
barbarians." (4) 
It has been seen that Smith's policy, in the first British 
Kaffrarian Administration, of simply eliminating the chiefs and 
attempting to establish political domination directly over the 
masses was clearly unworkable and led directly to war. The 
sett1 efll:n t at the end of the war of 1851 res ul te d in an important 
concession to the chiefs - the granting of internal autonomy. 
Haniever it is necessary to understand what the nature of th is 
'autonomy' was, and to examine hOn' the exercise of power by the 
chiefs had already begun to change. 
The autonomy granted to the chiefs did not mean the restoration of 
the status quo ante. 
Col on ial State, would 
It meant that the chiefs, rather than the 
directly_ hav~ to absorb and fight the 
contradictory demands on the State engendered by the new economic 
conflicts which conquest and Colonial domination brought. The 
position of the chiefs was therefore very different to anything 
they had experienced before. They enjoyed 'autonomy 1 , but the 
basis for their 'autonomy' had been radically changed. The basic 
requirements of the old mode of production (cattle and land) were 
now in permnent short supply and their acquisition was crucially 
influenced by the presence of the Colonial interloper. 
The settlerrent achieved at the end of the war represented what the 
chiefs assessed to be the opti mai trade-off between continued war 
.and the advantages of achieviilg some accommodation with the 
Colony, short of total capitulation. Yet the social formations 
°i'li1ich the chiefs presided ov2r by 1853 had been thoroughly invaded 
by the development of Co1onial ecc.nomy and the political demands 
associated with it. This ;ro.-:th had made the continued 
reproci.Jction of the old mode of pr'.'.laHction an impossibility. New 
productive forces were daily err:er"?;n::;, ·;:ith profound consequences 
for the position of the chi.~fs. ,;n 2.xamination of the responses 
of the chiefs to this sit!latfo;1 i~; me way of gaining an insight, 
into the intensity of the 1:is1.} :;: :i ::n whi c~ ·was experienced by the 
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The losses and gains of the various chiefs as a result of the 
settlement of 1853 at the end of the war, may be seen in a 
comparison of Map 1 and rv'iap 2 above. The Ngqika under San dill e 
and Maqoma had lost the whole of the A'Tiatola highlands which were 
then designated a 'Royal Reserve', (later changed to Crown 
Reserve). This was an area of rich fertile soil and fine surmier 
grazing, and its 1 oss was a severe bl ow to the Ngqika. They were 
now confined to the area east of the King Wi 11iam 1 s Town tO 
Queenstown road. 
Into about 150 ,square mil es of territory vacated by the Ngqika, 
Kama, the estranged half-brother of Phato, returned from exile to 
occupy the land from Fort Hare to Fort White and down the Qibira 
to the Keiskamma River. This established in a prominent position, 
a chief who wou1 d never have amounted to anything without the 
assistance and favour of the Colonial State and its missionaries. 
Siwani controlled a similar extent of territory from the Keiskarmia 
to King William's Town. Siwani was regent for Seyolo, the heir of 
Mdushane. By exploiting his position and consistently supporting 
, the Co1 onial State, even when most of his people deserted him for 
\ 
the fiery and combative Seyol o, he emerged as a chief of greater 
importance than he could ever otherwise have been. The Colonial 
State even tried to revive Mqayi (Umkai) the son of Ndl ambe who 
had been defeated by Mhalla to gain control of the Ndlanbe. 
However, because they did not participate in the war of 1851-53, 
the Ndlambe were least affected by the land losses, and Mqayi 
remained a nonentity. Tshatshu and Toise retained control of 
small areas around King William's Town, the latter increasing his 
autonomy from the rest of the Ngqika. 
Wihfie it is clear that the position of the c.o11abonting chiefs 
improved at the expense of others, it does n·o: fo11 ow 




i ............. ""' ti'.leir expanded territory attracted many 
househo\ ds from other chiefs, who joined 
es tab 11 shed homesteads there. Except for 
es tab l i sh€ d homestead heads, most of the 
of the impove~ished 
a 
foll owinJs 
sma 11 cl dSS 
~ o. 
of 
households of the 
collaborating chiefs were not in a much better position tJ1an :.1ose 
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elsewhere. The exception to this was the Mfengu whose gain in 
territory in the CrCNm Reserve more than offset any inf1 ux of 
population. 
The period between the end of the war in 1853 and the onset of the 
cattle-killing episode in 1856 is crucial. The death throes of 
the old mode of production produced intense strugg1 es, the 
resolution of which could only be found outside the relations of 
production which dominated the Xhosa homestead economy. The 
adoption of commodity production within all homesteads, and the 
resu1 tant changes in the structure of the 1 abour process and the 
transformation of the relations of production, were to prove far 
more lethal to the old chiefdoms than uncertain military conquest. 
( 7) However it must not be 1 ost sight of that it was the 
fundamental effect of land deprivation through war, which brought 
on th is process of transformation. 
At the close of the war the adninistrative apparatus of the 
Colonial State was partially restored. Brownlee was retained as 
Ngqika Cormiissioner, based at the Dohne mission station in 
San di11 e's new lo ca ti on ( 8). Maclean was a ppo in ted Chief 
Corrmissioner to replace Mackinnon, and retained special 
responsibility for the Ndlambe district. 
I11111ediately peace was J'.'estored, steps were taken to reactivate 
trade. All the traders· had been forced to 1 eave during the war, 
and most stores had been destroyed by fire. Traders' licenses 
were reduced from 50 pounds to 20 pounds, and traders again had 
free access to the interior, well protected by friendly chiefs and 
military forts. By the end of 
of goods coming in to 
i dea of the na tm·e :J f the trade 
1853, Maclean estimated the value 
at over 100 000 pounds (9). Sorne 
in the early 1850s is given in tlie 
compensation cla~u:,s er Blaine and Jeffries who had traded at 
Butterworth un':f! they abandoned their store in January 1852. 
Corrmod1ties in S''tcd<. included 718 ITTJids of sorghum, 60 000 lbs of 
gum, 10 GCO h_f:'.i:es., 1 500 horns, 90 sacks, 320 spades, 308 plates. 
The ;:;i·ice they pa~d per rrn1id of sorghum was probably between 4 
h ., , . J ., • • .. 1 . ,., " ( 10) s 1 11ngs a1\i i sn·i f i ·;n,;s an·.1 ~ pence~ Wi th the c us toms 
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revenue of 5 000 pounds, vklich trad:! through East London at that 
stage brought in, the cost of the Colonial State was alroost fu11y 
met out of its own revenues. 
In the Ngqika location there was immediate and great 
dissatisfaction over the condition of the territory they were nc;.y 
forced to occupy. Maqoma received the worst of the roove, being 
pl aced in the infertile, dry, and rocky region on . the Thomas 
River. At the peace meeting in March, Maqoma had spoken on behalf 
of the absent Sandi11 e and had told Cathcart: 
11
this young man (Sandil1e) erred, has been punished, 
and is new forgiven, but the country you give him 
is too srra11. Tois~,-who formerly occupied it had 
but a small tribe. Sandille has a large one, which 
will rot find room there". {11) 
Maqoma saw the immediate threat, in their condensed location along 
the Kei River and its tributaries, of conflict both with Sarhil i 
and with Mhalla and Toise. (12) The period 1853 to 1857 was a 
rrost uncertain time for Sandille and the Ngqika chieftainship. He 
was subjected to continual harassment. and manoeuvering by Maqoma, 
who still hoped to oust San dill e with _the help of the old guard of 
Ngqika homestead heads and counci11 ors, and to wrest the 
chieftainship of the Ngqika from him. As wil1 be seen, a rrejor 
impetus to the cattle-killing itself stemmed from this dynamic. 
Maqoma wanted Sandille to take a rrore active part in the struggle 
- \ 
against the Colony, and, if unable to do so, to give way to him. 
Shortly after the meeting with Cathca:--t, Maqoma sent messages to 
Brownlee complaining of Sandille's.1ack of "energy" in exercising 
11
proper authority over his people ... in matters of importance, 
San dill e acted without the counsel and advice of other chiefs and 
men of influence who ••. he was bcund to hear." (13} 
Maqoma was here referring direct1 y to :hos-:: o1 der council 1 ors 
whose interests Sandiile .had to ~;ppcs~~. in extending patronage and 
support to young married men s2oeking ca::i'= ar.d place to start 
homesteads of their On'n. Brownl•;2 d::.:i:l·in.21'.'. :o intervene, in terms 
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of Cathcart 's policy of non-interference. This however, did not 
discourage Maqoma· from his efforts to utilise the Col onia1 State 
and Sandille's weak position, in his attempts to improve the 
position of his section of the chieftaincy. Worried about the 
future, he repeatedly returned to the idea of his son Namba 
establishing himself in Kama's enlarged location. 
Namba exp1 ained the motivation for this to Maclean in terms of his 
desire to "separate from the Gaika tribe", and referred to 
Maqoma 's abstention from the war of 1848. Maclean estimated that 
Maqoma had 680 households under him and that he wished to expand 
his influence. 11 I am satisfied that Macomo has pushed Namba 
forward to gain SORE advantage 11 he wrote. (14) That Maqoma shou1 d 
seek to expand in to territory occupied by Ka~ is easy to 
understand as Kama's new location bordered on the hnatola Cr0tm 
Reserve which the Ngqika had just been cl:prived of. .Maqoma 1 s 
- efforts were an attempt to achieve by diplomatic means, and at the 
expense of Sandi11e, what was an urgent necessity for all Ngqika 
households - an extension of territory. All eyes inevitably 
turned to the more than 700 square miles of Kama's location and 
the Crcwn Reserve. 
In July 1853 Brcwn1ee wrote: 11 the occupation of parts of the 1ate 
Gaika District by Kama and the Fingoes is causin.g considerabie 
sensation among the Gaikas 11 • (15) During this period the 
contradictions between chiefs and the young and impoverished 
households intensified. It was abso1 utely imperative for the 
chiefs to take action to improve the situation of the mass of poor 
~ 
households. Unlike in previous years, in which military alliance 
seemed to be effective in re ta in ing the necessary resource base 
for the chiefdoms, military action was no longer an immediate 
possibility. Relationships between the chiefs b-2came more and 
more competitive. Despite the official policy of the Colonial 
State of non-interference, the State's presence 'i'iC.S a far mere 
crucial inhibiting factor in the struggle to maintain the base of 
the chiefdoms tl:an in any previous period .• 
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At a meeting of the Ngqika held at the Great Place shortly after 
the proclamation of peace, Sandil le had announced that he would 
punish all cases of thefts from the Colony very severely. (16) 
Sandille was bound to appease the Colonial State by the 
suppression of cattle theft - a duty which conflicted directly 
with the interests of many of his fo 11 owe rs who would rather he 
supported them. At the same time, the policy of non-interference, 
which left all matters of discipline and justice in the hands of 
the chiefs and their hierachies of councillors, led to an 
intensification of internal appropriations. This was a necessary 
consequence of the shortage of cattle and the pressure on 1 and. 
Brownlee observed these deteriorating conditions and noted: 
"the plundering of women, of their seed, spades and 
household utensils, which is almost invariably done 
when a kraal is eaten up for theft or any other 
offence. 11 {l 7) 
As such confiscations were not normally imposed for mere theft, 
and the appropriation of other. useful goods such as seeds and 
spades even more rarely, this would indicate an extreme level of 
conflict. Under these conditions there was obvious scope for the 
Colonial State to increase its influence as a source of 
patronage. As Brownlee pointed out, 11 it is quite necessary that 
we establish a system for promptly rewarding persons who make 
themselves useful to us 11 • (18) 
It has been seen that the confiscation of a11 cattle and property 
was only resorted to at times of extreme distress and 
disequilibrium in the Xhosa homesteads - as for example when 
Tshiwo resorted to this in the 1700s. (19) The intensification of 
the level of appropriations as a means of acquiring cattle 
redistribution had definite 1 imits. By driving out of the 
chiefdom, house ho 1 ds or homesteads that had corrnni tted thefts or 
other off enc es, 
homesteads that 
the ch iEf cou1 d extend his support to other 
1r1cul 1 be indebted to him. This form of 
appropriation., thrcugh cnr.fiscation or banishment,· had obvfous 
negative consequences. There were definite limits to which the 
chief could redistri~u:e r':!sources within the chiefdom without 
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gaining access to fresh resources. Redistributed resources were 
consumed in the establishment of new households and hornesteads. 
While the chief could act against certain households, he had to 
retain an alliance with the other heads of large homesteads, 
without whose support his position would have been untenable. 
While chiefs tried to prevent their people from becoming more 
involved in the Colonial economy, conditions in the homesteads 
I • 
<:l:ter1orated. This made the Colonial farms and mission stations 
ever greater a ttracti ans. Some chiefs used force to exert control 
over the homesteads. In one instance, Mha11a's son Mato seized 
the cattle and all the corn of Mako pi ya, a Mfengu a tternpting to 
leave Mhalla 's location to join Mfengu at Mount Coke mission 
station. Cathcart, commenting on this incident, noted "This 
appears to be an affair of Kaffir Government with which we cannot 
interfer.e 11 • (20} Brownlee reported that the Ngqik_a were feeling 
--, -- ·- --·- - -- -
the loss of land and that there was an air of apathy and 
l":opel essness about recovering it. Th is was associated with 
rumours that the prophet Mlanjeni was alive and in the land. 
(21} Commenting on the popular mood, he wrote: 
"The bulk of the people are heartily ti red of war, 
and if war or peace were decided by their decision, 
we might hope for permanent peace, but though 
opposed to war, it is not probable that they would 
ci:!sert their chiefs should they take up arms 
against us-, though at present the chiefs have their 
<Dub ts of th is, from a powerful inducement to break 
through tl-ieir rule he1 d out to the Kaffirs by the 
weal th and prosperity of those chiefs and common 
people who rerna ined fa i thf u1 to the English 
Governrrent. 11 ( 22) 
Further evidence of the bui1 ding up of tension and conf1 ict in the 
chiefdoms between 1353 and 1856, was the high incidence of 
witchcraft accusat.io:is. it has been seen above that witchcraft 
accusations t~ri de.i to increase during periods of change in 
composition of the domin<lnt po1-1er block within the chief".i0m, 3nd 
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when the level of appropriation of cattle by the chief was on the 
increase. Witchcraft accusations and the subsequent confiscation 
of the cattle of the accused was a major means of acquisi ticn of 
1 arge numbers of cattle by the chief. One of the JOOS t famous 
cases concerns a rich councillor actually put to death by the 
chief Toise. In this incident he gained 80 head of cattle which 
were distributed amongst the younger councillors who Toise wished 
to support. (23} Witchcraft accusations were always a sign of 
social dis tress, a symptom of the con f1 i ct be tween a chief, the 
rich councillors, homestead heads, and the mass of households. 
The apparent root cause of this intensification of appropriation 
by the chiefs, was the confined size of the 1 ocations which made 
it impossible for the normal process of homestead expansion to 
continue. The presence of large numbers of Imperial troops 
manning forti fi~d posts along the 'boundary' proclaimed by the 
Colonial State, effectively prohibited any of the rrovement onto 
the Col on ial farms which was to be such a feature of the period 
1848-1850. 
In 1854, the chiefs, bottled up 
frantically for solutions. In 
in their. locations, 
September Cathcart met 
sought 
with 
Sandi1le and fvlaqorr.a who requested repossession of the Amatala and 
the Tyhumie valley. They told Cathcart that the land on t.lie Kei 
was hard and less fertile than that on the Keiskarrma. These 
representations were to no avail. (24) But for the collaborating 
chiefs n-any things were possible. Where fvlaqoma failed to get his 
son Namba land in Kama's location, Phato managed to arrange this 
for his brother Cobus Congo. (25) 
In his efforts not to convey the impression that he in any way 
accepted his new restricted 1 location 1 , Sandille attempted to use 
the Church and the missionaries to bring pressure on the Colonial 
State, a strategy \oklich had underlain Xhosa attitudes to the 
missionaries sfoce :he time of Ngqika. He continually delayed 
choosing a site for the building of a mission station in his ncw 




(26) By their activities~ the missionaries had so 
strongly associated themselves with the Colonial State that it is 
not surprising that in the eyes of many Xhosa there was hardly any 
difference between the two. Reporting on his work in the new 
Ngqika location in January 1854 the Rev. Niven noted that there 
were only two Xhosa Christians in Sandi1'1e 1 s location and that 
Sandille and the mass of Xhosa: 
11wil1 believe in spite of our protestations to the 
contrary that we are 1 imbs of the admi n i strati on, 
ar-id that we can as well as ought to work for them 
in things temporal, above all on territorial 
subjects - I found only one person, a councillor, 
who said that the desire to get back the forfeited 
country is not uni versa 1 • 11 ( 27) 
Niven further observed that very many of the Ngqika were scattered 
among the Ndl ambe and Gcal eka homesteads 11wi th a few head of 
cattle or as servants to the Fingoes 11 • This dispersion of 
households was extremely de.trimenta1 to the authority of the 
chiefs and it i.ntensified the urgency with which they looked for 
new ways to assert their control over the mass of households. As 
Niven observed, "One meets with many well disposed persons who 
would be glad to be relieved of feudal servitude and be subject to 
British Authority a 1 one". ( 28) 
If there was any doubt about the dissatisfaction within the Ngqika 
at this stage it was settled by the missionary Shaw, who wrote to 
Maclean telling him bluntly 11 that the Gaikas are much dissatisfied 
at the 1 ass of their country, and are reported to express a hope 
of ultimately regaining their forfeited possessions". (29) There 
were thus two clear tendencies at work within the Ngqika and (as 
subsequent events proved) within the Nd1ambe chiefdoms. On the 
one hand there was support for the regaining of 1 ost territory and 
the strengthening of the chieftaincy through increased 
appropriations in favour of the younger households, on the other, 
disillusionmeri: with military means of achieving this goa1. 
Amongst the di sil 1 usi oned there was a growing number of those w'no 
were prepared to come more fully within the orbit of the Co]ony 
and the Colonial mercantile and agrarian economy. 
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Not least among these were .the chiefs themselves. some of whom 
took the lead in devoting more labour to arable agriculture. In 
January 1854 Maclean reported that many of the prominent chiefs 
were using ploughs for the first time: 
"Crops are in first rate order, and many influential 
men amongst the Gaikas are desirous of having oxen 
trained for p lou gi ng • . . Batman, Macomo, . . . Namba 
and Umhalla have hired people to plough for them 
and Namba is purchasing a plough for himself. 
Siwani and Jan Tzatzoe al so Cobus Congo have 
ploughed extensively. I therefore trust that as 
the chiefs are taking the lead in an improved mode 
of cultivation, that the people will not be long in 
following the exarnpl e. 11 ( 30) 
These developments were restricted in scope and reflected the 
shortage of cattle and the 1 imited basis of appropriation by the 
---
chiefs and the need to find means of subsistence. Nevertheless 
they reflect the continuity of a trend, apparent since at least 
1835, for greater concentration on arable agriculture and 
commodity production. 
II The Arrival of Sir G. Grey and the Growth of Commodity 
Production 
The conflicting tendencies within the Xhosa economy intensified in 
the two years following Cathcart 1 s departure from the Cape in 
1854. These conflicts culminated in the cattle-killing episode, 
which must be seen as nothing other than the literal explosion of 
the contradictions between a given set of relations of production 
and the non-fulfilment of their conditions of reproduction. 
Sir G. Grey arrived in the Colony in late 1854.. Since the 1840s 
the Colonial State had been headed by a string of appointees who 
were essentially military rulers - Po:tinger, Maitland, Smith and 
Cathcart. Like the others, Grey was al so supreme military 
d th · ... · ... · · ·· · i:: ...... h d • s ... t comman er, , 1s ue1ng an essen-.1a1 reature 01 ... 11e . ea 01 1.a-e. 
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However he was not a military governor~ 
that beyond the immediate conditions 
State could intervene directly in the 
Cathcart did not believe 
of conquest the Colonial 
day to day economic and 
social organisation of the Xhosa. Grey, by contrast, was from the 
ou.tset obsessed by a firm interventionist policy. 
Grey did not advocate a return to the straightforward 
interventionism of Smith, whose suppression of the chieftaincy was 
nothing more than the imposition of external authority, without 
any other development of ins ti tuti ans which could effectively 
replace those being superseded. Grey 1 s attitude to British 
Kaffraria was based on a determined reorganisation of the social 
and economic structure of the Xhosa homesteads. His plan for the 
new Colony had been succinctly sullilled up in the following terms: 
11
• • • undermine the power of the chiefs, break up the 
larger tribes into smaller more manageable units, 
remove 1 arge numbers of natives out of the 
province al together, concentrate the rest in 
vi11age settlements under European officers, and 
convey 1 arge areas of the best 1 and to European 
farmers ••. 11 { 31 ) 
The departure 
something might 
of Cathcart had encouraged expectations that 
still happen to reverse the settlement that he had 
\,.; 
reached. Grey's late arrival in the Cape encouraged such 
rumours. In December Anta, a brother of Sandi11e
1
s, made an armed 
foray into the newly estab1 ished Crown Reserve to test the State 
1
s 
reaction. That resentment was growing amongst the mass is 
illustrated by an incident that occurred in late 1854. A party of 
young men from Sandille's location organised a mounted expedition 
to attack two farmers on the Thomas River. They took aw·ay wi.th 
them a number of cattle and ordered the farmers to quit their 
farms. In response to this Sandille organised a large party of 
over 200 armed men to go in pursuit of the thieves. This group 
failed, apparently deliberately, to capture the 'thieves 
1
, (a 
concession to popu1ar sentiment) but confiscated 59 head of cattie 
and 2 horses. Only a small part of this cattle was handed over to 
the Colonial State. (32) 
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By the end of 1854 Maclean was highly al armed and thought another 
war was imminent. In January Stretch, the former Ngqika 
Diplomatic Agent in the 1830s, was in Sandil1e 1s location having 
meetings with Sandille, Maqoma and other Ngqika chiefs. These 
meetings further al armed Maclean, because Stretch informed 
San dill e of opposition to the war of 1850-53 in Whitehall, of 
Stock ens troom 1 s feel in gs about 't'1e war and settlement and that 
"the war was begun without the knowledge of the Home Government, 
that a great council had sat across the seas to investigate into 
the case of the Ka ffi rs, and that they had come to t'1e con cl us ion 
that the war was an unjust one on the part of the Col on is ts .•. 
and that the whole country as far back as the Kat River was to be 
given back to t~e Ngqika nation". He consequently advised them to 
"press the Governor for the return of their land. 11 ( 33) 
Grey, so far from intending to return any lost territory to the 
Xhosa, was fully determined to push ahead with his pl ans. Early 
in 1855, after returning from a tour of British Kaffraria, Grey. 
addressed Parliarrent, calling for support for his pol icy of 
creating "institutions of a civil character suited to their 
present condition", - precisely the step Si'Tiith had failed to take 
after 1848. 
"we sh ou1 d try to make them a part of ourselves, 
useful servants, consumers of our goods, 
contributors to our revenue, in short, a source of 
strengt'i and weal th for the Colony, such as 
Providence resigned them to be". (34) 
The central part of Grey's p1 ans was the introduction of a series 
of public works centred mainly on road-building, the construction 
of irrigation furrows for the chiefs and the building of 
Governrrent buildings. In addition he promised State support for 
industrial tr a i n i n g sch o o 1 s and aran ts for the es tabl i shment of ¥ -
further mission station farms. Grey obtained 40 000 pounds per 
annum for three years from the English Treasury to finance his 
schemes. Thus, even before he conceived his plan for the payment 




s policy of 1imiting State intervention to pure military 
control. His policy did not represent a return to that of Smith. 
In a crucial sense he retained Cathca~t 1 s realisat.ion that the 
chiefs could not be dispensed with at once. What he wanted to 
achieve was the breaking of the old relationship between chief and 
homestead. For Grey, the chief had to be primarily dependent on 
the support of the Colonial State, and the homestead dependent on 
the Colonial economy. The one would complement the other and both 
were a necesary part of the assertion of Col on i al control over the 
mass of the conquered Xhosa. 
Grey un cbub tedl y possessed, to a greater degree than his 
predecessors, an ability to understand the basic elements of the 
conflicts that confronted him and the social forces that lay 
behind them. ( 35) There were however more important objective 
factors that supported Grey 1s initiatives. First among these vJas 
the lung-sickness epidemic v.tiich had been gaming ground in 
British 'Kaffraria since 1863. The lung-sickness (bovine 
pleuropneumonia) was the first of the great cattle epizootics 
which d:cima ted herds all over South Africa during the remainder 
of the 19th century and into the first decades of the 20t~ 
century. (36) The effects of such diseases (including red water, 
foot-and-mouth, East Coast fever and rinderpest) are widely 
recognised as having had an important effect on the rate and 
timing of the development of migrant labour in Southern Africa, 
especially from the East Coast. (37) 
The first reports of the 1 ung-si ckness epidemic were ma de before 
the end of the war. In August 1853 Richard Taylor, the Resident 
Magistrate in King William 1s Town reported tliat he was setting up 
a place where afflicted cattle could be impounded. (38) The 
disease ma de steady progress, affecting the Mfengu cattle of the 
Crc~m Reserve rrost severely. In December 1854 Bro.¥nlee reported 
that the "Xhosa were gr-eat1y afraid of the lung-sickness and every 
exertion is made to keep heal thy catt1e separate from those that 
are diseased. 11 ( 39) In tiie Crown Reserve, .A.yl i ff reported to 
Maclean that lung-sickness had affected the Mfengu very badly 
11 sweeping off nearly the ¥A1o1e of their cat:ie". (40) 
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Mac1 ean, who thought the condi ti ens right for the outbreak of war· 
' 
saw as one of the factors mitigating against such an eventuality, 
tithe depression consequent on the spread of the Cattle Epidemic 
(so-called lung-sickness) in spite of their fears and 
precautions". (41) Maclean fully appreciated the implication of 
the loss of cattle by disease for the Xhosa, and the favourable 
opportunity it created for the implementation of Grey's plans. (42) 
Grey wished for Government sponsored works to begin immediately to 
take advantage of the favourable conjuncture. By April 1855 the 
first workers were being recruited. It was only possible for Grey 
to begin his road-building and other schemes because he knew 
sufficient labour would be available for work which did not 
require 1 ong absence from the homestead or travel to distant 
places. Brownlee informed Grey that: 
11Kaffir labour can be obtained to any extent in the 
Gaika District, the usual rate of payment being 
sixpence a day with food." ( 43) 
Rations provided were to consist of 1 ~ lbs of beef and 2 lbs of 
sorghum so that 11a man on first being employed would cost 1/. per 
diern. 11 (44} This rate of pay was considerably higher than that 
generally prevailing in the Colony. Brownlee estimated that in 
the Col any a farm worker could expect to earn 6 shill in gs per 
month with food. He proposed appointing some workers as overseers 
at 2 shillings and 6 pence per day and sub-overseers at 1 shilling 
and 6 pence. per day.· 
The chiefs initially supported the idea of the 1publ ic works 1 and 
acted as r.ecrui ters, encouraging people to take employment. Their 
motivation was two-fold. First, it was a way of relieving the 
distress of many households; secondly they were the direct 
beneficiaries of the irrigation furrows which were being built for 
t.liem. Sandi11e was to be provided with an irrigation furrow from 
the Kabousie River about 1 ·~ miles long and about 3 feet wide and 
2 feet deep. This project would irrigate about 30 acres of land, 
which Sandille int.ended to have worked for him with t1e piough he 
had been given. it is clear the Sandi1ie did not intend 
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that his wives should work . this 1 and, al though ; t was usual for 
young women to assist the wives of chiefs with their lands, and he 
could easily have obtained labour through this means. Sandil1e 
told Brcwnlee tliat he would retain the gardens at his o1 d kraal 
for his wives, and Brownlee promised to have the land there 
manured and ploughed, ''exemplifying to the natives the advantages 
of manure.11 ( 45) 
San di 11 e ev i den t1 y took a great interest in this project, 
accompanying Brownlee on his supervision of the work and "standing 
and watching from roorning till evening even in the cold and 
drizzle." He even picked up the name 11 Umjelo 11 (the water furrow). 
(46) Apart from Sandille's furrcw, money was allocated for 
furrows for Xoxo, Sandille's brother and for tJ1e Chief iola. All 
the chiefs were making use of the p1 oughs they had received from 
Ca th cart. 
Sandi11e was not blind to the implications of this building 
programme and asked Brownlee whether providing roads and water 
furrcws was an attempt to prevent him getting back his old 
country. (47) What the official reply was, is not known. However 
Maqoma, who did not benefit directly from the building programme, 
was quick to reach the conc1 us ion that the intention behind it was 
to prevent their return to the ftmatolas. He lost no opportunity 
to publicly and loudly raise the question, asking Sandille: 
"if having water courses made was advocating the case 
of his people for land, was it not saying to the 
Govermrent he was satisfied •.vhere he is 11 • (48) 
Al toget.her, between April and November 1856, three separate water 
furrcws irrigating over 150 acres of land were provided for Ngqika 
chi,efs. These projects employed 231 men, and cost 140 :Jounds 4 
shillings, most of which was absorbed as ·11ages. (.'.i-9) In additfon 
to these projects .• Government bun dings were construct.<:d at Dehne, 
where Brcwnlee was stationed, and d iarge '.vatc:r flir':"OW ·..ias built 
for the benefit of t1e mission station land there. 
bui1 ding projects, one in the 'xindvoge1be.:9 and one connecting 
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Dehne to King William 1s Town, were undertaken. A1 together these 
projects cost 909 pounds 4 shillings and' 2 pence and employed a 
total of 480 men. 
There was undoubtedly a great demand for the employment offered on 
the works. At the opening of recruitment, Brownlee had to refuse 
,, 00 work- seekers. ( 50) By November 1855 over 950 men had worked 
for so!TE period of time on the works. ( 51} Brownlee had 
an ti ci pated the ease with vii ich it woul d be poss ib 1 e to find wage 
workers,. and had informed Grey in February that 111 abour can be 
obtained to any extent in the Gaika District. 11 (52) In the event 
he attributed the large numbers that turned up not so much to 
chiefly recruiting, as to the pressure exerted by economic 
con di ti ens: 
11th ere being no sa1 e for ca tt1 e (due to the lung-
si ckness J.L.}, the Kaffirs find it difficult to 
obtain the articles usually bartered for cattle, 
they may n°"' ob ta in those with out parting with 
their cattle, and a rrarket has been opened for 
their Kaffir corn (for sale to the people on the 
works) which th is seas on wou1 d have been a 1 most 
unsaleable as almost all the stock purchased last 
season is stil 1 on hand. 11 ( 53} 
If the poor economic con di ti on of many households and the 
difficulty of obtaining manufactured goods was t1e cause for some 
men taking on wage work, this tends to shew that the consumption 
of such goods was already becoming a practical necessity. Beyond 
th is, the existence of the works created for the first ti me the 
need to supply grain for food purposes to a substantial nurroer of 
people who were not being fed from the producti en of t1eir own 
househoi d. It therefore expanded the market for grain and thereby 
stimulated commodity 'prodJction. 
The question of supplying food for t"le newly created workforce had 
been carefu11y considered. Traders agr~ed to sell grain at 6 
sh i11 in gs per 180 lb, which was the pric2 Srcwn 1 ee had 
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conventionally paid directly to the Xhosa producers for grain for 
the Govermrent establishirent. If the grain was now to be supplied 
through traders at that price, this would force down the price to 
Xhosa producers who sold to the traders. To purchase grain from 
the traders was obviously more convenient for Brownlee. He 
observed that as there was only one trader in the vicinity, a Mr 
Yi ce, and "from the absence of compe ti ti on he may be ab 1 e to 
ob ta in it at such low prices as would hardly compensate the 
natives for carrying 30 or 40 mil es to market, which was the case 
last season, when the quantity now offered for 6 shillings was 
sometimes purchased for 2 shillings and 6 pence or 3 shillings." 
( 54) 
In the end it appears that both sys terns of grain purchase 
prevailed, but regarc!l ess of \lklether purchase was made direct from 
the producers, or from the trader, the practice of g1 utti ng the 
market immediately after harvest had a d:pressing effect on 
prices. Thus, by November 1855; Brcwnlee was nut paying more than 
5 shillings per ruid, which is less than a half penny per lb. 
(55) These prices were confirmed by the Rev. Birt, who felt that 
such lcw prices must ultimately reduce supply because "the 
Caffre-Corn brought from over the Kei does not pay the labour of 
scuffling alone, not to mention the sowing and harvesting .. From 
4 shillings to 6 shillings per ruid is the price which the natives 
ob ta in." ( 56) These prices were far under the market rate at 
King William's Town, or elsewhere in Kaffraria where grain fetched 
an average price of 1 penny per pound or 15 sh il 1 in gs for a mui d 
of 180 lbs. 
Apart from the trade in grain stimulated by the public works, 
there was a 1 arge increase in the volume of tra ee in manufactured 
goods. An increase in this demand, both for consumption and for 
productive purposes, was an es sen ti al element in ex pan d'i ng the 
position of the commodity over the units of production. linking 
them together in a wider economic system. The effect of ".:hfs Wds 
to transform an occasional trade in s~rpluses into the re;ular 
procilction of commodities for the market. 
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Black traders and artisans were keen participants in this 
expansion of corrmodity production in the mid-1850s. The Rev. Birt 
of Peel ton wrote at 1 ength to Maclean urging that the 20 pound fee 
for a trader 1 s licence be abo1 ished, or lowered, to all ow more 
Xhosas to trade legally. (57) His suggestion for the formation of 
11 native companies" was regarded as controversial, ·but he provided 
some evidence of what were quite possibly the first non-itinerant 
black traders working in the area: 
11 Three natives on this Station did trade to profit 
previous to the war of 1846 and left no debt unpaid 
while there are several other who are more 
competent than they 11 • ( 58) 
His suggestions were resisted for the obvious reason, which he 
himself pointed out, that 11 on the part of the Europeans it would 
be widely clamoured against. 11 (59) 
These early incentives to the acquisition of money, either as 
wages or from the sale of agricultural commodities, were 
overshadowed in this period by the sale of hides of the cattle 
"'1i ch had died of lung-sickness. In fact it seems that there was, 
between March 1854 and June 1856, a commodity boom in British 
Ka ffrari a with the sale of hi des 1 ea ding to the most extraordinary 
expansion of tr,ade. The new-found place of money in the Xhosa 
homestead was evidenced by the marked tendency to hoard silver 
that took place at this time. Hoarding is an important stage in 
the development of commodity production, and a stimulus to the 
modification of the relations of production in accordance with the 
requirements of comrnodi ty pro due ti on. It is par ti cul arl y 
important to notice that this was present in the Xhosa homesteads 
to a marked extent; the hoarding of silver, it appears, becaITE the 
rage: 
In 1855 Maclean had al ready reported that: 
11The drain of specie has been ·1ery great in 
consequence of the increase of Trade in Hi des and 
Horns with natives whc lay up in store all tile 




s Office in King Will iam 1 s Town expanded on this in 
an internal llE!OO to Maclean a rronth later: 
"As you are aware specie has become very scarce and 
this is to be attributed to the hoarding_ among the 
Natives into whose hands most of the specie now 
finds its way, from the large disbursements on 
account of Roads and public works; and in the 
purchase of Hi des, which are to be purchased to an 
incredib1 e amount from the 1 ung-si ckness among the 
cattle. From this cause very 1 itt1 e of the specie 
returns into general circulation: 11 (61) 
How far the tendency to hoard silver influenced the commodity 
transactions of this period-- was illustrated by an interesting 
report by Chalmers wring the height of the cattl e~kjJ_l tng which 
was shortly to break over the Xhosa (and~ as a by-product, was 
vastly tc stimulc:.te the sale of hides): 
"oo several occasions the police have examined, in my 
presence, the bags, tinder-boxes etc of those who -
have coTTE for Registry, and each - of these people 
have had sums of money varying from 1 sh il 1 ing to 
10 sh i11 in gs. On two occasions my a tten ti on was 
attracted by a kind of necklace made of beads, worn 
by different par ti es. Examining these, I found the 
part worn next to the body was lined with skin, and 
that between this skin and the beads were 
arranged several hal f-crOl/n pieces ... or several 
pieces of coin ••. so carefully were these put up 
they could not possibly be detected except by 
handling the neck1ace 11 • { 62) 
There can be little doubt that the main spring of this drive t..c 
accumulate was the desire to secure the means of acquiring cattle 
and other livestock. Manufactured goods, while of g:-owing 
importance~ were s ti11 a secondary consi dera ti on. 
convnented on t'1e motivation of those employed on pub1 ic works: 
11 they always seek employment for a specific purpose, 
such as obtaining b1ankets, cattle, horses and 
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goats, others for the purpose of obtaining wives." 
( 63) 
Most households \'Jere simply adapting a new means of accumulation 
to try to serve the ends which accumulation of cattle served in 
the Xhosa social formation. Monetarisation could not, at one 
stroke, remove the influence of the pastoral economy of the 
Xhosa. However, the changes in economic orientation induced by 
hoarding were invidious. Once introduced, the mechanism of 
accumulation of money as opposed to cattle increasingly becomes an 
end in itself and would, more or less rapidly, induce other more 
fundamental changes in the structure of production. 
The accumu1 a ti on of money required not only that sources of money 
be available but that the old mode of production no longer be able 
to provide an adequate basis for accumulation. With its 
fundamental process of accumulation interrupted and stunted, this 
it could no longer do. However at this point it is necessary to 
be very careful in ob.;erv ing the meaning of the distinction that 
was made earlier between the relations of production and the 
dynamics of the mode of production. (64) 
While conquest and the interruption of the normal conditions of 
accumulation and reproduction of the mode of production and its 
constitutive units of production were interrupted, this does not 
mean that the cl ass structure and i deo 1 ogy of the al d mode of 
production had been abo 1 i shed. In the response of the mass of 
homesteads to the conditions prevailing in the post-1853 period 
can be seen the operation of precisely this crucial disjunction. 
The class structure and ideology of the dominant class persists 
despite the fact that the old mode of production is r-apidly fading 
away. The leading elements of the dominant class in the old mode 
cf production become the key figures in t~e adoption of new 
technological and organisational changes imposed by ~he dominant 
position of the Colonial State, and the capitalist economic 
organ i sa ti on it supported. In this way, the structure of 
differentiation associated wtth the lineage mode of production 
fundame'17.ally influences, and even determines, which elements 
amongst the conquered peoples were to be able successfully to 
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adapt their economic activity to meet the new conditions: 
Generally speak.ing, the mass of poor and indebted Xhosa households 
which were unable to establish themselves as independent 
homesteads in the o1 d lineage mode, were in a weak position to 
attempt to do so on the basis of comroodi ty markets in 1 ivestock, 
hides ·and grain. ·By contrast, those who had successfully 
accumulated cattle and had many indebted adherents were able to 
grasp such new economic. opportunities as were available. The 
structure of differentiation which was associated with the 
_declining of the 1 ineage mode of production, was integrated into 
the new structure of prod.lction that was growing up. 
The persistence of this structure 'of differentiation Jreant also 
the persistence of certain regulatory· and coercive apparatus 
' 
associated with the Xhosa homestead· structure. This regulatory 
and coercive apparatus, involving both ideological and physical 
' 
powers of control , all owed for the performance of bot.': necessary 
and surplus 1 ab our under the direction of the head of a 
household. The cl ass position of the larger heads of households 
thus remained very constant, despite the changes that occurred at 
the level of production. With the integration of the 
differentiated household structure that had prevailed up to the 
1850s in the Colonial capitalist economy, it became possible for 
the dominant households to continue to reprodJce their position 
because they sti11 enjoyed the necessary ideological and coercive 
power to direct the utilisation of labour within the domestic 
economy. 
In subsequent chapters the ab i1 ity of some poor households 
successfully to accumulate ca tti e and sheep through wage work on 
Colonial farms wi11 be examined. HCM1ever, even here it will be 
seen that the ba.si c structure of hous€hol d di ff er en tia ti on was not 
overturned. Those who accuru1ated wealth outside the confines of 
the locations were most often reincorporated into the structure of 
househol d di fferen ti a ti on. T'. ~1 rrte , almost all 
pract; ces and in tern al transactions l?§Y.i(~.~ househo1 ds themselves 
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became monetarised and subject to exchange value, some of the 
mechanisms of appropriation and control persisted and reinforced 
the structure of household and homestead differentiation. 
The interaction between land scarcity and the loss of cattle 
through war, lung-sickness, increased demand for hides, and the 
availability of wage labour, all produced an ineluctable trend 
towards the transformation of the old mode of production. This 
involved a change - or, rather, a break, in the old relations of 
production which linked and subordinated the homestead production 
unit to the chiefdom as a whole. The tightly structured e~tity of 
the homestead was being dismembered. The effects on the mass of 
households must have been distressing in the extreme. The entire 
sense of Xhosa nationhood was· now at stake. The idea of the Xhosa 
nation had always merged seamlessly with the integrity of the 
homestead and its cattle, and as the latter came apart, so the 
need to reach out and secure the former became more and more 
intense. Perhaps this was in the vain hope that a reconstituU:d 
Xhosa chiefdom would recreate the homestead in an act of divine 
res ti tu ti on. While there were precedents for this, for example 
Shaka and the more nearby Moshoeshoe who had made chiefdoms from 
nothing, in this case the time and place were quite wrong for such 
developments. This was so if for no other reason than that, even 
in the case of Moshoeshoe and Shaka, it was the homesteads that 
lent integrity to the chiefdom and with these weakened and unable 
to carry on the economic process of independent accumulation of 
cattle, there was no earthly way in which the chiefdom could be 
reformed. { 65) 
In the face of the c:=intra<ii::::tions inherent in the process of the 
clash of two worlds of accumulation, and the actual ramifications 
of this, there came the firs-:: mani festati ans of that frame of mind 
which was ultimately to l::ad to disaster. In July 1855 one of 
Maclean's informers brough:. him definite information concerning a 
rumour about the prophet ~n '3:!1j en i: * 
* Mlanjeni was the prochet '>'!flC doctored the armies 
1851-53. He was --i:;. - +.1 tt revered, on a par with ;;it ...: ct ..... ;.) 
in the war of 
Makana { Nxel e) 
who doctored :h:; J.rmy orfor to the unsuccesful Ndl ambe atta:::k 




"There is a rumour in Kaffirland that "Umlanjeni" 
seen at Keiskama Hoek a short while ago by a 
Fingoe, that 11 Umlanjeni 11 told the Fingoe the report 
which was spread that he had died, and was buried, 
is untrue, a grave was made to deceive the 
people but that he has been alive and 1 iving in 
Mosheshe's country. He also told the Fingoe he 
intended visiting Fort Hare and Fort Beaufort. It 
is also said 11 Umlanjeni 11 said that if the Kaffirs 
inake war with the English they will get plenty of 
cattle and that all the cattle that have died of 
the Lung sickness will come to 1 ife again. 11 (66) 
This is the earliest mention of a prophecy of the rebirth of 
cattle that appears to have been made. It was prophetic indeed. 
That Moshoeshoe was mentioned as an element. or this rumour is of 
some importance. His name crops up again and again in the run up-
to the cattle-killing and in the subsequent investigations. There 
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is no doubt that Moshoeshoe's tactical victory over Cathcart at/ 
Barea in 1853 had a tremendous impact al 1 over Kaffrari a, and 
raised Moshoeshoe in the estimation of many people. Maclean had 
heard of Cathcart's defeat through a special runner who was 
broadcasting the news to chiefs and people all over Xhosaland, 
before Cathcart 's own express messenger to Maclean had arrived! 
{ 67) To the down-hearted Xhosa, Mos hoe shoe represented the sort 
of leadership that wa.s necessary - he ruled and dominated a united 
kingdom and was clearly achieving some sort of diplomatic and 
military accolTlllodation with the Colonists and Imperialists, goals 
for which the Xhosa chiefs had 1ong striven in vain. 
It had become more and more apparent that a divided chiefdom such 
as the Xhosa were could not achieve either diplomatic or military 
accolTlllodation with the Colonists. The basic organisation of the 
nation had to be preserved c.nC: reinforced if this was to be 
achieved. But how cou 1 d this be done? One way was to invoke the 
guidance of the . prophets dnd doctor: who had a 1 ways guided the 
Xhosa chiefs in their hour of neeri. That the rumour current in 
1855 should have had Mlanjeni residing with Moshoeshoe is an 
effective mrrying of two crucial elements: belief in the efficacy 
of the Xhosa doctors, divine:--s and prophets and a realistic 
assessrrent of the <Emancis of the current conjuncture which 
undoubtedly required that sorre move in favour of a more 
centralized chiefdom emerge a rrodel well-represented by 
Moshoeshoe. 
In the next chapter we wil 1 be taking some themes further in our 
specific examination of the cattle-killing and its impact on the 
economic 1 ife of the Xhosa. H~ever, the nature of the present 
period forms indispensable background to an understanding of the 
ca ttl e-kil 1 ing itself. 
III Grey 1 s Crucial Intervention 
The further <Evel oµnent of Xhosa response t.o the imposition of 
British Kaffraria was affected at this stage by Grey's unveiling 
of his plans for the territory and his proposal t.o overturn 
Cathcart's decision on internal autonomy for the chiefs. Grey was 
determined that there shou1 d not be ci.lal power in Kaffraria, in 
the form of the juris diction of both the Col on ial State and the 
chiefs. He recognised that the chiefs could not be done away with 
or simply overlooked, as had been Smith's approach in 1848. The 
only alternative therefore was t.o incorporate the chiefs and their 
council 1 ors in t.o the Col on i al State. 
Grey first mooted his pl ans in a 1 ong memorandum to the Secretary 
of State for C o1 on i es, in October 1855.. He envisaged that the 
chiefs shou1 d become part of the Colonial State by making: 
"every chief of importance 1 ook to the Government for 
his remuneration <'1rHi requiring them t.o carry on 
those du ti es of mag is tra tes, police etc. wtii ch they 
exercise at present ;;nder the direction of British 
Officers. 11 ( 68) 
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The immediate advantages that Grey foresaw were an improvement in 
the conditions of tenure creating a 11 vested interest in the soil 11 
and an improved volume of trade. The end result of incorporating 
the chiefs forrmlly into the Colonial State apparatus would be to 
11 gain a hold over every part of British Kaffraria 11 • As Grey put 
it: 
11 The Government may make the Ka ffi r sys tern a part of 
the Government of the country, with wtli ch the whole 
of the native chiefs nay, by degrees, become so 
interwoven that they will, in fact, be, as it were, 
incoporated or adopted into Government, of which 
they will form a necessary and important part." ( 69) 
By December 1855 Grey had finalised his proposals. He would offer 
the chiefs a salary based on an estimate of their current revenue, 
and an additional allowance for each councillor resident at the 
chief's place~ The chiefs and councillors were to sit and hear 
all cases, but all fines imposed by them, and fees of the court 
were to fonn part of Government revenue. They were to be assisted 
by a C o 1 on i a 1 rm gi s tr ate • 
Maclean was initially thoroughly opposed to Grey's scheme, both on 
the grounds that it overturned part of Ca th cart's policy, which 
Mac1 ean had supported, and that it was impracticable because the 
Co}onial State did not possess sufficient force to make it work. 
( 70) BrONnlee was convinced that the proposed rate of payment was 
inadequate as compensation for the loss of revenue that the chiefs 
would suffer. He estimated Sandi11e's annual income from fines at 
300 head of cattle "and as many more may hav·e passed into the 
hands of his councillors. 11 (71) Yet even then Sandille did not 
directly retain 300 head of cattle, as many of these were given 
out to clients. 8rONn1ee estimated that Sandille had at the most 
120 head of cattle in his personal possession in late 1855. (72) 
That a great chief sh0L1"lr.i have so few cattle is indicative of the 
extreme measures which Sand111 e had· to resort to in order to 
sustain his following, :<:e?ing very little for himself but 
resorting to immediat.: cist.;ib:J:ion 0f income. 
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In Table 1 belr:M the Authorised Schedule of payment to chiefs and 
the riumber of paid councillors to be allowed to the various chiefs 
is shown. 
Table 1: Authorised Schedule of Pay to Chiefs and Councillors 
- August 1855 ( 73) 
NUMBER OF TOTAL FCR TOTAL COST 
CHIEF SALARY COUNCILLORS SALARY COUNCILLORS FOR EACH CHIEF 
POUNDS POUNDS POUNDS POUNDS 
PHATO 96 10 18 180 . 276 
UM HALLA 96 10 18 180 276 
MA COMA 84 6 18 108 192 
BOTMPN 48 4 18 72 120 
SAND ILLE 96 10 18 180 276 
ZALI & TATA! 48 2 18 36 84 
TOISE 48 2 18 36 84 
KAMA 84 4 18 72 156 
TZATZOE 36 2. 18 36 72 
ANTA 84 4 18 72 156 
S !WAN I 84 6 18 108 192 
T 0 TA L 004 60 l 080 l 884 
While the ravages of the lung-sickness rrust have made the lure of 
c.ash income a11 the more attractive to the chiefs, the key 
question was control over con fi .seated cattle which were 
appropriated as fines. If th is control passed from the chiefs to 
the Government, then one of the pillars of chiefly authority was 
removed. The reduction in the number of cattle as a result of the 
lung-sickness '2!11phasised the role of money in accumulation. and 
8rcwn1 ee ther~ fore su9ges ted to Grey that he first intro duce his 
scheme in the a:.-eas worst affected by the 1 ung-sickness. In these 
areas fines wou1 d ha'-•e to be appropriated in money, or a prison 
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sentence substituted for the tra di ti on al fine of cattle, because 
in these areas, "even where the people are weal thy, in di vi duals 
will be faun d who have not ten sh ill in gs worth of. property. 11 ( 74) 
There can be no doubt that poverty and the economic crisis of the 
chieftaincy and the homesteads favoured the intro<ilction of Grey's 
plans. In August 1855 Grey issued definite instructions to 
Maclean and Brownlee. 11 The Ka fir Chiefs you must endeavour to 
ind.Jee, one by one, to adopt the proposed system. 11 ( 75) The 
chiefs and council 1 ors were to be paid monthly, and the salaries 
of the councillors were to be paid only to the persc'.'ls who 
performed the duties of the office. The first two magistrates 
seconded from the military were Captains Gawler and Reeve. In U1e 
next· chapter we sha11 examine the imposition of the Magisterial 
system and the beginning of the cattle-killing. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CATTLE-KILLING 
I The Mfengu 
One of the greatly complicating factors in the economic history of 
the Ci skei is the existence in the peri ad up to 1855 of two 
distinct political communities, Xhosa and Mfengu. It has 
previously been mentioned that the Mfengu came from. Gca 1 eka1 and 
after the war of 1835 and settled under Colonial protection in the 
Peddie district. Here they stagnated and s1 owly atrophied in ·the 
period between 1835 and 1848. As a reward for their 1 oyal ty to 
th:: Colony in that war,. land concessions were made to them in Fort 
Beaufort and Victoria East. This was the beginning of the 
reawakening of the Mfengu.. The end of the 1850-53 war saw 
further land concessions made -to the Mfengu in the Crown Reserve 
and elsewhere. These grants of 1 and were at Xhosa expense and did 
nothing to heal the rift between Xhosa and Mfengu. 
Up to 1855 the two corrmunities were increasingly differentiated 
economically as well as politically. Mfengu cormiunities paid hut 
tax, acquired ploughs and wagons, and. were · generally more 
involved in the producti~n of commodities for sale on Colonial 
markets than the Xhosa. It was only through the drastic 
consequences of the cattle-killing for both cormlUnities that they 
were brought into the orbit of a single economic system. It was 
the cattl e-kil 1 ing more than any other cause that was responsible 
for the growth of African agriculture in the subsequent decades. 
If it were not for the cattle-killing there is little doubt that 
a gri cul tu re based on corr.modi ty pro due ti on and the sa 1 e of 
surpluses would not have become widespread as early as it did. 
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In this chapter the history of the Mfengu districts, (the Crown 
Reserve, Victoria East; Fort Beaufort and Peddie which are today 
a11 geographically part of the Ciskei) wi11 be considered in 
totality with that of other groups 1 iving and 1 abouring in the 
Ciskei. It is precisely when this is not done that an incorrect 
picture emerges of 'progressive' Mfengu and 11 backward 11 Xhosa in 
the 19th century, as projected by some missionary authors, and 
more lately, by those who have discerned the growth of a 
'prosperous peasantry' in the 19th century Eastern Cape. 
Bundy, who was foremost amongst contemporary authors in pointing 
out the growth of productivity in African agriculture in the 
second half of the 19th century, did not specifically focus on the 
differences that have existed between Mfengu and Xhosa 
conmunities. This has had the unfortunate consequence of glossing 
over the different experiences of the two communities and of 
generalising fran examples drawn mainly fran Mfengu sources (also 
Thembu and Sotho in Queenstown and Herschel) for all households in 
the Ciskei. The moment the effects of the cattle-kil 1 ing on the 
development of production are taken into account it is no longer· 
possible to generalise in this way.· The historical experiences of 
the Mfengu and Xhosa, the two most important groupings west of the 
Kei River, have to be interrelated in tenns of their specific 
experiences shaped through these dramatic events. As Bundy has 
cormnented, 11 the_ effects of the cattle-killing on African peasant 
production awaits detailed archival investigation. 11 {1) 
One of the most marked consequences of the cattle-killing was its 
effects on the productivity of Mfengu agriculture and subsequently 
{but in different ways} on that of the Xhosa groups, so that the 
differences between them did di mini sh as they becarre part of a 
single economic system.. To understand Mfengu responses to the 
ca ttl e-k ill i ng it is necessary to have some acquaintance with the 
position of Mfengu households up to 1855. 
In the same way as Grey had plans to bring the Xhosa chieftaincy 
under his control, so he wished :o eliminate the Mfengu 
240 
chieftaincies~ replacing them with paid officials~ headmen~ and 
police~ This_ move he hoped to make acceptable by rewarding Mfengu 
loyalty with land~ 
The oldest Mfengu settlements in the Colony were those estab1 ished 
around Peddie after the war of 1835. With each succeeding war 
further land was made available for Mfengu occupation. After the 
war of 1848, with the establishment of the district of Victoria 
(East), the Mfengu occupied the area around Healdtown in the Gaga 
river valley. From 1848, when they were settled, each grantee of 
an allotment had to pay a 'quit-rent' (hut tax) of 10 shillings 
per year., This was the first tax imposed on Africans in the 
eastern Cape by the Colonial State. 
The relatively easy introduction of the tax after 1848, which was 
collected in cash,· was permanently to tinge the view of the 
Colonial State on the desirability of taxation of Africans. In 
1848, the first fu11 year of taxation, 1 013 pounds was realised, 
meaning that approximately 2 026 househo1 ds paid the tax. In the 
following year 1 250 pounds was paid by approximately 2 500 
households. (2) Clearly the taxation was a highly attractive 
proposition. It was also an incentive to the laying out of 
individual allotments which facilitated the imposition and 
collection of taxation. 
The biggest Mfengu 1 and grants came after the war of 1850-53. The 
area around Heal dtown was extended so that they then occupied an 
ar-ea of about 28 square miles. The Mfengu settlements in the 
Victoria - Peddie area covered some 517 square miles. To this was 
now added Mf engu settlements in the newly-created Crown Reserve. 
Mfengu locations were also established in the newly-proclaimed 
Queenstown district at Lesseyton, Kamastone and Ox-Kraal as \'le11 
as in the Windvoge1berg. All these districts also contained many 
large farms laid out for occupation by Colonists. In Victoria 200 
farms of 1 000 to 1 400 acres were laid out and 400 farms of 
similar size were laid out in Queensto·wi •. {3) This meant that 
241 
Mfengu stock owners were limited in the extent to which they could 
expand their stock and other agricultural activity. However this 
proximity al so gave the Mfengu communities close access to work on 
the Colonial farms, markets for the sale of their grain and the 
acquisition of sheep. 
The CraHn Reserve that was opened to Mfengu occupation was 
es:sentia11y part of the King Wi1liam 1 s Town district comprising 
the area from the Amatola mountains to Fort Hare. The Crown 
Reserve was a 1 arge area of uneven agricultural po ten ti al with a 
lot of excellent pasturage and some good agricultural land capable 
of bearing a high density of population. It also embraced the 
former site of _the chief Maqoma ~ s Great Pl ace and had for years 
been the epicentre of the Ngqika ter:T:itory. 
The Crown Reserve is of particular interest because o{ tffe--rures· 
that were introduced governing the occupation of 1 and. It was 
speci fie ally reserved for· Mfengu occupation, with . Colonists on1y 
being located in the vicinity of the only town at Keiskama Hoek. 
A yearly quit-rent of 10 shillings was required from the owner of 
each separate dwelling -- to be collected by the Superintendent of 
the Crown Reserve. Dwellings were to be grouped together in 
villages of not less than 20 huts. Each village would receive 
garden ground al 1 ocated to it by the Superintendent. Pasturage 
was to be free but the whole, amount of cattle belonging to each 
vil 1 age could not exceed ten head per house. Each vil 1 age was to 
have a headman elected by the village, but subject to the approval 
of the Colonial State, which could remove him and appoint 
another. ( 4) 
These regulations were unique, this being the first time that the 
Colonial State was attempting to lay down the manner in which land 
util i sa ti on and a 11 oti11ent was to occur. ( 5) These rules 
promulgated in 1853 by Governor Cathcart pre-date the arrival of 
Sir G. Grey who succeeded Cathcart. Whi1 e Cathcart accepted the 
internal autonomy of the Xhosa chiefs and the sanctity of their 





ne.v Mf engu settlements. Grey 1 s subsequent overturning of 
Cathcart's stand on internal autonomy might have been encouraged 
by the introduction of direct Co1onia1 superintendence over -the 
Mfengu. There was a definite build- up of resentment and 
di ssa tisfacti on with the rules governing Mfengu sett1 ement ....+ii ch 
Cathcart imposed. The idea of vil 1 agi sati on was particularly 
unpopular. (6) The hut tax, which was first imposed in 1848, had 
not been collected in 1851 and 1852 as a result of the war in 
which many Mfengu men participated in the Colonial levies, thus 
disrupting production. The reintroduction of the tax after the 
war was deeply resented. The terms of Cathcart's settlement of 
Mfengu in the CrCMn Reserve were already leading to a reawakening 
of the Mfengu and the emergence of a 1 ess servile 1 eadershi p more 
prepared to rrake i tse1 f heard. 
The principal groups of the Mfengu that moved into the CrCMn 
Reserve were the Hl ubi under a chief, Mhla!OOiso; the Amaxosana who 
had an influential headnan, Njikelana, but no legitimate chief; 
the Amaz i z i un der So ci tsh e; the Amak uz i un der Mh 1 eh 1 e; the Amab eb e 
_und::r Yontela •. Only the Hlubi still retained its chieftainship, 
al though the powerful headmen of the other Mfengu cl ans functioned 
as d:: facto chiefs. Nevertheless the relative weakness of the 
Mfengu chieftainship was a major factor differentiating between 
Mf engu and Xhosa. 
These various clans had no sooner settled into the confiscated 
Xhosa lands when the 1 ung-sickness disease struck their cattle. 
As a group they were amongst the first to suffer its effects. By 
June 1856 it was reported from the Crown Reserve that: 
"They possess several wagons but unfortJJnate 1 y the 
whole of their cattle with a fet1 exceptions were 
swept off by that dreadful scourge the Lung 
sickness, so that their wagons are quite useless 
II ( 7) 
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. Apart from adversely affecting those fet1 people 'Who had wagons~ 
the loss of cattle ·also made the paying of the quit-rent very much 
more di ffi cu1 t. Whereas Mfengu in 1853 and 1854 had managed to 
pay their tax by se11 ing 11 one or more of their cattl e 11 , they could 
n™ only find the money through seeking work on the public works' 
in British Kaffraria, or on the Colonial farms and in the towns or 
by selling their grain. ( 8) In 1855, of an expected revenue of 
600 pounds from the Cr™n Reserve only 400 pounds was obtained. 
The figure for 1856 was expected to be "1 ess than half 11 of the 
estimate •. 
On his arrival Sir G. Grey wished ·to speed up the surveying of 
allotments in the Crown Reserve. It was this step which from 1854 
to 1856 united the Mfengu and. caused a revival in the Mfengu 
chieftainship. (9} As will be discussed in detail belo.v, it was 
vital for the existing patterns of accutrulation and production 
within- Mfengu homesteads that the strict. allocation of limited 
a11otnents and the restriction of cattle-holding not becom= 
effective. (10) Grey 1s decision to implement individual tenure 
for the Mfengu was to have the roost far-reaching consequences for 
the economic transformation of the domestic household production 
unit. One of the important points that must be stressed, in 
considering the impact of the cattle-killing on prod.Jction in 
Mfengu and Xhosa households, is that the response made· - by 
individual households was a·, response to a total political, 
economic and social conjunction of circumstances. The response of 
the households expressed at the level of production was not itself 
determined at the level of production. 
The political threat to the existing cl an· structure in the Mfengu 
'communities implied by the terms of sett1 ement in the Crcwn 
' 
Reserve, and Grey 1 s eagerness to proceed with · the surveying of 
individual allotments were in themselves a ~finite stimulus to 
expand, agricul tura1 prod.lction. Most importantly this stimui us 
was presen·t prior to the beginning of the cattle-killing. This 
was soon to combine with the many new opportunities created by the 
catt1 e-kil ling to change t.lie role of agriculture in Mfengu 
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cbmestic proci.lcion. The way in \IAiich this occurred is the central 
problem of the transforTriltion of dorrestic production in both 
Mfengu and Xhosa households. 
Up to 1855 Mfengu agriculture and pastoralism differed little from 
practices already described for the Xhosa. It. is possible to 
1 earn 11Dre about the position of the Mfengu prior to the 
cattle-killing by looking at some of t+ie early census data that is 
avail ab 1 e. The earliest pre-ca tt1e-ki11 ing census of the Mf engu 
was a count made in July 1854 by N. Edye, the Resident Magistrate 
at Peddie. The census is of special interest as it is earlier 
and more comprehensive than the more wel 1 known census ·prepared 
for Henry Calderwood in January 1855. By 1 coking at sorre of this 
early statistical material we can get a rough idea of conditions 
anxmgst the Mfengu prior to the catt1 e-ki11 ing. 
In Table 1 bel"" the basic population break-down and t+ie number of 
stock and other assets are give.'1 for the Peddie district in July 
1854 .. 
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58 544 538 100 2496 716 89 
70 521 624 108 2653 721 80 
363 371 50 1509 431 89 
14 83 21 439 130 12 
25 129 i31 33 595 163 21 
12 110 120 27 521 321 14 
2 28 25 9 113 27 
ii 43 25 215 48 
7 39 31 5 14 7 28 
253 1967 379 .3688 2535 308 
Table 1 (ii) Stock, Wagons, Ploughs and Guns in Peddie District 
July 1854 
NAME OF OXEN 
BULL HEADMAN OR AND cows HEIFERS GOATS SnEE? HORSES WAGONS PLOUGHS GUNS 
CHIEF BULLS CALVES 
JOKWENI I 839 1564 839 629 616 11 183 3 4 235 
MATOMELA I 859 1423 904 426 485 106 123 14 13 186 
NZULU I 699 1201 699 390 514 46 162 8 2 174 
KWANKWEZl I 163 310 178 124 173 16 32 46 
KAULELA I 281 404 237 147 185 20 36 3 4 
c:,.. .,,:;, 
M'THONHLI I 159 297 178 121 92 17 1 41 
FT. PEDO IE: I 
LOCATION 65 80 39 34 40 1 1 8 
O'URBAN 
MISS10N 134 144 73 61 108 2 18 5 5 19 
STATION 
NOOONDALE 
MISSION 125 73 47 31 91 7 6 9 6 
STATION 
T 0 T A L 3324 5496 3194 1963 2304 201 579 42 39 770 
From Table 1 (i) it can be se~n that the Mfengu population of 
Peddie ref1ecte<I a community in \lktich polygamous households still 
fornEd an important f€a tu re. The 1 991 rrarried warren exceeded the. 
nurrt>er of married men by 339 (20~). Relatively feN girls over the 
age of 16 rena ined unirarried, ref1 ecting the importance of 
marriage in the 1 i :2 of t.lie cammuni ty. The high numb,er of 
chi1dren relative to :O"le number of mar1"'ied adults· indicates t.1at 
. the population was inc:-easing rapi a1y. The census reveals tJ1at 
the population s-:i11 lived in g.rcups of i'fouseholds maintaining a 
communal ~xisterlc.e in homest2ads (ki'aals) under the direction of a 




. From Table 1 (ii) it can be seen_ that investment in sheep and 
ploughs had hardly begun. There were approximaately 40.8 households 
per plough. (11) If the two mission stations are left out of 
account, the number of households per plough declines even further, 
to 60.8. It is clear that in the mid-1850s most agriculture was 
still undertaken with an iron hoe or with a digging stick. 
Investment in sheep was, if anything, even less advanced.. Of 201 
sheep, 106 (52%) were in Matomela's location. His was a large 
location with 475 households and it is most likely that the majority 
of these sheep were in the hands of a few individuals who were 
experimenting with sheep and wool. 
The cattle cover of 13 977 head of all kinds for a total population 
of 8 688 represents 1.6 head of cattle per person. This cover is in 
fact very high c9mpared -to- the __ co_v_er ___ revea1 ed in the 1848 Census of 
the Xhosa where the ratio was approximately 1:1. The Mfengu were in 
a favourable position in regard. to cattle and this is hardly 
surprising since between 1848 and 1854 the Mfengu had been a 1 arge 
recipient of Xhosa catt1 e. 
There were hOflever fluctuations between the different areas. Table 
.,.~ 
2 gives a condensed version of Table 1 all owing a comparison of the 
various grau pings in terms of the per ca pi ta distribution of 
resources. An approximate rate of polygamy is given for each area, 
this being the difference between the number of men and women as a 
percentage of the nuwber of women. 
1 ) 
2} 
Table 2 Comoarison of Key Resources in Relation to Total 
Population : Peddie District 1854 
PERCENTAGE 
CATTLE PEOPLE HUTS OF 
AREA 
I 
PER PER PER PER POLYGAMOUS 
CAPITA HOMESiEAD HOMESTEAD HOMESTEAD HOUSE~OLDS 
I I 
JOKWENI I 1 • s 43.0 I 28 I 8 26.7 
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Table 2 confirms the very 'traditional 1 picture to be expected 
where the social relationships of pastoral ism are still dominant. 
The number of huts per homestead vari e<l between 5 and 1 O. Where 
the homesteads were sma11 the number of cattle in each homestead 
was also s:na11. However, the fa11 in the number of cattle per 
homestead was not a1 ways proportion ate to the decrease ~ n :he 
b - • d t' . ., I.. • ~-num er or peopie, an some 1mes an area genera1 ,y :;av1t1g s.;iai i 
homesteads enjoyed a higher ratio of cattle to peop1:: than ether 
f • ' ti Th Z 1 1 1 ...,.. / ~· I.. A areas o larger nomes-:ea .... s. us u us oca1..1on \:10 • ..)) da.,., en 
average, homestaads c::insisting of only 5 hcuseh<:ii~s. · .. d::1 an· 
average of 33.5 cat"':1e per homestead. This repr-::sent:::c ; ,9 c::-:.::::1e 
per capita. In Kwani<wezi's and WThcnh1i 1 s 1ocat~cns (nc 1 :;.::. & 6 
respectively in Tabi e 2)there was an averaae of 10 hcuse:-:o 1 cs oer w I 
homestead and the nt:mber of cattle per homes t.eac cl ven:;:~ct '5,.t. 3 and 
I 
53 respectively. This represented 1. 7 and 1.5 cattle per capita 
for the inhabitants of these large homesteads. 
Comparing Zulu's location, where the homesteads were relatively 
small, and Kwankwezi 's and WThonl r~s locations where they were 
much larger some interesting differences emerge. Generally there 
seems to have been an inverse rel aticnsh i p between the number of 
polygamous households and the number of cattle per capita. Zulu's 
location had the highest ratio of cattle to people at 1.9 head and 
there were. no polygamous households. In Kwankwezi 's and 
M'Thonhli 's locations 26% and 28.9% respectively of all households 
were polygamous and here. the number of stock per capita fell to 
1.7 and 1.5 respectively. 
This observation suggests that the distribution of stock was still 
dependent on the dynamic of centralisation of control over cattle 
in the large homesteads of older men. This centralisation 
engendered the. corresponding decentralisation of cattle-holdings 
to the smaller and more newly established homesteads of younger 
men. The fundamental social rel ati ans in the Mfengu community 
were. still determined by the rules governing the acquisition of 
cattle and the passage of bri deweal th in the arrangement of 
marriages. In other words, the community was still ruled by the 





Even though most households were involved in monetary 
a regular basis, these had by no means yet 
the pre-existing social relations of production in 
The high rate of polygamy in certain areas may have held 
advantages from the point of view of accumulation based on :he 
. 
pre-existing conceptions of the heads of large homes tec.ds on the 
best way to acquire wealth. Because such accumulation a1so 
increased the uneveness of the distribution of livestock, however, 
it created pressures within the co11111uni ty. The5e press:.ires were 
_ccnventi onall y expressed in the es tab 1 i sh~nt by young.er men of 
their own homesteads on fresh territory. It is import,1nt, in 
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analysing the transition period from one dynamic of accumu1 a ti on 
to another, to be aware of the effects of decisions and 
innovations imposed by the Colonists on the internal processes of 
the social forimtion. When issues such as taxation and land 
surveys intervened in the delicate balance between people, ca tt1 e 
and the homesteads, they affected the wh'ole class structure of the 
social formation. 
In looking at Table 1 (ii) for innovations, the only area where a 
significant impact was being made was in transport riding. A 
large number of wagons had been purchased, 42 in al 1, amongst 
1 592 men, or 1 wagon for every 37 men~ This was quite a high 
figure if looked at in terms of homesteads, being 1 wagon for 
every 7.3 homesteads. The capital investment in a wagon, trek 
chains, harnesses and the training of trek oxen was large - of the 
order of 65 pounds. This represented a considerable investment. 
(14) Such investment was encouraged during the 1851-53 war in 
Wii ch Mf engu were one of the ma in providers of trans port to the 
British Anny, for Wiich they earned from 12 shillings and sixpence 
to 15 shillings per day. (15) The other object of investment was 
guns, with 770 being noted in the census, or very nearly 1 gun for 
every 2 men. 
What is cl ear from th is description of the Peddie Mf engu in 1854 
is that prior to the cattle-killing there was no significant 
tend:ncy to investnent in agriculture or in sheep farming. 
Investment of surplus cash derived from work in the locality on 
Colonial farms and from the sale of grain was invested in wagons 
and guns and in the purchase of cattle. 
Prior to the cattle-killing, the only areas· in which agriculture 
had overtaken pastoral ism in relative importance were the mission 
sta ti ans. The miss ion settlements were however by no nEan s 
a:itirely Mfengu. They had mixed population.s with many Xhosa also 
absorbed into them. As with ploughs.a disprcportionate nurrber of 
the wagons were t.'1e property of people residing on the mission 
stations, 11 out of 42. or 26%. The presence a f transport is an 
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important determinant of the ability to market 
surpluses, and such rTEans undoubte~y existed in 
Mfengu transport riders prior to the cattle-killing. 
many small 
the hands of 
Brcwnlee observed that the people residing on the mission stations 
purchased wagons and ploughs as soon as tliey acquired the funds, 
while very few ploughs or wagons were purchased outside of the 
mission stations. So impressed by this distinction was Brownlee 
that he wrote: 
"This is the more remarkable in as much as nurrtiers of 
Kaffirs who have for many years lived in the 
Col any, where they have learnt to plough and drive 
wagons, as wel 1 as to perform other useful 
occupations, having by their inciJstry obtained a 
competence in the service of Colonial masters, are 
at present living among their countrymen, fo11owing 
all their heathenish practices. This remark may 
with peculiar truth be applied to the Fingoes ..• 11 
{16) 
Brcwnlee 1 s cbservation reinforces the conclusion drawn from the 
analysis of the 1854 Peddie census. Al though the Mfengu (and the 
Xhosa communities) enjoyed a high degree of trading contact with 
the Colonial economy and .some households had members engaged in 
wage labour·, the reproduction of the oomesti c household was not 
yet regulated by the Colonial economy .. In this sense, as Maclean 
always suspected 'they were not yet defeated. 1 More or less 
autonomous African communities still regulated their economic 
activity according to their cwn laws of accumulation of weal th. 
The imperatives of the old mode of prodUction were still being 
asserted - with its emphasis cm the accumulation of cattle and 
bri deweal th exchang~.s an:d the ideology of chiefta inship. Young 
rren and others who had di::>persed into the Colony were continually 
drawn back to it and tlt:r-7: still seeking to accorr.odate their 
economic aspirations in h::rms of its framework. 
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Brown1 ee • s 
knowledge 
observation quoted above also implies that the 
of new techniques and new 
competitive participation in commodity 
accumulation existed, at 1 east for some. 
some key event to trigger the latent 
i deo 1 ogi es s u i tab 1 e to 
markets and monetary 
What was missing was 
trans formation of the 
relations of production and to integrate domestic household 
prod.Jction with the Colonial economy. For this the ideoloay of 
the old mode of production had to suffer a defeat of equal 
magnitude to the setback already suffered up to 1853 as a result 
of war, with the loss of cattle and land that this had entailed. 
Before Mfengu and Xhosa. agriculture could be 
" - ------· 
largely with Colonial commodity markets there 
integrated more 
had to be a 
fundamental transformation of the i deol ogi cal component of the 
mode of production coupled with the most severe economic 
compulsion. While the cattle-killing provided. this it is 
important to see that it was 'not the only stimulus at work in the 
Mf engu communities~ The impl emen ta ti on of Grey 1 s pl ans furt1er 
supported the transformation of Mfengu agriculture and it is 
therefore important to see _how these pl ans were received by the 
Mfengu. 
The first important develoj)Tlent directly to effect Mfengu 
proruc:tive potential was the movement of people to the Crown 
Reserve from Peddie. and Fort Beaufort. 857 Mfengu households 
moved in to the Crown Reserve from Peddie· during 1854. {17) Their 
numbers were soon supplemented by an influx of Mfengu and others 
1 eaving Mhalla, and from across the Kei. By June 1856 there were 
1 052 househo1 ds comprising 5 297 peop1 e in the C ro.·m Reserve. 
In Table 3 bel CM the population of the Crown Reserve up to 1856 is 
given, indicating the nurrber of separate locations, the nunt>er of. 
households and the total population. 
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Table 3 Pooulation of the Crown Reserve 1856 (18) 
LOCATION AREA NM4E OF HEADS OF! NUMBER NUMBER GU IT-RENT 
HEADMAN FAM IL IESI OF HUTS OF PEOPLE Pounds Sh. 
NCWAZI I FORT COX JAM ELA I 26 
I 
36 I I 153 18 I -I 
NCWAZI I FORT COX JIKELANA 52 I 60 362 30 -
NCWAZI FORT COX ZIB I 79 I 96 I 422 48 - l I I 
,AMATO LA I FORT COX HLAMBISO I 64 I 89 182 42 10 l 
BURNS HILL FORT COX JONAS. 29 30 224 15 I MISS ION - I 
I 
I 
j 102 I !ZELE IZELE POST XENXE 181 204 I 741 -
I 
!ZELE 138 I 163 
I 
IZELE POST TINS ILANA 631 81 10 I I 
BUFFALO K.W.T. NGUHLE 107 I 137 554 68 10 
I 
I 
TBANDODA l FORT HILL DOD ANA l 59 I 88 I 336 I 44 -I -I I GULU KE ISK.AMMA TONTELA 43 l 59 245 29 10 !{)EK I 
GULU KE ISK.AJ'.1MA ULA.NA 42 so 260 26 !{)EK -
I 
GWIL I GWILI KE ISK.AMMA MHLEHLE 33 I 50' 196 25 HOEK i -I 
' l 
. ~ ~KAMMA I JAMA I 
i 
I 
GW IL I GWILI 34 I 45 208 22 10 . 
PEEL iON YELLGJ I l ' 
WOODS I NELE 54 I 54 240 27 -MISS ION 
I K. w. T. i 
I 
I BALAS! TIJS I 19 21 j , 113 10 10 MISS ION I 
I l 




! : ! .. 
I 
! I PERIE PERIE LOSHE 39 ! ,. , I 233 25 10 MISS ION ! '.j' ! ! I -·---·"' I 
I 
DoHNE ! DoHNE LUDUME 1 '; I 14 80 I 7 -MISS ION ' I 
l I ... ,..,,_, __ 
_ r_o_T_A _L_t 1~·· ·=~~:~~~~ .. ~:_.6_6 _j_s_29_1 __ \_63_2 ___ - _I 
From Tab1 e 3 it can be seen that 1 032 families compr1s1ng 5 297 
people had left Peddie and Fort Beaufort districts by July 1856. 
Th is must have si gni fi can tly reduced pressure on productive 
resources in those 1 oca ti ons. It appears that the nurrter of 
polygamous households established in the Crown Reserve was around 
18.5% of the total number of households. This relatively 1 ow rate 
of polygamy indicates that a large number of those who moved to 
the Cro.11n Reserve were drawn .from the younger househo1 ds who were 
seeking to establish themselves in a more favourable position. 
Just before the outbreak. of the catt1e-k.i11ing, therefore, a-
consi derable improvement in the agricultural position of the 
Mf engu had occurred. 
In 1855, as part· of a report on the Mfengu, the Special 
Commissioner Henry Calderwood prepared a census of the Mfengu 
districts in the Colony. It is of importance to look at 
Calderwood's figures in more detail because he provided one of the 
only estimates of land actually under cultivation. 
Table 4 provides us with SOfl'E guidelines fer understanding Mfengu 
attitudes towards the plan for land survey which Grey was to 
" in trod.Ice. 
In Table 4 the values have been expressea in per ca pi ta form 
'wherever possible, and the rate of polygamy calculated as for the 
Peddie census .. 
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Table 4 {i) Mfengu Districts in the Colony (excluding Peddie) accor'ding 
to Calderwood's Census of 1855 {19) 
PERCENTAGE 
LOCATION HEADMAN POPULATION OF PEOPLE PER MEN WOMEN CHILDREN TOTAL POLYGAMOUS HOUSEHOLD 
HOUSEHOLDS 































T 0 T A L 611 589 1038 
TYHUMIE MABANhlA 300 
. QUALO 111 
VELA 57 
T 0 T A L 468 
FT BEAUFORT BOOY FUSHA; 72 
t 
KATANGANA I 42 
SLINYA I 90 
i 
1J~ RUGWA j 40. 
ZAZELA 1180 
··p1i::-1 111i::i I - ", 
lBANGANA 140 

























































































TOTAL I 1838 ~902 3775 7515 ______ __._ __ __..f .,.....,_ .. ,_ _ ..__,... _________ _.__~----!.-------l 
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Table 4 {ii) Mfengu Locations in the Colony (excluding Peddie) showin3 
Total Land Cultivated - July 1855 
I 
ACRES A.CRES 
PLOUGHS WAGmis I LOCATION HEADMAN EXTENT ACRES PER PER CATILE SHEEP SQ M iLES CULTIVATED !,./OMAN HOUSE-
HOLD ! 
i 
VICTORIA LUZI PO 21 . 5 258 2.2 2.5 1200 48 3 8 I 
I 
MISS ION MAVUSO 10 360 2.3 2.5 1390 63 6 10 I 
I 
JWABEN i iO 282 2.4 2.4 1480 150 3 3 I 
i 
JOBE 5 63 2. 1 2.5 400 i 50 3 
I --··-·- ----· SIKUNYA 5 65 2.8 2.5 350 37 I 
CWACWA 10 338 2. 1 2.5 800 457 2 6 I 
I VABA 5 110 2.2 2.5 1100 100 2 2 
LOVED ALE 2.5 53 1.8 2.5 106 2 2 MISSION 
T 0 T A L '"Q Q_, 1529 I - 6826 1005 21 32 
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Table 4 (iii) Mf L engu ocations in the Colony (excluding Peddie) 
Showing Assets per Capita and per Household 
LOCATION HEADMAN 
CATTLE PER CATTLE PER SHEEP PER HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS :-iO US E:i-10 LJ Si 
CAPITA HOUSEHOLD HOUSEJ-lOLD PER PLOUGH PER WAGON PER GUN I l 
VICTORIAiLUZIPO 2.73 l l . 60 -* 34.3 12. 9 42 I 
IMAl/USO 2.54 9.54 24.0 14.4 1 7 I I 
IJWABENI 3 .12 12.38 l. 3 37.67 37.6 67 i 
JOBE 3.80 16.00 6.0 8.3 25.0 64 
I 
I 
SIKUNYA 3.70 13. 46 2. 1 84 I 
CWACWA 2 .. 60 5.92 3.3 67.5 22.5 10 I I 
I 
VASA 5.90 25.00 2.2 22. 0 22.0 22 I 
ILOVEDALE 
I 
1.07 5.04 10.5 10. 5 40 
I 
I 
MISS ION I 
I 
I AVERAGE 3. 18 12. 37 25.5 18. 1 43 
TYHUMIE I MAB .AN HU\ 3.3 12. 0 l 50 300 40 
QUALO ? ,. 9.0 
,.,... 
37 53 - • :J :J:J 
I 
I VELA 3.4 10.4 57 
~- 37 -, I ~' 
I !AVERAGE 3. 1 10.5 87 43 I I 
I I 
!FORT lsooY FUSHA 3.6 19. 1 3.6 72 57 I 
JsEAUFORT I KA TAN GANA l. 5 7 .1 57 I I 
I SLINYA 1 . 5 7.7 30 38 
I 
I 
! !JAN RUGWA 
I 
I 
2.0 10.3 3.7 40 25 I 
jZAZELA 2.3 9.9 780 90 95 I I prcT 1.8 9.2 I ;. '- I 
I IBANGANA l.4 ~ .·o 70 28 3 I 
!KONOhlO 2.6 13. 1 6.2 15 2 I I 
I I !AVERAGE 2. 1 10.4 34 ... ,.. ..) :J 
j 
In Table 4 (i) the population for each of the Mfengu districts 
(exc1uding Peddie, see Table 1 (i) above) is given. It shows a 
total population of 7 515. They were divided in to 1 838 
households with approximately 4 people per households. If this 
population is taken together with that of Peddie there was a total 
Mfengu population of 16 203 in those districts bordering the Xhosa 
settlements. The comparatively low number of people in each 
household contrasts with the 5.4 people in each household in 
Peddie. The number of polygamous households (in those areas 
where there were any at al 1 ) varied between 5% and 23% of the 
households. There was thus less polygamy than in Peddie where 
such households accounted for from 24% to 29% of all households. 
This may be explained by the fact that the Victoria East, Fort 
Beaufort and Thyumie locations were still relatively new, only 
having been established since 1848. Originally they attracted the 
younger, 1 ess settled part of the Peddie population. Because of 
the di sru pti on of war from 1851 to 1853 they had not yet had the 
chance to expand their numbers through the natural increase of 
population and the attraction of further immigrants to these 
areas. They thus retained a favourable demographic position up to 
this time. The pressure of population in U1ese areas was further 
ease·a by the movement of many households into the newly-acquired 
Crown Reserve in 1855 and 1856. 
From Table 4 (ii) it can be seen that there was a vast cattle 
population in these three districts amounting to some 19 538 
cattle. With a total population of 7 515 this provided 2.6 cattle 
per head, a rate considerably higher than the average of 1.6 per 
head found at Peddie. However Table 4 {iii) shows that the cattle-
hol dings were not evenly distributed across the different 
locations in the three communities. The number of cattle per 
capita varied from a. high of 5.9 in Vaba 's location, Victoria 
East, to a low of 1.4 in Bangana's location at Hea1dtown, Fort 
Beaufort. ( 20) 
It is difficult to assess to l'ihat extent the number of polygamous 
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households in the different locations accounted for the 
variation. Pmong the rn=n in this census were counted many 
unmarried men who had recently been initiated but were in fact 
still part of their fathers' households; This inflated the nurrber 
of men, and as initiations happened in batches it could have had a 
1 arge effect on the census. There appear to have been fewer 
polygamous househo1 ds in these areas compared to Peddie. In Table 
4 (i} it can be seen that polygamous households - one hundred and 
el even - occurred most frequently in Fort Beaufort - accounting 
for 14.67% of all households. The 44 Miich occurred in Victoria 
East accounted for only 7 .5% of a11 ·households and there were 
apparently none at all in the Tyhumie va11 ey area, but this latter 
result is almost certainly influenced by an inflated figure for 
the number of 'men'. The number of cattle per ca pi ta nevertheless 
reflects this order of precedence with 2.06 in Fort Beaufort, 2.88 
in Victoria East and 3.16 in Tyhumie: This reinforces the finding 
that the number of cattle per capita tends to vary inversely with 
the number of p.olygamous households in a particu1ar community. It 
also affirms the conclusion that even in the Mfengu communities 
the process of accumulation of weal th was still control! ed by the 
dynamic of the pre-Colonial economy: The Colonial economy was not 
yet the cbminant force in the internal organisation of production 
in these communities. 
As in Peddie, there were few signs of investment in either 
agricultural equipment or sheep~ In the vklo1e of Fort Beaufort 
there were only 3 ploughs, and the approximately 611 households in 
Victoria East had between them only 21 ploughs. On1 y 1. 5% of a 11 
households possessed ploughs. investment in sheep had hardly 
begun, with most households probably having none at a11, while a 
srna11 number had managed to acquire rrEdium sized fl eeks. The 
number of sheep per household was so small that it can be safeiy 
disregarded when considering its contribution to household 
incom=. The only :3rea where investment had taken place was in 
guns and wagons, both of which had been stimulated by th·e war 
conditions which .had preva·iled since 1848. 
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Up to J u1y 1855 Al 1 the Mfengu communities appear to have enjoyed 
a ·generally high cattle to people ratio and this in itself would 
have been enough to sustain a fairly large population. In 
addition they occupied good agricultural land. ,According to the 
census each household cultivated 2:5 acres~ In fact it is very 
unlikely that each household cultivated exactly this amount. 
While some would have cultivated less than this, down to 1 acre, 
say, many would have cultivated much rrore than this. Certainly 
all- the polygamous households would have cultivated anything from 
5 to 12 acres cl::pending on the amount of labour available. 
The uneveness of the distribution of stock and arable land 1ed to 
sortE hous ehol ds experiencing a shortage of good arab 1 e 1 and. 
Their reluctance to cultivate poor 1 and, unsuited to being farmed 
withoot irrigation, created a land shortage. This pressure on 
arable 1 and resources was par ti cul arly acute in Fort Beaufort 
where 244 hcusehol ds, comprising 1 238 peop1 e, were in fact 1 iving 
on the commonage and carving out arable 1 ots from the grazing 
area, thus reducing the pasturage: (21) 
The high cattle per capita figure indicated that the lung-sickness 
had not yet struck ·in these districts by January 1855. Its 
imminent outbreak in the course of the next 18 months was rapidly 
to· alter this picture. The Mfengu, who up to this point had 
<:Epended on their cattle were to find themselves without cattle 
and confronted by thousands of starving Xhosa refugees from the 
cattle-killing who wanted to buy grain= This was to prove a 
lasting impetus to the change in the distribution of land usage 
from pastoralism to arable agriculture: The remainder of this 
section will examine t."1is process in cetail and .explore the 
political evolution that was working concommitant]y to transform 
Mfencu cbmes tic economy. 
Between Jar:uary 1855 and June 1856 the lung-·sidrness (which ~1ad 
first bf:'en reported in the King William's ToMi distr"i;:t in August 
1853) swept through the Mfengu districts having its rr:ost sev.ere 
outbreck in +Jle Crown Res~rve area. ( 22) From there ·it was 
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reported by June 1856 that the disease had accounted for nearly 
all Mfe.ngu cattle. {23) 
Grey 1 s plans for surveying allotments, granting title to the land 
and grouping the 1 andhol ders into villages was first made kno\<tTl to 
the Mfengu at that point in 1856, when the effects of the disease 
were most intense. At a meeting of chiefs and headmen at 
Keiskamna Hoek in the Crcwn Reserve Maclean inforired them: 
11
Si r G. Grey has determined to al 1 \111 you to ho1 d your 
lands on the same terms on wtiich land is held in 
the Col any by the \'rtli te man, that is to divide such 
land as will now be granted to each location into 
the same number of 1 ots as there are persons paying 
the hut tax and to grant to each tax payer, on 
certain cooditions, a lot with title which will 
make such lot the property of the said tax payer 
for ever ••• 11 ( 2 4 ) 
The conditions announced by Maclean for the occupation of the land 
were not so out of the ordinary as to cause concern amongst his 
audience: the land could not be alienated without permission of 
the government; the hut tax would continue to be paid annually; 
the lot would be forfeited for any act of 1 dis1oya1ty 1 committed 
by the ho1 der; the ho1 der of an al 1 otment might not reside in any 
other pl ace in the Reserve. Mac1 ean further explained that 
resi den ti al 1 and would be granted separately in compact villages 
of 20 huts each uncEr a headnan. The heactnan was to assist the 
Resident Mag is tra te in the collection of the hut tax and in return 
would receive 20 pounds per annum. This having been said, Maclean 
then dropped his bomb shell: 
"The extent of each lot to be granted to each Fingoe 
hut tax payer has been determined by the Governor 
to be two acres .•• 11 ( 25) 
As soon as he had finished Lilana from Thymie asked, 11Will two 
acres be sufficient for us? 11 To 't'f.lich rhetorical question Maclean 
replied, 11 Yes 11 • But this b1and assurance did not satisfy Ulana. 
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His first objection was that such title abolished the 
chieftainship, 11because each man wi11 be chief over his own two 
acres. 
11 
Mac1 ean could only reply that they wou1 d still be chiefs 
over their people 11 in what was good" but not in "what was bad 11 • 
Ul ana finally ended the the exchange with 11 these are your customs 
not ours": 
Objections were also expressed with regard to villagisation. 
Mabanhla observed: 11 we cannot 1 ive together in villages except in 
war
11
• Jama from Gwil i valley commented: "This is the first act of 
oppression that I have known from . the Government you are 
killing by cutting up my land in this way~ my knees are broken 
' 
I think it looks suspicious, we have enough land no.'/ and we can 
change as we wish, besides if a man has more than one wife he may 
want to give a garden elsewhere for the other ~:: 11 
The question of being able to change the piece of ground 
cultivated was essential. With existing agricultural monocropping 
of sorghum and maize,. land continually lost fertility and required 
a fal 1 CM period and rota ti on. Maclean' s reply to the chiefs 1 
objections was that they (at least Mabanhla) had asked for 
security of tenure. The tenure which they had asked for, retorted 
Mabanhla, was title to "a tract of land - not one cut up .•. 11 
The meeting closed on an ambivalent note~ Mhlambiso speaking for 
the chiefs told Maclean: 
11 I am un d:r the Governm:n t and will do as they wish 
.•• our hearts are sore at present because t~is 
change seems tn us oppressive ... we wi11 wait and 
see and then if we are not satisfied we will speak 
to you about it." (26) 
In this way the first systematic steps to undertake the survey of 
1 and and the granting of ti t.1 es to 1 and that had always been 
al 1 oca te d by the chiefs was begun. The matter was taken back to 
the various locations and the demands of the Mfengu were sent to 
Maclean in a letter a few •t1.eeks later. 
262 
The principle of a registered title to the land was accepted by 
the chiefs, but they made it clear that 2 acres were 
insufficient. In a joint letter to Grey two chiefs demanded 8 
acres: 
11 
Give us 8 acres so that we can live, we have many 
thing to cultivate, kaffir corn, mealies, wheat, 
oats and potatoes, we say these things are too 
many to attempt to cultivate on so 1 i ttl e ground. 11 
( 27} 
The wide variety of crops rren ti oned in the 1 etter were in fact 
/ 
very sparsely cultivated outsid= the mission station communities. 
Neverthe1 ess it is of importance that the chiefs couched their 
demand for greater allotments of 1 and in terms of the agricultural 
potential of a large allotment. It indicates that, at this time 
when cattle were very scarce, even prior to the outbreak of tlie 
cattle-killing, markets for grain were rapidly being expanded and 
there was a conscious realisation of the need to expand the 
agricultural base of domestic production~ It must be remembered 
that at this time 1 ess than 4% of all Mfengu households possessed 
ploughs and wagons. 
The Mfengu were net alone in questioning the viability of the 
proposed 2 acre allotments. It seems that even Maclean had his 
doubts about the limited extent of the proposed aJlotments. (28) 
Writing from the Pirie Mission Station, the Rev. John Ross 
expressed the general sentiment when he wrote: 0 It quite 
surprised rre to 1 earn that they are to have only two acres each. 
I can scarcely believe it. 11 He was convinced that":.: they have 
twice that quantity under cultivation, some have more." (29) 
The main focus of Mfengu opposition came from Mhlarrbiso in the 
Crown Reserve. He now enjoyed the added prestige of being 
generally recognised as the roost senior Mfengu headnan foll owing 
the death of Njokweni. As 1856 wore on the need t.o increase 
agricultural cultivation to raise rooney for the hut tax and other 
nec.essary articles becarre more pressing: Ayl i ff 1-.rc te that 11 corn 
was, as a result of the 1 ung-sicknes.s their only means of 1 iving 
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so that 3 acres per family was a mini mum~ 11 ( 30) 
Mhlambiso infor1TEd the Rev. Dacre who had been appointed to 
investigate the size of holding to be given, that 2 acres per wife 
would be suffi ci en t in good seasons, but that in dry seasons, and 
in the case of a man in charge of orphans or with more than one 
wife it would not be sufficient. He then pointed out to Dacre a 
piece of garden land measuring three acres wtii ch he regarded as 
the minimum acceptable land allocation. (31) 
He also raised the question of men who would soon be marrying and 
wou1 d require land.. Dacre recommended in his report that 1 and 
should be granted in accordance with the . then exis tina 
distribution in proportion to the nunt>er of wives and that a 
certain number of erven be reserved to a11 CM for those who would 
shortly marry. He emphasised to Mhlambiso that no additional 
1 and wou1 d be ava i1ab1 e to a man who took a second wife after the 
all otnen t had been ma de. The question of the effects of th is on 
providing land for a future increase in population was not 
raised. It was cl ear from the Colonial State's point of view that 
no provision or allowance was to be made for this. 
Proletarianisation was the intended outcome of the pol icy. 
expressed this exactly in his report to Maclean: 
11
The sma.11 er the erven consistent with the 
maintenance of the existing people - the sooner 
wil 1 the children of the holders be driven to seek 
employment in tlie Colony or among the neighbouring 
fartTErs. u ( 32) 
Dacre 
This was not the end of Mhlambiso's opposition to the 
villagisation and allotment schemes and the threads of this story 
will be picked up at a later stage, for no sooner had the Reverend 
Dacre finished writing his report, than the effects of ·the 
cattle-killing were to be felt in the Mfengu locations, creating 
an unprecedented market for grain which temporarily swept aside 
an talk of limiting the amount of land under cultivation by 
Mfengu prod.Jeers. It is to the immediate effect of tllis 
deve1 oµnent that we now turn. 
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II The Effects of the Cattle-Killing on Markets for Grain 
Even before any officially designated markets were established by 
the Colonial State, the Grahamstown Journal reported: 
"It is not generally known that a great trade is 
carried. on at Alice between the Kaffirs and 
Fingoes. Large quantities of Mi el ies and 
kaffir-corn are daily sold ·to the Kaffirs by 
Fingoes, the market price being three pence per 
. quart .•• " { 33) 
While the Journal thought the trade a good thing it hastened to 
assure its readers that th is did not mean an 1 al1iance 1 between . 
· Mfengu and Xhosa. (34) We will daa1 rrore fully with the events 
of the cattle-killing episode in the next section~ At the moment 
it is important to be aware that the cattle-killing-was ·-actually a 
series of episodes relating to politics as ruch as to prophecy, 
that extenc:Ed from the sprin3 sowing season of 1855-56 through to 
the sal'IE! period of 1858-59. It cropped up in various 
man if es ta ti ans and took hol d in different areas at different ti mes 
during the Miol e of th is period. 
The cattl e-kil 1 ing started with the arrival on the scene of a 
group of prophets in the Gqunukwebe district of Phato and Kama. 
The first consequence was the failure of cultivation in the 
Gqunukwebe district in 1855-56. This failure was also ascribable 
to intense drought. It is impossible to tell whether the drought 
preceded the prophecy prohibiting cultivation or vice versa. At 
all events it appears that many people in Phato's country did not 
even put seed in the ground, which in di ca tes that prophecy had 
something to cb with crop failure. 
Crops were withered in rre.ny parts of the Ciskei in 1855-56. This 
would by itself have led to a critical shortage of grain by ti1e 
winter of 1856 and the prevalence of hunger M'lich would have 
forced many people tc buy grain. The drought, Miich was most 
severe in the cocsta1 regi:::it?s occupied by the Ndlarrt>e and 
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Gqunukwebe, was rruch 1 ess severe in the Crown Reserve and in other 
high. lying areas occupied by the Mfengu. 
The market opportunities created by the hundreds of starving Xhosa 
seeking to buy grain were consciously anticipated by sorre Mfengu 
producers. Prophecies prohibiting cultivation had been prevalent 
since the spring of 1855 and those (such as the Mfengu) who did 
not believe in them could wel 1 have foreseen that hunger would 
soon ensue as belief in the prophecies spread. In addition 
increased cul tiva ti on by the Mfengu was necessitated by the 1 ass 
through lung-sickness of most of their cattle~ Increased amounts 
of grain were required both for domestic consumption and for sale 
to rreet the <Eman ds for payment of the hut tax~ Of course, no one 
could have anticipated quite how vast the local demand for grain 
would sudden 1 y become. 
In late 1856 and the first few months of 1857 the combined effect 
of drought, 1 ung-sickness amongst the Xhosa cattle, and prophecy 
achieved the total disruption of production in the majority of 
Xhosa households. Through 1856 many Mfengu households had already 
been adapting their production to these changing circumstances. 
By as early as October 1856 the Grahamstown Journal reported that: 
11The Fingoes ... are p 1 ou gh in g extens iv el y and are 
n CM sel 1 ing their corn to the Kaffirs at 
renumerative prices II ( 35) ... 
Evidence of the tra<E in grains in the 1 ast quarter of 1856 
came from the rragistrate, Reeve, who noted: 
11 A great many Ka firs of Kama's tribe passing this 
place from the Reserve with quantities of seed corn 
and mealies wtii ch tliey have received from the 
F• II 1 ngoes ••• ( 36) 
also 
That the extent of cultivation in the 1856-57 season was greatly 
increased in apparent anticipation of the consequences of the 
cattle-killing, ·which had begun a few months earlier, is strongly 
supported by a report from Heal dtown, Fort Beaufort in December 
1856: 
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11 The crops of Indian and Kaffir corn in this 
settlement promise to yield a first rate return, 
far surpassing last season, and that after almost 
wholly supporting a population of 2 500 souls· -
for milk was very scarce nearly all the cattle 
having died of 1 ung sickness. Already nearly 
1 000 mui ds have been sent to Fort Beaufort and 
Grahamstown for sale. The Fingoes are beginning 
to find their best market is to sel 1 to the 
Kafirs at Fort Hare so that the vast sums cf coin 
in possession of the Kafirs wi11 coITE into the 
Colony ·through the Fi ngoes who wi1 l not fail to 
make them pay for their folly in believing the 
lies of Umhlakaza ••. 11 (37) 
There were several advantages to Xhosa purchasing from other 
African. producers •... Fi r::;tl y their proximity to the markets, and 
secondly the much more competitive price: Before the boom in 
prices caused by the effect of the cattl e-kil 1 ing on the markets 
for grain, the price in the Xhosa locations was half that on the 
Colonial rrarkets. Brcwnlee wrote to Maclean: 
0 I have hi th er to been able to purchase corn at 
7 shillings & sixpence the 180 ibs, whereas its 
market price at King Wi11 iam 's Town has 1 ong been 
above 13 shillings." (38} 
As the effects of the cattl e-kil 1 ing began to be felt and the 
reserve supplies of grain held by the believers in the prophecies 
were exhausted, so the conditions favouring those with a surp1 us 
of grain to sell intensified. The price of grain began to rise. 
Because the cattle-killing was so drawn out, there was in fact 
plenty of time for Mfengu and other non-believers in the 
prcpheci es to pl ant extra quan ti ti es of grain in an ti ci pa ti on of 
this potential market. As a correspondent for the King William's 
Town Gazette ob served 1 ate in 1856: 
"Never have the Fingoes launched more bo1 dly and 
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1 argely, throughout the Colony, into agricultural 
speculation ••• 11 (39) 
As the situation in the Xhosa 1 ocations worsened it became cl ear 
that some steps on the part of the Colonial State would have to be 
taken to avert death through starvation: Some of these are 
well-known particu1 arly the drafting of tens of thousands of Xhosa 
men, women and children as workers on the Colonial farms. However 
the decision to establish three markets specifically for the 
marketing of Mfengu and Xhosa grains is less well-known and, as 
sha11 be seen, probably at 1 east as important: 
The Colonial State specifically favoured creating conditions under 
' \tklich the needs of starving Xhosa could be met out of prod..Jction 
by the non-believer Xhosa and Mfengu ~ This was seen as the most 
efficient way of preventing the Government itself having to foot 
the bill for rel i.ef food supplies. food would either be purchased 
or families would be forced onto the Colonial labour market. 
Disc1 osing just h<::fvV 111Jch grain was sold by Mfengu producers to the 
Xhosa during the ti me of the ca ttl e-k ill ing, there has survived a 
very valuable series of market statistics of al 1 the grain sold at 
the markets established in July 1857 at Line Drift, Ebb and Flow 
Drift and Fort lt>ntgomery Williams. The first returns make it 
quite clear what the nature of these markets were - the· figures 
reflect "the arnoun t of corn sold by the Fi ngoes on the Na ti ve 
Markets at that place. 11 (40) They were prepared by Verity who 
had taken over as Superintendent of the Crown Reserve from 
Ayliff. The statistics show that grain sales continued unabated 
from July 1857 through to March 1858~ Table 5 gives the market 
returns for the whole period., indicating the weekly total sales of 
rreal ies, sorghum and beans as well as the average price obtained 
in each week. The returns also indicate the number of wagons 
which were used to transport the grain to the market.. 
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Table 5 (i): Market Returns for Ebb and F1o.v Drift~ Line Drift 
and Fort Pbntgom:ry Williams, July 1857 - Deceroer 
1857 ( 41 ) 
.. lifEAL !ES 
GUANTITY VAL E . u 
20 - 25 JULY 
27 - 1 AUG 
10 - 15 AUG 
24 - 29 AUG 
7 -· 12 SE? 
14 - 19 SEP 
21 - 26 SEP 
28 - 3 OCT 
S - 10 OCT 
12 - 17 OCT 
19 - 24 OCT 
. 26 - 31 OCT 
2 - 7 NOV 
9 - 14 NOY 

















2 830 23 - 28 NOV 
30 - 5 DEC I 3 960 
7 - 12 DEC 






63 5 0 
11 a a 
28 o a 
16 a a 
52 10 a 
31 0 0 
46 10 0 
19 10 0 
23 o a 
22 o-o 
11 a o 
17 o a 
30 0 0 
36 a o 
49 0 0 
27 a a 
35 a a 
15 a o 
33 o a 
565 15 0 
. SORGHU>! 
GUANT!TY VALUE 
d. lbs. L. s. d. 
20 150 157 5 a 
3 670 27 s a 
1 730 13 0 0 
2 560 19 0 0 
11 sro 131 0 0 
6 655 50 o a 
14 950 112 10 0 
4 260 32 0 0 
7 400 ss 10 a 
7 170 54 a a 
2 960 22 o a 
9 100 ss 10 a 
7 300 66 0 0 
14 450 115 a o 
16 350 145 o a 
·a 840 84 a a 
10 110 85 o a 
5 600 42 o a 
6 450 52 10 a 
167 255 1331 10 0 
AVERAGE 
PRICE 
PER MU ID WAGONS 
( 180 lbs) 
L. s. d. I 
I ! 
I I I 
I 
f 
1 7 10 i 13 i 
I 1 6 10 I 1 I 
I 
1 7 2 ! 1 I 
1 ii 
J 
6 i 1 I i 1 6 11 i 7 I I 
I 1 7 0 I I -' I 1 6 9 I 4 l 
I 
1 7 3 I I -I : 1 7 a 
I 
2 I ' 
I 1 7 a -I 
1 .. 0 ! I I I -
I 1 7 ij I 3 
l 1 12 5 I 1 I 
1 9 0 
1 · 
4 I I -I ' 
I 
I ,,- -I 1 9 6 





1 10 9 3 I . I 1 7 a 2 I I 
I I 1 9 7 .., ..) I I I I ! 
, 
8 4 53 I 
(average) 
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Table 5 (ii}: Market Returns for Ebb and Flow Drift, Line Drift 
and Fort Montgomery Williams, 26th December 
- 12th March 1858 (42) 
TOTAL QUANTITY TOTAL VALUE AVERAGE PRICE 
(lbs. ) L. s. d. L. s. d. 
26 - 2 JAN 19 620 145 13 0 6 2 
3 10 JAN 1 5 740 144 3 r 1 12 2 - 0 
11 - 17 JAN 11 260 102 6 6 1 12 10 
18 - 23 JAN 15 470 134 3 0 11 10 
24 - 30 JAN 13 395 117 r 9 11 4 0 
1 - 7 FEB 11 350 103 5 0 12 3 
8 - 13 FEB 6 700 64 12 6 14 3 
14 - 20 FEB 5 665 55 9 9 15 6 
21 - 27 FEB 5 370 49 15 6 13 7 
28 - 6 MAR 4 835 43 17 9 1 ~ . '- 3 
7 12 MAR 4 100 36 , ;1 I -r 0 12 7 
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PER MU ID 
TOTAL 113 505 997 ..., 3 1 12 3 (average) I 
TOrnL GRAIN 
S.AlES 
20 jUi_Y 1857 352 340 2 894 12 3 0 7 (average) TO .J 
12 MARCH 1858 
One of the first points to be observed is the exceedingly high 
price per muid of 180 lbs which was maintained throughout the 
period for which the markets were in operation. It must be 
remembered that these markets were instituted at the height of the 




predicted by the prophet Mh1akaza was in mid-February 
1857. While some people had been without cattle and had to trade 
for food for many months prior to this, many cattle were finally 
killed in the days irm1ediat21y preceding the predicted 
resurrection. Demand must there fore have been in tense between 
February and July when the statist·Jcs begin. 
Between February and July, prior to the completion of the harvest, 
sales were taking place informally at different points in the 
Crown Reserve. This was confirmed in a report from Reeve who 
observed in April : 
"A market is now established at Fort Hare for Caffres 
purchasing from the Fingoes, it is now unnecessary 
that Caffres get passes to buy food in the Fingoe 
1 oca ti on ... 11 ( 43) 
However this unofficial market was not entirely satisfactory and 
Reeve soon wrote: 
11 I have been induced to grant a very few passes on 
the grounds of food purchases on account of the 
outrageously high prices demanded by the Fingoes at 
Fort Hare ... 11 (44) 
It will be remembered that when Brownlee purchased grain for 
rations as part of the wage to workers on the early road-building 
and other projects in 1854, he paid only 6 shilling per 180 lbs. 
(45) This was regarded as the rock bottom price at Miich it was 
possible to obtain grain. By April 1857 the price of grain on the 
King William 1 s Town market had jumped to 1 pound 12 shillings per 
muid. (46) .A. high point in the price of grain was reached in 
August 1857 i'lhen sorghum fetched 2 pounds and l ·sh il 1 ing per mui d 
at King William 1 s Town. Comparatively, it can be seen in Table 5 
{ i) that in August the average price per mui d for Mfengu grain on 
these local markets was 1 pound 6 shillings and elevenpence, fully 
14 shillings cheaper than the prevailing price in King Wil1iam 1 s 
Town. Nevertheless these were really astronomical prices and it 
would indeed have been strange if the Mf engu had not been 
motivated to take advantage of them. 
The total amount of money injected in to the Mfengu l ocati ans 
mainly as a result of the market for grain must have been 
considerably more than the 2 894 pounds 12 shillings and 3 pence 
reflected in Table 5 (i} and 5 (ii). (47) Some Mf2.ngu wagon 
owners took grain into the interior, selling it up the Kei, and 
they obtained even higher prices as distances from the main markets 
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increased. (48) On these trips they were _also purchasing cattle\) 
and horses brought from across the Kei: (49) In addition some 
grain must have ma de its way to the King Wi11 iam 's Town market 
where higher prices were to be obtained~ (50) However, because 
of the relatively small number of wagons then available, it is 
safe to conclude that the bulk of Mfengu grain marketed in this 
period was channelled through the main markets dealt with in Table 
5 above. 
III The Analysis of Market Statistics for Mfengu Grain 
Proch.Jction 1857 - 1858 
~f we are adequately to conceptualise the significance of these 
market s ta tis ti cs we have to move beyond being over-impressed with 
the quantitative picture which emerges from the data at specific 
·points in time. Data on market-related phenomena are more obvious 
and easily recorded, precisely because the function of a market is 
to relate together and concentrate a myriad individual 
transactions. Because of the 'obviousness' of market-related 
transactions, it is easy to overlook the stage of prod'Jcti on which 
necessari1 y precedes any activity on t'ie market: 
The conditions under ""'1ich production takes place are c'.efined by 
the relations of production. For every mode of production the. 
constitution of the relations of pro<ilction may be generally 
determined, specifying the forces of production, the relationship 
between pro di.leers and non-producers and the form of the unit of 
production. However because of lack of data it has very often 
been difficult to gaiA concrete informtion on the dynamics of tlie 
production units, the struggle to achieve adequate reproduction of 
the production unit, and the differentiation and class antagonisms 
which cev~:1 JP in response to this. 
It is possib'le to _use market statistics, if they are sufficiently 
comprehens i •1:?, te determine certain aspects u f the prod..1cti on 
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to rrove beyond the merely quantitative aspects of market 
phenomena it is necessary to subject existing approaches 
an empirical and a ti1eoretica1 critique: If 
market-related phenomena such as statistics of quantities of grain 
marketed are to be useful then it is necessary that these overall 
statistics should as far as possible be disaggregated: By this is 
meant that we should ask certain simple. questi ans concerning the 
data. How many potential and actual producers contributed to the 
overall result? What was the 1 ikely contribution of each 
prod.Jeer? Over what seasonal time period was the produce in 
question produced? Were the surpluses of a purely '.economic' 
nature or were they actual surpluses above and beyond al 1 
subsistence· requirements? Above all we have to 1 ook cl ose1y at 
l 
the political conjuncture and es tab 1 i sh what its effects were on 
the gra.vth of the markets being examined~ 
For the moment it is necessary to confine the critique to the 
empirical 1 eve19 The method used here wi11 be app1 ied again at 
later stages of the analysis in which a theoretical cr·itique will 
be developed which relates the inferences drawn from a critical 
examination of market statistics to our tota1 knowledge of the 
rel a ti ans of production of the social formation~ 
Most of the grain reflected in the statistics was produced by 
Mfengu. Tables 1 ,3, and 4 reveal that there were 4 462 households 
in the key Mfengu areas of the Crown Reserve, Peddie, Fort 
Beaufort and Victoria E.ast~ Obviously not a'Jl of these househo1 ds 
would have participated in this prodlction to an equal extent. Is 
it possible to gain any idea of how production was actually 
distributed? 
A clue is given by 1:Joking at the number of wagons used to deliver 
grain noted in the r~turns. ~h·ere no wagons were used the returns 
usually specify that t:1e grafn was Je11vered in 11 sma1l 
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quantities". Table 5 (i) is in fact a condensed table drawn from 
the separate returns for each week, for each of the three 
markets. By referring to the individual returns it is possible to 
cal cul ate how rruch of the grain was de1 ivered in such sma11 
quantities. Ca1cu1ating from these daily returns from vklich Table 
5 ( i} was derived it was found that 91 850 1bs of grain v1ere 
brought to the market up to .December 1857 in small quantities 
without the use of wagons. ( 51) This represents 38~ 4% of the 
238 835 lbs of grain brought to the three markets between July and 
December 1857. 
The loads brought in a single day in small quantities varied 
-· 
between a minilllJm of 10 lbs of sorghum (Thursday 17th December 
1857, Line Drift) and a iraximum of 1 900 lbs (Friday 21st 
November, Ebb and Fl CM Ori ft). On the average, over the 114 days 
that the market operated between July and December 1857, the daily 
amount delivered in "sma 11 quan ti ti es 11 with out the use of wagons 
amunted to 805 lbs. Individual loads of between 10 and 180 lbs 
were common. In contrast, in the sarre period 53 wagon 1 oads of 
grain were brought to the markets, carrying a total of 146 985 lbs 
or approximately 2 773 lbs per load. Wagon loads of as little as 
660 lbs (7th September 1857, Ebb and Flow Drift), and as much as 
3 550 1bs (Monday 7th Decerrber 1857, Line Drift) were received. 
Much of the grain in these big 1 oa ds must a 1 so in 1 arge measure 
have been ma de up of the proceeds of many producers. As the 1 a ter 
censuses conducted in Fort Beaufort in the 1860s revealed, the 
ownership of a wagon was invariably associated with the ownership 
of a plough. (52) Al thcugh we cannot tell if the wagons and 
ploughs shoMI in Tabi es ·i and 4 above were owned by the sarre 
individuals, the s:•viaenc::: frcm subsequent periods would indicate 
this to be highly ; H:.::1J. As there were only 68 ploughs and 100 
wagons shared amongst th!: 4 lo2 households it is quite 1 ikely that 
most of them wer<:: ;;~;12ri by the sarre individuals who would also 
have been in ;:;oss e::~;;; ';:,;; of the oxen necessary to drive them. 
Those ff:M irldivi d:~2. 's w~::; ·:'.lW:-h':d '!'lagon.s and ploughs might have been 
in a position t:: 0r::i<1:~::.;; ·;:-·a;n on a larger scale, and some of the 
small er wagon 1 <>~ i:: :; r ::<:: ~~-'lf:c:;i 6CG and 1 500 lbs could have been 
the produce of :;n~ er ~;...1:; :-· .. :'. :~v~t:1rs only. 
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The small number of producers capab1e of producing on a large 
scale, and the large·amount of grain delivered in sma11 quantities 
of between 10 and 180 lbs reinforces the conclusion that many 
producers were in fact involved in creating the overa11 resu1 t 
depicted in the market returns. The total amount of grain sold 
between July 1857 and March 1858 would have represented sales from 
two seasons - that of 1856-57, and the beginning of the 1857-58 
harvest. The fact that sa1 es from two harvests were ref1 ected in 
the returns supports the conclusion that many households 
participated to varying extents in the sale of grain. If we 
as sun--= that every Mfengu household par ti Ci pated to som: extent in 
the production of grain for the market this would mean that in the 
period July 1857 - March 1858 each household marketed 79 lbs of 
grain. 
If we al 1 CM that each househo1 d had on average 2~ 5 acres under 
cultivation, as suggested in Table 4, this would give a total of 
11 155 ·acres- under cultivation. (53) On this basis 3L6 lbs was 
brought to the markets for each acre under cultivation~ This 
fairly low result is quite realistic an{j it would not have been 
beyond the resources of most Mfengu ho us eh olds to a chi eve this 
rate of surplus. If each household produced 79 lbs of marketab 1 e 
pro<ilce at the average price of 29 shillings per muid or 
approxima t.ely 2 pence per lb, this would have been worth l4 or i5 
shillings depending on i,..tien it was marketed - the grain marketed 
in January-March 1858 being s1 ightly more expensive. 
It so happens that this amount just covers the hut tax of 10 
shillings per hut and horse tax of 2 shillings with a few 
shillings left over. There was therefore, because of the tax, 
every incentive for each household to .produce at least sufficient 
to realise 12 shillings through the sale of grain~ The data seems 
to fit this scale nicely and further suoports the suggestion that 
production consisted of a mass of sma.if pr~ducers with small 
surp1.uses rrost of which went on ;Ja.Jing the r;;.:t tax. Looking at 
hew the grain was marketed it ::.::rt 'J.2 sug;~sted that Mfengu 
production at this stage consisted of 5. :r.c:;s Df sma11 producers 
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marketing surpluses somewhere between 50 to 100 lbs each and a few 
larger producers who were irost 1 ikely the owners of the ploughs, 
trek oxen and wagons as wel 1. 
We referred above to the need to distinguish between surpluses 
above subsistence requirements and what may be termed purely 
economic surpluses. All produce brought to a market for exchange 
for cash, functions on that market as a commodity~ From the point 
of view of its status as a commodity no one is in the least bit 
interested in whether the produce being sold is a surol us above 
the conventional subsistence requiref!l?nts for the reproduction of 
the direct producers. The economic surplus is that part of total 
product of the household not retained for domestic consumption. 
However in the case of many househo1 d production uni ts it may only 
be poss ib4 e to bring forward th is 'surp1us 1 by reducing the amount 
retained for their 0""1 consumption. While economically this was 
still a 'surp1 us' it had in fact only been achieved by sel 1 ing 
part of what was usually retained for domestic consumption~ 
That this was occurring in the Mfengu grain sales and that many 
procilcers were stampeded into selling because of the high prices 
and because t'1ey had no other source of money to meet the hut tax 
was suggested in one report from Peelton Missicr. Station: 
11A quantity of corn was sold by the people of the 
station as the price obtained was high~ I think it 
ind.Jced many to sell irore corn than they shou1 d have 
done .•• 11 ( 54) 
There is a strong suggestion that much of the grain marketed 
during this period was merely an economic suro1 us and not a 
surplus above 1 subsistence needs' h01Jever t'ris Ls conceived. The 
magistrate Cha1 mers observed that in t1e Crown Res2:-"V'2 some Mfengu: 
11were proceeding into the Colony for ;;e:vice ... in 
a very destitute state as they soid ;::heir car~ to 
the Kaffirs ruring the time of s~r'lc'.:fon •i {55) 
In addition it is necessary to «:110;4 fe:r 'U<t:· fa::-: tha: in any 
given year grains from the previous harvest ,_:nd frc:m ;he cur;ent 
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production could be marketed~ In this way the capacity for 
producing what looks at first like large surpluses might depend on 
the product of two harvests. When looked at in this perspective 
the 'very 1arge 1 quantities that were produced appear no more than 
barely adequate to meet the needs of the community: But these 
were boom years, exceptional in every sense~ What would have 
happened if prices had fallen to their previous levels? 
Production would then have looked far from prosperous: 
For the 4 500 Mfengu househo1 ds in the immediate vicinity of t.lie 
Xhosa it is cl ear that the potential capacity existed, under 
optimal conditions, for most to be able to meet their cash needs 
from their a...n production. From the outset, however, there were 
factors tending towards the accumulation of advantages and 
disadvantages between households. 
In fact, far from being 'prosperous 1 , the Mfengu after nearly 20 
years in the Colony were under pressure. The stage had been 
reached where they had either to expand production to JTEet the 
cash requirements (imposed by the Colonial State and to recoup the 
losses associated with lung-sickness), or emigrate from their 
established locations to fresh territory~ In the event both of 
these options were to be uti1 ised, because the cattl e-kil 1 ing, by 
displacing the .Gcal eka in the Transkei, created an area into which 
Mf engu sub-col on is a ti on could proceed. This rrovement was in turn 
to be of t'1e greatest significance for the subsequent development 
of cofll!OOdi ty production amongst the remaining Mfengu and Xhosa 
1 oca ti ons in the Ci skei. ( 56) 
W'nile the benef1ts of the opening of the local grain market may 
have been thinly spread, they were far-reaching precisely for this 
reason. Sorre h.Jusehoi ds were undoubtedly able to enter a phase of 
monetary accum~i'lation and investment in cattle, sheep, p~ou 1:ihs, 
wagons a;1a (mos: irr:;;ortantly) land. Private land own.ersh~? ;.;a.; a 
new ~12me:H intr·:H]1ced in the aftermath of the cattle-k.fliing «~hen 
it becc.;;,;; ;JCSSfbie for Mfengu to compete for the purchas2 of 
agric1Jit:..:r:i! L::;t:; ma.de available by the State. 
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The effect of the cattle-killing was to begin a new period of 
di ff er en ti a ti on between households, based on the accumulation of 
money and the investment in ploughs and sheep~ The 'revolution in 
their circumstances 1 long awaited by Brown 1 ee had arrived: 
IV The Cattle-Killing - Economic Effects on the Xhosa 
It was stated at the beginning of this analysis that develoµnents 
within Mfengu had to be placed within the context of Xhosa 
dominance in the Ciskei as a whole. It is wrong to 1 oak at the 
two groups in isolation, and the cattle-killing more tlian any 
other event had the effect of drawing them into a cormnon economic 
universe. The impact of the cattle-killing on the market for 
grain has been dealt with. It was certainly a sellers' market, 
affecting in the first instance those in a position to produce and 
market grain. But the Xhosa for their part had to be able to 
purchase it. Where did they get the money? 
We have already commented on the propensity for hoarding silver 
coin Miich had been observed from about 1853 onwards. This 
tendency had apparently continued unabated and tile road works, 
service in the Colony, and trade rerna ined sources of cash. ( 57) 
As the lung-sickness took its to11 amongst the Xhosa cattle the 
sale of the hi des of the diseased and dying cattle rapidly became 
the most important source of cash income. Many households had 
their small reserves of coin added to in this way~ The influx of 
coin in the second half of 1856 caused a minor trade boom on the 
frontier, which was in fact encouraged by the prophet Mhlakaza at 
one stage. The Grahams town ,] ourr.al ob served in a report from King 
Wi 11 i am 1 s Town 1 a te in 185 5 : 
11A good nu ....... er oc o.: ,....., _,. ....,_,,_. ''e"'n bounn' ... by the 11u 1 J·t-....1·,~ ~~av~ v ,.._: ':J'\.. 
Ka firs during ~h-<? ; ast ft!W cays there are 
hundreds of Kc.firs 'tr'ho vf.'.3:it this town daily and 
lay out large ;er.is of mcn.::y ·aith the traders~~ (58) 
278 
The extent to which money had penetrated into all commodity 
transactions was witnessed in the foll owing report in the Journal: 
"a large portion of the trade carried on with them is 
for rroney instead of useless trinkets. With rroney 
you can now buy from the Kafir anything he has for 
sale, and this extends far into the interior 
( 5 9) 
In the period preceding the general starvation which started to 
become serious 1 ate in March 1857, most Xhosa households had 
accurrulated a small cash reserve. With tlie onset of large scale 
cattle-killing from about August 1856 onwards the amount of hides 
sold increased drama ti ca 11 y. Al though the price obtained was 
1 CM, the sheer numbers involved must have put quite a bit of cash 
intn Xhosa hands. Whi1 e the Xhosa had in many cases lost every 
other means of barter, the one thing they did generally possess 
was rroney. it is important to emphasise the extent to which the 
Xhosa were saved from even worse loss of life in the starvation 
that followed the cattle-killing, by the possession of small sums 
of money - the product of past hoarding - wi t41 which they were 
able to buy food. Reeve, magistrate with Kama, commented: 
11 
It has come •under my notice that several of those 
who have presented themselves before !il? have been 
in possession of considerable sums of money always 
carefully concealed ••. (60) 
It is cl ear from th is evidence that the penetration of money and 
commodity exchange had become a familiar experience in the Xhosa 
chieftaincies. As shall be seen, the subtle influences worked by 
these forces over the Xhosa economy were as ruch a reason for the 
fan ure of the pol i ti ca1 project behind the ca t'~1 e-i<ill ing as were 
the non-materialisation of the prophecies themselves;' In order to 
understand the extent of this penetration i~ is necessary to look 
i'urt'ier into ho.v the cattle-killing itse1f rapid"'Jy expanded the 
~µhere of operation of trade, money and comrrcdity pr;ruc:'ion. 
When t:1e prophecies of Mhlakaza and the i:ijun;::ti.'.Jn ::,:;: k il 1 cattle 
-N::!"'e f~rst spread it was initially forbidder. ~vr ;;eopl'?. to s.::11 
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' their cattle. After messengers from Mhall a had been to see the 
prophet it then became known that the sale of cattle or of their 
hi des was to be al 1 owed. With in ten days of th is change becoming 
kno.-m in July 1857 
11 a roost extraordinary number of Gaca1eka cattle 
were sold at King Williams Town, as 1 ow as 11 
shi11 ings has been taken for a cow and 15 shillings 
for a ful 1 grown ox. 11 ( 61 ) 
Con tr a di ctory orders sub sequen tl y appeared, but these emanated 
from local prophets that arose in Ndlambe territory. These young 
female prophets specifically ordered the destruction of money, as 
money would no 1 anger be needed after the fulfilment of the 
prophecies. (62) By the time these orders came tQ be given most 
cattle had already been slaughtered or sold. Besides they did not 
have much impact outside of the NdlantJe area. Elsewhere people 
foll ONed the words of Mhl akaza and Sarhil i. ( 63) 
The cattle-ki11ing proceeded in waves with many peaks and valleys 
which were determined by the com pl ex political manoeuvering 
associated with it. This extended from July 1856 through to late 
1857, with the two peak periods of killing being in July-August 
1856 and again in February 1857, although peripheral effects 
continued for a much 1 onger ti me. From about August 1856. the 
practice of selling cattle rather than slaughtering them became 
prevalent. One observer noted: 
11During the past week, cattle which a short ti me ago 
would have realised three or four pounds, have been 
sold for something less than the value of the hi des 
a native man drove some fifteen or sixteen oxen 
and :ows to East London and offered them for sale 
at a nominal price.t but was unable to dispose of 
them. I:istead of offering them at a more ready 
market., as one would naturally suppose, he drove 
tl'H~m to a neighbouring hil 1 ock, slaughtered them, 
m2re1y flaying the carcases and disposing of tlie 
s k fo s a~ th e gr ea te s t i mrne di a te a dv an ta ge ••. 11 ( 64 ) 
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At this tirre the Gcaleka, Ndlambe and Gqunukwebe were principa1ly 
involved in the killing of cattle without much participation of 
the Ngqika under Sandi11e. Hides were brought to King William's 
Town for sale, from where it was reported: 
11 ei ght hundred have been purchased in a single day 
••• and with the rroney they have received in return 
they have purchased axes, knives, etc ••• " {65) 
At East Loncbn irostly Gcaleka cattle were being brought for sale 
and the sarre trade was ensuing. ( 66) At the sa!TE ti me, as if in 
alirost deliberate counterpoint to the general trend, there were 
reports of Ngqikas purchasing Gcaleka cattle. Sandille purchased 
oxen Mi ich he gave to people on the miss ion stations to be trained 
to work for him, the report adding 11 Sandil1e 1s wish being to have 
a wagon and oxen to put on the road to earn 100ney for him. 11 {67) 
Sandille 1 s action at this tiire indicates that many people were 
continuing with their normal economic activity. The prophecies of 
Mh1akaza operated in an economic environment that was alrE:ady 
changing. The prophecies had to take account of the presence of 
the Colonial economy and were in part an attempt to overcome the 
influence that it was already exerting. Some had an openly 
opportunistic attituee to the prophecies: 
"It appears tiiat a number cf Si wan i's people 
proceeded to tlte Gacal eka territory in order to see 
the prophet These devotees endeavoured to 
carmine worldly advantage with the performance of 
what they evidently considered to be a religious 
duty. Accordingly a considerable number of cattle 
was purchased by them during their stay, with which 
they returned to their ovm country, declaring that 
the animals had been raised from the earth by 
Umhlakaza and presented to them Siwani 
compelled thes.e men to surrender their cattle and 
this created a divis~on in th-2 tribe. 11 (68) 
In Cape Town in July and A.uqust 1:356 ft was not yet realised what 
was happening in the Ciskei. Grey .,.12.s aware of the presence of 
1 ung-sickness in Xhosa c~ ':t~ e ari::1 assurred that the vast 
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quantities of hides being purchased by traders were a result of 
this. Indeed the killing of cattle because of infestation by 
lung-sickness was a major motivation for the slaughter of cattie. 
Cul 1 ing was the most effective way to control the spread of a 
disease such as lung-sickness amongst the cattle. This was we11-
known to the Xhosa, and it is quite possible that initia11y 
Mhl akaza was only providing an ad di ti on al reason for a 1 arge sea 1 e 
culling of infected cattle necessitated by the disease amongst the 
stock. 
As early as October 1856 Grey received a report from a trader, one 
Mr Scott at King William's Town, described as 11 a very intelligent 
merchant" which showed: 
"about 130 000 hides, believed to be principally 
those of cattle which had died from 1 ung-si ckness 
have been exported from this province since the 
appearance of that disease, al though previously the 
article of hides had only formed a very 
inconsiderable article of export ... " (69) 
Scott estimated that the 130 000 hides exported through East 
London between January 1854 and August 1856 weighed 1 303 000 lbs. 
and were worth 14 COO pounds. If he included those exported 
through Por,t Elizabeth and those purchased for 1 oca1 con sump ti on 
the estimated total weight of hides purchased was 3 909 000 lbs 
worth 42 300 pounds. ( 70) If these estimates are even 
approximately correct the combined deaths of cattle through lung-
sickness, through preventative culling, and through slaughter in 
accordance with the views of the prophet would have led to an 
enormous influx of money to the Xhosa. 
in considering the number of cattle that died up to the time of 
the cattle-killing and during this period, it must be taken into 
ac::ount that the number actually exported wc.s oniy a small 
p;oporticn of the number that died. In many cases the skins were 
simu1 v di scc.rded because of distance from !:he market or were used . ,, 
by tne Xhosa ~hemselves. Nevertheless the impact of lung-sickness 
and ~he beginning of the prophecies of Mhlakaza a~2 inex~ricably 
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interconnected. It is possible to pose the question whether -the 
prophecies would have arisen at a 11 had it not been for the effect 
of the 1 ung-si ckness. This question cannot be answered 
definitively, but there is no doubt that the lung-sickness was a 
crucial pre-disposing factor contributing to the other ca uses of 
the resperation that beset the Xhosa. 
A Tab1 e was prepared by Grey showing the number of cattle which 
had died from 1 ung-sickness in the herds belonging to certain 
chiefs. It is of questionable accuracy, but it indicates, if 
nothing else, the extent of Colonial awareness of the strain the 
Xhosa economy was under at the time of the cattle-killing. 
Table 6: The Number of Cattle which had Died of Lung-Sickness 
Belonging to certain Chiefs - September 1856 (71) 
Delima (son of Phato-Gqunukwebe) .••• about 





••••••• * ·• •• •· •••••••••••••••••••• 
.................................. 
Kl a as ................................. . 
Cobus Congo (Chun.gwe, Gqunukwebe) •••• 
Vase .................................. 
Stock (Stokwe - Mbal u chief) ........ . 
San dili (son of S tokwe ) ..•••••...•.•• 
Pi et Congo .................. , ........ . 










60 out of 70 
2400 out of 2500 
200 OU t of 200 
2 out of 25 
1 3 0 OU t 0 f 1 50 
9 out of 9 
130 out of. 150 
60 out of 70 
110 out of 110 
10 out of 
20 out of 20 
20 out of 20 
As late as November 1856, when the cattl,e-ki11 ing was widespread, 
Brownlee reported that: 
"The Gaikas have been averse to purchasing the cattle 
of the Gacal ekas, in consequence of many of t.'lem 
having lun.g sickness, they being afraid that they 
might introd.lce the disease among th·eir own cattle 
, • , II ( 72) 
As tiie cattl e-kil 1 ing was well underway by th is stage, this 
indicates that consciousness of t"ie cattie-kf:1 ing '-'fas pal'a11eled 
by consd cusness of the dangers of 1 ung-si ck nes'.:;. 
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Some of the 1 unbelievers 1 those who were opposed to the 
prophecies of Mh1akaza - tried to separate the issues of cu11 ing 
due to threat of 1 ung-sickness and of slaughter in response to the 
prophecies. In Kama 1 s 1 oca ti on a hea dnan, Si tyi , stated: 
-
11
The people do not kill their cattle on account of 




tells them. The cattle are not a11 
dying of the lung sickness, nor are they killed for 
the purposes of making 11 karosses 11 for the women. 
If so, why are the hi des carried for sal e?11 ( 73) 
Earlier the magistrate with Mhalla had tried to explain the 
increased cattle-killing in the Ndlambe location by pointing out 
11
that this was the time of the year when they kill oxen to make 
clothes for their wives
11
, thus emphasising how little the Colonial 
authorities initially knew about the cattle-killing prophecies. 
( 74) 
' 
The rel e of the prophecies of Mhlakaza in the grOtVth of the 
cattle-killing were kept secret as far as possible from the 
Colonial authorities. In the Gqunukwebe location, where 
resistance to cultivation and the slaughter of cattle first began 
in the Ciskei, the Chief Phato told a magistrate: 
11
That his people are many of them killing cattle for 
.. food for their children and for no other reason, 
that he is entirely without food .•• that he is 
going to Umhall a 1s country to buy mealies and 
corn. 11 ( 75) 
Similarly many Gcal'eka denied that they had heard of Mhlakaza: 
11
To the question why they were killing so many 
cattle, they were answered by the Gacalekas, that 
it was because tliey i,1ere afraid of the 
1 un gs i ck nes s 11 • {76) 
Finaily from St. Marks Mission Station in Gcaleka country the Rev. 
Waters reported that "Kre1i is ki11ir.g on account of lung 
sickness 11 • (76) 
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It seems likely that killing associated with the lung-sickness 
occurred simultaneously with that of the prophecies.· When cattle 
had to be killed in any case· because of infestation by 
lung-sickness this could have been declared a sacrifice in 
accordance with the wish of the prophet Mhl akaza. At 1 east this 
would have softened the loss of prized animals with the thought 
that they would be resurrected if the words of the prophet carTE · to 
pass. In August 1856, at the height of the first wave of killing, 
Lamont, one of the superintendents of public works at Keiskamma 
Hoek, reported that: 
11
People are still killing cattle infected with lung 
sickness . . • but at those pl aces where the disease 
has left 10 or 12 out of all the cattle and pl aces 
where it has not reached yet, there are the people 
• • • who appear to rre to have stopped k il 1 ing .•• 11 
( 78) 
The question of the interrelation of the various causes ·of the 
cattle-killing will be considered more fully in the next section. 
Here we are primarily concerned with the consequences of the 
cattle-killing for the transformation of the Xhosa economy. From 
the aforegoing evidence it is clear that from the sale of hides of 
slaughtered cattle, what2•/er the reasons for the slaughter, a 
large quantity of cash was placed in Xhosa hands. While hides 
exported between January 1854 and August 1856 as reported by Scott 
consisted of cattle killed both as a result of lung-sickness and 
in response to the prophecies of Mhlakaza, the hides sold in the 
subsequent period are certainly due main1y to Mhlakaza. Between 
1st January and 30 April 1857 a further 30 873 hides weighing 
1 543 650 lbs. were exported through East London al one. These 
hi des were vaiued at 23 144 pounds. (79) In the period fo11 owing 
this and up to June 1857 a further 118 000 lbs. of hides worth 
2 950 pounds was exported. ( 80} The average price varied from 
three and a half pence per lb. when ca~t.1;; w~re plentiful, rising 
to 6 pence per lb. when they were scarce by mi d-1857. The price 
obtained for roost of the hi des ~flh~dl 'f/er~ sold was under the 
average price in 1856 of 5 pence per 1b. If the ri-: des weighed on 
average about 50 lbs. each, then the value of a single hide could 
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have varied from anything between 14 shillings and 6 pence and one 
pound 5 shillings, although many hides offered for sale must have 
been 1 i gh ter th an this • 
The result of these sales was that many Xhosa had money with which 
to purchase grain, and this accounts directly for the 1 ength of 
time over \'klich the catt1 e-kill ing was able to extend. In June 
1957 Reeve observed: 
"Large quantities of corn are everyday bought by 
Kaffirs, showing that there is still money amongst 
them .•• 11 ( 81 ) 
The trade with the Mfengu for grain became increasingly visible. 
One observer noted: 
11
50 - 60 women laden with hides ful1 of mealies 
passed in the directi'on of King Wi11 iarn 's Town and 
this ITOrning three par ti es of women nurrtering 
between 40 and 50 moved up the hill leading to the 
Quilli basin .•. women coming and going with grain 
,. •II ( 82) 
How the sale of hides from slaughtered cattle affected the ability 
of the Xhosa househol els to buy grain and feed themselves depended 
to a large extent on how the cattle were distributed between the 
households. It is possible to gain some idea of how the cattle 
were actua 11 y distributed by referring to the 1848 census of the 
Xhosa. The census reveals t1at the basic distribution of cattle 
was very uneven between households and homesteads and it is cl ear 
that not all households would have been able to derive much income 
from the sale of hi des. (83) 
The basic distribution of cattle for all Ngqika households 
recorded in the 1848 census "'evealed an average of 3.9 cattle per 
household. The rraximum nurr.ber of cattle in any househo1 d was 160 
and the minimum number was 0 ·o't'hich was also the roodal level. Only 
20% of all households had ab0ve S cattle while correspondingly 80% 
had less ti-Jan 5 cattle. The IT'.edian number of catt1e was 2. An 
analysis of the census r~:::vea1s '!:hat the top 20~ Jf the househo1 ds 
accounted for t"ie majority r)f From the smal 1 amount 
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of cattle he1 d by 80% of the households it can be seen ·that the 
distribution of cattle was very skew between househo1 ds. 
In terms of the problem of the sale of cattle due to the combined 
effects of lung-sickness and the Mhlakazian prophecy it is clear 
that at 1 east 20% of the households cou1 d survive for a 1 ong time 
by strategically spacing the rate at which cattle were killed and 
sold, and buying grain with the proceeds. By contrast about 80~~ 
of the Xhosa households had insufficient cattle to achieve this 
and would be quickly exhausted after the slaughter of even one 
beast. The 1848 census showed that 14.5% of the households had 
only 1 head of cattle and those with 2 head accounted for 12.2%. 
The very uneveness of ca tt1 e- holding was an important factor in 
accounting for sorre of the difficulties encountered by the 
Mhlakazian tTOYement. 
From this consideration of the value of the hides disposed of by 
the Xhosa taken in relation to the average price of grain sold by 
the Mfengu, it can be seen that it would have been possible to 
realise the price of about 100 lbs. of grain by the sale of a 
single hi de. Those households with rrore than 5 cattle could 
survive for many months in this way. Those with no cattle or only 
very few animals - less t'ian five say - would have no option but 
to seek other ways of obtaining grain during the 1 ong wait, 
between July 1856 and Fe9ruary 1857, for the ful fi 1 ment of the 
prophecies. Initially, before the people were forced to turn to 
labour on the Colonial farms, they resorted to selling anything of 
val.ue that they possessed. 
Some of San dill e's people resorted to the se11 ing of thatch to the 
German Colonists who had begun to settle around the Stutterheim 
area in 1856. (84) By early 1857 reports were appearing of people 
selling 
1
jack-chains 1 , beads and all kinds of orna.r.ients at a 
fourth of there former value in order to eke out an existence. 
I t""I ,,_) 
\ C,;j More importantly many people even sold tJ1eir guns. 
,.At one of the trading stations near this town four 
guns have been given by the Kaffirs ·in exchange· for 
food. 11 ( 86) 
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In February 1857, when the killing of cattle was reaching ; ts peak 
and traders in Butterworth were purchasing 1 000 hi des a day, it 
was also reported that 11 the women were selling their ornaments 
freely, those bought a few weeks ago being sold at a third of what 
it cost them ... 11 ( 87) 
The sa1 e of their guns was of course by far the rros t important 
loss to the Xhosa after the loss of the cattle. The Colonial 
State naturally encouraged the purchase of the guns. The Rev. H. 
Keyser at Peel ton spent over 50 pounds purchasing 20 stand of arms 
and was continually being offered guns for sales. (88) In this 
trade too there was Mfengu participation. Ay1iff reported Mfengu 
arms purchases particularly in the izeli district. (89) Reeve 
stated that: 
"the sale of arms to the Government has also been the 
means of supplying many fami1 i es with food . • • I 
have purchased 22 stand of arms, and have always 
given a good price, as I consider this Government 
measure an excellent way of affording relief ..• 11 
( 90) 
As far as the Colonial State was concerned the cattle-killing 
itself was an internal Xhosa affair in which they would not 
interfere. The official attitude was expressed in a letter from 
Brownlee to Maclean, where he reported that he had told Sandi11e 
a t a ITEe ti n g: 
11
that they need be under no apprehension that the 
Government would meddle with Umhlakaza. It grieved 
the Governor to see the Ka firs thus destroying 
themselves, but he would not interfere with them so 
1 ong as they were destroying their cwn property 
• • • II ( 91 ) 
Despite 't1e high- sounding tone adopted by Brcwnlee, the Colonial 
officials naturally did everything they could to turn the 
cattle-killing to their advantage and viewed it in the 1 ight of 
t1eir political and military struggle with tlie Xhosa. 
Nevertheless Macle~n issued instructions 'i..O the magistrates to 
purchase corn f'.""om those 11 as might sell it at a, low price 11 to be 
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held for relief purposes. ( 92) By as early as August 1856 there 
was a shortage of grain in Maqoma 1 s location and the rriagistrate 
Luc as reported that many of Maqoma 1 s and Bo to mane 1 s peo p 1 e were 
buyi n g corn fr om the Ge a 1 ek a. ( 93 ) 
Apart from some small laying-in of stocks, the Colonial State made 
som= attempts to supply seed and imp1 ements to those who wished to 
sow. This activity was mainly aimed at those small groups of 
people who defied their chiefs in not slaughtering their cattle. 
The first group of these 1 unbelievers 1 who sett1 ed around Brownlee 
were: 
11
exceedingly anxious to have tlieir oxen trained for 
the plough two have purchased ploughs and 
others wil 1 cb the saire as soon as they have the 
means .•• 11 ( 94) 
These were the people to whom the Colonial State extended it's 
assistance: 
11
Soire of the people hire out their oxen to work for 
their more civilised brethren and I have lately 
assisted two of them with rooney for the purchase of 
a wagon, 'Nhich is new employed on the road between 
this and King Wil 1 iam 1s Town 11 ( 95) 
There was a shortage of seed in many 1 oca ti ons as a result of the 
severe drought in the 1855-56 season. This would in any case have 
curtailed cultivation. Those Mio wished to cultivate were 
restricted both by a lack of seed and the injunctions of the 
prophet against cul tiva ti on. _Many people who had desisted from 
cultivation !TE.inly because of the prophet gave as a reason, when 
pressed by Colonial officials, that they were short of seed. This 
situation mtivated the Colonial State to distribute SOl'!E seed but 
these efforts were limited and insufficient. in practice only 
small amounts were expended and these usually went to selected 
individuals v.tio had served the rr.agistrates in some way: 
"According to your instructions that I should do 
whatever I could in the way of ploughing, 
distributing implements of husbandry and seed to 
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those desirous of cultivating their lands I 
have incurred an expenditure of 1 pound & 9 pence. 
One of the ploughs I have purchased I have given to 
'Jofa' who has cultivated most extensively ••• 11 (96) 
Ultimately, after much prevarication the magistrates becaire more 
actively involved in the distribution of seed. In Sandil1e 1s 
location a total of 1 800 lbs of seed was distributed - from 6 to 
10 lbs to certain households. This was not a very generous scale 
of aid and many received none at all. A concession was later made 
that Brcwnlee could grant passes to certain trusted Ngqika (paid 
headmen, police, and approved women) to go to the CroM'! Reserve to 
purchase seed, which was normally forbidden. (97) Owing to the 
absence of so much of t.'ie population in the sowing season of 
1857-58, those that remained and who possessed sufficient seed 
were encouraged to bring more 1 and under cul tiva ti on than usual . 
The competition for seed became intense and in late 1857 it was 
reported that Xhosa coming to the markets in search of seed corn 
were 1 eaving empty-handed: 
"the Fingoes bring but 1 ittl e corn for sale and the 
Ka firs will not be able to cultivate so extensively 
as they wou1 d wish~.~" ( 98) 
The d:population of most of the Ciskeian chiefdoms, after the 
starvation induced by the cattle-killing was fully developed, 
stimulated the agricultural production of the remaining 
households. The people who remained after the general exodus to 
the Colony were reported to have broken up more ground than had 
previously been brought under cul tiva ti on: 
11The people are exerting themselves to tfie utmost in 
breaking up ground and many are digging in the hope 
of obtaining seed before the season is over ••. 11 
( 99) 
This was seen by some C o1 en ia l offi ci a 1 s as an important mom:?n t 
for the transformation of agricultural practices. Just at the 
time when Mfengu grain sales were at thefr peak, it was reported 
that cul tiva ti on had been resumed on a wi d..: seal e by those who 
remained in San di 11 e's 1 oca ti on: 
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"As it is too early for sowing the crops which they 
usually cultivate, I am giving them wheat, peas and 
lentils ~ich I purchased for distribution ••. If 
the Ka firs generally were disposed to cultivate the 
above narred products it is important to encourage 
the thing by a distribution of seed, as this will 
eventually tend greatly to the prosperity of the 
country, and we can have no better opportunity than 
the present for the introduction of any innovations 
• • • II ( 1 00) 
There is no cbubt that the immediate aftermath of the cattle-
k il 1 ing saw some of the ho us eh olds which had survived the 
d=vastation begin to adopt new agricultural practices - a process 
partly incilced by necessity and partly by the influence of the aid 
distributed by the Colonial State • . 
The distribution of seed and the possib_il·ity of cultivating 
increased acreages because of the absence of most of fhe 
population led to the first general emergence of ploughs amongst 
the Xhosa. Whereas before the cattle-killing there had been 
sea reel y any ploughs in use except that of Soga and one or two 
given as presents by the Colonial State, new there were reports 
that: 
11
Four Kaffirs (!!£!including residents on Missionary 
Stations) have ploughs . and have amongst them 24 
span of trained oxen. These are now actively 
engaged for their owners and others. By next year 
I expect that as ira.ny more ploughs wil 1 be 
purchased and that oxen will be trained .•• 11 (101) 
Just as Brcwnlee had distributed ploughs to his favourite 
co-ope~_?.tive headmen, Gawler, with Mhalla, gave Mjuzu a plough and 
he had 18 oxen trained for it. Similar gifts were made in Phato 1 s 
location by Vigne. ( 102) 
Innovation was not oniy apparent in the variety of produce 
cultivated and the use of ploughs. Sheep farming also suddenly 
started foaruri:ig more prominently. As if heralding the beginning 
~ . 




We are infor11Ed that Mr Perks jun. has lately 
received, by way of Queens town, two ba 1 es of wool 
in the grease from sheep bred by Tambook ies; the 
staple is lengthy, but the quality is rather 
coarse. We believe this is the first Kaffrarian 
grOHth of the article that has been transmitted to 
the Colony ••. 11 (103) 
The seed and grain that were distributed and the ploughs that were 
given away were only the final stage in driving a wedge between 
those who had cultivated and not killed their cattle and those who 
had participated to one extent or another in the prophecy. The 
importance of this distinction in creating a group of Xhosa rrore 
irmnediately involved in the adoption of an agricultural and 
commodity base for domestic production cannot be overemphasised. 
There was however an additional avenue of change to which we have 
already alluded .• This was the growth of wage labour both within 
the Xhosa and Mfengu locations and of course on the Colonial farms 
in the wake of the mass population exodus after the failure of the 
prophecies. The growth of 1 abour for wages in cash or in kind, 
which gre-1 directly out of the cattle-killing further revealed the 
contradictions which had emerged in the Xhosa social forr.a:ion. 
Attention will first be focused on t1e grcwth of wage labour 
within the Xhosa locations by large producers 'Who had not 
participated in the prophecy, as it is generally less well known 
and because it holds important theoretical implications for 
subsequent analysis and discussion. 
While the slaughter of cattle was stil.1 reaching its height it was 
reported that people who had faun d employment hoeing the gr our. d 
fo.r 
11
Nativ-e Christians 11 were being forced to desist becau.se this 
was in conflict with Mh1akaza 1 s orders. {l 04) As the full 
effects of the crisis were felt, it became apparent tlo:iat this new 
relationship was cropping up fairly widely. Inevitably it was 
amongst th·e 1 arger concentrations of uribel i evers and the Mf::ngu 
that it '.-ias roost prevalent. 
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Interestingly, the initial ~ppearance of wage labour in Xhosa 
domestic production was more prevalent amongst the Gqunukwebe of 
Kama, who were generally a small and not much respected group. 
Reeve reported: 
11
A good number have had their friends registered by 
me to work, with the understanding that they should 
receive in some cases a small wage, and in a11 
cases at 1 east their support, but that these would 
have to work for a given time, and I have explained 
to the par ti es making these contracts that I should 
consider them 1 i able to imprisonment . . . if they 
left their employment without permission ... The 
number employed is ... perhaps 250 ••• 11 (105) 
Such 'wage work 1 ·contracts were al so encouraged on the mission 
stations and the effect of the increased labour availability was 
that: 
11 at Mr Sargent's St~tion alone nearly double the 
amount of land is already cleared and planted than 
was under cul ti vati on up to the end of November 
last. The cultivation is still increasing u 
(106) 
When the extensive crops of 1857 came to be harvested in 1858, 
A.M. Chalmers, who had succeeded Reeve, reported that many: 
11 gain a livelihood by working for those whose crops 
are so plentiful as to require their employing 
hands to gather them in •.. 11 (107) 
Wage labour within the locations for other household production 
units remained 1 imi ted. Nevertheless its emergence at this stage 
must be considered as part of the overall transformation wrought 
in the aftermath of the cattle-killing. Before going on to 
consider the far greater extent of wage labour on the farms in the 
Colony it will be useful briefly to sum up the analysis so far. 
Several di.stinct developments have been outlined that may be 
regarded as part of the immediate impact of the explosion of the 




differentiating types of. Xhosa and Mfengu production units in 
terms of changes in their productive activity and the organisation 
of production. They were briefly: 
1 ) the grONt~ of the grain trade and the production of marketab 1 e 
surpluses; 
2) the sale of cattle and hides and the extensive 
commercialisation of cattle transactions; 
3) the sale of other corrunodities (e.g. ornarrents) which widened 
the net spread of money transactions within the domestic 
economy; 
4) the adoption of the plough; 
5) the increase in the area of 1 and cultivated by those who 
survived and remained in t~eir locations after the 
cattle-killing; 
6) the adoption of a wider assortment of crops; 
7) as a result of the foregoing the emergence of the possibility 
of hired labour within Xhosa domestic production. 
Al 1 of these factors working together 1 ead to the con cl us ion that 
the d2ve1opnent within Xhosa and Mfengu dorrestic production of new 
rel a ti ans of prod.Jc ti on based on small commodity production and 
rronetary accu!Tlllation had begun. There can be no doubt that 
amongst certain of the Mfengu, the non-believer Xhosa, and on the 
Mission Stations t~e conditions were now right for the develoµnent 
of a 'larger farmer 1 kulak type class •. These developments will 
be considered in Chapter 9 be1 ™· 
Once again hOHever it is necessary to return to the hard earth of 
the Ciskei and remind oneself that those on the threshold of this 
nett class formation were but a small minority of the mass of 
people in the Ci skei. As we saw with the Mfengu, (who have to be 
considered in relation to tlie mass of Xhosa without whom their 
elevated economic position would not have been possible) the total 
conditions for the revel opnent cf :his :'lew c1 ass, which was by no 
means exclusively Mfengu, must oe set within the context of the 
effects of the cattle-killing .upon t1e r.:.a.ss of households who were 
impoverished and destroyed in this period. 
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V The Ca ttl e-K ill ing - The Experience of Wage Labour and ; ts 
Effects 
The response of the Colonial State to the starvation in the Xhosa 
locations was to encourage, wherever possible, the mass emigration 
of the Xhosa to take work on the Colonial farms. The resultant 
depopulation of the Ciskei was ·itself the most far-reaching 
consequence of the cattle-killing. (108) 
As a result of the depopulation consequent on the cattle-killing 
the Xhosa were to lose more land than they had lost in either the 
1848 war or the 1853 war. It is therefore particularly important 
to examine the extent of the depopulation, and its effects on the , 
participants. Ultimately the monetary value of the extended 
periods of wage labour were more valuable even than the sale of 
the hi des of the cattle, and the collective experience of mass 
(though temporary) proletarianisation permanently changed the 
relationship of the Xhosa domestic procilction unit to the 
capitalist economy. From then on an element of wage work was to 
become an increasingly accepted part in the composition of 
cbmestic production. 
it is in this sense that the cattle-killing laid the founration 
for an economic structure based on migrant workers and drew the 
entire socia1 forrration into the sphere of the <:Eve1oping 
capitalist economy of the Colony. Relationships constituted 
within the Colonial economy were irreversibly introduced within 
the Xhosa domestic prediction unit, so that while it eventually 
regained and retained its different appearance (huts, cattle 
kraals, cornmonage, no fences etc) these basic consti;:uents were 
held together by economic relationships not originally found 
within them. Domestic production based on family i abour was from 
tJ1e~ on increasingly a part of a single economic entity. shaped by 
th.e grcwt1 of the Col onia1 capitalist economy in its pr::::ce3s of 




Like the ca tt1 e-k il 1 ing itself, ·the movement of Xhosa in to the 
Colony began b·efore the prophecies of Mh1akaza started to have an 
effect on t"ie Xhosa homesteads. The agri cul tura 1 season of 
1854-56 was a poor one. Drought was prevalent and the effects of 
certain other miner prophets who preceded Mhlakaza and had 
prohibited cultivation, all served to restrict the amount of grain 
harvested in 1856. 
The result was an increased interest in opportunities for earning 
money on the Colonial farms. In May 1856 Reeve reported: 
11
Within the last three weeks a great desire has been 
manifested by the people for work. I attributed 
this to the cold weather as the demand for blankets 
is 1 arge. Besides ~is the crops have been but 
small, which together with the loss of cattle has 
left many families anxious for employment. 11 (109) 
These peop1 e often found Col on ia 1 em pl o.}11lent 1 ess than 
attractive. Reev~ received "many just complaints made of the 
non-pa.}11lent of wages. 11 {110) Often wages were paid in goats or 
cattle, which were then confiscated by the Field Cornets in the 
Col any because the passes of the workers had not been endorsed to 
certify that t'1e stock was their property. 
The 1 arge demand for workers was apparent from the beginning of 
1856. Solll:! magistrates like Reeve were particular about the 
contracts they registered, refusing to register contracts in which 
the wages were too 1 IM. Others were 1 ess discerning, 1 ea ding to 
reports of wages of 15 shillings or a cow for six months work. 
(111) Reeve noted that the workers going into the Col any at this 
stage were generally beb1een tiie ages of 17 and 25 years. He 
estimated that a "good masteru paid 6 shillings and 6 pence to 10 
shillings per rmnth. (112) 
In terms of a ;:irociarnation cf September 7th 1855 issued by Grey it 
was required that: 
11 If any persoi1 shall ~rnp1 oy a native otherwise than 
as a day 1 <:t<iur<?r, he sha11 make a ppl i ca ti on to the 
Comnfssior.er of the 1 ocation to which the native 
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belongs ... No native shall pass into the Colony 
without a pass issued by the Cammi ss ioner of his 
division at a cost of 1 shilling" (113) 
This was the first large scale pass system enforced against the 
Xhosa and it required the presence of the Colonial State in the 
Xhosa territory to enforce it. Mfengu, as citizens of the Colony 
(i.e. British Citizens) were not required to carry such passes and 
could move freely within the Colony. The racist nature of the 
system was revealed by the nece~sity to issue all Mfengu with 
11 Certi ficates of Ci ti zensh ip 11 which they had to carry at all 
times, the purpose of which was, the Attorney General explained: 
11 in substance a pass calculated 
from being apprehended and 
wandering Ka fir- ... " (114) 
to prevent the bearer 
deal t wi th as a 
With free movement thus restricted and employment strictly 
contro1led it was possible for the various magistrates to have a 
good idea of the number of people leaving for employment. However 
the sheer numbers of Xhosa who left for employment placed a severe 
strain on the system and, in so far as it was ever intended as a 
check on abuses by Colonial farmers and other employers, it soon 
ceased to function as such. In practice farmers would simply 
write to the magistrate requesting a certain number of workers. 
The rriagistrate wou1d form these into a party with others heading 
in the same di rec ti on and send them off on foot under a 
'conductor', or in other words, a guard. The guard would see them 
to the places to which they were to be sent. The 1contractual 1 
formalities were in this way purely administrative measures 
between the farmer and the magistrate. 
A sophistication was introduced into the basic system with the 
establishment of a "Central Office" for the registration of those 
proceeding to the Co1ony for work and for cl earing a11 
applications for workers coming from farmers. (115) In each 
applicat~o0 ~ne ;;r·c~9ectiv~ employer was to state 11 the kind of 
labour reauire~, the :er~s. both as to wages and length of 
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service; and Mieth er the wives, or the wives and families can 
accompany the labourers •.• " (116) 
Some of the intended workers did not appreciate the benefit of the 
sys tern: 
"The Ka fir servants of Mr Pu11 er brought me three men 
and one woman to be registered for Mr Walton, upon 
my asking the parties whether they were wi11 ing to 
go , they said they had been to 1 d by the man who 
came to fetch them that I wou1 d be able to tell 
them what wages they were 
was not the case . • • they 
go as there was always 
to receive .•. but this 
then said they wou1 d not 
some di ffi cul ty in the 
Colony if everything was not sett1 ed previous to 
their 1 eaving ... 11 ( 117) 
There were certainly many others who could not 
selective about the conditions under which 
afford to be 
they en tere d 
employment. I nevi tab 1 y reports were received of 1 ab our recruiters 
simply gathering people together and t.'1en d.istributing them, at a 
fee, to Colonial farmers. (118) 
., 
The Cape Parliament sought to pass a bil1 (known as tlie 11Kaffir 
Employment Bill") wnich would have made it impossible fer workers 
to be indentured for 11 short periods 11 of from 1-3 years, only 
recognising 1 abour contracts of from 3-5 years. Maclean had the 
sophistication to see the negative consequences of this and 
actively campaigned against it, arguing tbat it was: 
11 tak ing advantage of the short term food scarcity, 
without considering the real conditions prevalent 
in Kaffraria and the disincen:ive to labour that 
this would ultimately coif€ t8 repres€nt .•• 11 (119) 
Scire Colonists openly exploited :!ie s,ituation and .saw in the 
destitution of the Xhosa an opportuni':y for ;:he introduction of 
scarcely disguised forms of slaver.:. :::11ieen Dowsley writing in 
1932 found that: 
"It is true that to-day :~om= .cf thf: aged Natives in 
the Transkei tel 1 hew, as er ii dr-en, t~ey ·~1ere taken 
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to Graaff-Reinet, put up to auction and sold 11 ~ 
(120) 
The matter was raised in the columns of the 'Argus' and free1 y 
debated, soire in favour of such 'altruistic' acts and others 
against this trafficking. Grey acknowledged that labour 
recruiters were guilty of abuses~ especially one Mr Hart who took 
11
inhabitants of Kaffraria into the Colony as labourers disposing 
afterwards of their labour under some system of bargaining for the 
sam: ••. 11 ( 121 ) There were many others who evaded the sys tern of 
regi strati on and passes. Mull ins reported "Boers coming in to the 
district (Gcalekaland near Butterworth) and hiring as ruch as 50 
people at once ..• 11 (122) 
The real 'champion'· of Colonial employment for the Xhosa was not 
Maclean but Richard Southey~ ( 123) He wrote to Maclean: 
"The Civil Co1m1issioner of Albany has at the present 
time applications from his 0\'81 and neighbouring 
··divisions for about 6 000 Kafir servants of both 
sexes. More than he can or has been able to supply 
•••II (124) 
Southey was particularly enthusiastic about the big demand that 
existed even for ch i1 dren and the aged: 
11There appears to be scarcely any limit to the <:Emand 
for them in all parts of the Colony .•• a11 that 
you can forward will REet ready employment at fair 
remuneration •• ~ 11 (125) 
This assesstrent of the wil 1 ingness of Co1 onial employers to take 
on children was soon confirmed \'klen such applications began 
arriving on Maclean 's desk in large numbers: 
11The Civil Commissioner for S¥h::11endam states that 
000 to 1 000 workers \.'rou: d find immediate 
employment, especially juven~1 es, boys and girls 
fr om the age of 1 0 to 1 5 yea i"' s 11 ( 1 2 6) 
HOn' 'fair' the remunen.ticn was is unc1e=.r. What was so 
significant in tile rmss exo1jus rn"C:,1 C.oio:i:a1 empioyment was its 
forced character. Xhosa had L:n-:; ~':?sist::'.1 · .. mrkfog on the Colonial 
farms because t1e wages i,.1ere ~;r:~;.:t;:E:t·i ve compared to the 
possibilities for obtaining :asi1 :0~·oi~g;1 :tad::. T:rie demand for 
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1 abour had existed in the Colony for many years and the shortage 
of labour had been a factor holding up the devel oµnent of Colonial 
agriculture. However, the demand had been at a rate of pay that 
could not compete with alternative sources for ob ta in ing cash. Now 
peop1 e were forced to accept these wages en rnasse. Before the 
cattle-killing, wages of 10 shillings per rronth were fairly 
common. NCM they dropped to half that. By mid-1857 the rate of 
pay .for adult males was registered as 5 shillings per ironth plus 
food and for females 2 shillings pl us food. Children were to 
receive 2 shillings and 6 pence ,per rronth, pl us food, for boys and 
2 shillings, plus food, for girls~ (127) 
In early 1856, before the ca ttl e-ki11 ing had any effect on 
employment the Rev. Dacre tliought that 1 ow wages were the main 
reason for the 1 ab our shortage: 
"the unwil 1 ingness of the col on is ts to pay a fair 
amount of wages to a black man (the result perhaps 
of the o1d slave system, which led colonists to 
regard the Na ti ve as a ire.re beast whom they were to 
catch and work) together with too often defrauding 
the Native of his ci.Je :~~"were cited as tlie main 
reasons. 11 (128) 
It was not that wage rates or labour conditions changed, but it 
was compulsion on the Xhosa that forced them to accept the 
conditions of employment offered in the Colony because of the 
collapse of the domestic economy. 
Mhlakaza in his prophecies and associated injunctions specifically 
forbade the taking of employment in the Colony - unity was 
essential to the prophecies. As we have seen he also forbade 
working for other Xhosa or Mfengu. Such work was an obvious sign 
of disbe1ief and cbubt, which was the worst threat to the 
fuifilmBnt of prophecies. (129) Mhlakaza apart, the d:iefs 
thense1 vo.s were very unhappy about the grOi'ling l 1k:::1 ihood of a 
massive ~~fflux of people to tfie Colony. Most deaths due to 
stc.rvation took place in June-Juiy because of the cp'.)osf-:icn of 
chiefs t:; t.'1:= dispersion of their people into the C.oior:y. {130} 
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Sarhil i was in fact trying to get those who had left for the 
Colony to return. As will be seen later this is of the utmost 
significance in unravelling the intentions and motivations behind 
the cattle-killing. The dispersal of peop1 e was more of a threat 
to the chiefs than was even the .loss of the cattle. Because of 
the expectations of the fulfilment of the prophecies tra.ny people 
held out against taking work for as long as they could. In the 
first montlts of 1857 the supply of labour from the Xhosa locations 
could not meet the demand. Even Brownlee could not find 250 men 
to work on public works~ As a result, stated Capt. Roberts, 
"farmers cannot get labourers under the usual wages " (131) 
As an incentive to take work Maclean authorised that those who 
registered for work should be fed at state expense. (132) 
Ho.Yever, such relief, while it probably kept many from dying of 
starvation, was not necessary as an in du cement to 1 ab our as by the 
ti me it was introduced the effects of food scarcity had set in. 
From late July 't1e .nur.iber seeking work became a veritable flood. 
Brcwnlee reported: 
11
Wan t amongst those who have destroyed their cattle 
has now arrived at the highest pitch" (13.3) 
When t'1ose still remaining at their kraals were asked why they did 
not go into t'"ie Co1 any for employment: 
11 sorre replied that they did not know ho.v to work and 
were afraid ••. they would be beaten by tiieir 
tra.sters, others replied in tlie roost apathetic 
manner, that there was no he1 p for them, and if 
they died they died, wh i1 e sorre stated that they 
were already too weak to travel ... 11 (134) 
As the Colonial officials only distributed aid to those who 
registered for work, many people simply died in their kraals. 
There was for example Qol a. He arrived at t'1e Dohne, where 
Brownlee had his office. Brownlee wished to send him into the 
Co1 ony t::> work but he replied that he had never been in service 
a:id that he would rather die of starvation than go into service 
and be beaten. He returned to his kraal and died ::here. (135) 
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Two months later Brownlee estimated that: 
11
on an average four have died at each kraal. 11 (136) 
He regarded this estimate as being conservative, the real number 
being certainly higher than that. By October he reported: 
11
Frorn Butterworth Drift to the Thomas River all the 
country on each side of the Kei is now uninhabited, 
with the exception of a kraal here and there 
containing a few individia1s who cannot long 
continue to drag out the miserable existence they 
now 1 ead II (137) 
VI The Extent of Depopu1 a ti on of the Xhosa Locations -
A Consideration of the Census Data 
The 1848 Census revealed 1 090 homesteads (kraals) in the Nqgika 
district and 2 709 homesteads in the Ndl ambe district, a total of 
3 799 homesteads.· (138) On Brc:wnlee 1 s estimate of four deaths per 
homestead this would mean that approximately 15 196 people had 
died of starvation as a result of belief in the prophecies. 
Adni ttedly the 1848 census did not represent the total Xhosa 
population of the C isk ei. Many people had not yet returned from 
their places of refuge at the end of the war. It found 61 855 
-- .. . -
people in Ute Ngqika and Ndlarnbe groups together. Writing shortly 
after the census was taken Brownlee and Maclean estimated that 
70 000 was closer to the actual population. (139) 
Taking an avercge of 16. 29 people in each homestead there would 
have been an addi tionai 498 homesteads if the estimated population 
of 70 000 is accepted. The total number of homesteads v1ou1 d have 
been 4 297. ,;n c•,.dng four deaths per homestead the maxi mum death 
toll would then ;;-5ve been 17 188~ This estimate of the total 
number who .::ti-;:d 1s very much rrore realistic than that given in 
some sources i'/hich indicate 22 GOO deaths. (140) 
In ·exami~1in3 ::ne impact cf the cattle-killing on Xhosa hc~stead 
size and ~;cpuL:ttior ii': ·is worth observing that many homesteads 
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contained far fewer than the average of 16. 29 people. 25% of the 
1 090 Ngqika hom:steads had 1 ess than 13 people in them. However 
the bulk of the population 1 ived in the larger homesteads. 
Ngqika district 12 330 people, or 46.7% of the total 
In the 
Ngqika 
population, lived in homesteads with over 32 people in them. The 
weighting of the population in the larger homesteads accounts for 
the high average number of people per homestead. The Grahams town 
Journal and other Colonial lobbies for agriculrural interests 
probably wished to exaggerate the number of deaths in order to 
provide evidence in support of their claim for further grants of 
Xhosa land on the ground of its permanent depopulation. 
Between 1st January and 30th April 1857, 5 093 people officially 
entered Colonial service. The main districts to which they were 
sent were Somerset East (1 064), Victoria (684), Fort Beaufort 
(559) and Queensto\tm (455). (141) Between 1st May and 31st July 
a further 3 615 adult males, 3 599 adult females, 3 391 boys and 
3 444 girls, (a total of 14 049) were registered for service. 
(142) The combined total to the end of July was in fact 19 239 
(there were discrepancies in the figures for the first period). 
The largest outflow of people was in April and May. Lucas, in 
Maqoma 's 1 oca ti on,. observed that during April he sent 673 people 
to t"le Cen tra1 Office in King Wil 1iam 1 s Town and a further 963 in 
May (143). Between August 1857 and January 1858 a further 9 826 
Xhosa were sent into service. (144) This gave.a total nurrber of 
workers in the Colony of 29 065. 
Of the 4 328 workers sent to the key agricul rural districts of 
Alexandria, Albert, Bedford, F"ort 3.eaufort, Richmond, Peddie and 
Victoria (for 'fklich statistics are available) in the period 
1857-58, 56.1% went on y·2ar con tracts, 10. 3% 
contracts, 12.1% for 3 years, 2.9% for l years and 
on 2 year 
18.9% for 5 
years. (145) The number of wr;;kers who were indentured for 5 
years is important. ih~:y woul.:; hav:: h.·::d il greater chance to 
accumulate stock and wou1d ::1es.r1y beco;ne more integrated with 
wage work than those on a on:: ;'sar c.:;nt:--,ic-::. The significance of 
workers who stayed fer a re1.:;;:iv:-:1y ~orig time on the Colonial 
farms should be emphas i s.ed. Th:~:y .v(.;re ·:-,:-; prov2 to be t.lie key to 
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the reacquisition of stock by many Xhosa households impoverished 
by the cattle-killing. Approximately 19% (or 5 500) of the 29 ooo 
workers contracted stayed on the farms for a period of 5 years. 
Nev-erthel ess those on one year contracts were in a 1 arge 
majority. These people clearly intended to work on1y as a way of 
tiding then over until the 1858-59 planting season, when they 
would return to their homesteads {where this was possible). 
Despite these qualifications the diminishITEnt of population was 
large and many homesteads were never able to re-establish 
themselves. It is· important to gain som= idea of ho.v many 
homesteads were likely to have been destroyed, and hOH many in 
fact survived wh i1 e only ~ of their members par ti ci pated ; n 
wage work. Because of the 1 arge seal e 1 oss of 1 and that fol 1 owed 
the cattle-killing particularly for the Ndlambe, who lost land 
around East London, and the Gcaleka, it is irnporant to dispei the 
idea put out by the Col on is ts that the 1 and was empty. 
If, as our analysis from the sources suggests, 29 000 entered the 
Colony in search of empl oyrnent and 17 000 died this would make a 
total diminution of population of 46 000 in 1857-58. It will be 
useful to compare this calculation with the offical reports of the 
number of people remaining in the Ciskei, revealed in the various 
censuses. called _fo~- by the Colonial State in 1857 and 1858 to 
investigate the extent of the decrease in population. 
The offical census estimate of the nurTEr of people in British 
Kaffraria on the 1st January 1857, before the massive efflux 
began, was 104 721 comprising 3 842 kraals. (146) This drastic 
increase in the probable population over the 1848 figure of 70 000 
can be accounted for in a variety of ways. (147) One reason is 
that a large nuIT'ber of Gcaleka, who were not includ-:!d ~n the 1848 
ce:r;sus because they lived outside British Kaffral"'ia, had moved 
in~;.; Mha"lla 1 s location in the intervening ye2rs, 1-;hi.ch c.:'.)uld 
accoun'.: for the over 100% increase in that area. l:n adc~ticri K3.ma 
had returned from his exile in the Queenstown a~s-:7·L::t tD 8r-i ti sh 
Ka·ffraric as part of th-: peace settlement of 1353. Th·is 1:.ccount.<:d 
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for a part of the 12 938 people 1 iving in his location in January 
1857. 
These two factors can account for only a part of the 34 721 
increase in population over 1848 claimed by the census. Suspicion 
that the total population claimed for British Kaffraria in January 
1857 was inflated is increased by the fact that the number of 
homesteads in that census was stated as 3 842 \'kiich is an increase 
of only 43 homesteads over the 3 799 revealed in the 1848 census 
itself and is actua 11 y 455 homesteads ~ than the 4 297 that we 
estimated must have existed if a population of 70 000 in 1848 is 
accepted. This discrepancy between tlie large increase in 
population claimed in the 1857 estimates and the small increase in 
the number of homesteads suggests some deliberate over-estimation 
on the part of the Colonial Officials. 
In comparing these results with those obtained on the 31st July 
1 E57 after the ma in e ff1 ux of population, the number of homesteads 
is shown to have dropped to 1 725 and the population to 37 399, 
from the population of 104 721 in January of that year. This 
indicates a decrease of 67 328 or 62.5'.t in the total population. 
However it must be rement>ered that we cou1 d account for only a 
46 000 decrease in population based on a scrutiny of the original 
returns of tlie number who went in to the Col any and Brownlee' s 
estimate of the number who died per homestead. 
All owing a maximum possible decrease of 50 000 people through 
death and migration, the decrease of 67 328 claimed by the 
Colonial State would still leave 17 328 unaccounted for. 
It is a possibility that some of this number coui d have gone to 
Thent>uland or to other Transkeian chiefdoms a.s refugees. However, 
it is unlikely that the discrepancy couid b~ explained in this 
way. There is no evidence of such a migration ha1i~g occurred and 
t'le arrival of 17 000 refugees in any Tr~r.sk~ian chiefdom would 
c;:;:r:ainly have aroused some comment. The most 1 ik~iy explanation 
r'=!"na:n:; an attempt on the part of the Colonia.i Cff~cials to 
C\"erstat:: the extent of the depopulation of t~·;e territory. 
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This is further suggested by 1 ook i ng at the decrease in the number 
of· homesteads over this period. It was observed that in 1848 
there were probably 4 297 homesteads, each with an average of 16 
people. The census estimate of January 1857 claimed a population 
of 104 721 people living in 3 842 homesteads. This would have 
meant an average of 27.25 people per homestead. This is a 
dramatic increase, and whilst land pressure had been increasing 
there can be little doubt that this was actually the result of the 
inflated population estimate. By July 1857, according to the 
official census, the population had decreased by 62.5% to 37 339. 
The number of homesteads is stated as having decreased by only 
44.89% to 1 725. The number of people per homestead was then 21.6. 
The rel a tive1y much small er decrease in the number of homesteads 
compared to the large decrease in the number of people shown in 
the two official censuses of January and June 1857, is entirely 
what would be expected. T.he head of a homestead would, wherever 
possible, have tried to retain some presence at the site of the 
homestead in the hope of re-estab1 ishing it in the future. If the 
number of homesteads declined by 44% then over 55% of the 
homesteads in British Kaffraria were sti11 occupied after the 
worst outflow of people had occurred. 
- -
It must be remembered that the figures presented for the 
population of British Kaffraria in January 1857 were not the 
result of a census taken at that time. They were purely 
retrospective estimates drawn up in response to Maclean 's demand 
for such information in August 1857. There was thus ample time 
for the Colonial State to discover that in their weakened state 
the Xhosa could no longer resist, and that large tracts of the 
1 and could safely be taken from them. To just'f fy this, the State 
wished to create the impression that the land ... 1as '.empty'. 
The Col on i al press took up the theme with .;: vengeance. The 
Grahamstown Journal {quoting the Rev. Birt ~,,.ho ·+1a.s actually 
actively opposed to grabbing any i and at Xho·;;a e;;::;e:1se), cl aimed 
that SO 000 had died of starvation and 40 OGC ,:Ttered into 
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service! It strongly defended the occupation of the 11 vacated 
territory" by "needy, ind!strious Engl ish1TEn 11 • (148) In fact as 
has been sho\>81 the territory was far from empty, even if 
calculations are based on the suspect official censuses. 
However, if we revise the official figures in accordance with more 
reliable estimates a clearer picture of the extent of depopulation 
emerges. If an average of 20 people per homestead is assumed and 
4 000 homesteads are al1a.ved, the total population in January 1857 
may be put at approximately 80 ooo: The decrease of population to 
approximately 37 697 by the end of June 1867, would then be 
42 303, a figure lll.lch closer to the actual number, (46 000) that 
are known to have 1 eft British Ka ffraria for the Colony or who had 
died up to the ~ of 1857. The popu1 a ti on decrease of 52.8% 
indicates a fair picture of the proportion of the population 
permanently or temporarily displaced by the cattle-killing. 
Nearly 50% of the population remained. A great many of the 
migrants were kno\>81 to be on short contracts and due to return 
after only one year. The 17 000 dead represented 21.25% of the 
1 ik ely population as at January 1857. I'n such circumstances the 
country cou1 d not reasonbly be regarded as 'vacant~ or 'empty'. 
The next census estimates were given in December 1857. (i49) 
From this it can be seen tbat the number of homesteads. had further 
declined to 1 291. However the total population had increased 
slightly from 37 229 to 37 69L This had the effect of increasing 
the number of people per homestead from 21.5 to 29.1 This was 
caused by the influx of refugees into t'ie 1 ocations of Siwani and 
Kama, the leading non-believer chiefs~ Since July there had been 
an efflux of 5 311 people, mainly from the Gqunukwebe location and 
from t.'ie Ngqika under Oba and Anta~ This would account for the 
decreased number of homesteads combined with the increased size of 
the remaining homesteads. Population was being redistributed from 
sma 11 homesteads to 1 arger ones. 
This increc1sing :oncentration of people in larger homesteads is of 
some importance. it ".i".S caused in the first instance by many 
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people who were destitute joining homesteads of those who had not 
believed in the prophet. Its subsequent effect must have been to 
increase the intensity of exploitation within the domestic 
production unit and encourage the breaking up of 1 arger areas of 
ground for cultivation. This would therefore also have been an 
inducement for the production of crops for the market, al though 
such production would not have been an i ndica ti on of 1 prosperity 1 ; 
it would be a result of the impoverishment of many homesteads and 
their inability to persist as independent production units. This 
finding be1 ies Brownlee 1 s observation that: 
11
As a rule in famine the poorer cl asses are those who 
suffer the most, but in this case there was no 
difference between the highest and lowest 11 (150} 
Although many leading members of the patriarchal establishment in 
the Xhosa locations died of starvation, there does seem to have 
been a tendency for the 1 arge homesteads to persist, sometimes on 
an increased scale but most of-.:en much reduced in size. Smaller 
homesteads, by contrast, broke up and were extinguished. 
The other major area of employment. apart from the Colonial farms, 
was on the Government sponsored works which were begun in 1855. 
In this area there was a dramatic increase in the number of men 
employed. In January 1857 there were 591 men employed on seven 
projects: the Thomas River watercourse and 6 road-building 
projects. (151) At the height of the expectations for the 
. fulfilment of the prophecies the number employed fe11 to 493. In 
April it had increased to l 194 and additional projects were 
begun, such as the building of a "Native Hospital" at King 
William's Town. The number of employed finally peaked by the end 
of Ju1y at 2 105 employed on 19 projects. 
The :-ate of pay on the works had been reduced to 4 pence per day 
since 1857 on Brownlee 1s initiative: 
"I think a reduction in the rate of pay necessary 
that the peop 1 e may see that they are the losers i r. 
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consequence of strikes and further that we may be 
enabled to employ more men than we could at the 
present rate. 11 {152) 
As in the agricultural sector~ the influx of 1 ab our for short term 
employment on the public works had a depressing effect on wages. 
Before the cattle-killing Mfengu seeking work were shunning the 
Government works because they were able to achieve wages of 1 
shilling and 6 pence to 2 shi11 ings and 6 pence per day working 
for farmers or in the towns for shopkeepers. (153) 
From the total amount of employment generated as a resu1 t of the 
cattle-killing it can be seen that a massive monetarisation of the 
Xhosa economy was 
affected. Wh i1 e the 
enorITDus, its 1 ong 
occurring in which every household was 
immediate impact of the cattle-killing was 
term 11 fa1l-out 1 was of even greater 
consequence. It has already been indicated hON the response to 
the food shortages created the conditions for the emergence of a 
larger farming class~ In the aftermath of the cattle-killing 
al !TDS t all the important elements that were to Sh ape the future 
development of domes tic pro ch..icti on were introduced. In subsequent 
chapters we will examine the manner in which the different trends 
in commodity prodlction, .t"'ie differentiation of household 
production units and wage labour deveioped from this point. 
309 
(1) Bundy, C. The Emergence of a South African Peasantrv~ 
,; 
Heinemann, (1979) p. 51. 
(2) G.H. 8/24, Audit Office Cape Town, Statement of Hut Tax 
derived from Fingoes in each Division of the Colony from 
1849, 17th November 1854; 
( 3) Cathcart, Sir G~ Correspondence. London (1856) p. 302. 
(4) Government Notice, King William's Town. 8th March 1853. 
( 5) Du Toi t, A. E. The Cape Fron ti er - A Study of Na ti ve Policy 
with Special Reference to the Years 1847-1866. Archive Year 
Book (1854) p. 82~ 
(6) Moyer, R.A. ·'The History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape 
1815 - 1865. '. Unpub~ Phd. Thesis, S.O.A.S. (1976) p. 223 
and p. 391. 
(7} B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 16th June 1856. 
( 8) Ib·i d. In 1855 of an expected revenue of 600 pounds only 400 · 
poun els were ob ta in ed. 
{9) Moyers, R.A. op.cit~ p. 232. 
( 10) Ibid. p • 391. 
(11) G.H. 8/24, Census of Fingoes Residing in the District of 
Peddie, 31st July 1854. 
(12} Each rran rray be taken as representing a married man and 
equal to one household.. The nulTDer of 1 men 1 may tend to be 
overinflated because some single men ;ray be counted amonst 
them. The advantage of this census is t"iat 'chi1 dren over 
the age of 16 1 are counted separately tfiL!s reducing the 
possibility that a large nurrber J"' single adult ma1es are 
included among the 'men 1 • 
310 
(13) See Chapter 1 above for a full treatment of the mode of 
production in the Xhosa social formation~ 
(14) B~K: 90~ Memo by Sir George Grey; 11 Estimated Costs of 
outfit for a farm in British Kaffraria 11 ~ 15th December 1856: 
(15) B:K: 90~ Brownlee to Maclean~ 17th August 1854: 
(16) Ibid: 
(17) G:H: 8/23~ Ayliff to Maclean~ 1st July 1854: 
(18) B:K: 24~ Ayliff to Maclean~ 16th June 1856: 
(19) G:H~ 8/27~ Statistical Returns of Fingoe Locations in the 
Divisions of Victoria~ Fort Beaufort and Queenstown: July 
1855: 
\ 
(20) Excluding Lovedale .Mission Station~ where· the number of 
cattle was even lower: 
(21) In Table 4 (i)~ (ii) and (iii): The locations of Boey Fusha~ 
Katangana, Slinga and Jan Ragwa were a11 located on the fort 
Beaufort commonage. Table 4 (ii) reveals the 1 imited extent 
-
of 1 and cultivated by these househo 1 ds because the other 
residents objected to their encroachment on the common age: 
As it was~ they occupied 137 acres of pasturage fo) fields 
alone. ) 
(22) 8.K. 65, R. Taylor to Maclean, 21st August 1853. 
(23) B.K. 24, Ay1iff to Maclean, 16th June 1856. 




( 27) B. K. 90' Vela and Ubota to Maclean, 30th ·July 1856. 
(28) B.K. 24, Maclean to Grey, 17th July 1856. 
(29) 8. K. 90' Ross to Maclean, 1 5 th J u 1 y 1 8 5 6 . 
( 30) B.K. 24, Ayliff to Maclean, 5th August 1856. 
( 31 ) G.H. 8/32, Rev. Dacre to Maclean, 1 7th May 1 857 . 
( 32) Ibid. 
( 33) Grahams town Journal , 20th December 1856. 
(34) Frontier Colonists were still nervous about the 
poss i bi1 i ti es of a Xhosa alliance with the Mfengu. This 
possibility had been briefly explored between them in 1854. 
See Chapter·s above. 
( 35) Grahams town Journal, 11 th October 1856. 
(36) G.H. 8/29, Vol il. Reeve to-Maclean, 27th September 1856. 
( 37) Grahams town Journal, 27th December 1856. 
(38) King William's Town Gazette, Grey to Maclean, November 
1856. 
(39) Ibid. 
( 40} C.O. 2951, Vol IV, Secretary to 
Colonial Secretary, 21st July 1857. 
( 41) Table compiled from CO 2948/49/50, 
I.._ 
l.. I,.. Governor to the 
Secretary to ,,.. I,.. (..ne ... 1... 
Governor, Letters. Received, Veri:y to the Colonial 
Secretary, July to December 1857. 
31.2 
(42) CO 2950, Tainton to Southey December to March 1858. 1 Muid 
equals 180 lbs. A muid was a conventional measure still in 
use in the Cape throughout most of the 19th century. 
1 Muid = 4 Schepls., 5 Schep1s = 3 Imperial Bushels. 
3 Imperial Bushels= 60 lbs. See Cape of Good Hope Blue 
·Books 1860. Money, Accounts, Weights, Measures; Corn 
Measures Definitions p 5. 
(43) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 1st April 1857. 
(44) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 3rd April 1857. 
(45) See Chapter 5 above. 
(46) King William 1 s Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer, 25th 
April 1857. 
{ 47) This total includes 810 lbs of beans delivered to the market 
in July, November and December which realised a total of 7 
pounds and 12 shillings. 
(48) 8.K. 29, Tainton to Maclean, 29th October 1857. 
(49} ELK. 89, Tainton to Maclean, 20th October 1957. 
(SO} B.K. 24, Campbell to Maclean, 4th June 1856. The new 
Superintendent of the Crown Reserve reported in one instance 
22 bags of corn weighing 4 595 lbs were sent from Keiskanma 
Hoek to King William's Town. See Campbell to Maclean. 
(51) C.O. 2948/49/50/, Verity to Colonial Secretary, 
July-December 1857. Tainton to Southey, December - March 
1858. 
(52) C.O. 3026 and C.O. 3163, Census of Fort Beaufort and 
Heal dtown Mfengu 1861 and 1869 .. 
313 
(53} This is of course an underestimate as many houses, 
especially those with ploughs, and polygamous households had 
more than this under cultivation. 
(54) B.K. 91, Lt. Lucas to Maclean, 26th August 1857. 
( 55) B. K. 2, Chalmers to Maclean, October 1858. 
( 56) See Chapter 9 bel CM for the ·full story of post Catt1 e-
k il 1 ing population move men ts. 
( 57) See Chapter 5 above~ 
(58) Grahams town Journal, 2nd October 1856. 
( 59) Grahams town J ourna1, 11th October 1856. 
( 60} B. K. 23/86, Reeve to Maclean, 30th September i 857. 
{ 61) G. H. 8/29, Vol I I, Gawl er to Maclean, 25th July 1856. 
( 62) G. H. 8/31' . Yi gne to Mac1 ean, lst February 1857; Brownlee 
to J'llacl ean, 2nd February 1857. 
(63) See also Chapter 7. 
(64) King William 1 s Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer, 14th 
August 1 856 • 
( 65) · Ibid. 
(66) Ibid., Report from Herbert Vigne, 4th September 1856. 
( 67) Ibid., ffovember 13th 1856. 
(68} Grahamstown Journal, 13th September 1856. 
314 
(69) Grey, Sir G. Correspondence, Grey . to Labauchere 3rd 
October 1856, after a report from Mr Seo tt to Ayl i ff, 25th 
September 1856. pp. 148-49. 
(70) Scott's figures include the total of hides exported from the 
beginning of 1854~ As has been indicated there was in this 
period a large upswing in trading activity and a large 
amount of money was spent by Xhosa in the stores at King 
William's Town and elsewhere. By 1857 when the market sales 
at Line Drift etc began much of this money had already been 
spent. 
(71) Grey, Sir G. op.cit~ p~ 149~ 
(72) Grahamstown Journal, 
1856. 
Brownlee to Maclean, 13th Noverrt>er 
( 73) B. K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 5th August 1856. 
( 74) G. H. 8/29, Vol I I, Gawl er to Maclean, 14th July 1856. 
( 75) G. H. 8/29, Vol III, Vigne to Maclean, 19th July 1856. 
( 76) G. H •. 8/29, Vol I I, Brownlee to Maclean, 8th July 1856. 
( 77) B. K. 90' Rev. Waters to Ma.clean, 14th October 1856. 
{ 78} G. H. 8/29, Vol. I I, Lamont to Maclean, 13th August 1856. 
( 79} G. H. 8/32, Port of East London. Returns of exports for the 
period 1st January to 30th April 1857, compiled by Ma ttliew 
Jenn in gs. 
{BJ) G.H. 8/32, Vol III, Pon: of East London. Returns of 
Exports for the period 1st May to 30th June· 1857, Customs 
House , East Lon don. 
30873 hides weighing ·1543650 lbs. would allow an average 
'iVeight of 50 lbs. per hide: Contempor.ary evidence from 
tanners confirms that an average cow hide weighs 30 kgs (66 
1 b s ) an d an ox hi de up to 40 kg s • { 50 1 b s ) • 
315 
(81) G.H. 8/32, Vol Ii, Reeve to Maclean, 15th June 1857. 
( 82) G. H. 8/31, Capt. Fraser to Major Douglas, 24th February 
1857. 
(83) C.O. 6155, Returns of the 1848 Census of the Xhosa. All 
references to the Census of 1848 are to this volume. 
( 84} B. K. 23/ 71, Bra-1n 1 ee to Maclean, 20th July 1857. 
(85} King William's Town Gazette, 7th February 1857. 
(86) Ibid. 7th ~a-rch 1857~ 
(87) B.K. 89, Statement made to Maclean, 5th February 1857. 
(88} B.K. 91, Rev. Keyser to Maclean, 25th June 1857. 
( 89) B. K. 24, Ayl i ff to Maclean, 28th March 1857. See a 1 so . 
G. H. 8/32. Reeve to Maclean, 4th June 1857. 
( 9:3) B. K. 86, Reeve to Mac1 ean, 30th September 1857. 
( 91 ) Grahams town J ourna 1 , Brown 1 ee to Maclean, 5th August 1856. 
{92) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 25th August 1856. 
{93) B.K. 82, This observation shows that the trade in grain was 
not only between Mfengu and Xhosa, but also between Xhosa 
who had grain and those W'ho had none. 
(94) B.K. 71, Bra-1nlee to Maclean, 11th August 1857. 
(95) Ibid. 
(96) Ibid. Brcwn1ee to Maclean, 21st July 1857. 
(97) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Mac1ean, 11th September 1858. 
316 
( 98) c. 0. 2948, Vol I, Ta in ton to Southey, 5th October 1857 ~ 
( 99} B. K. 71' Brcwn lee to Maclean, 12th October 1858. 
( 100) B. K. 71 , Brownlee to Mac1 ean, 20th J u1y 1857. 
(101) B. K. 71 , Brcwn 1 ee to Maclean, 1st September 1858. 
(102) G.H. 8/32, Gawler to Maclean, 8th June 1857. See also 
ibid., Vigne to Maclean, 25th July 1857. 
(103) King William's Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer, 3rd 
January 1857. 
(104) G.H. 8/341, Brcwnlee to Maclean, 31st December 1856. 
(105) B. K. 86, Reeve to Mac1 ean, 30th September 1857. 
(106) Ibid. 
(107) B. K. 86, Chal rrers to Maclean, 11th April 1858. 
( 108} King on, J. L. 'The Economics of East Coast Fever', The 
Christian Express, Vol. Yl.V, (1915), pp. 152-153, and Vol. 
XLVI, {1916). p. 10~ Kingon stresses· the effect of the 
cattle-killing 'on redis.tributing the population. 
(109) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 7th May 1856. 
(110) Ibid. 
(111 ) B. K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 4th June 1856. 
(112) Ibid. 
(113) Laws and Reoulations of British Kaffraria. Cape To•,yn 
(1869). Proclamation, 7th Se'.)tember 1855. 
317 
(114) C.O. 2948, Opinion of the Attorney General, 16th January 
1858. 
(115) British Kaffrarian Govermrent Notice, King William's Town, 
7th November 1856. 
(116) Ibid. 
(117) B. K. 80' Edye to Maclean, 11th January 1858. 
( 118} B. K. 2, Taylor to Maclean, 19th April 1858. 
(119) Cape Annexures. A: H. 16' 1857. Maclean 
1 s Reply to the 
Committee's proposal~ 30th May 1857. 
{120) Dows1ey, E.D. 1 An Investigation into the Circumstances 
Relating to 
1856-1857. 1 , 
the Cattle Killing Delusion in Kaffraria 
Unpublished MA thesis UNISA 1932. p. 46. 
Statement by 11 Seeko Nqamnqa 11 in possession of the author. 
(121) Ibid. p. 46. Quotes 1 etter of Travers to Maclean, 19th 
April 1858. 
(122) Mullin's Diary, Sunday 21st 1857. Cory Library unpublished 
Manuscript. Typescript kindly supplied by Prof. N. Charton. 
(123) \~idely believed to have been respons·ible for the death of 
Hintsa. 
(124) A.H. 15, 1857, Sou~hey to Maclean, 30th May 1857. 
(125) Ibid. 
(126) 8.K. 7, Rawson to Maclean, 9th July 1857. 
(127) G. 39, Return of numbers emp1oyed. King William's Town, 
20th May H:57. 
318 
319 
( 128) Dowsley, E. D. op.cit. p ~ 123: 
( 129) B. K. 71 ' Bra.tln1ee to Maclean, 1st May 1857. 
( 130) G. H. 8/32, Mac1 ean to Capt~ Travers, 5th July , 857. 
( 131 ) Ibid. 
(132) G. H. 8/32, Mac1 ean Circular of 10th June 1857. 
( 133} B. K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 20th July 1857. 
( 134) Ibid. 
(135) B r°"'n 1 ee, c. Reminiscences of Ka fir Life and 
History. Lovedale, (1916). p. 156. 
(136) B.K. 71, Bra.tlnlee to Maclean, 1st Ocotber 1857. 
( 137) Ibid. 
(138) C.O. 6155, Census of the Xhosa, 1848. 
{139) Imperial Blue Books, August 1857, pp. 42-43. 
(140) Burton, A.W. Sparks From the Bord::r Anvil, King Wil 1 iam's 
Town ( 1950) p. 74. Burton claims 22 000 deaths and 30 000 
cattle k i11 ed. 
(141) G39, Return dated King William's Town, 20th May 1857. 
{142) Ibid. Government Notice Number 265, 1857. 
( 143) B. K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 30tfi May 1857. 
(144) A.H., Vol 22 of 1858. 
(145) Ibid. 
(146) G 5 1858, Statement of Probable Number of Kraals, 
Population and Firearms in British Kaffraria as on 1st 
January and 31st July 1857, as· requested per circular of 
Chief Commissioner. 1st August 1857. 
(147) It must be remembered that the 1848 census was a physical 
count with a d:tailed census roll. These later census 
figures are purely 'eyeball' counts or estimates. 
(148} Grahamstown Journal, 24th July 1858. 
(149) B.K. 70, Population Returns British Kaffraria 1857, Ft. 
Murry. 1 s t J an ua ry 185 8: 
(150) Brownlee, C. op.cit. p: 156. 
(151} G.H. 8/31, Returns of Public Works. n.d. 1857. 
(152) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 21st January 1857. 
(153) B.K. 24, Ay1iff to Maclean, 13th March 1856. 
320 
CHAPTER 7 
THE FINAL STAGE OF RESISTANCE - JUNE 1856 TO 1863 
I The Conjuncture within the Chiefdoms 
The growth of monetary transactions in the period up to 1857 ~ and 
their relationship to poverty, dispossession of land~ cattle 
sickness and wage 1 abour has been examined: We also briefly 
nEntioned the great ideological and political crisis that the 
peace sett1 ement of 1853 and the sys tern subsequently imposed by 
Grey inciJced. It is now possible to examine this crisis in 
greater de ta i1 . 
The res pcnse to Grey 1 s in i ti a ti ves has to be seen at two 1 evel s. 
First there was the response of the different chiefs to the 
irrnnediate issue of the arrival of magistrates and the receipt of 
regular payments. Secondly there was the more complex response of 
the rrass of homesteads to the entire process of the dissolution of 
the powers of the chief and the old relationship which t'iey had 
enjoyed with the chief and his councillors. This second l eve1 is, 
for us, the more important and indeed it serves as the critical 
context in which the actions of the chiefs rrust be judged. A;Jain 
it will be found that the responses of the chiefs form one of the 
main surviving guides to the conditions and sentiments of the 
homesteads. 
There can be no cbubt that poverty and the economic crisis of the 
chiefta incy favoured tlie introduction of Grey 1s p 1 ans. Both 
Maclean and 3rc),om 1 ee were sceptical of Grey 1 s . ... ... in cen .. 1 on.s. Faced 
with his bl ind deter:nination they had to proceed as cautiously as 
they could. Maclean x.u in ta ined his view that the reversal of the 
Cathcart po1icy, granting internal autonomy to the chiefs, would 
lead to ¥1a1. Macie1nls assessment was again reiterated in early 
1855 wtien he wro t-2: 
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"I have seen no reasons to a1 ter the opinions I 
expressed previously as to the general 
expectations of war among the Ka ffi rs genera 11 y 
and as to the war designs of many among them, and 
especially among the Chiefs ••. 11 (1) 
Maclean actually understood that the interventions of 
Stockenstroom and Stretch with the chiefs (in encouraging them to 
await the arriva1 of Grey to press t~eir land claims on the new 
Governor) had in fact bought tirre for the Col onia1 State. ( 2) As 
to the implementation of Grey's plans it was, in Maclean and 
Brownlee's view, only the favourable conjuncture .determined by the 
ravages of the lung-sickness amongst the cattle that made the 
chiefs interested in the schemes: The 1 ung-si ckness was without 
doubt the 'thin edge of the wedge•~ 
" .•• for while this lasts it will be useless for 
the Chiefs to endeavour to revive a war spirit, and 
the 1 osers of property wil 1 be more disposed ·to 
labour and hire t'1emse1ves out and thus a beginning 
be ma de - and the wedge introduced - but we must 
not be too sanguine on t~e immediate effect of this 
loss in changing the Kaffirs from a pastoral to an 
agricultural people, the habits and peculiarities 
which lead them to be cattle herders, are of 
several centuries gro.'lth ••. 11 ( 3) 
To which assessment Brown1 ee added: 
"Before the Ka ffi rs will accept of Sir George 
Grey's pl ans there must be a revolution both in 
their circumstances and sentiments." (4) 
Maclean had certa inl)'. pinpointed a key aspect of the process of 
dissoi ut:ion of the o1 d mode of production: that the tradition al 
mechanisms of accumulation and the social, ideological and 
political r-elationships 11/hich regulated them could no longer 
withs ~and the pressur~ of a ne-1 world of accumulations, one wtli ch 
was based on wage labour, commodities and money. f-ie was a1so 
aware, hcwe,1 er, ~at the incorporation of sorre measure .;:if these 
eiem::n":s of the capitalist :node of production does not overnight 
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turn every Xhosa in to a capitalist frontiersman or a proletarian~ 
On the contrary, those soci a 1 , i deo1 ogi ca 1 and po 1; ti ca 1 
relationships of the old rriode of prod.lction that survive and are 
incorporated into the new structure exercise a crucial power in 
shaping the form in which the elements of the capitalist mode of 
production are assimilated. 
The 'revolution' was to come in the shape of the cattle-killing 
movement. One of the spurs to the cattle-killing movement was the 
introduction of the rr.agi s tr ates th ems elves. The acceptance of the 
magistrates by the chiefs was induced by necessity, yet, far from 
answering to the needs of the chiefs, it forced them to 1 ook for 
ever more desperate soiutions to their plight. 
Lt. Reeve and Captain Gaw1 er were seconded from the army for 
appointment as magistrates in August 1855. At this stage the full 
nature of the plans for surrendering to the Colonial State their 
internal autonomy and the right to operate their .own court: had 
not yet been made known to the chiefs. The first disclosures to 
the chiefs were made unofficially in September 1855. At a chance 
meeting at Dehne, BrOn'nlee inforrred Sandille ttiat the Governor was 
anxious "for the better government of the people 11 and that he was 
to give them salaries, 11 th at the Chiefs should not derive their 
revenues from fines and confiscations. 11 ( 5) Maqoma was first 
inform:d in a similar way. 
Sandille's only immmediate reaction was to enquire whether Tola, 
Xoxo and Oba would also receive salaries, as otherwise they would 
be "a tax on his income, while he had so many brothers and 
councillors that he would find it difficult to supply them all 
II ( 6.) from the all o.vance . . . \ · 
On the 9th October Maclean offic1ariy informed Sandi11e of the 
proposals. He was to receiv~ 96 pounds oer annum personally and a 
further 180 pounds to be distrfouted among the councillors who 
assisted him in his cuti,.:.:s .. In retur:i he ·was to continue to 
adninister justic2 within the tr~Jt:!, but an fines imposed by his 
court had to be surrender"ed t.:; ~:~:(:'! Co'J onia1 State. All cases 
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could go on appeal to the magistrate appointed to reside with them. 
( 7) 
It was decided to take the matter back for further discussion 
before any decision was given~ Before communicating· these views 
Sandille did manage to query with ft'iaclean t!ie honesty of Grey's 
proposals, enquiring 
11
why if Sir George Grey could change ...mat Sir 
George Cathcart had conceded to them [in regard to internal 
autonomy J. L.] "'11y can he not change what the former Governor had 
done with regard to land, and restore their country to them 
( 8) 
fl 
At the same time similar announcements were ma de amongst Ndl ant>e 
chiefs under Mhalla. At once the internal divisions amongst the 
chiefs came into play with various attempts being made to secure 
sectional interests. The first communications accepting Grey's 
terms came from those chiefs who had most actively co11eborated 
with the Colonial State; Kama, Pato and Siwani. Siwani aci:ed with 
particular alacrity because roost judicial cases had,in any event, 
been going to his brother Seyo1o 's court. ( 9) 
One particular point of concern among the chiefs was the case of 
fines imposed for homicide or murder. These cases were of 
particular ideological significance and the ability of the chief 
to decide on them was syrrbolic of his power over his followers. 
The Colonial State accepted Mha11a 's demand for some control over 
such 11 blood-f.ines 11 and 
imposed in such cases 
ch i1 dren rather th an 
it was agreed that, as heretofore, fines 
would go to the injured party, widows or 
to the Col on i al Sta ts. (i 0) With that 
agreed, Mhal 1 a accepted his magistrate and Major Gawl er was 
seconded to reside in Ndl ambe territory. 
ihe chiefs were undoubtedly aware of the 1mp1 ica:icns of accepting 
salaries and it is most likely that they were rr;otivated by 
economic necessity, by the pressures that were e·1ery day cr<»1ding 
in on them, demanding that they perfo.r.n the r:.:r:c-~f t;r::s of a cni~f 
as thP. Xhosa had a1ways und:rstood and expe:te( i-s, or iiake way 
for :hat greater power that then hung ov,::r t'iem ~1i. 
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How far chiefs were prepared to go in projecting a situation of 
economic need amongst their foll owe rs is illustrated by an 
incident during Grey 1 s vi sit to the frontier in late 1855. 
Sandille met Grey at Dohne on the 17th September. Brownlee 
reported that the following exchange took place between them: 
11
Sandil1e came alone to Grey and stated he was . 
greatly in need • ~ ~ He stated that h,e needed 
money, blankets and buttons for four of Sandi1le 1s 
wives, who had new cl oaks, but who had no buttons 
to put on them ... 11 ( 11 ) 
This private appeal should not be taken 1iteral1y. It does 
indicate that the chiefs were caught in the grip of a scarcity of 
appropriable surpluses so acute that any solutions - even that 
offered by Grey which was a surrender of all the concessions won 
by the 1850 - 53 1r1ar, were worth it to them. 
In early December Maqoma sent to Sandi11e saying: 
11 Sandi11e has acted well in receiving the Governor's 
proposal. I am also willing to receive it. But 
does Sandi 11 e understand what he is about to do? 
Hitherto we have been British subjects in name, 
henceforth we will be subjects in truth. Is 
Sandille prepared to meet the Governor at a11 
times, and in all places; is he willing now to 
meet the Governor in Grahams Town? After he has 
once received the Governor's :r.oney, he must no 
longer talk of his fears, but must obey in 
everything. Does Sandil1 ~ kno111 that the English 
over the water are at war? Is he prepared to go 
with his men and he1 p the Eng1 ~sh, if asked to do 
so? I am ready. Let Sandf11e well consider what 
he is doing. Let hfm-not bE t";mpted by the money, 
and afterwards become a 1 i a7' ~ :::1e Government. 11 
(12) 
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Sandille was the most reluctant of all the chiefs in his 
acceptance of the salaries. He was influenced by the opposition 
of senior councillors, amongst them Soga and Halo. Maqoma's 
actions are so11Ewhat more di ffi cult to understand. It seems as if 
he wished to push Sandille into refusing to accept the system, but 
fully intend::d accepting it himself, possibly with a view to 
ousting Sandille as chief of the Ngqika. In· all events his aim 
certainly remained to free himself as rtl.Jch as possible from 
Sandil1e's authority and attract as many followers to himself as 
he could. In December Maqoma was conspicuously absent from a 
meeting of chiefs convened by San dill e which decided to accept 
Grey's scheme provided only that BrOilnlee was appointed as the 
magistrate. (13) 
The reason for Maqoma not being present at the ~eting soon became 
clear. In January 1856 he held a private meeting with Maclean at 
which he argued very strongly for being al 1 owed a separate 
magistrate other than Brownlee. This fact t>eca.ITE the key question 
in the power struggle between Sandille and Maqoma. 
Whilst Sandille wanted the maximum number of chiefs to receive 
' salaries so that they should not be a burden to him, he wanted the 
minimum number of magistrates (14}. He also realised that 
Brcwn1ee was considerab1y more accontn0dating than any new and 
untried representative of Colonial authority that might be imposed 
on tllem. For Maqoma, on th~ other hand, every incenti·1e existed 
for seeing a pro1 i fera ti on of mag is tra tes, as this weakened 
Sandille 1 s position. 
Ma q oma ma de i t cl ear to Mac l ea n that wh i 1 e he des i red to be pa i d 
he also desired to be separate from Sandille.. However, there was 
another and more deep-rootedly significant aspect which emerged in 
Maqoma 's meeting with Maclean. Maqona inforr.ied :"1.ac1 ean t1at tlie 
decision of the Ngqika chiefs to have only Brcwn1ee as their 
magistrate was invalid without his presence at the meet~nq; that 
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the chiefs who . had attended the meeting had sent a message to 
Sarhili informing him of all the developments and of Maqoma's 
absence from the meeting, and that Sarhili had replied: 
"that he had never heard of any word left by Gaika 
to decide such questions without Macoma 1 s word. 
Macoma was charged with the care of the Gaika -
and that Kreli was not satisfied with Sandille 1 s 
message as I was not present at the meeting ... 11 
( 15) 
While Maqoma put his absence from the meeting with Sandille in a 
highly diplomatic light when he spoi<e to Maclean, his attitude 
towards Sandi11e was considerably more radical than this. Already 
in October, when Maqoma had missed the previous meeting held by 
Sandille to discuss the proposals, he had instructed his 
councillors to discuss the matter without reference to Sandille 
because: 
~The Gaika had no Chief, he therefore did not wish 
to take any part in Sandil1e 1s deliberations 11 (16) 
This amounted to frank rejection of Sandi11e 1s authority. 
As for Maqoma 1 s at ti tu de towards Brownlee, he to 1 d Maclean that he 
wished for a: 
"clever and experienced man as a magistrate. 
I do not want a foo 1 ..• 11 {17) 
If Sandil1e would reject the proposals, Maqoma would accept them. 
If Sand ill e accepted them, then Maqoma would demand a separate 
magistrate. Either way Sandi 11 e \voul d be forced to react to 
Maqoma 1s manoeuvering. 
Maclean's attitude to all thi.s typically illustrates the 
intentions of the Colonial S'::.at::! i:": the powerplay in which it was 
engaged with the Xhosa chi.::.:s. On the one hand he di srni ssed 
Maqoma 1 s attitude as "an insL;.:1c~: o~ Kaffir duplicity which need 
not surprise us 11 ; on -che o:h~.r lic.nd he recognised that 11 in this 
case the ends desired by Mc.corrk: a;r:: the same with our own ... 11 and 
recommended that a sepatdtE· ;~.19i.;';rat,2 be appointed for Maqoma. 
What Maclean .understGod b:.1 ces'.;:-·i;.;; 'si:ni~ar ends' as Maqoma he 
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made clear in a letter to Brownlee: 
11 we do not want central i sa ti on among the Kaffi rs 
but division. 11 (19) 
While Maclean may well have been correct in supposing that he was 
supporting the cause of 11 division 11 in agreeing to Maqoma's demands 
for a separate magistrate, it is possible that in his enthusiasm 
he overlooked a more profound coun tercurrent of centra 1 i sa ti on. 
He overlooked, that is, the significance of Maqoma 1 s subtle use of 
Sarhi1i (who as chief of the Gcaleka was ideologically the supreme 
Xhosa chief) to o•:erride the authority of Sandille. For while 
real · unity between the Gcaleka and Ngqika was impossible under 
Sandille, who was the heir of Ngqika's defeat of Gcaleka ambitions 
·-in the 18th and early 19th centuries, it was potentially possible 
under Maqoma who could assume a more independent 1 ine of po1 icy 
free from the influence of the old counciilors still under the 
sway of Ngqika, (such .as Soga, for example). (20) 
The split between the Gcaleka and Ngqika in the time of Phalo had 
been necessary to expand the physical basis of the mode of 
production; to provide fresh pasture and land for residential and 
agricultural purposes as well as huntin;. (21) To meet the 
ultimate threat posed by the establishment of ~h12 Colonial State 
over them, the Xhosa required something more than the tactical 
mi 1 i tary coa 1 i ti ons that characterised the wars of 1835, 1846 and 
1850. It required the reunification of the Xhosa nation and this 
was not something that could be done withotr': major ideological 
reshaping of the entire perception of the structure of the Xhosa 
chieftaincy in the eyes of the mass of Xhosa. 
The Xhosa chieftaincy had, since the end cf' be rns·i-53 v1ar, been 
looking for new solutions to the probl~ms c~a"': i111d :)ef:n plaguing 
it since the beginning of the centuiy - th2 s~.:::ddy encroachirent of 
t7H: Colonists. Some chiefs had (J~::ided ·r -'llly themselves 
i;"revoc.:bly with the Colony. Howev~:-. no ::io'.-r<:.r'{:ul ::::i-;1,i::f had done 
::;o. They sought to continue resi s -i.:anc~ ,t:u-: l r; fundamentally 
different ways. An early indication of :11·1s :"'.'<~S -.0 ·1id2nt in the 
attempts made in this period to forge an .=.11·Iar1::R ·v~·:Ji s~c~:~ons of 
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the Mfengu. 
The Mfengu alliance plans were seen and dismissed by Colonists as 
merely another attempt to instigate a war party; one which was 
bound to fail because of what the Colonial State saw as its 
generosity and good faith to the Mfengu (22). As shall be seen 
1 a ter, the Mf engu, or parts of them, did not see or experience it 
that way. For the moment it is necessary to draw a tten ti on to the 
alliance attempt and emphasise the key features in it: first the 
roles played by Sarhili and Maqoma which predate subsequent 
co-operation between them; secondly, the fact that certain chiefs, 
especially Mha11a and Phato, were clearly in a mood for radical 
departures from past practices. This mood certainly relates to 
the immediate build-up to the cattle-killing. 
Much dissatisfaction had been developing in that part of the King 
Wil 1iam 1 s Town district, known as the Crown Reserve, occupied by 
Mfengu. The area was former Ngqika territory confi seated in terms 
of Cathcart 1s settlement of the 1853 war. 
One major section of the Mfengu, the A.11azizi under Njokweni, had 
sympathised with Sandille in the conflict with the Colony. They 
had intermarried with the Ngqika extensively. (23) The Amazizi 
chief, Njokweni, was one of the most established and powerful of 
the Mfengu chiefs. He desired to foster closer relations with the 
Xhosa, particularly with Sarhili. After the war of 1836 an 
important Councillor of Njokweni 1 s, Dodwana, 'i-Jas flogged in public 
at King William 1 s Town for an alleged theft. He was so incensed ,, 
at this treatment that he left the Colony and returned to 
Sarhili. There he became a very po 1derft.il councillor of 
Sari1ili 1 s. (24) Thus a direct ambassadcric.1 i~nk existed in the 
1850s between the Amazi zi and Sad1i1i. Doawana succeeded in 
persuading a number of Njokwe.ni's peopie :::; return to Sarhili 
across the Kei. 
Irrrnediately after the war cf 1853 mission?...~ies ,%wngst the Amazizi 
start.ed attacking their cust~:xnary :;~·actic:~s on purely le~al 
grounds i.e. that they were Colonial d :·L;:e:!:'i ,::~:p~:ndent on the 
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Government and must therefore obey Colonial law in all things~ 
outlawing 'witchcraft' (by which missionaries meant all forms of 
divination and diagnosis) and dances, and observe Colonial dress, 
codes etc. This climate encouraged Njokweni in his idea of an 
Amazizi-Xhosa alliance. The means for fostering this alliance was 
intermarriage, especially by the chiefs. Thus Njokweni tried to 
marry a daughter of Sandille (25). This report does not make it 
clear if any marriage:was contracted or not. Tainton implies that 
the marriage was only forestalled by Njokweni 1s death in 1855. 
Mha11a did actually marry a Mfengu woman from his area at this 
time. 
In addition, meetings between Sandille, Mhalla and groups of 
Mfengu definitely took place. (26) Maclean emphasised Sarhili 's 
role in setiing up these meetings. The young Chief Oba was 
interested in Njokweni 's plans and it seems from this· as if the 
idea of the alliance was tactical and not military, (which would 
also explain why Special Commissioner Calderwood - appointed to 
investigate rl..ITlours of a Xhosa-Mfengu military alliance. - failed 
to find one). Njokweni discussed the possibility of his 
approximately 2 000 followers and their cattle moving into the 
Ngqika district where there was no room for them; the Colonial 
State might thereby be forced to al 1 ow an extension of the 
locations and Xhosa reoccupation of their old territory. (27) 
It is perhaps significant that in Mac1ean's report on these 
meetings Sandille is said to have addressed the Mfengu as Abambo 
which is a more proper designation than the pejorative 11Mfengu 11 
which was attributed to them by the Xhosa at the time of the 
Mf ecane. These d'i pl oma tic manoeuveri ngs '"'ere i ndi ca ti ve ·Of the 
attempts being made to find new so1:..:"".:ions ~o old problems that 
were then taking on their final and :.:7'iti(;c1 uimensions. 
The introduction of the magistrate'.~ in Aprii 1856 came at a time 
. of great economic hardship and µ011';;,·ic,11 <.:onf~usion. Within the 
Colonial State Maclean was not tonvinci=:-d tha: :~rey's scherre couid 
work. He still felt a strong a1iegL:w,>;; ta Sa.:hcart's line of 
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pol icy granting internal autonomy to the chiefs, and he wrote a 
1 ong mernorandlm to Grey outlining the origins of that pol icy, in 
February 1856, just two months before the magistrates were to be 
installed. (28) 
Within the Xhosa chiefdoms we have mentioned the tensions tliat 
existed between Sandil 1 e and Maqoma. To these must be added 
suspicions that existed within Mha11a 1s territory, between his 
sons, and the general hostility of all chiefs who resisted 
Colonial domination towards the collaborating chiefs such as Kama 
and Siwani. As has been emphasised throughout this discussion, 
the positions adopted by the various chiefs were determined by the 
internal struggles within their chiefdoms, and that varying 
d:?grees of collaboration were, of economic and political necessity, 
to be found within all chiefdoms. However the broader 
distinctions remained between those who put national interests 
above local ones and Xhosa unity above other considerations - and 
. hence had been prepared to risk all in active resistance, arid 
those who were happy to profit out of the consequences of such 
conflict and even lend 1 ogistica1 and military support to the 
Colonial armies. 
The interplay of these cross-cutting contradications was further 
reveaied wit1 the arrival of the m:igistrat2s. They were, it 
should be remembered, the first official representatives of the 
Colonial State to live in, and observe events in, the various 
chi·efdoms since the appointment of Maclean and BrONnlee after the 
1848 war. The very earliest reports of the cattle-killing and 
associated prophecies came through t'1ese magistrates and indeed it 
is hard to separate the initial receipt of payment by the chiefs, 
the loss of power through the imposition of the magistrates, and 
the onset of the cattle-killing. 
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II The Magistrates with Ndlambe, Mdushane and Ggun.ukwebe 
It will be remembered that Maclean was appointed commissioner with 
the Ndlambe of Mha11a after the 1848 war. His appointment as 
Chief Co111T1i ss ion er to succeed Mackinnon soon removed him from 
direct intervention in Ndlambe affairs. With the arrival of Major 
Gawler as rragistrate it was possible for such interventions to be 
reinstated. 
Grey had emphasised to Maclean that the success of his scheme 
depended in large part on the quality of the individuals selected 
for the job. As \ve have seen, Maqoma was al so reluctant to have a 
'fool 1 imposed on him! In the .light of this rutual assessment of 
the importance of the right individual it is an amusing, if 
tragic, touch that Major John ~ox Gawl er was selected to preside 
over the Ndlambe and deal with their chief Mhalla. (29) 
Relationships were stormy from the start. Mhalla tried very hard 
to avoid getting Major Gawler, indicating that, like all other 
important chiefs, he had sources of information that had let him 
kncw,r what he was in for. Mhal1a prefered Richard Tainton who had 
been a civil commissioner at King William's To1r111. (30) However, 
the chiefs had conceded that the Governor wcu1 d appoint the 
magistrates and in the end the need for the salary overcame his 
misgivings about Gawler. (31) 
I 
No sooner had Gawler arrived in April 1856 than the first 
full-scale dispute arose between Mhalla and Gawler. Mhalla wanted 
to have the payment of the ten council 1 ors in his ha;:ies. Gawl er 
naturally supposed he should act as paymaster. Mha11a alleged 
t.'lat Gawler was paying certain councillors twice. !n the end 
Ga·l'ii er preva 11 ed. ( 32) There was an obvious loss of pa t:--onage 
invoiv,::d in the question of control over payment of cotmcilicr·:>. 
Counc-f11 ors .5erved for only a few days or even for only cne day at 
the Grea·: ?Lace. There was continuous movement, coming anc! 901nr1 
fron tf;,:: i:hief '5 homestead. ·The attempt ·;fl d21 imi t :::en 
fndivid1~L who wou1 d be paid for their services ·2t :::1e Great 
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Place was a drastic departure from the way the chief 1s court had 
normally functioned. 
In Mha1la 's hands the monthly payment intended for ten counci11 ors 
would most probably have been spread directly over more than twice 
that number of individuals. As it was t'1e money was still 
disbursed, but nON through the medium of ten influential men 
selected by Gawl er~ This cl early undermined Mha11 a and was an 
ongoing cause of resentment against tlie Yklo1 e system of payment. 
The si tua ti on was not helped by the fact that initially Bra.i/n 1 ee 
had allowed Sandille to disburse payments to his ten councillors. 
(33) Mhalla's relationship with Sandille was an uneasy one. 
While there was no open hostility between them Gawler found: 
11
i t is a prevailing opinion among the Kaffirs that 
if Umhalla were to die, Sandilli would attempt to 
usurp the Chieftainship. Sandi11 i is d:lily 
endeavouring to gain over those of Umhalla 's 
people who 1 ive near him and there are many of 
Sandilli's and Macoma's people living in the 
middle of l.knha11a's country. Tola and Umfundisi 
for instance. These men give Umhalla no little 
an xi e ty ••• 11 ( 34) 
Mhalla's position differed from Sandille's in that he was 
approximately 66 years old in 1856 and had adult sons, some of 
whom supported him and others who had aspirations of their o.-m. 
Sandille was only 36 years old and was sti11 confronted by 
nurrerous internal barriers to his authority in the form of o1 der, 
wealthy councillors of his father 1 s generation. (35) 
The.re is evidence t1at Mha1la did in fact exercise the sort of 
control over the homesteads that would only, typi::a1iy, be found 
wi~h a strong chief at the peak of his powe?". Gaw1er reported 
that work on his house {Waterloo Huts) had b~.:en d<:?iayed because 
they "do not allow ox-wagons into the country." (36) ?·;-evfously 
Hr.a11a had stopped Mfengu trying to leave hfa ,:hi·:i'\.!om v.dt1 their 
ca tt1 c. { 37} This apparent ab i1 i ty to con ~Toi ::he fi'l<)Ve!m'2n~ of 
;::eDpie and cattle indicated a far deeper lev.21 OT con:r;:;·; 012--:-
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homesteads than existed with Sandille. 
As important as Mhalla's relationship with Sandille, was that with 
Sarhili. There were many Gcaleka families under prominent 
councillors of Sarhili living in the Ndlambe area. 
These people were all relatively recent immigrants, (post 1848), 
who were attracted by the 1 arge, open and fertile tracts of 
country between East London and the Kei River that Mhalla 
dominated. (38) With this mix of Ndlambe, Ngqika and Gcaleka all 
living in the same area the contradictory needs of the various 
chiefs were bound to emerge. 
The feeling of the times, and the nature of particular struggles 
that emerged as the effects of the imposition of magistrates were 
felt, are revealed in the following case. 
Three Gca1ekas 1 iving under a petty chief 1 Giddie 1 1 iving in 
Mhalla
1
s country stole a number of rifles frcxn some Mfengu. 
Gawler wished to organise a party to go and retrieve the stolen 
rifles, take the thieves prisoner and confiscate ten head of 
cattle as a fine. Mhalla was not keen to get involved because 
"The Fingoes are Government people and therefore the guns are 
Government Guns ... moreover the thieves belonged ~another Chief 
and he did not 1 ike interfering ... 11 (39). 
After threats and inducements from Gawler, which it seemed to 
Mhalla were virtua11y sanctioning him to confiscate the property 
of the Gcalekas for himself, he organised a raiding party. 
Whereas Gawler wanted a small party for what he saw as a police 
operation, Mhalla provided a raiding party of 80 armed Nd1ambe and 
Mfengu under the command of one of Mhal la 1 s sons, Siwani. 
From the outset it was clear that the force ''l'!'as not at all 
frlter::;sted in assisting Gawier and was simp1y pu~ting on a show 
fer his benefit. When they approached r.ne ;;c.mes tead of the 
suspected thief, its head barred the way with ~ rifle saying that 
'\:iaw1::r, the Government and Umha11a might gc arid be htn1ed .•. 11 




s huts, but the thatch had been dampened and it wou1 d not take 
fire. />mid clouds of smoke Gawler then gave orders to take the 
cattle from the kraa1. This was done - at which the homestead 
head defended himself with his rifle, while the other ITEn of the 
homestead escaped into the bush. As Gawl er and his force moved 
off with the cattle the men of the kraal fired on them again. The 
response to this offensive was devastating. As Gawler put it: 
11
I looked round and saw my rear guard in a heap 
running do\tin the h il 1 1 eav ing me and the 
cattle in the presence of the two thieves ••• 11 
The thieves then re-took the cattle and disappeared, firing all 
the ti me on Gawl er and the remman ts of his co 1 umn: 
"We ran for about a mile and a half - the only 
danger was what was rrade by running in a mob like 
a flock of sheep ••• I laid hold of them, used my 
knobkerrie on them, shouted to the Chii:fs,. asked 
them to stop for a moment to count their pursuers, 
called them women and boys without effect. When a 
good mile had been put between the par ti es we 
halted and it was the general opinion - loudly 
upheld - that it had been a 'great fight' .•• " (40) 
In fact the entire attempt by the Colonial State to usurp the 
rights of chiefs to appropriate fines was initially obstructed by 
rreans such as the carefully nurtured chaos ill us trated above.' In 
th is si tua ti on the power of inf1 uen ti al council 1 ors and homestead 
heads with local followings was greatly increased. This is 
illustrated in the denouement to the debacle of the stolen 
rifles. When Gawler t:Emanded the fines and the thieves from the 
Chief Gi ddie the latter sent a message to G.aw1 er informing him: 
11
I am a little Chief, Mhalla is a li:t1e Chief and 
you are a little Chief and nei "':her he nor .you had 
any business in my country ••• ~· ,\ 41) 
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In the end Gi ddie only delivered the fine after the head of the 
homestead involved, one Gubenguwa, had been taken prisoner by 
Maclean, who had subseqently become involved. In fact it appears 
that Gubenguwa enjoyed a 1 arge 1 oca l fo 11 owing and 'Gi ddi e' was 
not strong enough to arrest him. These con di ti ans, prevail ing 
a100ngst the mass of homesteads as a result of the weakening of the 
power of the chiefs with the arrival of the mag is tra tes, are 
helpful in understanding the spread of the belief in 
cattle-killing at this time:: As we sha11 see it was a movement 
that first spread spontaneously amongst the masses before being 
sanctioned by the important chiefs. 
The immediate effects of the introduction of the magistrates did 
not eliminate ·'dual-power', that of chiefs and the Colonial 
State.. Ra th er it sharpened the con tr a di cti ans between them. The 
control of tlie homesteads was cl early the key factor in this 
conflict. Where this control now lay was not cl ear, ieast of all 
to the participants in the conflict. The chiefs' acceptance of 
monthly salaries did not automaticaliy change the realities of 
their power. As in the example quoted above, it made the 
exercising of it very circuitous and created definite 
opportunities for relatively insi gni fi cant figures such as 
'Giddie'' and Gubenouwa to take initiatives of their cwn. 
This obscuration of lines of ·authority and the break up of clear 
power a11iances within and between chiefdoms, cow.bined with 
underlying economic. hardship, were necessary conditions for belief 
in the prophecies that were to give rise to the cattle-killing in 
the second half of 1856. The insecurity prevailing throughout 
Xhosa territory was not therefore only a subjective experience., it 
was a real obscuring of effective authority. In such situations 
·the way is always open for ideological solutions to problems of 
power to assert themselves from the base of th€ social formation, 
in this case from the mass of holil:steads. 
1856 dawned inauspi cious1y for the Xhosa. 7he summer rains were 
icte and drought threatened. If it didn'~ ra~n S;.)Cn the land 
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would be scorched and fe-1 crops would survive: Gaw1 er reported 
that there was: 
"an almost universal blight upon the Kaffir corn 
Yklich I have noticed from King Will iam 1 s ToMl to 
to the Kwegha and heard of as being in rrost other 
places ..• 11 ( 42) 
If conditions were unsettled in the Ndlambe territory in the first 
half of 1856 they were paral 1 el ed by even more ominous signs 
elsewhere. In a report· from Kama 1 s country the magistrate, Reeve, 
observed: 
11 I believe the crops were not so extensively 
pl anted this year as the 1 ast .•• I am given to 
understand that a prophet last year said that they 
need not p 1 ant, as the Russi ans would come and 
fight against us this woman belonged to 
"Siwani 1s 11 tribe but resided for a time in 
11 Karna 1s 11 country. Kana ordered her to l~ave his 
tribe .•• n ( 43) 
Shortly after this Kama received messages from Sarh'il i enquiring 
about the prophecies~ At the saire time, independently of Reeve, 
BrONn 1 ee reported: 
11 I was aware some time since that several Doctors 
had arisen lately amongst the Hlambis, but until 
lately i did not know of the extent of the 
influence they had exerted. Cultivation in Pa to 1s 
tribe through the ins trumen ta 1 i ty of the Doctors 
has been almost universally neglected this· 
season. Pato himself is said not to have 
cultivated and does not appear to have exerted his 
i n fl u en ce in in c1J ci n g h is pe op 1 e to cu 1 ti v ate ; 
what his ci:>ject may have been I do not know ••. 11 
( 44) 
Phato 1 s people had been par ti cul ariy s~verel y hit by the 
lung-sickness and Brownlee 
in great destitution having 
observed the.-'.: 11 mc:ny of his people are 
The only 
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reason Brownlee could see for this move on Phato 1s part was to 
sh°"' roore clearly to the people 11 the folly of listening to the 
deceptions of the Doctors~ 11 As this statement shows, Brownlee (a 
great 'expert' on Xhosa affairs) had not the vaguest notion of the 
impending cattle-killing prophecies even as their earliest 
manifestations hovered directly over him. If this was so for 
Brownlee, who had a good command of Xhosa 1 anguage and many 
informers, it was even roore marked with the other recently 
appointed magistrates. 
Bra-1nlee found that the failure to cultivate in the 1855/56 surrmer 
season was fairly widespread, affecting also Toise, Siwani and 
Mhalla. Kama and Siwani~ who were both collaborating chiefs 
dependent on Colonial support for their positions, did all in. 
their power to ind.Jee people to cultivate. The problem they 
experienced was that their power did not extend very far, even 
within their °"'n locations. Much of Kama ~s territory was settled 
by Ngqika loyal to Sandille or Maqoma, while many of Siwani's 
people stayed with him out of necessity only, their true loyalties 
being witli his popular half-brother Seyolo. 
The site of the first prophet was in Kama 1 s country. She was the 
wife of a councillor of Kama's, Bula, and predicted Kama 1 s return 
to 1heathenism 1 as well as t1at of a11 those Xhosa who had 
converted to Christianity. She also claimed: 
11 that the white men will be destroyed because the 
wrath and curse of God are on them, for putting to 
d:!ath his son. ihe Kaffirs are to be the favoured 
race, and tliat they may not want wtien the white 
rren are swept from the face of the earth. an 
inexhaustible supply of skins, carcasses of all 
kinds of wfl d an·imals as 1.vell as ornaments and 
beads of every description wi11 be provided for 
r ' ., ~ r • • • • U ( 46) ttie wants or trie r,ar;1rs 
She urged tlie Xhosa to lay aside t'rieir witchcraft in order that 
the good time :night come. Th·is prophetess was not alone. The 




s country was now residing with Stokwe. She began 
prophesying around December 1855 and was said to be the wife of 
Petsheni of Stokwe 1s tribe~ She prohibited cultivation and 
directed the Xhosa to kill their cattle as rrore would be 
provided. They should purchase axes to make kraals which at the 
appropriate time they would find filled with cattle. (47) 
These prophets also claimed that the Russians had defeated the 
English (in Crimea) and would soon come to t1e assistance of the 
Xhosa. The prophets are speci fi ca11 y reported as not having urged 
the Xhosa to rise against the Colonists "but have induced the 
belief of external aid. 11 (48) Brownlee also reported the 
presence of prophets· in Mhalla 1 s and Seyal 0 1 s territory. Thus -in 
essence, by May 1856, the central theses of the prophecies leading 
- up to the catt1e-ki1'1 ing had already been in circulation for some 
months. What they lacked was any overt support from any of t'ie 
major chiefs. 
It is from these reports of BrONnlee 1 s that the origins of the 
persistent view of the Colonial State that Moshoeshoe was bel1ind 
the cattle-killing movement can be found. In the form in which he 
presented it at this time, it was a far more plausible observation 
than the fantasy into which it was subsequently developed. 
Brownlee simply noted that even ts between the Free State and 
Moshoeshoe would influence Sarhili and Sandille in their attitudes 
to war with the Colony at that point. This was certainly true. 
( 49) 
The drought deepened and the prospects for the 1856 harvest 
diminished. (50) By May it was starting to take its toll -
people were coming . to Reeve and the other rregi strates and 
appealing for work. For the first tiira there was a distinct 
inclination to accept work in the more distant Colonial districts 
of the Midlands. Up to this point the existence of the public 
works had rendered it unnecessarv to croc.eed far into the Colony "' . 
in search of work. The reluctanc•= to prcc:=ed to the Col any was 
partly what had motivated Grey t:) institute t'1e 'puj1ic works,. as 
a means of in trod.icing wage 1 abour and money more generally. 
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In recognition of the changing labour supply, in January 1856 Grey 
authorised a reci.iction in the rate of pay on the works from 1 
shilling per day without rations to 6 pence per day with rations. 
(51) In part this was probably motivated by the grain scarcity 
that was beginning to be felt~ There was some resistance to this 
from the Keiskamma Hoek area where workers had refused to work at 
the lo~er rate "although any number could be attained at the old 
rate •.. " (52) The desire to sustain the wage rate of 1 shilling 
per day was also in evidence in the Ndlambe district where repair 
work on the road between East London and Line Drift was stopped 
because cf a dispute over wages~ This work employed 50 people per 
day. 
It is important to appreciate, therefore, that the roovement of 
workers· from theCiskei to the Colony had already begun from the 
roost depressed areas such as that of Kama, before the cattle-
k il 1 ing commenced. The effects of the cattle-kin ing in this 
respect, as in so much else, vastly aggravated an already existing 
situation. Drought, the lung-sickness, the intrusion of the 
magistrates and the des ti tu ti on caused by war all contributed to 
the appearance of the first mil 1 enarian prophets of the neiw dawn 
in those reg,ions which had been roost severely affected by the 
impact of Colonial conquest and of the Colonial economy. In July 
1856, reviewing this combination of circumstances Maclean wrote: 
11 Un der the circumstances it would be natural to 
expect in any country that there would be acts of 
des pera ti on ••. 11 { 53) 
Once the principle that an external agency would come to their 
rescue had gained credibility amongst the people, it mattered 
little if the agency was named as the 11Russians 11 , or ancestors, or 
anyone else. 
I II The Maai s tr ates and the Naa ik a _______ , _______ ............. ,_ 
Lt. Lucas was appoir:r..ed as Maqoma 1 s magistrate anc arrived in King 
William's Town in ADril 1856. There were now five magistratesj 
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Gawler with the Ndlambe, Herbert Vigne with Phato, Reeve with Kama 
and Siwani, Lucas with Maqoma and Botomane, and of course Brownlee 
with San dill e, An ta and Oba. 
From the outset the magistrates in the Ngqika district were viewed 
. -
by the chiefs as a means for continuing pressure to be put on the 
Colonial State. This became apparent at the meeting in April when 
Lt. Lucas was introduced to Maqoma and Botomane as the magistrate 
responsible for implementing the new system of control. 
After Maqoma had been formally introduced to Lucas and the 
salaries they were to receive in 1 i eu of the fines and court fees 
that they had previously appropriated were outlined, Maqoma rose 
and addressed the crOn'd: 
"When I to1 d Maclean I was ready to receive a 
Magistrate and money, I said I wanted land also 
II ( 54) 
As if indicating the extreme caution with ¥.tiich they viewed the 
entire operation, one of the Colonial representatives asked Maqoma 
if that was the con di ti on on which he wou1 d receive a magistrate. 
To wtii ch he replied: 
"No, but I asked Maclean to tel 1 the Governor I 
wanted 1 and. What is the Governor 1s answer?11 
The honourable gentlemen were considerably taken aback at this 
bluntness on Maqoma 1s part. After Ayliff informed him that the 
Governor would not make land concessions, ~qoma wel corned Lucas 
with the fol 1 owing a dmoni ti on: 
11We h Ope th e Magi s tr ate W i 11 mi X free 1 y w i th OU r 
people,. and not permit pri c:E to prevent t.tieir 
gaining access readily to him, and that he· will 
submit our requests at all times to the Governor. 
When he gets to kn™ us we will give him the 
his tori ·es of the different persons who have had to 
rule us, and those whose character we adnire we 
will tell him to imitate. Maclean has spoken for 
the Hlambies .and secured for thei11 al 1 good 
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locations, we expect this officer wi11 speak for 
us, and get us more land ••• 11 
At this, consternation increased amongst the assembled wortliies 
and Maqoma pushed horre the advantage: 
11
He must ask, ask and never tire, and never say 
1 
The Governor has refused, I cannot ask again.'.' 
He must continue to ask. 11 ( 55) 
When Ay1 i ff, Lucas and the Rev~ Keyser reached Bo to mane they found 
an even more sceptical response from the aged chief. Botomane at 
once seized on the central di ffi cul ty of the system: 
11
What do we get the money for? We know ttiat you as a 
Governrren t Officer have regular di ti es to perform 
but for. which you are paid, but what are we to be 
paid for?" ( 56) 
To ~i ch Ayl i ff responded: 
11 for governing, on behalf of the Governor, the 
Queen's subjects of your tribe. 11 
Botomane: 
11 I s that a 11 , do not 1 et me de ce i v e mys e 1 f. 
I have known you for many years, tell ire truly is 
there nothing that wil 1 come after we have taken 
the money?" 
Botomane's and Maqoma 's responses reveal the c:Eep mistrust with 
which they entered formally into Grey's new dispensation. 
They viewed Lucas as a nego ti a ting instrument for carrying on the 
struggle for repossession of Xhosa lands. A. few days after his 
arrival, Maqoma and Botomane wrote a joint 1 etter to Grey. They 
requested that Xhosa interpreters be attached to Lucas and also 
in forrre d Grey: 
"The ·new Resident we have nothing to say of, and 
the money we say nothing of; but where then is tlie 
land we can live together on? It is not with 
our consent - we take it through compu1sion, for if 
we refused it, yo1J wou1 d think we wished to fight 
wi th you Si r ! " ( 5 7 ) 
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As this letter makes clear it v•as by no means avarice or 
collaboration that led the chiefs to accept Grey's system, but 
rather economic and political necessity grounded in an all too 
accurate assessment of Grey's intentions. It was with deep unease 
that the system was introduced. As if looking for the 
re-assurance of a bygone era, Botomane (who was old enough to 
remember Ngqika 's regal meeting with General Janssens) asked: 
11
Who is Lucas? Is he a gentleman? Is he a wise 
man, is he a chief in his own country? We Chiefs 
1 i k e to be ass o ci a te d with C hie f s ... 11 ( 58) 
IV The Growth of Prophecy _ 
Almost immediately after the magistrates had been introduced and 
their effect had begun to be fe1 t by the chiefs, the growth of the 
prophecies already in circulation became evident. To sorre extent 
the introduction of the magistrates and the appointment of paid 
councillors nominated by them was the catalyst which brought 
together t'1e ingredients of the cattle-killing. To this extent 
Grey, and his scheme for the introduction of magistrates which 
once more removed the internal autonomy of the Xhosa chiefs and 
their supporters over their subjects (as with Smith's scheme prior 
to the 1850-53 war), was responsible for the consequences which 
ensued. This was tacitly recognised by som: Colonial observers, 
just after the main drama of the killing had passed: 
11 His Excellency's system, which rais'es a power that 
interferes between the Chiefs and t1eir people 
appears to have worked well during th is past year. 
H cw far tJ1 is sys tern helped to precipitate the 
crises through which the colony has now happily 
passed, we need not now discuss ... " ( 59) 
The opposition to the magistrates was intensified by a crucial 
elaboration of the basic system introduced after the chiefs had 
accepted the scheme. Each location was div~ded up into 
'convenient groups of kraals 1 and over each group a 1headman' was 
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appointed with a detachment of unarmed police under his orders~ 
Grey authorised the appointment of~ 100 "first class" heactnen at 
12 pounds per annum each; 200 11 second class" headmen at 9 pounds 
per annum and 700 ass is tan ts at 6 pounds per annum each. All of 
these were to be appointed, dismissed, and paid by the magistrate. 
( 60) 
This innovation did indeed 11 raise up a power which interfered 
between the chiefs and their people. 11 The entire system of 
magisterial authority was therefore, as in 1848, an unacceptable 
degradation of the power of the chiefs, in a situation where the 
combatant chiefs sti11 unooubtedly enjoyed the roonopoly of 
political legitimacy and the balance of economic power still lay 
within the Xhosa homesteads and not yet in Colonial economic· 
hegemony. 
The Chiefs had already seen that even near-unity of all the Xhosa, 
and considerable Kho i support in the 1850-53 war, were 
insufficient to defeat the Imperial armies. A new. form of unity 
was needed. We have already mentioned the intense pleasure with 
which the news of l>tlshoeshoe's defeat of Cathcart at Berea was 
received by the Xhosa. The differences between the political 
organisation of Moshoeshoe's kingdom and the Xhosa must have been 
obvious to all. Our approach to the cattle-killing will be based 
on the hypo th es is that, if it had any un der1yi ng mo ti vati on at 
all, it was intended as a renaissance or reformation of the Xhosa 
state. In practical terms it was intended to remove the political 
obstacles to a united Xhosa State that had existed since the time 
of Phalo. Certainly the latest attack on their position by Grey 
heightened the already present realisation of the need for a nev 
solution to the problems of Co1 onial domination. 
In early 1856 the Ngqika chiefs were still trying to assert their 
control over the land against the pretensfons of the magistrates. 
Any opportunity in which authority could be asserted was seized 
upon as symbolic and strategic testing of the strength of the 
mag is tra tes. 
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In Sandi11e's location the clearest demonstration of this was 
provided by his successful attempt to extract an annual rent of 10 
pounds per annum from tlie Rev~ Allen of the Church of England 
mission station, St. Johns, for land occupied by the mission. 
(61) When Allen demurred to pay, Sandille threatened to cut off 
~ 
the supply of firewood and water to the station which he said was 
his, and to 1 eave his counci11 ors at its entrance there to prevent 
any Xhosa or European from working on the station. In response 
Al 1 en gave up 10 pounds. 
In March, scarcely a tronth after the installation 'of the 
magistrates· the first reports of new prophecies being made by a 
niece of a prophet in Sarhil i 1 s country were received. (62) 
Sarh il i at first did not react to· her prophecies which were 
in i ti a 11 y no different - from those a 1 ready in ci rcu1 a ti on to the 
west. In June 1956 Sarhili sent envoys to make enquiries at the 
homestead of the <bctor Mh lakaza concerning the prophecies or, 
more a•:curately, the visions of his niece Nongqawuse. As a result 
of these enquiries Sarhili killed his first cattle in accordance 
with these prophecies, thus lending tacit support to the visions. 
( 63) 
In trying to gain a clearer understanding of what t'le cattle-
k il 1 ing was about we must move away from past perspectives ~hi ch 
have started out from a strong set of unexamined and unjustified 
assumpti ans. One group of assumpti ans sterns from the ex pl ana ti ons 
put forward by the Colonial officials themselves, that it was 
primarily aimed at the preparation of a military 1combination 1 of 
the chiefs to <Efeat the Colonists. Most writers who have 
commented on the cattle-killing, and of course Theal, have 
accepted this conventional wisdom. (64} 
In this version the 1 culprit 1 is usually pres-ented as Sarhili and 
Mhlakaza as his willing agent. The alternative to this has been 
to stress t~e be1 ief in witchcraft and to m-3.ke the Xhosa cosmology 
the villain - ·with its national cbctors, animist religion and 
general be1 i.ef in prophecy and divination. This vi et1 is 'l<re1l 
represented in A.W. Burt..on 's imaginative recreation of the 
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prophecies of Mhlakaza. (65) A variation on this theme has been 
to look at the cattle-ki11 ing through a contemporary academic 1 ens 
and regard it as a pure millenarian movement. (66) 
Finally of course there is the view of Xhosa colTlllentators and 
writers themselves, al though they have generally not taken up a 
firm position on the movement~ Soga, in answer to the question of 
what underlay 11 th is piece of folly ... 11 as he put it, while 
rejecting the military cons pi racy theories, side-steps the question: 
11 It is singular that Natives can never give a reason 
for the perpetration of this terrible act. 
To a question of the motive is always given the 
answer 11 asazi 11 (We cannot tell. We do not 
knON. ),and apparently in sincerity. 11 (67) 
A. C. Jordan quotes a tradition recorded by Rabusana in his 
anthology 1 Zeni< 1 ii nkorro Magwal an dini 1 told by Wil 1 iam Gqoba \'Jio 
was 17 at the time of the catt1 e-kill ing. (68) While much of what 
Gqoba says is of interest, he is clearly concentrating on certain 
key events and has condensed the time seal e of other events to 
suit. his narrative purpose~ Essentially he evokes 'sincere 
bel ief 1 in the wond:rs foretold by two young visionary girls who 
gained the ears of the 1 ea ding chiefs as the cause of the 
catt1 e-ki11 ing. 
As we shall see, this version, while it contains probably the most 
authentic account of the details of Nongqawuse's visions, does not 
take account of the myriad even ts that occurred in the more than 
six months prier to the 11 Great Disillusionment" Yt.len tlie 
prophecies finally failed to materialise, or ~at happened after 
th is. 
Dealing first witl-i the military theories, these were e1aboratcd in 
the exceedingly voluminous official and private correspondence 
among the Colonial officials during the cattle-killing itself. 





"The reason of the cattle-killing was the recovery of \ 
their lost ter~tory, in case of war there should ~ 
be no encumbrance. The scheJTE failed in 
consequence of sorre Chiefs not having entered into 
the matter, and more particularly because Sandille 
held back and did not finally destroy his 
cattle until the other tribes were broken up and 
dispersed. So far as I am able to ascertain Kre1 i 
was responsible for it: He took advantage of it at 
any rate. I don 1 t believe Llmhlakaza was the author 
of it. He made certain professions of inspirations 
and it struck the Chiefs that his inspired words 
might be ma de use of for political purposes ... 11 
( 69) 
This was the official explanation~ Yet BrONnlee himself deve1ope¢ 
his doubts. In his memoirs he wrote: 
11atter thirty years, I do not feel quite so certain 
that there was th is plot ~ ~ ~ no one who took an 
active part in the cattle killing, except 
Umhlakaza, has aanitted that there was a plot. All 
assert that the cattle k il 1 ing was ma de in a full 
belief in the predicticns of Umhlakaza. 11 {70) 
There is· in fact a straightforward reason for concluding that 
there was no 1 plot' immediately to attack the Colony. As all the 
magistrates repeatedly reported, there were no signs of any 
pre para ti ons for war anywhere in evidence. Maclean reported in 
July 1856 that he coul d not udi scern any sys tern of corrb ined action 
has been formed. 11 {71) Brownlee reported early in 1857 that the 
people had a firm faith in the promises of the prophet and that 
the common people were led to believe that they were to. tak~ no 
part in t1e destruction of the Colonists, but that they were to be 
annihilated by Sifubasibanzi (literally "the Broad Chested 11 , the 
spiritual leader cf the 11New Peopl e 11 who were to arise). (72} 
The absence of pre para ti ans for war was one of the most remark ab 1 e 
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features of what was taking place: Indeed the very requirements 
of the prophet necessitated a great deal of domestic labour in and 
around the kraals. According to Gqoba's version of the 
prophecies, the chiefs of the 'New People' that were to arise from 
the dead ordered the people to make "big new granaries", that were 
suddenly to be filled with corn; erect new huts and make many 
doors.; and make new milk sacks for receiving the milk of the new 
cattle which were to be provided. (73) Many believers in the 
prophecies did these things, activities which cannot be carried on 
in war time when the kraals have to be cleared and people made 
ready to move. So the official theory of the Colonial Officials 
elaoorated after the event, is obviously discredited. At the same 
time the sincerity of the Xhosa belief in a millenarian .solution 
to their political problems is emphasised. 
However, to accept the entire episode as a· simple (or a complex) 
millenarian delusion (even without invoking the 'cauldrons of 
wi tchc~a ft~) suffers from the weakness that it fails to account 
adequately for the overt role played by political aspirations in 
the cattle-killing. Although the agency of the prophecies was 
external aid, de 1 i very frcxn suffering produced through 
'supernatural ' intervention, the extremely concrete nature of the 
political action taken in association with the prophecies and the 
struggles that ensued after them indicate that the prophecies in 
practice operated to enhance the political position of certain 
chiefs quite independently of the intervent·ions of 'Sifubasibanzi 1 
and his son 'Napukade 1 • Furthermore that the chiefs were aware 
(or shouid have been aware) and conscious of this 'second level' 
on which the whole movement could be construed is only to credit 
them with quite normal perception - a faculty which we know men 
1ik9 Maqoma, Mhalla and Sarhi1i enjoyed to an enhanced degree. 
Granting the 'sincere belief' of most Xhosa (including the chiefs) 
in the ·1~1idity of prophecies, an alternative exp1anc.ticn has to 
be derived by synthesizing the various active er innovative 
eh~r;it:nts of the movement with the objective economic and 120·1 itical 
ci."cumstdr:ces i:1 which they occurred and the cla.ss ?Gsi:ion of the 
various .:lg~n'.':s ::if the drama. 
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We have already indicated that the objective economic and 
political circumstances, with drought and cattle disease on the 
one hand and Sir George Grey's interventions on the other, were 
conducive to the utmost insecurity for both the ordinary 
homesteads and the chiefs. What we have now to look at is who put 
forward the various elements of the drama, what the pas i ti ans of 
these agents were, and how the interaction that resulted revealed 
the fundamentally contradictory pas i tion of these agents, caught 
between the Xhosa social fonnation and the broader Colonial 
capitalist economy which was engulfing it. In this way we may be 
able to see that the cattle-killing was indeed a political 
movement (as the Colonial State maintained) but one not aimed in 
the first instance at the elimination of the Colonists by military 
force. Rather it was aimed at the fundamental reorganisation of 
the Xhosa state to provide a basis for future political and 
therefore also military action against the Colony. This we will 
argue was the underlying intention or motive of the chiefs' 
invo!vement in the cattle-killing. This is the only explanation 
capable of taking into account all the various levels of conflict 
and belief on which the cattl e-kil 1 i ng drama was played out. 
A.W. Burton has put the following words into the mouth of Mhlakaza 
and indicates quite accurate 1 y the subjective background to the 
prophecies. Mh1 akaza, perched on a high vantage point surveying 
the plains and valleys in all directions. proclaims: 
"I am not surprised at Sarhili who is sullen and 
greatly worried over the tribulations of his 
people. On yonder plains I see a few wretched 
cattle, and 1and that has become so poor and barren 
that even our young men find no happiness in the 
bare subsistence derived from the poor harvests. 
Our Chiefs and the~r prophets must do so_mething to 
uplift and sat~:;fy our discouraged and unhappy 
people. u ( 74) 
Bel i e f i n the f::F Mhl aka.za spread first among the peop_1 e 
of Phato, Siward, '.<Bma a;1a Maq:;ma. The way the prophecie$ "{ere 
communicated wa.s ess::n::i-:ti r.o their initial impact. It was a 
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grassroots movement ,,.,.;,;ch spread by personal communication of the 
revelation amongst the masses. The chiefs who subsequently 
supported the prophecies were in large measure only ratifying what 
irost of their people had already begun~ 
The prophecies coming from Mhlakaza were initially spread by word 
of mouth rather than any official pronouncement from the chiefs. 
A trader on the Kei for example, overheard his guide telling the 
people of a kraal t1at, when at the coast he saw people and cattle 
co~ from the sea to the shore out of a great ball of fire. ( 75} 
P('The people on the Keiskamrna, (Le~ those in Siwani's, Kama's and 
Pha to 1 s 1 oca ti ons) wh".e°?e prophecy had abounded s i nee the previous 
summer, were the first to kill any cattle in response to 
Mhl akaza 1s appeals. ( 76) For them more than anyone else 
Mhlakaza 1s communication of Nongqawuse's visions was nothing more 
than a more sophisticated and authoritative version of what they 
--...... ----had al re:idy heard for nearly a year~ (77) 
The earliest reaction from chiefs came in tlie form of strident 
opposition to the movement by the collaborating chiefs Siwani and 
Kama who forbade any cattle killing (78). However even chiefs who 
subsequently beca~ the most ardent supporters of the roovement 
were sceptical at first. Mhalla reportedly sent to Phato saying: 
11 He has already accepted a magistrate and that he did 
not think any notice ought ·to be taken of Kreli 1 s 
messages. 11 ( 79) 
The spread of the movement was not dependent on chiefly sanction. 
On the contrary, 11 the Gaikas and Umhaila 1 s people, in cornpl iance 
with llmh 1 ak aza ,·s orders, are fast k i'il i.r1~ their cattle 11 despite 
the vacillation and even opposition of ch~efs such as Sandille, 
Oba and Anta. (80) Gawler asked a so;i of Mr.alla known as 1Smith 1 
if Mhalla was going to kili his catt.i°., ~md received the reply, 
"Oh, go near the Bashee, they a::: kn 1 'L1g pi enty. but the news is 
not strong enough for us to kiii ,_,ur:;.;' (31) Ctllers adopted a 
pragnat~c attitude to the prophecies, 11."ny Fc1ther and mother are 
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dead and I shall wait until I see them among the Russians before I 
kill my ca ttl e ..• 11 { 82) 
The first reports received by Maclean of Mh1akaza 1 s prophecies 
arrived early in July 1856. (83) His informers told him that the 
prophet Mhlakaza had ~ niece Nongqawuse who was the medium for 
communicating with representatives of a 'New People 1 who included 
all the great Xhosa chiefs and doctors of the past, expecia11y 
naming Mlanjeni, Ngqika and Hintsa, who would arise and destroy 
the whites. Before this could happen the Xhosa had to sacrifice 
all their cattle and thrOH away all bewitching matter. 
Nongqawuse also told that those who died from snake bites and 
drowning will not again be restored to life - but those who die by 
the gun or assegaai will rise again from the dead. {84) 
Sarhil i sent messengers to all the chiefs officially informing 
them of what was going on at Mhlakaza's kraal. These messengers 
were around at least from the ls t of July. The message they 
brought was reported 1 ike this: 
11 Strong people ••• forefathers of the Kaffir Chiefs 
and also nany of th€ common people who died in 
former times these people will assist the 
Ka ff i rs in dr iv in g a 11 the wh i te s out of the 1 an d, 
the cattle at present possessed by tlie Ka ffirs are 
bewitched and they must s.acrifice them for others 
Wiich will be obtained from this New People ••• 11 
( 85) 
It is important to note that the affliction of the cattle with 
lung-sickness (bewitching) was directly linked in the prophecies 
with the motivation to sacrifice t.1em. 
In response to Sarhili 's messages Sandille reportedly replied that 
Ml anjen i had ma i:E promises s imi 1 ar to Mh lak aza and had brought on 
a war of ·l'k!i ch they had now had enough. ( 86) Soga claimed that 
the Thembu chief Joyi and the Bomvana chief Moni sent to Sarhil i a 
terse message cc:nC"?.rrming Mhl akaza 's prophecies: 
11 Catt1 e ar-~ t.'1e race; they being dead, the race 
di es. lt (en 
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Initially Phato was the only chief who openly supported the 
movement and this is consistent with the attitude he had been 
adopting for months previously~ He sent a messenger to all chiefs 
urging them to support the action~ For Kama, his alienated 
half-brother, he sent a special message that he should give up his 
charms and bewitching matter (as the prophets required) "which has 
been the means of making you a Great Chief though not the son of 
the Great Wife 11 To which Kama replied that "a copy of the 
Bible was the only charm he could send. 11 ( 88) Among Pha to 's 
peop1e a great many cattle were killed in July and many people 
disposed of charms that they had kept~ 
Throughout July, ordinary households sent emissaries to Mhlakaza's 
kraal to enquire the news, and the movement spread rapidly. The 
wave of cattle-killing quickened especially in Ndlarrbe territory 
despite magisterial assurances that 11 the prophet has excited 
1 i ttl e or no interest here •• ~ 11 ( 89) This mis information was the 
result of a closing u~ of sources of information on what was 
occurring. The supporters of Mh l ak aza were beginning to attempt 
not to associate or fraternise with those who did not believe. (90) 
With the great extent of mass involvement the ability of chiefs to 
oppose it decreased. Mhalla, 
respond to the popular rrood. 
Maqoma and Phato were first :.0 
When Sarhil i wished to encourage 
Ngqika support for the movement he sent 3 oxen to Maqorna wi t'i an 
injunction to "purify himself"~ (91) This overt support for 
Maqoml demonstrated Sarh i1 i 1 s hostility to San dil 1 e. 
Phato, who for rrnnths had denied any political involvement with 
the various prophets that had been around, first broke the ice and 
openly stated his feelings:· 
"In other wars he was rich, and had reason for 
rsma foing :;t peace, but now being poor he wishes 
for a change."( 92) 
As t~ e r:io v ::men. t became more wides pr ea d so its po 1 i ti ca 1 character 
as a mov~me~t of ~esis:ance developed. Cattle were being killed 
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and ownership o.f cattle was the foundation stone on which all 
socia1 relations in Xhosa society were bui1 t. It was inevitable 
that the destruction of the cattle should reveal the cleavages 
between t~e various groupings around the different chiefs. 
Within every chiefdom the same conflict emerged. Every chiefdom 
becanx= internally split between those \vho supported Sarhil i and 
Mh1 akaza and those who rejected both~ Where the chief was against 
the roovement, powerful heads of homesteads sp1 it the chiefdom, 
virtually becoming chiefs themselves on the basis of their support 
for Sarhil i. Where the chief supported the roovement, sorre arose 
to oppose him. 
Here we have to observe an important distinction. Where a 
council 1 or or homestead head opposed the chief in supporting the 
movement, he drew the masses witl1 him and left the chief 
isolated. Here we find the young councillors and heads of 
homesteads rrost vigor 1Jus in their support of the roovement. The 
impoverished young men were the ones most directly involved in 
supporting Sarhil i. Where . counci11 ors opposed the chief by 
opposing the movement it was usually his oldest councillors, those 
with ITOst power and wealth and usually sorre of the chief 1 s sons 
w+io 1 ed the dissent. 
•· 
The distinction which we shall try to demonstrate is crucial to 
understanding the cattle-killing as a mass action of the poorest, 
rrost impoverished and desperate strata of the Xhosa chiefdoms. 
The young married men with a fEW cattle placed in their hands by 
an o1 der head of homestead or by the chief; the head of a small 
homestead with no room to expand on the hard and unfertile ground . 
to which they were now confined; these were the type of men who 
led and responded most enthusiastically to ~he movement. 
By early August Bro.omlee reported :n::~: Mh1akaza's influence had 
spread 11with astonishing rapidity''. (93) In late August Mhlakaza 
claimed that large numbers of th?. ':-iev-1 ?~opie 1 were gathering at 
the mouth of the Kwel era i<iver. Tt-;·:s a:1~lc1Jnc:Pment spurred another 
wave of killing. Gawler significant1y 0i".:serv"~li: 
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11
Within the last few days the lower orders in this 
District have taken to cattle killing .•• I am not 
aware of any influential person having ,Yet 
commenced i t ... 11 ( 94) (emphasis added~) 
Brownlee noticed that many 11 indigent adherents of heads of kraals" 
had killed their stock or quit their residence at the kraal thus 
breaking up relationships of economic dependency and rendering 
them free to lend political support where they wished. (95) 
After this enthusiastic 
September and Q:tober. 
beginning the movement 
The cause of th is ebb 
subsided in 
was in tlie 
vacillation exhibited by Sarhi1i himse1L Sarhili reportedly sent 
a rn:ssage to Mhlakaza 11 intimating that should the cattle not be 
forthcoming he would hear of something to his disadvantage. 11 { 96) 
Mhlakaza, taken aback by the threatened 1 oss of patronage replied 
that: 
11 he had not corrunan Q: d them either to k il 1 or t.o 
waste - as a proof po in ting to his OYm cattle and 
corn wit ich were thriving and abun cant - but had 
merely related to them the visions of tlie girl as 
reported to him ... doubts have been raised as to 
the truth of the witchdoctors' premises and the 
slaughter of cattle has therefore ceased and no 
hi des have of late been brought into King Will iarn 1s 
Town. 11 { 97) 
The withdrawal on Sarhil i's part in fact marks the point from 
\oklich the movement developed from a 1arge1y spontaneous mass 
rrovernent, to a rrovement more closely .:ontrolled by those chiefs 
who supported it. It therefore oiiso 1;;c.rked the beginning of a 
period of intense strugg1 e between ~:hos.:; \"iho ~;pposed the movement 
and those who supported it. Those ;.f.'.o c;.;pcsed tlieir chiefs in 
supporting the roovemen t cou1 d :; u~'::iv-e w; :h th-:;; active support for 
their position by more powerful chi-~f,~. 1"h~se who opposed their 
chiefs in opposing the irovemer.t ~:2.d ::0 r-s!y ori support from the 
Colonial State and the collabor-:lti:;:~ :tdefs. Hence the polarity 
between tJ1e two parties was 
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The first rea1 obstacle to the further progress of the movement 
\ 
was the opposition of San di l1 e. This opposition was 1 argel y 
predictable. A mass movement initiated by Sarhili was an overt 
threat to the position of Sandille~ His opposition was supported 
by t'ie evident vacillation on the part of Sarhil i himself. 
Sandille was at first influenced by his own desire to do nothing 
that would weaken his position in regard to Maqoma, Mhalla or any 
other neighbouring chief. He was also influenced by Bro.Yn1ee who 
kept up a virtually continuous presence at Sandille's Great 
Place. Bra.vnlee's excursions also took him to Sandille 1s brother 
Anta and his nephew, the young chief Oba. All of these important 
Ngqika chiefs remained opposed to Sarhi1 i, with the support of the 
older homestead heads and Brownlee~ 
Brcwnlee held a ~eting with Sandille and some influential 
councillors opposed to the movement on the 5th August 1856. He 
managed to organise a strong group of council i ors in opposition to 
Mhl akaza who arranged privately among themselves that five or six 
of them would remain constantly with San dill e to prevent him being 
influenced by anyone else. (98) The key concillors opposing the 
movement were Tyala, Neku, Nxokwana, Soga, Mxamisa, Kemhle and 
J aka la. ( 99 ) 
The result of their continuous presence at Sandi11e's homestead 
was to drive away his brother Dandas and the council i ors Ml unguzu, 
Baba and Tshaigweni. To encourage this splitting of the tribe 
into powerfully opposed factions, Maclean obtained Grey's sanction 
for chiefs to retain cattle con fi seated as fines from ho~s tea ds 
~ich disobeyed a chief 1 s instructions and kii1ed cattle or 
c:Esisted from cultivation. Sandille imposed a fine of ten head of 
catr.ie on Tshongweni for this reason. (100) It is not clear if 
furtl:er u'Se was iiE.de of this provision but it seems doubtful as 
i ':s cnl y e f f-sct was further to underscore the di ff err.-:nt ·;Joi i ti cal 
att;i t.:..ides t1wards -t'ie Colonial State between cpponr:nt.s and 
st.q.:por::.ers of the movement. 
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By the end of August Brownlee felt confident that: 
11
the crisis may now be past .. ~ few of them having 
killed more than two or three head of cattle, while 
the body of the people have preserved a11 their 
corn and catt1e 11 ••• (101} 
Although there was practically no further killing of cattle during 
September, attention shifted to the question of cultivation. 
As with the killing of his cattle San dill e cultivated only to a 
small extent, but showed a desire not to commit himself too far 
either to one faction or the other~ (102) In a similar way to the 
spread of the cattle-killing, the move to desist from cultivation 
in the 1856/57 season spread first among the masses before the 
chiefs took any stand 'on the issue: The mechanism of its 
operation was certainly effective: 
11 It is generally believed and extensively reported 
that in consequence of unbelief, Bul ungwa has been 
cursed and that the sexual parts of a woman have 
appeared upon him. 11 (103) 
It was also widely reported that those who attempted to cultivate 
would be fixed to the ground and unable again to leave their 
work. {104} 
Sandi1le 1 s reluctance to support Sarhili was matched only by his 
reluctance to support those of his councillors who actively 
opposed the movement. In September and October he officially 
opposed the killing of .cattle. But for a chief it was not what 
you did officially but ha.-J 111.lCh your actions were supported by the 
homestead heads t~at mattered. In truth the majority of the 
peop1 e were being i :1 f1 uence d by Sarhi1 i whose direct appea 1 to 
them over the head of Sandi11 e was irresistible. 
If Sarhili coulc net find active support from Sandille he could 
find it on tilt:~ coas: from Phato and Mhalla. In late Septerroer 
Sarhi1 i sent a brotherly ;;1essa.ge to Mha11a urging him to destroy 
his cattl~ and :~ra:;:. {1::)5) The ferment in Ndlambe was perhaps 
greater than e1 :::C\-'!'he:e. !•lh.ad 1a 1 s sons were divided - the rros t 
J'unior su:::rnor:::.~(j t:1i:: ;;1ov2rnen': ,::rid the more senior opposing it. I,- <.1 
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The exception was Siwani * who was the first reported emissary Miom 
Mhalla sent to Mhlakaza to investigate the prophecies. Siwani 
reported that he and Sarhil i had gone to Mhl akaza and had been 
sh0n1n certain 'shadows 1 which were taken as confirmation of the 
prophecies. When the news was relayed at Mha11a 's Great Place it. 
was reported that: 
11
they consider Umhlakaza 's talk truthful and more 
acceptable than what they are told by the 
missionaries and not at all so incredible as sorre 
parts of the Gospel~ 11 ( 106) 
Mhal1a
1
s eagerness to go along with Sarhili could well have been 
prompted by the threat perceived from San dil 1 e. There were 
reports that Mhlakaza had visited Phato, which could account for 
the increased interest that was soon to be seen there and in 
Ndlambe territory. (107). 
By October the alliance between Mhalla and Sarhili had been 
cemented. In future all communications by Sarhi1i to the Ciskeian 
chiefs were to go through Mha11 a~ (108) On the 4th October 1856 
Mhalla had issued definite orders prohibiting cultivation and 
backed this up with a threat to "eat-up 11 any who disobeyed. (109) 
This was a second turning point in the political develop;;;.ent of 
the rovement. Mha11a was t'ie first chief to t1row down the 
gauntlet to his people, challenging them to support the 
ch iefta incy or <Esert it for an unknown fate at the hands of the 
Co 1 on i a 1 reg i rre • 
The tempestuous reaction of Gawler to Mha11a's initiatives 
elicited· a response true to tlie sp'lrit of t1eir relationship. 
Mhalla reportedly renarke<i, ''if he makes a rOH about it 
(non-cultivation J.L. ), we can but go and pick away at the hills, 
* Not to be confused with the collaborati:-ig Mdushane chief 
Siwani \vho was opposed to the movement~ 
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, 
but there is no reason we should put any seed in ::: 11 (110): The 
tendency for Mha11a to rely on his younger and lesser known sons 
became more marked. He sent Tshatshu and a nephew of his Goqosh 
to the Qumbe river ioouth to see the '1New Peop1 e'. They reported 
that the people had been sighted: As a result of this report 
Tshatshu was 
11
more in his father's confidence than any of the 
others." (111) This report led to many reports of sightings of 
detachments of 1 New People 1 at the mouths of rivers. 
The reliance of fvtla 11 a on his younger sons was in directly an 
appeal to a 11 the younger men to support the chief and the 
movement. It had the inevi tab 1 e consequence of alienating 
estab1 ished homestead heads with large fo11 owings. Some 
v.tiat was happening is given in a report by Gawl er: 
''Umhalla now ctisl ikes his al d councillors as they 
are opposed to Umhlakaza 1 s movement, but he is 
surrounc:Ed by a number of young second - rate 
cotDlclllors arrt>itious of distinction and ready to 
take their chance in forwarding any of the current 
nonsense.0 (112) 
idea of 




who gave orders to his followers to cultivate. In the face 
of Unc0.i 1 s intransigence Mhalla sent him a message: 
11 Show new, whom you are for, the Government or me. 
I don t care for the Governrnen t : : . 11 
To iM1 i ch ' Un da i 1 rep l i e d: 
"What river cb you intend crossing now? 
You were once near Grahams Town~" (113) 
These brief g1 ir.mses into the nature of the polarisation tliat was 
occurring indic,~:e clearly that it was following the main lines of 
struggle inhereflt h the lineage If.Ode of production in the Xhosa 
social forT:a ti ch, especially the .splitting of chiefdoms on a 
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Mha1la relayed the messages he received from Sarhil i and the 
results of his ONn investigations to all the chiefs except Kama, 
Si wan i and Toi se who, with the Mf engu, 't1ere purposefully 
excluded. Messengers arrived at Sandille's Place from Mha1la in 
early October with word from Sarh il i to proceed with the 
cattle-killing. On the 17th O:tober, all the chiefs sent 
representatives to hear the news at Sandille's Great Place. The 
rep1 ies of the chiefs came in an overwhe1 ming vote of confidence 
for Sarhili which left Sandille quite isolated. 
Phato's replay to Sarhili's ITEssage reveals how acutely he 
perceived the situation at _the time: 
"This is the second year that I have not ploughed; 
the 1 ung sickness destroyed most of my cattle. 
Sometime since I saw some people from Krel i's 
country, they informed !TE that some New People had 
arrived in Krel i's country, and they ordered the 
destruction of the cattle, I therefore killed those 
cattle which had been left over by the lung 
sickness. MY people are no.iJ in want, they are 
dispersing into the Colony, and among other 
tribes. Disappointment and shame came over me, 
that I should receive no formal _announcement from 
Kreli, but today I thank for his word~ Though I am 
but a side shoot, I am a great Chief, and have many 
people. Krel i is our Great Chief and we 1 ook for 
his word. 11 (114) (emphasis added) 
The crucial point is of course the explicit acknowledgement of 
Sa.rhili (Kreli) as supreme chief. The sentiment was echoed by 
MaqoiM in his response: 
'Krei i is the Paramount Chief . ~ ~ his orders wou1 d 
not be disobeyed, his people had already kil1e'2 
their cattle, their corn was exhausted_, and they 
were s:.iffering from hunger, and they now "!od~ed t.: 
~Cre"l i fer support ... " ( 115) 
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Maqoma also now revealed quite clearly that for him 
cattle-killing was a political action. He stated in an 
meeting that: 
"their not sowing had reference to the land question, 
that neither his.people nor himself would again srM 
in the country which they now occupy. Nor would 
they 1 is ten to anything the Government had to say 
as long as they were 1 iving here 11 (116) 
the 
open 
The effect of Sarhili 's communications with Mha11a was to bring 
all the important chiefs and councillors into alliance with him. 
It was inconceivable that Sandille could hold out against this 
trend of opinion. That Sarhi1 i did not trust Sandi11e is sho,•m by 
his anger at Brownlee 's presence during the meeting at Sandille 's 
Place on October 17th, thus rreking known to the Govermrent 
Sarhili 1 s appeal for support for the killing. He sent to Sandille 
saying that he suspected that it was because "they received a 
certain s·um of money each from the Government \'f.1i ch they did not 
wish to forfeit" that they had let Brownlee attend. (117) 
The effect of Brownlee 1s presence at the October meeting made 
Sarhil i feel ct> 1 i ged to send a 1 etter to the Governor via Maclean, 
informing him officially of the "thing \lkiich speaks in my country 11 
ordering him to inaugurate the cattl e-kil 1 ing throughout Xhosa 
land. ( 118) 
Sandille's councillors opposed to the movement had of their GWn 
accord cultivated the 'fklole of the gardens of Su tu, Sandille 's 
mther, as well as those of his Great Wife. S-3ndille refused to 
enclose these gardens and forced them to stop cu1 tiva ting on his 
behalf. These council 1 ors were forced to 1 eave San di 11 e's kraal. 
(119} Brownlee observed: 
"The Unhlakaza party is now ciombant .•• yet I feel 
confident that no aggressive :;;ove is contemplated, 
the people are 1 ed en b·y a strc.nge f nf.s.t:1ation, in 
the midst of t1eir rui;1, t;:..tey are hcppy and 
contented and in the confi d::;nc2 ::f t~e fo1 fi1rr..ent 
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• 
of their expectati ans, they no 1 anger made a secret 
of what was at first so carefully concealed from us 
II ( 120) 
Despite the departure of Sandille's 'unbelieving' councillors from 
his Great Place, he still felt so constrained as to kill his 
cattle only at night. Nevertheless his brother Dundas had 
returned to his homestead and was supporting his moves to kill his 
ca tt 1 ~ • (1 21 ) 
Many people were at this time sending their cattle to. Toise, Kama 
and Thembu locations where killing (_so they thought) was not 
undertaken. However, in these areas things were not going 
smoothly for the collaborating chiefs who actively supported the 
Colonial State. In Kama's location those of his senior homestead 
heads who owed allegiance to Phato quickly rebelled against the 
ineffectual Kama: 
11 Some of the people, especially those nearest Fort 
Hare, received Kama very coldly and some seemed 
desirous to avoid speaking to him at all . 11 (122) 
Kama seems to have been almost who11y cut off from his people and 
his district. The main homestead heads supporting Phato and 
Sarhi1i in Kama's location were Mate, Hashe and Cabana. These men 
virtually cut Kama off from any influence in the location and the 
area had one of the highest rates of cattle-killing. 
Siwani similarly battled to retain any semb.1ance of a hold over 
his section of tile Mdushane. The majority of the homesteads 
favoured his charismatic brother Seyolo. As he was in prison for 
his part in the 1850 war, the majority now clung to his son 
Bangai. Bangai considered himself a legitimate chief of the 
Mdushane and was determined to isolate Siwani (123). In 
desperation Siwani assembled as many peoo1 = ~s he could, inspanned 
his oxen and ploughed his fields, say~;1g ".:hat he did so before 
their eyes to show that he did nc1, tie1i::ve and that he did not 
become fixed to the ground. ( 124} 
361 
It was Reeve, in Kama's location, who first observed anot1er 
important feature of the movement - tnat it was the woTJEn, the 
young married and the elderly senior women and widows alike, who 
were amongst the roost enthusiastic supporters of the prophet. 
Reeve reported: 
11
that fear of the prophet was the principal excuse 
against planting. This is principally felt by the 
women ••. 11 {125) 
This cbservation was to be repeated many times over, revealing 
quite clearly hew the cattle-killing movement was acting as a 
great retort for a11 the contradictions of the Xhosa social 
formation, producing as its residue conflicts which touched the 
most basic relationships previously shie1 ded from conflict by 
conventional forms. 
' WoTJEn everywhere 1 ived for a few roonths in the hope of seeing 
their deceased husbands or fathers and of being +:reed from 
unsatisfactory marriages and labour: Mac1 ean recognised the 1 ink 
between the position of women in the Xhosa 1 ineage rrode of 
production and their role in spreading the prophecy: 
11There are no daub t many who believe in the 
predi cti ens of the prophet and the WO!iEn (the 
cu1 tiva tors of the soil ) are more especia11 y 
carried away by them II ( 126) ... 
Mia11a 's battle with the homestead head Uridai intensified and it 
was reporte d1 y Un ca i ',s senior wife who, a 1 armed at her husband 1 s 
disobedience to ~al la, ran away. Undai, reported Gawler: 
"undaunted works in the garden himse1 f with his 
ch il dr en 11 ( 12 7) 
The question of whether or not to cultivate in the 1856-57 season 
became a crucial stepping stone :n the attempt to unite the people 
behind the chiefs and Sarhii i. One of the ma 'in t1reats facing men 
who continued with cultivation and 7"2fus2d :o kill any cattle was 




s location this had occurred very widely. Kama •s son 
Samuel a11owed his wives not to cultivate for fear they would 
1 eave him~ Elsewhere in Siwani 1 s 1 oca ti on there were reports of 
nen forcing their wives to work in the fields at gun point. (129) 
Later, 'lklen the Ndlambe chief Tyali* refused to yield and 
slaughter his cattle, his father Mqhayi 1s wives came to his kraal 
"and cried and howled and tried to make Tyal i slaughter his 
ca ttl e
11
• (130) ·Ty al i remained resolute and refused. 
The young Chief Oba who with his uncle Anta had not supported 
Sarhili was virtJ.Jaily forced into it by his rrother who proclaimed 
that he was denying her the opportunity to be reunited with her 
husband Tyal i. (131) 
By the end of 1856 al 1 the major chiefdoms where the chief did not 
actively support the movement had been divided into dis tin ct 
factions involved in an internal power struggle. This struggle 
emanating from Kama 1s and Siwani 1s locations affected alsa those 
chiefs who .s!!_£ support the movement who had also to cope wit'1 
their own dissenting minorities: 
The trend in the forrration of these groups was clear. Mate in 
Kama's location was a young son of Phato and. Bangai in Siwani 's 
locations rrust ha1v1e been extremely young indeed - in his early 
twenties at most - as his father Seyolo was only i.n his early 
forties. Conversely, those most opposed to the movement were the 
old established homestead heads, Undai, Tyala, and their cohorts. 
The ma in supporters and opponents of the movement were therefore 
grouped along the main lines of class struggle in the Xhosa 
lineage rrode of production that is between opposing 
generations. As Brownlee observed: 
11
The Devel oµnen t of Kril i's pl ans does not seem to 
meet with great favour from the ol der more 
in f1 uen ti a 1 po r ti on of h is tr i b e • ~ : " ( 1 3 2 ) 
* (The son of Mqayi the minority Ndlambe chief and therefore a 
fanaticai 1.unoe·11everi, being one who had nothing to gain by 
supporting who had after all deprived his father of the 
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It was of added significance that the women, who were closely 
involved with the causes of the intergenerational struggle, also 
supported the movement most vociferously in those areas where the 
chiefs opposed it. Whatever the u1 timate motivations of the 
chiefs and the people (and these are to some extent separate 
questions) it seems clear that the way the movement spread, and 
was implemented by young men and women and the heads of small 
homesteads, supports our earlier theoreti ca 1 assessment of the 
inner nature of the dynamics of the Xhosa 1 ineage mode of 
production • (133 ) 
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G:H~ 8/31 ~ Vigne to Maclean, 1st February 1857: 
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See Chapter I above: 
This refers principally to the crucial interaction between 
control over women and cattle and the struggle to establish 
homesteads. 
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